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Abstract
Inter-ethnic conflicts have been mainly addressed at a geo-political and economic
level in the literature of international relations, often neglecting the human factor,
both as a negotiating agent (in terms of political leaders/negotiators), and as the
target-people affected by the proposed solutions. This thesis has focused on the
psychological processes taking place at a group level between conflicting sides. In
particular, it examined the role of political and social trust and that of inter-group
emotions in conflict resolution amongst young Greek Cypriots.
The thesis employed a multi-methodological approach to study the correlates of social
and political trust and its consequences for conflict resolution. Study 1 involved the
administration of questionnaires to 280 Greek Cypriot students. Its main findings
were that young people's trust levels and also Understanding of trust is target specific,
based not only on the in-group/out-group status of these targets but also on their
political/social character and their particular relationship with the Greek Cypriot
people. Concerning the correlates of trust, both in-group/out-group social and in-
group/out-group political trust were related differentially to different identifications,
demographics and political interest, knowledge and ideology. Furthermore it was
found that, compared to out-group/in-group political trust, out-group/in-group social
trust appeared to be more relevant to attitudes toward reconciliation.
Study 2 involved semi-structured interviews with 20 Greek Cypriot students, which
were analysed using content and thematic analysis. Its findings were, first, that
different inter-group emotions are related to different cognitive and emotional inter-
group evaluations and, second, that inter-group social trust and political trust are
based both on cognitive evaluations (the differences/commonalities of the in-group
with the out-group, the history of the relationship, the existence of in-group/out-group
bias, the familiarity/proximity of the two groups, power relations, procedural trust and
general distrust) and evaluations of the out-group's and the in-group's emotions (fear,
hate, anger).
Study 3 involved administering questionnaires to 354 Greek Cypriot students.
Drawing on the results of the previous two studies, its findings were, first, that
11
Fisher's "Eclectic" model (1990, 2000) and Kelman's (1978, 2005) trust and
acceptance prerequisites help explaining willingness to reconcile and accept different
solutions to the conflict, second, that inter-group social trust and distinct inter-group
emotions have an important role in the psychological processes of conflict resolution
and, third, that young people's choices of solutions to the conflict differ in terms of
feasibility and preference (Inbar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1989).
Overall the findings of this thesis suggest, first, that inter-group social trust has a
distinct role in conflict resolution attitudes to inter-group political trust, second, that
the role of emotions in inter-group conflict should not be disregarded as they appear
to explain both inter-group trust levels and the choice of specific solutions to the
conflict and, third, that Fisher's "Eclectic" model (1990, 2000) could be considered a
de-escalation model with some adaptations.
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"Some day it will dawn/or us too"
Now that I am facing life again, now that I study it from the start
Twpa1tou ~piaKOllat ~avu ll1tpOaTUa1tO tTJ~roil, rropc nou tTJlleAeTuro a1t6 rrtv apxil
Now that things are not easy anymore and Iam no longer a child,
Twpa 1tOUru eUKOAa1tepaaav Kat beY eill<l1.ma1tal.bi
Now my parents' words come into shape;
Twpa ro A6y1.(lrev Y0VtWV1l0U1taipvouv 1l0p<pTJ.
Igrew up in a country half occupied, and since Iwas one year old I've been hearing
that "the Turks are bad"
MeyuAroaa as Ilia xwpa IltcrTJU1t6 KaToxil Kat a1tO evo~ xpovwv aKouro, «01 TOUPKOl.
eivm xoxot»
Igrew up reading the history of this people
lleyuAroaa 8ta~U~ovTa~ mv tcroptc aUTou TOUAaou
And Ididn't find any clarifications, only lies everywhere
Kat 8taAeUKavall 8e ~pilKa 1l0VO'Vella 1taVTOU
Ifeel a burden when Ilook over the balcony
Vl.Werotva ~upo~ 61tOTeKOtTU~roa1t6 TOll1taAKOVt
The pseudo state's flag on the Pentadachtylos Mountain gives me the finger
o 1tevTa8uKruAo~ us "C1l allllaia TOU'VeuOOKpUTOU~ue 1l0UVT~WVet
Words get less and less, nobody in this country knows the events, the real events
AtyoaTeUouv 'ta Aoyta,K avei<; as autij "C1l xwpa Ssv ~tpet re yeyovo'ta, 'ta 1tpaYllanKu
yeyovoTa
No explanations from anyone and nowhere, only dead people and spilled blood
blemish my heart
e~llyiJaet~ Ssv U1tUPXOUVa1tO xavsvc Kat 1tOueevu 1l0VO vexpoi, ailla XUlltvo uou
allaupwvouv rnv Kap01U
The culprits draw the curtains on us
O1u1teu9uvol. u1tainot Ila~ KAeivouv n~ xouprtvs;
There's nothing to see, now we fill the attendance sheet
on eioaTe eioa"Ce"Cwpa7taipvOUlle a1toucrie~
Igrew up with questions and puzzlement
lleyuAroaa Ilel eprotTJllanKu Kat a1topie~
At school we are taught with false stories, what happened in '63 and what happened
in '74
oro axoAeio ce 8tbuaKouv J.Le avaA.llesi~ ioroptsc, n eytve TO63 Kat n 1:074
XVll
Why we used to live with the Turks and at the end we got frustrated with them
Kat ytati f.1E1:0U~'tOUpKOUe;~oUO'af.1EKa1. oro ttAoe; ayava1('touO'af.1E;
Politicians are hiding behind their finger
1tOA1.nKOivc KpU~OVra1.mO'IDa1to 'to Oa1('tl)AOroix
Undoubtedly, slaughters happen every time in presidential elections
a01.af.1<ptO'~~'tTltaO'<paye<;O'EKaeE 1tpOeOptKee;
None of them will set his ego aside
Kaveie; cero auroue; oeY ea 1tpoO'~aAct 'to. eyoo rou
That's why we have to wake up, people
y1.' auto 1tpS1tEtvc ~U~O'OUf.1E Aat.
2007 and who's to stand this transmutation
2007 Kat 1tOtOe;vc avte~et 'tTl f.1etaMa~l1,
The result is a sudden u-turn of the country
at<pviota f.1era~OA~ rou tozou 11KataA11~l1,
I am looking for the answer with my little soul
eym us f.1ta 'l'U;o1 f.1tKPitYUPSUID'tllv a1tav'tTlO'l1,
For years now I've been trying to find a destination for my heart
- 1tOUxpovta 'toopa a1toO'1ta~a vc ~PID Kap01.ae; 'tTlv a<p1.~l1,
But I found another way to get away from this situation
f.1a ~pitKa o.Uo rpo1to vc ~e<puyO)a1tO 'tllv Ka'to.O''taO'l1,
To get off the train of their abandonment
vu ~yO) a1to to ~ayoV1. 'tlle; 01.KTte;rou; eYKataAct\jl11e;,
They left the rails bloody to be remembered
a<pitO'av f.1atIDf.1€vee;ne; payEe; 1tpOe;aVaf.1V1lO'1l,
They opened the doors as if it was a superstition
roix avOt~av n~ 1tOptEe;euv vc rev 1tPOKato.A11\j111,
A bitter path
mKPit zopstc,
Three families think they define history
rpsu; <paf.1tAtec;'toopc a1toeavoV'ta1. xapa~ouv tcropic,
Years and years I get consumed in this monstrosity
xpOV1.U'toopa rpooyof.1at 0" auLit 'tll e11ptO)oeia,
In our new books they have hidden the truth
XVlll
t.X01)VKp{)\jlStTIlVaA.:fjesw.ere KatvOupta Ila~~t~Aia,
Everyone perceives it as an old movie
OAOt'to avnAall~avov'tat oo» Ilta 1taAta rurvio,
Scandalous bias is the essence that is projected
(iKaVoaAroo11~IlEpOA11\j1ia11ouotc 1(01)1tpO~aAAetat,
The South is sinking and the North is promoted highly, they weigh the baits
~\)ei~Etat 0 voro; Kat 0 ~oppo.~ \jI11Ao.1tpoaYEtat, OOAW!lata ~\)Y~01)V,
They will abandon us, at the mercy of the Koran you will march my children
ea Ila~ EYKa'taAei\jlo1)v, oro t.AeO~t01) xopcviou 1tatOta 1l01) ea ~aoi~EtS
I am tired of hiding, my brothers, I am losing my Greek identity,
K01)pa(iTIlKa vc KPU~OIl(l1.,aoepqna aVeSAA11Vt~Ollat,
They roam on the island, I will become a stranger in my home land and I get dizzy
usee oro vnoi aAcovi~o\)VE, ~EvO~IlE~ orov 't01tO 1l01) ea yivco Kat ~aAi~Ollat,
Only when they want me to vote they recognise me.
Ilovaxa orcv et.A01)Vvc \jI11<pi(ico !le yvO)pi~O\)VE,
With Cypriot nationality, I am an explorer of the truth "
ME t9aYEvEta 1C1J1tptaKil,tTl~ aA1l9Eta~ EPE1)VTlt1l~
A free soul that lives in an enslaved land
\jI1)xtlEAeUeEP111(01)~Et (JS Ilta crda~CO!lEV11Y11
Parades of injustice, khaki armies and enlistments
a8tria~ 1tapeAa(iEt~, Xari orpctoi Katata~Et~
Grids, borders and roadblocks, battalions of the right and left wing
1tAeYllata opta oOo<ppo.Yllata, 8E~ta~ Kt apt(JtEfio.~ 'taYllata
We are in between and they are outside in parallel, they put the newborns on tanks
ellsi~EVOta!lEO'aKat curoi 1tapaM11Aa, ~a~o1)v re vEoYEvV11taO'ta ap!lata
When is it going to dawn for us?
l\paYE 1totE ea aVatEtAet yta ella~
We are a small nation in the corner of this planet.
Etunots eva~ IltKpo~ Aao~ crou 1tAavllt11 tTl ycovta
DNA (Cyprus, 2007) Andreas MegaHz
Lyrics of a Greek Cypriot hip-hop song
XIX
Chapter 1: Introduction and Overview of the Thesis
1.1 Introduction
Young people have limited forms of expression for their opinions which can ensure
them a wide audience. The above lyrics come from a hip hop song popular amongst
Greek Cypriot youth which shows both the perception and the effect on them of the
Cyprus issue and its political and social agents. Even though young Greek Cypriots
have never lived in a united Cyprus and they have not personally experienced inter-
communal violence, they appear distressed, experiencing mixed beliefs and emotions
both about the contlict and the conflicting "other" side. Despite their lack of
experience in comparison to older generations, their beliefs and emotions are based on
the same societal and political influences the rest of the population has been exposed
to. Therefore, studying young people's perceptions and attitudes toward conflict
resolution can help us to understand the prevalence and the role of different factors
which have been identified amongst people who have personally experienced conflict
violence as crucial for the development, maintenance and resolution of perpetuated
conflicts, when there is no personal experience either of the onset events of the
conflict or of conflict violence.
However, there are certain factors amongst those identified as crucial, for contlict
resolution, which the literature on conflict resolution has not focused upon. One of
these concepts is trust. Trust is a very wide concept which, despite its extensive use in
everyday language (Markova, 2004), and its consideration by different social sciences
e.g. sociology, psychology, nursing (Hupsey, Penrod, Morse & Mitcham, 2004), has
not yet been analysed in depth in reference to inter-group conflict resolution. Even
though its significance has been identified in conflict research (Fisher, 2000; Kelman,
2005; Hadjipavlou, 2002), neither the phenomenological understanding of the concept
of trust nor the role of different types of trust in the escalation/de-escalation process
have yet been specified. The present thesis addressed these gaps first by exploring
what young people mean when they use this concept in relation to other often
overlapping concepts such as "legitimacy" or "support" (Easton, 1975; Gamson, 1968;
Weatherford, 1992), and, second, by exploring the relationship of trust with different
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social psychological factors as its possible antecedents and also with willingness to
reconcile or accept different types of solutions as its possible outcomes.
Apart from trust, emotions have also received limited attention in relation to conflict
resolution. The effect of individual or group emotions has only recently started being
considered and explored but it remains under-represented in psychological studies in
reference to inter-group conflict (Fisher, 2000; Crawford, 2000; Iyer & Leach, 200&).
The present thesis recognised the importance of inter-group emotions in inter-group
relations (Parkinson, Fischer & Manstead, 2005; Iyer & Leach, 200&), and
specifically inter-group conflict, and explored in depth both the link between different
inter-group emotions and different types of trust and the link between emotions and
willingness to reconcile and accept different solutions to conflict. Due to the
confusion in the literature concerning both the definition and the correlates of
different emotions (Crawford, 2000), the present study also explored the relationship
of different emotions with cognitive and emotional factors (e.g. identity, conflict of
needs, history of antagonism etc) as well as with inter-group dynamics, such as
reciprocity, which have been identified as crucial in the conflict resolution context.
In the present thesis the aforementioned factors and their possible correlates (both as
antecedents or outcomes) were first addressed in an exploratory way and then in
reference to an integrative theoretical model of conflict escalation (Fisher, 1990,
2000). This model was chosen, first, because it included most of the concepts of
interest to the present thesis, second, because it was built upon Fisher's experience of
the Cyprus conflict, and, third, because it specified the relationships of the factors
considered. However, it remained, on the one hand, a theoretical model of conflict
escalation which had not been empirically tested before and, on the other hand, a very
complex model which involved numerous factors (sometimes with very abstract
definitions) which were very hard to conceptualise or operationalise. In particular,
concerning the concepts of interest to the present thesis, neither the type of trust was
originally specified nor the relationship of emotions with the rest of the factors since
emotions were only added by Fisher in a later version of the model (2000).
Furthermore, in terms of the outcomes of the model, contlict escalation was the
originally specified outcome while alternative outcomes/solutions were not
considered. The present study took into consideration these characteristics of the
2
model and addressed them by exploring only the part of the original model which
described the relationship of trust and emotions with possible antecedents and
outcomes and by using an alternative conflict outcome to conflict escalation, i.e.
reconciliation (Kelman, 1978; Burton, 1990; Long & Brecke, 2003; Rouhana, 2004).
Apart from reconciliation as a conflict outcome, it was also considered essential to
study other potential solutions to the Cyprus conflict. Until now, potential solutions
have been researched and introduced mainly at a political level without any
consideration of people's will at grassroots level. This could be attributed to the
difficulty of the diplomatic-international negotiation processes and their decisions on
potential solutions which the public not only cannot access but might also find
difficult to understand or evaluate due to the specialised knowledge required (Barzilai,
Goldberg & Inbar, 1991). However, while people might lack the knowledge to
understand such processes, since they are the target population of these decisions,
they should at least be consulted on these potential We-changing solutions, and the
factors which might affect their opinions should be researched, acknowledged and
also taken into consideration; both of these conditions would facilitate the design of a
solution which not only would be easier to accept by the conflicting groups but would
also be easier to sustain once it has been implemented. The present thesis addressed
this gap in the conflict resolution literature and explored different solutions to the
Cyprus conflict in terms of preference and of feasibility and also the correlates of
those solutions. The two dimensions of preference and feasibility were chosen
following the existing literature (lnbar & Yuchtman- Yaar, 1989; Kelman, 1978)
which emphasises the importance of differentiation between the idealistic solutions
and the solutions which are considered realistically possible in a conflict situation.
The reasons the particular context of the Cyprus conflict was chosen in order to
explore the aforementioned issues were: first, because it constitutes an example of
unresolved protracted inter-ethnic conflict and the only one currently dividing a
member state of the European Union; second, because the failure of the 5th revised
Annan plan in the referendum of April 2004, after a history of failed international
negotiations over the previous 35 years, has been attributed to distrust between the
two adversarial people, and, third, and most importantly, because even though a long
time has passed since the 1974 Turkish invasion and young people do not have any
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direct experience either of the "other" conflicting side or of the conflict violence, the
contlict still persists and has been characterised as having reached a dead-end, since
no hope is seen in the younger generations (Herac1ides, 2008). Although older
generations have experienced both inter-communal peaceful coexistence and then a
violent passage to the current spatial, political, social and psychological
separation/division of the two communities, younger generations have only direct
experience of the latter. It would therefore be very interesting to explore how trust
levels, emotions and attitudes towards different solutions are formed when direct
inter-group experience is missing.
Apart from the aforementioned main reason, there were two more reasons the present
thesis chose to focus particularly on young people: on the one hand, the lack of
previous research on young people in the context of inter-group conflict, even though
young people have been found to play an important role in inter-group conflicts, both
in the Cypriot history (i.e. in the struggle against the British colonialists- see chapter 2)
and in the history of other conflicts (Le. the 1987-1993 Palestinian Intifadah in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict), and, on the other hand, the importance of adolescent
political experience in the prediction of adult political attitudes (Boehnke & Boehnke,
2005). It could not be assumed that young people's attitudes, understanding and
processing of conflict related concepts is similar to that of adults due to their
difference of experience and knowledge, and also due to the small number of studies
looking at social psychological factors amongst young people; there are mainly either
developmental studies which have empirically explored children's and young
people's understanding of certain concepts (like "war" and "peace") related to inter-
group conflict (Alvik, 1968; Kohlberg, 1984; Emler, 2002) or psychological and
sociological studies which have looked at the effects of inter-group violence on
children (Cairns, 1987; Saylor, 1993; Zubenko & Capozzoli, 2002).
There follows a presentation of the eight remaining chapters of the present thesis in
order to give the reader an initial insight into the way the aforementioned issues were
addressed and treated.
4
1.2 Overview of the thesis
Chapter 2: The context of the Cyprus conflict
The second chapter of the thesis presents the context of the Cyprus conflict within
which on the one hand the participants grew up and, on the other hand, the factors
developed which led to the onset, the maintenance of the conflict and to the failure of
the 5th revised Annan plan. Different historical and sociological information on the
Greek Cypriots is presented: first, a summary of the history of the island is provided,
with a particular focus on the era starting with the British colonisation of the island
and ending with the referendum in April 2004, since this period has been critical for
the social memory of the Cypriot people and for the formation of many of the
attitudes found in Greek Cypriot people today. Second, the results of the February-
March 2004 and Spring 2006' Eurobarometers are presented concerning Greek Cypriot
levels of trust in the national and international institutions, as well as their level of
identification with and their opinion of their ED membership, as they give an idea of
adult levels of political trust just before the 2004 referendum, and at the time the first
and second studies of the thesis were conducted. Third, the role of schools in the
Cyprus issue is described since the school constitutes an important social learning
agent for young people and, fourth, in particular, inter-group attitudes and stereotypes
of the two conflicting communities are described through the existing literature.
Chap/er 3: Review ofthe literature on conflict resolution
The third chapter first reviews the concept of conflict and the identified types of inter-
group conflicts in the social psychological, sociological and political literature.
Second, it focuses on Fisher's (1990, 2000) "Eclectic" model of conflict escalation as
the framework within which different factors related to trust, emotions and
reconciliation were studied in the original model and are also being studied in the
present thesis. Third, it reviews the sources and moderators of inter-ethnic conflicts
included in the model, such as incompatibility of needs and fears, religious and ethnic
differences, unilateral group victimisation, inter-group negative emotions and distrust.
Fourth, it discusses different constituent elements of reconciliation and it argues for
the differentiation between attitudes towards reconciliation and attitudes towards a
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specific reconciliation plan (based on the Annan plan for the Cyprus conflict). Fifth, it
emphasises the importance of people's attitudes towards different types of solutions to
inter-group conflicts and, finally, it reviews the factors studied in the conflict
resolution literature specifically in reference to young people. These were considered
in order to enrich the subsequent studies with factors relevant to our sample.
Chapter 4: Trust in the context of conflict resolution
The fourth chapter focuses on the concept of trust and reviews in depth its relevance
for conflict resolution and its conceptualisation in this particular context, in contrast to
the theories of general trust. The prevalent distinction in the literature between
"calculus-based" trust and "identification-based" trust is analysed as well as the gap
concerning the emotional dimension and sources of trust in the context of conflict
resolution. Based on the importance of the target of trust in the conceptualisation of
trust in the literature, the chapter then refocuses on political trust and its specific
conceptualisation. However, concerning both inter-group social and political trust, the
review shows that trust is either conceptualised through other concepts, or
conceptualised as part of other concepts, or confused with other concepts (Gamson,
1968; Easton, 1975; Weatherford, 1992; Craig, 1993; Hornby, 2000). These were all
issues that emerged from the literature review and which the present thesis addressed
with its empirical studies. After the conceptualisation of trust, the chapter reviews
mechanisms and correlates of trust in conflict resolution, such as the history of the
relationship, perceived physical and identity threat, cognitive rigidity, mirror-imaging,
self-fulfilling prophecies, power, identity and cultural differences and demographics.
Finally, the chapter reviews practical methods designed to promote trust in the context
of conflict resolution. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the gaps in the existing
literature on trust and use this knowledge to design the following studies on trust with
reference to young Greek Cypriots and the Cyprus conflict.
Chapter 5: Methodology
In the fifth chapter, the methodology adopted in the present thesis is described and
explained, both in practical and in epistemological terms. The combination of
quantitative and qualitative methods is discussed as part of a multi-methodological
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approach based on a "pragmatist" stance towards research. Finally, endorsing the
assumptions of qualitative research, the role of the researcher's status and identity
groups are discussed in relevance to the design and the conduct of the empirical
studies.
Chapter 6: The concept of social and political trust, their meaning and their
correlates for young Greek Cypriots within the context of conflict resolution in
Cyprus
The sixth chapter describes and discusses the first empirical study of the thesis on the
concept of trust. This study was quantitative and it was conducted on 287 young
Greek Cypriots, all students of private educational institutions in Cyprus. This study
aimed to establish first whether young Greek Cypriot trust levels were target specific,
second, what the phenomenological understanding and meaning of social and political
trust (in relation to the concepts and theories identified in the literature) was and, third,
to explore the relationship of in-group and inter-group social and political trust with
different social psychological factors also identified in the literature (such as religious,
ethnic and national identification, political interest, political ideology etc.). Fourth, the
role of inter-group social and political trust and the other social psychological factors
was explored in relation to willingness to compromise. The results of the study
revealed that in the context of inter-group conflict, young people trust political
institutions and ethnic/national groups involved with the conflict at varying degrees;
based not only on the in-group/out-group status of these targets but also on their
social/political character and the particularities of each target's relationship with
people. Second, the results showed that, based on the above criteria, both the
phenomenological meaning of trust and the correlates of trust depend on the target
being evaluated. Finally, it has been shown that in the process of compromise, inter-
group social trust is more important than inter-group political trust.
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Chapter 7: Living within a federal state with two equal constituent communities;
exploring the factors affecting trust in bi-communal national institutions and the
development of bonds between the two communities
The seventh chapter describes a qualitative study which was conducted at the same
time as the first quantitative one and aimed to explore, on the one hand, the factors
affecting emotions and inter-group social and political trust and, on the other hand,
the ways emotions and inter-group social and political trust affect contlict resolution.
Due to the exploratory nature of this study, a qualitative methodology was considered
the most appropriate 'one. In particular, in order to not only explore inter-group
attitudes and emotions in general, but also to reveal in detail the ways these affect
conflict resolution and reconciliation, the interview schedule was built upon a
fictitious scenario according to which the two communities had found a solution to
the contlict and were now living together peacefully in a unified federal Cyprus.
Participants were then asked to place themselves within this scenario and answer
questions about different aspects of everyday life. Twenty semi-structured interviews
were conducted with young Greek Cypriots and then analysed using content and
thematic analysis. The results of the study revealed that trust attitudes and also
emotions are dependent on the characteristics and the role of the targets evaluated and
also that young people's attitudes to the resolution prospects are the result of complex
processes which involve cognitive evaluations, such as the evaluation of the
differences/commonalities of the in-group with the out-group, the history of the
relationship, the existence of in-group/out-group bias, the familiarity/proximity of the
two groups, power relations, procedural trust and general distrust, and also emotional
evaluations of the inter-group relationship, which are linked with all the
aforementioned cognitive processes.
Chapter 8: Theoretical and applied predictors of attitudes towards specific forms of
conflict resolution
The eighth chapter describes the second quantitative study of the thesis, which was
built upon the results of the first two studies (chapter 6 and 7). This third study
explored three different sets of processes leading to attitudes towards reconciliation,
attitudes towards a reconciliation plan and attitudes towards either preferred solutions
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or solutions considered feasible. The three processes consisted of a theoretical model
(Fisher, 1990, 2000) of conflict resolution which combined factors at different
temporal levels (including cognitive factors, emotions and trust), the prerequisites of
acceptance and the prerequisites of trust, as formulated by Kelman (1978, 2005). The
reason for the selection of these processes was to test three theoretical processes
which, even though they had been based on empirical work, had never been tested
empirically. Through these processes, the concept of trust, different emotions and all
other cognitive factors considered in the present thesis were linked with real life
contlict outcomes, which had never been done as extensively before. The results of
the study confirmed the distinction between inter-group social and political trust and
also between different inter-group negative emotions, both in terms of their correlates
and their outcomes for reconciliation. It was also revealed, however, that emotions
had a smaller explanatory power than inter-group trust and cognitive factors for
willingness to reconcile (either generally or to accept a specific reconciliation plan).
Finally it was shown that young people are able to distinguish between their preferred
solutions and those they consider feasible, a distinction which appeared to depend
mainly on cognitive evaluations.
Chapter 9: General Discussion
Chapter 9 provides a discussion of the main findings of all the empirical studies, an
evaluation of whether the research questions of the thesis are answered and whether
this was achieved in the best possible way. The theoretical and the practical
implications of the findings are also reflected upon as well as the directions for future
research based, on the one hand, on the limitations of the present thesis and, on the
other hand, the development of new and unexplored theoretical and empirical
questions.
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Chapter 2: The Context of the Cyprus conflict
2.1 The history of the island
Cyprus was only granted its independence in the second half of the 20th century, after
a long history of consecutive foreign occupations. Due to the geo-strategic position of
Cyprus, in between three continents, Europe, Africa and Asia, the historical rise of
different empires has led to the domination of the island by each of the powerful
peoples of the region. The Assyrians, the Egyptians, the Persians, the Macedonians,
the Romans, the Byzantines, the French, the Venetians, the Turks and the British have
all conquered the island and imposed their civilisation. Despite these strong cultural
influences, the cultural identity of the island was established in the 13th century BC by
the arrival of the Achaeans and the Mycenaeans, who brought with them the Greek
civilisation, the Greek language and the Greek culture which was to dominate the
island thereafter. Since then, the Greek civilisation has been coexisting with all other
civilisations introduced by the different conquerors. It is mentioned in historical texts
that Phoenician philosophers, like Zenon of Kition, used to speak and write in Greek,
while in later times, Lusignan kings used to speak Greek better than they spoke
French (Panteli, 1990). Christianity was introduced to the island during the first
century AD by the Apostle Paul and the Apostle Barnabas who came originally from
Salamina and was the founder of the Church of Cyprus.
2.1.1 The Ottoman Empire
Cyprus was conquered by the Ottomans and became part of the Ottoman Empire in
1571. This led to the beginning of the Turkish Cypriot minority in Cyprus, consisting
of members of the Turkish army who settled on the island and Christians who
converted to Islam. During the Ottoman rule, a large gap was created between the
higher and lower social and economic classes and as Greek and Greek Cypriot history
argue (Loizos, 1988) a cultural decline also began, with many educated and
progressive people being forced to leave the island and take refuge in other countries,
e.g. Neophytos Rodinos and Archbishop Kyprianos, who lived in Venice tor many
years. During this period of material deprivation and lack of spiritual freedom
(Panteli, 1990; Loizos, 1988), the Orthodox Church became a powerful institution. It
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took advantage of the privileges granted by the Turkish administrators (granted also to
serve the interests of the Ottomans, Kyrris, 1976) to protect and help the Christian
inhabitants of the island, who were left poor and illiterate. In this way, it filled the gap
that the abolition of feudalism had created and became a central institution in the
affairs of the Greek Cypriot community. In 1821, the Greek rising against the
Ottoman Empire led to disturbances against the Ottoman rule in Cyprus as well. In
response to these revolts and conspiracies of Greek Cypriots with Greeks taking part
or heading the Greek revolution in Greece, Archbishop Kyprianos and Meletios, his
Archdeacon, were hanged, and three bishops, many laymen and many more priests,
monks and young and old people were beheaded by the Turkish rulers of the island.
Despite the later disapproval of these killings by the Porte these atrocities remained
deeply rooted in Greek Cypriot memory and reminiscences of them appear in many
later poems and texts. After these events, in the early 1830s, there were more protests
against the administration and the taxation which were perceived as unjust (Panteli,
1990) and; for the first time two of these protests which were led by Greek Cypriots
had strong aspirations for union with Greece. Count Kapodistrias, who had come into
power in 1828 in the newly formed revolutionary Greek state, had immediately
expressed this aspiration of uniting Greece with Cyprus but both movements in
Cyprus were crushed and ended in bloodshed.
However, during this period, the relationship between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
people, at grass roots level, was friendly and peaceful (Loizos, 1988). They were not
polarised in two distinct separate communities since some Turkish Cypriots were
even related to the Christian inhabitants of the island. They were all working together
in a common economy. The only differentiation was in the practice of certain trades,
some of which were exclusively practised by Greek Cypriots and some only by
Turkish Cypriots; cabinet making for instance was exclusively practised by Greek
Cypriots and midwifery and weaving by Turkish Cypriots. Culturally, customs and
traditions were almost common and most of Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek; in some
Turkish schools, Turkish students would even perform Greek patriotic plays (Panteli,
1990), There are many reports also showing Greek and Turkish Cypriots (at that time
characterised as Christians and Moslems) joining in fighting against the government
of the Sultan, protesting and rebelling against its harshness and unfairness (Panteli,
1990) and the Greek leaders, such as in 1783-1784 and 1799 (Kitromilides, 1977).
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2.1.2 British colonisation
The Ottoman rule lasted for three hundred years, until 1878, when the fear of a
Russian attack on the Balkans and the Mediterranean led to a British-Turkish
convention, called The Cyprus Convention according to which Cyprus was annexed
by Britain in exchange for British help in the case of a Russian attack. Due to the
strategic importance of Cyprus, Britain welcomed the opportunity to control the island
in order to complete its project of creating a distant "British Lake", consisting of
Gibraltar in the west, Malta in the centre and Cyprus in the east, allowing the British
Crown to control the entrance to the Suez Canal, the coast of Palestine and Syria and
the southern coasts of Asia Minor. Hence, Britain enjoyed the economic and
commercial advantages that Cyprus offered and Cyprus remained a valuable British
Crown colony for the next eighty two years (Panteli, 1990).
During the first thirty years of British annexation, there were five major issues in the
Cypriot society: first, there were problems with the settlement; the Ottoman rulers left
the country devastated, and there were many issues to be handled by the new British
rulers, including land issues, law and order on the island, the privileges of the upper
classes and the corruption of the office holders, as well as the health, education and
language of the population. The second issue that dominated this era was the Hellenic
Ideal. The idea of creating a Great Greek state encompassing Greek territories that
were under foreign domination (like the Ionian Islands, Cyprus etc.) had persisted for
many centuries and continued to be strongly expressed during these thirty years
through protests, memoranda, deputations etc. As the "Greekness" of Cyprus was
beyond any contest or doubt, the majority of the Turkish Cypriot people supported it
as well. Only very few Turkish Cypriots had started to object to it. The third issue was
the emergence of a new Constitution, its composition and the way power was shared
between the British, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. The "divide and
rule" tactic was then used by the British to create this feeling of separateness and
contlict between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots for the first time, in order to
avoid unison of the two communities against them. The fourth issue was the economic
situation of the island. In the convention between Turkey and Britain it was arranged
that a fixed amount of money would be given annually to Turkey based on Britain's
exploitation of Cyprus. However, this amount of money in combination with natural
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disasters that took place during those years, and the control of the Suez canal already
achieved by the British led to the economic neglect of the island by the British. The
fifth issue finally that raised protests and riots was the disputation of the Church.
Internal conflicts between the candidate Archbishops of the Christian Church led to
conflicts among people who were split into opposing "camps" and fought for the
election of their preferred candidate as the head of the Church.
Due to these "flaming" issues, the situation became increasingly fragile and led to the
first major popular protests between 1914 and 1931, when Cyprus was officially
proclaimed a Crown Colony. The large and increasing economic gap between social
classes, the heavy and unfair taxation (as perceived by Greek Cypriots), and,
politically, the unjust representation and share of power between the Greek, the
Turkish and the British, as well as the increased talks concerning the union of Cyprus
with Greece ("enosis") led to these first popular protests (Panteli, 1990). These initial
protests continued until 1955 when there was finally an outbreak of armed conflict
between the British, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriots
(excluding the Communist members) were fighting for their union with Greece, while
the British were trying to keep "law and order" on the island by arresting and killing
suspects, protesters and initiators of the disturbances. During these armed attacks,
Turkey encouraged the Turkish Cypriot leaders to persuade the Turkish people to join
the British in their effort to suppress Greek Cypriot demands for liberation. While the
major Greek Cypriot party leading the protests EOKA (which was the National
Organisation of Cypriot Fighters, a Greek Cypriot underground nationalist
organisation, Loizos, 1988) had announced that they would not turn against the
Turkish Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot collaboration with the British meant that the Greek
Cypriots were fighting against not only the British but also the Turkish Cypriots. It
was no longer only an anti-colonial fight but also a fight between the two
communities.
At the same time, Rauf Denktash created VOLKAN (a Turkish underground
nationalist organisation) to fight Greek Cypriots and achieve partition of the island.
The lack of shared vision between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
reinforced the mutual fears and mistrust. VOLKAN was succeeded by the TMT
(Turkish Defence or Resistance organisation) which provoked further attacks and
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episodes between the two communities. Trying to put an end to the violence, the
British governors of the island and the commissioners of the British government
started considering the possibility of dichotomising the island, while also submitting
different plans for the government of the island. However, Greece or Turkey rejected
them all on grounds of unfair share of power, except for the Foot-Macmillan
Partnership Plan, which led to the Zurich-London treaties of 1959. This anti-colonial
and inter-community struggle ended in 1959 with the treaties signed in Zurich and
London by Britain, Greece, and Turkey which granted Cyprus its independence
(Cypriot Bureau of Press and Information, 2000). It was finally agreed that Cyprus
would be independent but that the sovereignty of Cyprus would be safeguarded by
Britain, Greece, and Turkey, and that Cyprus could not unite with any of these
countries. A Treaty of Alliance was also signed between Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus
for common defence, for the stationing of Greek and Turkish armies (950 and 650
men respectively) and the training of a Cypriot army. British artillery bases were also
to stay on the island. After three years of exile, Archbishop Makarios (the only person
able to control the Greek Cypriot people during those turbulent years), finally
returned to Cyprus and was elected by 66.82% of the total vote President of the
Republic of Cyprus. According to the Treaty, the Vice-President had to be Turkish
Cypriot so when Makarios became President of Cyprus, Kutchuk became Vice-
President. Political and economic control of British, Greek, and Turkish decisions as
well as a constitution which was unworkable in practice were the first problems to
make this new state fragile right from the beginning. The power share between the
Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots was the most important issue of dispute and
what reinforced suspicions and mistrust (Panteli, 1990).
2.1.3 1960-1974
The difficulty in the new constitution lay first in the fact that previous enemies had
now to work together and take common decisions. Furthermore, each community had
different aspirations concerning the ideal government of the country. The Greek
Cypriots were trying to put into practice a unitary system while the Turkish Cypriots
were perceived as trying to sabotage every decision that would not meet their needs or
would encroach upon their community's rights. It appeared that Cyprus was the first
country in the world where the majority could not rule by its own constitution.
14
Despite the provision of a partnership government, in practice it appeared as if Cyprus
had two different governments, one for the Greek Cypriot majority and one for the
Turkish Cypriot minority of the island, which were put to work together and whose
functions sometimes even overlapped (Panteli, 1990). Issues like the separation of
municipalities, the army, the civil service, and the use of Turkish veto on taxation
yielded serious disagreements between the two parties. These led to further violence,
not only between the two parties but also within each party. Turkish Cypriots who
supported a unitary system, or who had joined Greek Cypriot political parties (i.e.
AKEL the Communist party) were treated as traitors by the leading Turkish party of
Kutchuk and Denktash and became the victims of violent events such as arson,
destruction of property, and even murder. The un-workability of the constitution led
then Makarios to decide in 1963 to make certain reforms to increase the unified
character of the state. The Turkish Cypriots saw these reforms as an effort to
muurmse their power share, and responded with threats of civil disobedience if
anything was changed without their consent. Apart from communicating these
intended reforms to the Turkish Cypriots, Makarios also copied them to Greece,
Turkey and Britain for information purposes only. These reforms were (Panteli, 1990,
p.196):
1. The right of veto of the president and the vice-president was to be abandoned.
2. The vice-president was to deputize for the president in case of temporary absence
or incapacity to perform his duties.
3. The Greek president of the House of Representatives and the Turkish vrce-
president were to be elected by the House as a whole and not, as before, by'
separate Greek and Turkish majorities.
4. The vice-president of the House of Representatives was' to deputise for the
president of the House in case of his temporary absence or incapacity to perform
his duties.
5. The constitutional provisions regarding separated majorities for the enactment of
certain laws by the House of Representatives were to be abolished.
6. Unified municipalities were to be established.
7. The administration of justice was to be unified.
8. The division of the security forces into police and gendarmerie was to be
abolished.
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9. The numerical strength of the security forces and of the defence forces was to be
determined by law.
10. The proportion of participation of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the
composition of the public services (70:30) and the forces of the republic (60:40)
was to be modified in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and
Turkish Cypriots.
11. The number of members of the public service commission was to be reduced from
ten to five.
12. All decisions of the public service comrmssion were to be taken by simple
majority.
13. The communal chambers would be abolished and a new system devised. Should
the Turkish community however desire to retain its chamber in the new system.
such a course would be open to it.
Turkey. due to a crisis with Greece. rushed to reject these reforms. while the Turkish
Cypriots had not given their answer yet. Makarios refused to accept this rejection
since Turkey was supposed to have only a consulting role and not to take decisions on
behalf of the Turkish Cypriots. It was then that violent clashes started again between
the two communities and. despite the calls for peace by Greece. Turkey and Britain,
the violence intensified and the Turkish Cypriots were called by their leaders to move
towards Nicosia and the more densely Turkish populated northern cities of the island.
Partition had started and the Green Line was created as a partition line, which would
be guarded by British troops to prevent contact and violence between the two
communities. In the meantime strong Turkish armed forces started to move and take
up positions around the northern part of the island. At this time Cyprus became the
object of much international mobilisation and interest. NATO became interested in
the situation while Makarios called the UN Security Council accusing Turkey of
interfering in the internal affairs of Cyprus and violating the air space and territorial
waters of the country. Greece, France and Russia backed Makarios while Britain and
the USA began to fear the Russian support for Makarios. The USA and NATO
wanted Cyprus to become a zone under their influence (to become a NATO base) and
the best solution for that was to partition the island and achieve a double enosis
(union), which both Makarios and the British opposed. Makarios then continued
seeking refuge in the UN.
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In March and June 1964 Turkey threatened again to attack Cyprus in protest at the
reforms planned by Makarios since Turkey supported only a partition plan with a
federal state for finance, defence and foreign affairs. The relationship between Turkey
and the USA was always very close and mutually supportive except for this period in
1964, when the USA disagreed and stopped Turkey's attacks. In late June 1964 a plan
was proposed by the American mediator Acheson, which was rejected by Cyprus and
Athens because it again promoted partition but, for the first time, Cyprus started
considering independence and not union with Greece. In August 1964 Turkish jets
bombed Greek Cypriot villages and hospitals and many people were wounded or died.
While the USA and Russia called for a ceasefire, Greece, Russia, and Egypt stated
that they would intervene if the attack did not stop and Turkey agreed not to invade.
In 1965, the UN was called to find a solution to this situation. However, Turkey
rejected their first plan based on the report by Gala Plaza, because it promoted a
unitary system, and Turkey continued to insist on the existence of two elements.
Meanwhile in Cyprus, Greek Cypriot nationalists, in revenge for the Turkish attack,
attacked Turkish neighbourhoods in Nicosia, which led Turkish Cypriots to abandon
their villages and flee to enclaves both in the northern part of Nicosia and in the more
densely Turkish populated northern cities for security reasons. At the same time the
Turkish Cypriot leaders set lip agencies, including a Turkish Cypriot police and civil
service, to keep the two communities further apart. This was the beginning both of the
creation of "a state within a state" which lasted for ten years and the dependency of
the Turkish Cypriot community on Turkey. In front of this situation, on the one hand,
Greek Cypriots insisted to the UN that the two communities could still learn to live
together and there should not be any geographical separation between the two
communities, but on the other hand, to counteract the Turkish separatist moves, they
voted for all the reforms put forward by Makarios without Turkish consent and when
the USA proposed a new plan Makarios rejected it because he did not want other
states/institutions apart from the UN to be involved in the resolution of the issue.
In April 1967 a coup d'etat, supported by the USA, against the Greek government
brought to power a military junta in Greece which immediately took a position in the
Cyprus issue in favour of enosis (union). The major concern of the Greek Junta was to
resist the Communist threat and it saw that as its common goal with Turkey.
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Meanwhile, in Cyprus there were more clashes between the two communities with
many Turkish victims. Due to these clashes, Turkey threatened once more to attack
Greek Cypriots in order to protect Turkish Cypriots unless its demands were satisfied.
These demands which consisted of the removal of General Grivas (a stern anti-
Communist Greek Cypriot, who had participated in the Greek Civil war against the
Communists, Papadakis, 1998), the withdrawal of Greek troops, an indemnity paid for
the Turkish victims and for their destroyed property, the disarmament of Greek
organisations and the cessation of pressure on the Turkish Cypriot community, were
fully "accepted by the Greek Junta. Tension then eased and inter-communal talks
started via the UN. During the following six years of negotiations, Turkey demanded
a federal state even though partition was its ultimate goal. Between 1967 and 1974, a
second Greek Cypriot organisation called EOKA VITA, led underground by Grivas,
was formed in Cyprus. EOKA VITA financed and encouraged by the American CIA
and the Greek Junta who sought the partition of the island, supported enos is (union)
with Greece and tried to overthrow the legal Cypriot government. However, Makarios
escaped all murder attempts and declared the organisation unlawful; he also wrote a
letter to the Greek President demanding the withdrawal of Greek troops from the
island. In July 1974, a coup d'etat was staged and another murder attempt was made
against the legal Cypriot leader. However, Makarios managed to escape again and
found refuge in Malta and then the UK. While he was in the UK asking for help and
the restoration of the country's independence and sovereignty, Turkey invaded the
island under the Treaty of Guarantee, claiming that she had the right to intervene in
order to restore constitutional order after Makarios was overthrown by the Greek
junta. In February 1974 the Turkish government, under Bulent Ecevit, had declared
that "Federation" was the only solution for Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots were
supporting this position. The opportunity to intervene that was created by the coup
d'etat and the political instability of the island was seized by Turkey in July 1974.
Ecevit recalled "that the coup was the green light for their invasion" (Panteli, 1990,
p.232).
The military Turkish invasion was conducted in two phases, one on 20 July and one
on 14 August 1974, where Turkish troops landed in Kyrenia, paratroopers landed in
the Nicosia-Kyrenia enclave and jets bombed the capital and Famagusta. Neither the
British nor the Americans tried to stop the invasion, which led to the occupation of
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37.5% of the island, the displacement of200,000 Greek Cypriots from the north of the
island (one third of the population of Cyprus), 3,000 dead, 2,192 missing and 20,000
Greek Cypriots living in different enclaves in the north of the island (Panteli, 1990).
2.1.4 1974-2004
After the invasion, the Greek Cypriot side tried to limit the magnitude of the events
that had taken place and to achieve a workable solution for both Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots. From then on they were supported by Greece, which had regained
its democratic status after the overthrow of the junta in 1973, and by the UN; they
also continued to seek the support of the US, as it was also the only state which could
put pressure on Turkey, but the US remained closer to Turkey. Both the Makarios
government, in 1977, and the Kyprianou government, in 1979, agreed initially with
Denktash's government on certain guidelines for a federal state but failed to further
these agreements due to the different vision of the central government's power in a
federal state. Greek Cypriots wanted a more unitary federal state with a strong central
government while Turkish Cypriots wanted a weaker, decentralised central
government, with clear boundaries between the two communities (Hadjipavlou-
Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993). In 1981, further guidelines proposed by Javier Perez
de Cuellar, the Secretary-General of the UN, failed to lead to an agreement due to
strong disagreements within the Greek and Greek Cypriot society; this resulted in the
self-proclamation in 1983 of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", headed by
Rauf Denktash. The TRNC was recognised only by Turkey, as it failed to gain
recognition by the UN or any other country. Further efforts to find a solution both
under Javier Perez de Cuellar and Boutros Boutros-Ghali were not fruitful since either
one side or the other would disagree with the concessions required.
Greek Cypriot President Glaukos Clerides' "active volcano" tactic, in the early 1990s,
together with the S-300 missiles crisis, not only did not promote Greek Cypriot
interests, as intended, but also impeded the country's progress; Cyprus was warned
that. its accession route to the EU would be halted if it finally installed the missiles.
After a lot of threats, both by Turkey and other European countries, on 13th December
2002 the European Council agreed to the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004. The
prospect of Turkey's also accession to the EU and serious internal political and
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economic difficulties (in Turkey) led both Turkey and the TNRC to an increased
willingness to find a resolution to the Cyprus issue. However, the Turkish Cypriot
refusal to accept the 3rd revised Annan plan set back the negotiations and Turkey's
image. On the other hand, the willingness of Cyprus to accept the Annan plan put the
completion of Cyprus' accession to the EU beyond doubt, by the EU, and this took
place on ]6th April 2003. Turkey and the US then put pressure on Denktash to alter
the negative image of both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots by making a
reconciliatory move. On 23rd April 2003 Denktash allowed the free movement of
Greek and Turkish Cypriots from one side of the Green Line to the other, on condition
that passports were displayed and car insurance was provided by Turkish Cypriot
insurance companies for visiting Greek Cypriots (Lambrou, 2004).
During this period, despite the political tension, there were many efforts of peace
building at an inter-people level, focusing on the rapprochement of different
professional, age and local groups from the two communities. These efforts were
initiated both by Cypriot and international academics (Broome, 2005, 1998), but also
by different citizen associations (Cuhadar Gurkaynak, 2007;
http://www.prio.no!Cyprus/; http://www.peace-cyprus.org/youthD.
2.J. 5 The 51h revised A nnan plan
In February 2004, Kofi Annan, the Secretary-General of the UN, called on the Greek
and the Turkish Cypriot leaders to continue negotiations. The latest version of the
plan he was now proposing (the Slh version) was not, however, that different from the
3rd one, which had been rejected by Denktash and accepted by Papadopoulos (the
Greek Cypriot president) in 2003. The difference was that this time the US put a lot of
pressure on Turkey to accept the new version of the plan. Changes were proposed by
both leaders, and some of them were accepted while others were rejected by both of
them. Here is a summary of some of the major issues that were dealt with by the plan
which had 9000 pages (Lambrou, 2004):
Concerning the presidential council and the presidency alternating between Turkish
Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, according to the 51h revised plan there would be a Greek
Cypriot president for 40 weeks, and a Turkish Cypriot one for 20 weeks. As for the
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common presidency at the beginning of the newly formed state, the period of 30
months, as it was in the 3rd version of the plan, was now limited to 45 days.
Concerning the British bases, the land that would be returned to the. Greek Cypriots
was decreased at the British base of Dekeleia and increased in the area of Akrotiri.
Through this plan the British managed to keep their bases, obtain even greater access
to the sea, and remain outside European Law.
It was very important that all the churches, cemeteries and places of worship in the
Turkish Cypriot constituent state that belonged to the Orthodox and the Armenian
Churches, would now return to these Churches and the use of these places would be
thereafter incoercible.
On the subject of property, all refugees, even those who do not want or are unable to
return to their houses, would have the right to obtain one third of their properties
based on the size of the land and its value. However, for the rest of their property (the
remaining two thirds) they would have the right to receive compensation in stocks and
bonds, which would be released five years after the acceptance of the solution. These
bonds would be guaranteed by the federal government and redeemed twenty five
years after their release, while their owners would be able to trade both them and the
stocks from the moment they obtain them. However, this measure, while it makes sure
that the economy does not collapse, encumbers the Cypriot State and not the Turkish
State with all these expenses. Furthermore, none of the Greek Cypriot court cases for
compensation from the Turkish State would be able to progress with this arrangement.
The Greek Cypriot refugees, who would decide to return to their houses in the
Turkish constituent part, would not have the right to be elected or to vote for the
Turkish representatives in the Federal Parliament or in the Senate. They would only
have the right to vote for the Turkish Cypriot parliament and the local government of
the area they live in. However, the number of the refugees that would be allowed to
return to their properties in the Turkish constituent part would be decreased from
21%, in the 3rd version of the plan, to 18% of the Turkish Cypriot population. The
movement of this percentage would have to take place in the following 19 years,
while, after this time, more people would be able to return, at a percentage again only
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up to 33% of the Turkish Cypriot population. The same measures would apply to the
Turkish Cypriots living in the Greek Cypriot constituent part wishing to return to the
Turkish Cypriot constituent part.
Concerning the Turkish settlers, according to this plan, 50,000 Turkish settlers would
have the right to stay in the country, while those who wish to leave would receive
compensation of 10,000 euros. However, if the Turkish Cypriot constituent state did
not wish someone to leave, no-one else would have the right to force them to leave.
The percentage of Turkish citizens who wish to move to Cyprus will be limited to 5%
of the Turkish population of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state for the following 19
years. The same measure would apply to the Greek citizens who wish to move to
Cyprus. After the end of these 19 years there would be no official limits but the
Federal state would have to set its own rules on the immigration rates.
On the question of disarmament, the plan also prescribed that the Turkish and the
Greek army would have to be reduced to 6,000 soldiers by 2011 and to 3,000 soldiers
by 2018. However, after this date, according to the Zurich Treaty (of 1959) 950 Greek
soldiers and 650 Turkish soldiers would have the right to remain on the island. It has
to be emphasised that at the moment there are 35,000 Turkish soldiers and 3,000
Greek soldiers on the island. Another measure of the Treaty of Zurich, which was also
included in this plan, is the Treaty of Guarantee, according to which Greece, Turkey,
or Britain will have the right to intervene in order to protect the independence, the
territory, the security and the constitution of either of the two constituent states of the
new United Cyprus Republic (UCR).
Finally, it was prescribed that the return of the territories to the Greek Cypriots would
be completed in 3.5 years and in six phases. However, the territories, which would be
returned during the last three phases, would continue under Turkish control up to a
few months before the completion of their return, when the UN would undertake their
responsi bility ..
The Turkish President (Erdogan) appeared to be pleased with the final version of the
plan when it was finalised, while the Greek Cypriot President (Papadopoulos) was not
,
satisfied with it and in his message to the Greek Cypriot people on 7 April 2004 he
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expressed his disappointment and his dissatisfaction with the plan pointing out only
the negative aspects of it. The majority of the political parties in Cyprus as well as the
Orthodox Church also took a negative position towards the plan and continued to call
upon the Greek Cypriot people to reject the plan at the subsequent referendum.
2.1.6 The referendum on 2l" April2004
On 24 April 2004, separate referenda for the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
took place in the Republic of Cyprus and the TRNC. The turn out was very high, 90%
of registered Greek Cypriots and 75% of the Turkish Cypriots voted. However, the
results of the referenda were in reverse of the negotiations' history up to that moment:
the Greek Cypriots rejected the plan by 75.83% and the Turkish Cypriots ratified it by
64.91 %. The exit poll results showed that for Greek Cypriots the major reason for
rejecting the Annan plan was the issue of security vis-it-vis Turkey.
Political analyses report· that if the referendum had been conducted in 2002 or 2003
the Greek Cypriots, under the influence of Clerides, would have accepted the plan.
However, in 2004, the UN focus was on the Turkish Cypriot side, since it was
Denktash who kept rejecting the previous plans, and neglected what was happening
on the Greek Cypriot side. As it was reported by the Secretary-General, the Greek
Cypriot President was not willing to negotiate in a meaningful way, by making
concessions (Crisis Group, 2006); on the contrary, he only saw the demands he had
made which were not accepted, and this was the way he presented the plan to the
people in his message at the beginning of April. It should be emphasised that since
Annan plan I in November 2002, there was a continuous public campaign against the
plan by Cypriot officials, while the "yes" camp had only based its campaign on the
latest version of the plan and therefore had less than one month to swing the public
attitude round. The only political parties in the Republic of Cyprus whose members-
in their majority- campaigned in favour of the plan were the Democratic Rally and the
United Democrats (DHSI and ED II), while the majority of members of the other
parties (AKEL, EDEK, NEO, ADHK, OIKO and For Europe) opposed the plan. It is
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also worth emphasising that intra-party splits OCCUlTedas with certain members of the
Democratic Rally who created their own party, "For Europe", opposing the plan
(Chadjipadelis & Andreadis, 2007).
The "no" camp believed and proclaimed that too many Turkish Cypriot demands had
been accepted, while too little was given to the Greek Cypriots in return for these.
Their main assertions were on:
• the way property compensation was arranged, which was in opposition to previous
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights
• the derogation of the acquis communautaire, which decreased the freedoms of
property ownership, movement and settlement of the Greek Cypriots on Cyprus in
comparison to other European citizens
• the political power given to the Turkish Cypriot minority
• the economic responsibility for the repair of all the properties that were abandoned
or ruined by Turkey since the invasion
• the late disarmament of the island by the Turkish troops and the rematmng
Turkish right of intervention even in the Greek Cypriot constituent part at any
time
• the way the repatriation of the Turkish settlers would take place
However, all of these claims were refuted both by international and national political
analysts (Tombazos, 2005; Crisis Group, 2006). Concerning the issues of property,
the derogations would be temporary and not permanent and it was never stated in any
plan that there would be a better settlement for the Greek Cypriots on this issue. On
the contrary, by rejecting by the Annan plan V, not one refugee would be able to
return to or repossess their property. On the power sharing issue, the equal power
share would increase the cooperation between the two sides instead of dividing and
polarising the two communities, as it has happened in other countries, like
Switzerland, where the same political system has successfully been applied for many
years. Concerning the economic burden that would be put on the Cypriot government,
the international community had already agreed to provide most of the funding, so the
burden would not be as significant as it was thought it would have been. Concerning
the disarmament of the island, it would take some time but by 2011, only seven years
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later, the Turkish troops would be decreased to 6,000 (while now they remam
35,000). Finally, concerning the Greek Cypriot demand for the return of a large
number of the settlers to Turkey, this would have been almost impossible, since
settlers have been living in that area for three decades at least, and there are almost
two generations of people who have been born in this area.
After the referendum, research was conducted to determine the demographic,
attitudinal and political characteristics of the people who voted against the plan.
Webster and Lordos (2006) examined the effect of age, gender, education, party
preference, political radicalism, refugee status, preferences for a federation, distrust in
Turks, commonalities and sense of urgency in resolving the conflict, on the
acceptance or rejection of the Annan plan. The importance of the age factor was
previously suggested by Jackobsson Hatay (2004) and Webster (2005) who had found
age to be an important factor in the acceptance/rejection of the plan and in the
preference for a solution to the Cyprus issue. They had suggested that young Greek
Cypriots would be more willing to reject the plan since they are more nationalistic and
have never lived with Turkish Cypriots, in contrast to older generations. Younger
Greek Cypriots were also found to prefer either a solution of a permanent division or
of the maintenance of the status' quo, rather than a unification plan. However, in
Webster and Lordos' (2006) study, the refugee status was. the only demographic
factor that significantly predicted the result of the vote. Participants were, however,
eighteen years old or older. Among the attitudinal and political factors, distrust in
Turks, radicalism, urgency in resolving the conflict and two of the four political party
preferences (supporting the political parties DISY and DIKO) significantly predicted
the result of the vote. Those that were more likely to reject the plan were those
classified as "political radicals", believing that an armed struggle would solve the
Cyprus problem or feeling that any solution should ensure the return of all the
refugees. The weakest significant predictor was the refugee status, suggesting people
who were refugees are more likely to accept the plan.
2.2 Eurobarometers
According to the Eurobarometer conducted in February-March 2004 (National Report
Executive Summary Cyprus, 2004.1), Cypriots very much looked forward to joining
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the European Union. Joining the EU was evaluated mostly on two domains: the
economic and the political. Economically, Cypriots believed that their personal
condition would improve while overall the economic condition of their country would
deteriorate. More precisely, it was mentioned that almost half of the population
believed that their personal condition would improve in the next twelve months; only
one quarter believed that it would worsen and the rest believed that it would remain
the same. Concerning the financial condition and employment issues, the majority of
the population believed that they would remain unchanged. Fear for the country's
condition that was expressed by a minority of the population was counterbalanced by
optimism about their personal condition. The reason given for this was the current
high standard of living and the low unemployment levels. It should also be mentioned
that Cypriots considered joining the EU as a natural consequence of their long-term
economic progress.
Politically, joining the European Union constituted the ultimate solution for the
Cyprus problem and the thirty years of division of the island for the Cypriots. This
was the dominating reason given by the population in support of the accession.
Cypriots reported that they would feel more secure, more politically stable and they
would have more freedom when joining the EU. More precisely, they associated the
meaning of the EU with more positive attributes related to "peace", "democracy",
"social protection", and "freedom to travel, work and study" to a significantly higher
degree than the rest of member states. While they still recognised that the larger states
had more power within the EU, their feelings of security and stability were associated
also with the belief that the EU would hear the voice of Cyprus and that Cyprus would
have a more influential role within the EU. These positive evaluations of the EU made
up for the relatively negative view of the economy of the country and led to the
positive attitude to the accession to the EU.
When asked if and how they identified with the EU, the population was divided in
two, between those who identified themselves as Cypriots (49%) and those who
identified themselves as Cypriots and Europeans (46%). As can be seen, national
identification was very important, and even higher in comparison to other new
member states of the EU. Compared with the results of the 2003 Eurobarometer there
was even a significant increase, from 37% to 49% in those identifying themselves
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only as Cypriots. This could be due to the current political situation, the intensified
talks for a solution to the Cyprus issue and unification between the two communities.
In response to this possibility, Greek Cypriots might have wanted to show how much
they feel attached to the whole of the island and not only to the current territory of
Cyprus which is under Greek Cypriot control. However, this could also be explained
as an effort to show that the totality of Cyprus belongs only to the Greek Cypriots
instead of to both communities.
According to the Eurobarometer 2004.1, trust in most institutions was also high. They
trusted most the National Guard (83%), the Cypriot Government (75%) and the House
of Representatives (74%), while they trusted the political parties (31%) and the large
corporations (29%) least. It is important also to mention that trust in the UN and trust
in the police was lower than it was in the rest of the member states of the EU while
precisely trust in the UN was the lowest among the populations of all member states.
Concerning the national system, the percentage of Cypriots that appeared to be
satisfied with the way democracy operated was almost equal to the percentage of
people who trusted the Government and the Parliament. These results could show the
population's level of acceptance of the way the state functions, as well as the level of
support for the UN, which is an institution directly linked with the Cyprus issue. The
reason for the low levels of trust in the UN could be explained by the failure of the
UN up to the present time to find a solution to the Cyprus issue that satisfies the
Greek Cypriot community.
According to the Eurobarometer 65.2 (National Report Executive Summary Cyprus,
2006), conducted in Spring 2006, Greek Cypriots remained satisfied with the life they
led (85%) while the majority (44%) believed that it would not change, one third
(33%) believed that it would improve, and only one out of ten (10%) that it would
deteriorate. In reference to their expectations for their future personal situation, the
majority of Greek Cypriots believed that there would be either an improvement or it
would remain the same (39% and 31% respectively), while only a small number
believed that it would deteriorate (16%). Since joining the EU, it should be noted that
while half of Greek Cypriots still believed that the economic situation and the
employment conditions of the country would deteriorate within the next twelve
months, public opinion was more optimistic than it had been in 2005.
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The levels of trust in the Cyprus Government and the official political institutions had
severely decreased since 2004. Trust in the Cyprus Government reached 56% (75% as
reported in Winter 2004) and trust in the Cypriot Parliament reached 44% (74% as
reported in Winter 2004). Trust in the legal system also decreased in comparison with
previous reports (Spring 2006 53%, Autumn 2005 59%) as well as trust in the
political parties (Spring 2006 27%, Winter 2004 31%). In reference to trust in
international institutions, trust in the European Union remained high (64%) while trust
in the UN remained the lowest among all member states (27%). While the majority of
the population trusted the EU, Cypriots still expressed a positive opinion on EU
membership less often than most of other EU member states. It is also important to
notice that while expectations were very high before the accession to the EU, the
Spring 2006 Eurobarometer showed that only 40% of the Greek Cypriots believed
that their country had benefited from their EU membership (it was 56% in Winter
2004).
The Spring 2006 Eurobarometer also showed that Greek Cypriot citizens felt attached
to their country (97%), their town/village (91%) and their region (89%), and only a
small number of people felt attached to the European Union (27%), which was the
lowest among all EU member states.
2.3 The role of schools in the Cyprus issue
Schools are a very important agent in all countries in terms of social and political
education. Apart from the science lessons, like mathematics and physics, where the
materials are universally accepted, other lessons like history and literature are more
ambiguous. The course material can be very subjective, depending not only on the
personality and skill of the instructor, but also and most importantly on the official
position of the state on certain issues. The choice of material taught to the children is
finally very important because it helps formulate feelings and attitudes towards
certain events and groups since school is one of the first educational agents in a
child's life, apart from the parents. In the case of Cyprus, which was occupied by
different peoples, schools had an even more important and extended educational role,
to maintain and develop children's mother tongue and civilisation.
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Research (Bryant, 1998) on the role of Greek Cypriot schools, specifically during
British rule, has revealed this extended role; apart from the teaching of one's mother
tongue, children were exposed to the promotion of the idea of revolution against the
British colonial rule, as well as the political ideal of enosis (union) with Greece,
which was the main political goal of Greek Cypriots at that time. The British were
accused of efforts to de-Hellenise the Greek Cypriot children by the implementation
of specific anti-Hellenic measures. These were: a. the promotion of the English
language and the reduction of the status of the Greek language to a non-mother tongue
language, b. the teaching of the history of Cyprus in the context of European and
world history, instead of Greek history, which meant that the ideals of Greek
civilisation were not emphasised enough, and c. the creation of a common Training
College for Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot teachers.
Greek Cypriot schools at the time tried to resist to this perceived effort to cut Cypriot
bonds with their Greek compatriots both by resisting implementation of these
measures and by organising demonstrations and boycotts against the British rule.
However, the schools did not restrict their educational role within the school hours,
but also they extended their role into what would have been the family's or society's
pedagogical role in the children's lives. They were getting involved in the children's
life outside school hours, trying to promote these specific "ethnic goals", either
directly or indirectly; for instance, a youth magazine was published for elementary
school children, which presented these political ideals to the children in a simple,
understandable and persistent way. Another example was the implementation of a
paidhonomos, an after-school disciplinary agent, who used to patrol the streets and the
theatres or coffee places, to make sure that the curfew of 5pm was respected by the
young people. In this environment of control and commitment to the "ethnic goals",
Greek Cypriots themselves tried to silence the voices that opposed them. Communist
teachers were expelled, students used to denounce fellow students for their
Communist or pro-British attitudes and students who accepted British scholarships or
who read inter-communal magazines were marginalised, Trying to deal with this
situation, the British closed five-sixths of Greek Cypriot schools on the grounds that,
instead of discipline, they were promoting lawlessness and violence (Bryant, 1998).
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Concerning history lessons in school, not only during British rule but also after the
independence of Cyprus, until modem times, the relationship of Cyprus to Greece and
Turkey has always been on the school curriculum. Cyprus has been presented vis-a-
vis Greece as "the young, sad, and unprotected daughter awaiting the mother's
embrace" (Hadjipavlou, 2002, p.194). In the history textbooks, the emphasis has been
always put on the Hellenisation of the island in the 12th century BC and the formation
of the Hellenic characteristics which remain to the present day (Hadjipavlou, 2002) as
well as on the heroic struggles of the Greek Cypriot people against their occupiers.
The sacrifice of the revolutionaries against the Ottoman and the British rulers is
presented as an example to follow for Greek Cypriot youth while the Turkish
occupation of Greek Cypriot land calls on young people not only to remember but
also to commemorate all those that died during these violent trespasses. The Greek
history of Cyprus has been presented therefore as established, inevitable, and as the
only one. Cyprus, being Hellenic, has also been presented as awaiting union with
Greece and protection from all possible foreign conquerors. Greek Cypriot people
have also always been called on to remain faithful to the values and ideals of the
"Hellenic ethos and Orthodoxy", despite the int1uence of different peoples and
civilisations due to the proximity of Cyprus to three continents, and the occupation of
the island by so many foreign powers. While Cypriot history is presented in this
dramatic way, there is no mention of the positions and the traumas of the Turkish
Cypriot community of the island during these difficult historical times. The land,
origins, history, and Cypriot citizenship that Turkish Cypriots used to share with
Greek Cypriots have been omitted from the school textbooks.
The same patterns characterise also Turkish Cypriot education; Turkish Cypriot
educationalists along with their Greek Cypriot counterparts have argued that "schools
are in part institutions used to promote nationalism and militarism through activities
like celebrating national motherlands' days, naming schools after military heroes,
showing pictures of atrocities and holding competitions in poetry and essay-writing,
based on nationalistic themes or past glories of each nation" (Hadjipavlou, 2002,
p.194). An example of the unilateral history teaching could be the way Turkish
Cypriot and Greek Cypriot children are taught about 15th November 1983. Turkish
Cypriot children are told that it is a day of great historical significance since it was
when the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was created, giving to the Turkish
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Cypriot people their flag, parliament and constitution, while Greek Cypriot children
are taught that it is the date of the creation of a pseudo-state, only recognised by
Turkey, violating the UN charter. However, neither of the two is taught the other
community's point of view or significance of this event.
A start was made in the late 1970s to rethink Cypriot history, trying to break down the
generalisations and abstractions used up to that point concerning the characteristics
and the relationship of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot community. Instead of
presenting solely the historical events which marked the division of the two
communities, the alliances of members of the two communities which transcended
their ethnical division were also presented. The common rebellion of Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot peasants against the oppressors was mentioned as well as the fact
that before the dominance of the two ethnic nationalisms, people used to see
themselves in smaller scale, in the context of their family, or their neighbourhood, or
their co-workers, independently of their ethnic origins. This change in the viewpoint
of Cypriot history took place almost at the same time as a change in the viewpoint of
Greek history, when the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou and the Turkish Prime
Minister Ozal decided to improve the Greek-Turkish relationship (Loizos, 1998).
However, the spectrum of the social identities promoted to children in Cypriot school
textbooks was only broadened in 1990s, with the inclusion of the European identity.
The efforts of accession to the EU and the Greek Cypriot government's official
positioning in favour of such an event led to the promotion of the idea of a European
identity alongside the Greek Cypriot one in schools, which has been one of the few
changes in all these years (Hadjipavlou, 2002).
Furthermore, the educational system in Cyprus, both for Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots, is very syllabus-oriented and leaves very little space for critical thinking and
personal development. The introduction of new material is not allowed without the
central authority's permission, while teachers, especially in the secondary schools, are
considered to hold conservative ideas (Fisher, 1991). Furthermore, the influence of
the Greek Orthodox Church on Greek Cypriot education, which is still important,
makes the school environment even more conservative and controlled.
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The polarisation of the views on the Cyprus issue and the way the relationship
between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot community is presented in Greek Cypriot
and in Turkish Cypriot school textbooks have recently raised concerns and protests by
the international community, including the UN and the European Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU) who have examined the educational system in both communities
(Hadjipavlou, 2002). They have called for a more open-minded curriculum that will
embrace both communities emphasising the commonalities and the possibility of a
peaceful coexistence, instead of living as indefinite, eternal enemies. However, the
resistance not only of central authorities, but also of the Church, the media and the
public have impeded any attempt in that direction.
2.4 Inter-group stereotypes/attitudes and possible sociological explanations
The reading of history and the ideals promoted through schools and other societal
agents, such as the media and politicians' speeches, up to the present day, have deeply
affected the stereotypes and the attitudes of one community towards the other
(Hadjipavlou, 2003). These preconceptions should be taken into consideration when
examining the possibility of peaceful coexistence between two conflicting
communities, as has been shown by previous research on conflict resolution (Azar,
1990; Burton, 1987; Kelman, 1997). Hadjipavlou (2003) has found that Greek
Cypriots hold a much more negative view of Turkish Cypriots than do Turkish
Cypriots for Greek Cypriots. In her study, Greek Cypriots chose laziness,
deceitfulness and backwardness as the most important stereotypical characteristics of
Turkish Cypriots and honour, culture and intelligence as their least stereotypical ones.
In contrast, the Turkish Cypriots chose honesty, hospitality, culture and intelligence as
the most stereotypical characteristics of Greek Cypriots, and laziness, dirt,
backwardness and barbarity as their least stereotypical ones.
It is argued that there are different reasons for this difference in inter-community
stereotypical characterisation, this lack of mirror imaging. Especially for the older
generations, the reason for this negative characterisation could be the ethnic division
of labour before 1974 and the progress of each community after 1974. During the
Ottoman and the British rule, upper class Turkish Cypriots used to work in the police
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or in the army, or in administrative jobs, while lower class Turkish Cypriots used to
be peasants or farmers. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots used to work as traders,
importing/exporting goods, developing an entrepreneurial practice. Turkish Cypriots'
lack of involvement in owning land or in the free market did not give them prospects
for economic development. After Cyprus was granted its independence, the social and
economic gap between the two communities got even larger due to the political
instability and the start of Turkish Cypriot dependence on Turkish decisions.
Furthermore, the "economic miracle" which followed 1974 for Greek Cypriots did not
involve the Turkish Cypriots, who were bound to Turkey, belonged to a state only
recognised by Turkey, and shared with it a weak currency. Their commercial and
economic isolation from the rest of the world could not but lead to a very poor
economy in comparison to the Greek Cypriot economic growth. However, the Greek
Cypriots only saw that the Turkish Cypriots occupied the most fertile and richest part
of land of Cyprus, as well as the industries left behind by the Greek Cypriots, and did
nothing to take advantage of them. They underestimated the role of outside factors
that allowed themselves to develop, such as the flourishing of off-shore companies in
Cyprus, and, on the other hand, the commercial isolation of Turkish Cypriots. They
attributed their economic development to their "hard-work" and Turkish Cypriot
economic decline to their "laziness" (Hadjipavlou, 2003).
However, the aforementioned results were also valid for the younger generations, who
did not have any direct experience of Turkish Cypriots and most of them had never
even seen or talked to a Turkish Cypriot. Hadjipavlou (2003) argues that this could be
due first, to the only image of Turkish Cypriots that young Greek Cypriots have
which is that of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader for many decades.
Denktash was always portrayed in the Greek Cypriot media as a tough negotiator,
uncompromising, unwilling to find a solution to accommodate both communities,
whilst his honesty was always controversial. Another explanation for this negative
characterisation of Turkish Cypriots, and one that transcends generations, is that
during and after the Turkish invasion of 1974, Turkish Cypriots did not differentiate
their position from that of Turkish people. The Turkish invasion has been therefore
associated both with Turkish and Turkish Cypriot people. However, the reason why
Turkish Cypriots did not differentiate their position, because they felt threatened by
Greek Cypriots, is never mentioned in the Greek Cypriot media or school textbooks.
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Later research (Danielidou & Horvath, 2006) on the attitudes of Greek Cypriots
towards Turkish Cypriots, however, differentiated between attitudes towards Turkish
Cypriots and Turkish immigrants living in the occupied part of Cyprus. These
immigrants were mostly lower class Turkish people who came from Anatolia, either
forced to do so by the Turkish government in its effort to enlarge the Turkish
population of the occupied part of Cyprus, or by their own free will on the promise of
a better future. In Danielidou and Horvath's study, it was found that Greek Cypriots
had more positive attitudes towards the Turkish Cypriots and appeared willing to
cohabit with them, while they had the opposite attitude towards Turkish immigrants.
The same pattern of attitudes was found independently of gender and refugee status. It
was argued that the reasons for these attitudes were perceived victimisation and
perceived cultural differences, as well as a history of negative inter-group contact and
conflicts. Concerning the differentiation between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish
immigrants, participants tended to see fewer differences between themselves and
Turkish Cypriots, than with Turkish immigrants; they also considered Turkish
Cypriots more equal members of the Republic of Cyprus than the Turkish immigrants.
It has to be emphasised, however, that these attitudes towards Turkish immigrants
have been developed even though Greek Cypriots have not had any contact with the
Turkish immigrants, since they immigrated to northern Cyprus after the invasion of
1974.
All of the above historical and psychological information provide an insight of the
context of the Cyprus conflict, so that the results of the following literature review
and empirical studies can be better understood. Macro-factors are very important in
the formation of micro-factors in social research (Fisher, 1990; Anderson, 1991) and
therefore should be taken into consideration.
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Chapter 3: Conflict Resolution
The inter-communal conflict in Cyprus has existed for 35 years according to the
Greek Cypriots (since 1974) and more than 45 years according to the Turkish
Cypriots (since 1960-63). For both communities, this conflict has been very costly
psychologically (identities have been denied and both communities have suffered
human losses and displacement) and economically (properties have been lost,
companies have been closed or boycotted etc). Despite the longevity, the high cost,
and the intractability of the conflict, research on the Cyprus issue has not been as
extensive as it has been in other conflicts such as in Northern Ireland or Israel and
Palestine. Even though each conflict has its particular characteristics since it develops
in reference to a specific geographical, demographic, politico-economic, and
historical context, research on other conflicts could offer a useful background for the
present thesis, since similarities can be and have been identified between different
conflicts.
3.1 The concept of conflict in social psychology
In contrast to international relations, sociology and political science, social
psychology has argued that the processes taking place at an individual level can only
explain a certain number of aspects of conflicts since they cannot capture the
dynamics of inter-group relations. The lack of consideration of this crucial aspect of
conflicts in other disciplines could be one of the reasons several contlict situations
around the world still persist. To address this issue, the present thesis adopted a social
psychological approach in the study of the Cyprus conflict, Contlict from a socio-
psychological, phenomenological perspective has been defined as:
"a social situation involving perceived incompatibilities in goals or values between
two or more parties, attempts by the parties to control each other, and antagonistic
feelings by the parties towards each other" (Fisher, 1990, p.6).
Individuals' perceptions, cognitions and feelings influence their groups' perceptions,
cognitions and feelings which then engage in inter-group conflicts due to the
perceived differences or the incompatibility of their goals, motivations, perceptions
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and finally actions (Fisher, 1991). However, since groups do not function as
individuals do, a simple transfer of individual phenomena to a group level would not
be sufficient. Separate research has to be conducted, using an inter-group perspective,
in order to capture the dynamics of the relations between the parties involved.
Following this position, in the present thesis, only inter-group theories were
considered.
Interethnic conflicts, however, even when treated at a group level, are often examined
only at an inter-governmental or inter-state level, overlooking their inter-societal level
(Kelman, 2004). In a conflict, there are many dimensions, cultural, social and
psychological ones, which official research has traditionally overlooked, focusing
only on the diplomatic, economic and military aspects. It is well-documented and
recognised that governments play a decisive role in the progress of interethnic
conflicts, shaping and leading public opinion especially in international crisis
situations (the "rally round-the-flag" phenomenon has described comprehensively this
tendency of the public to support the government in cases of external/international
threat, Baker & 0'Neal, 2001).
In particular in the Cyprus conflict, the Cypriot government constitutes the only
official and competent national institution responsible for negotiating on behalf of the
Greek Cypriots both with the Turkish Cypriots and the mediating international
institutions. Hence, the Greek Cypriot people do not have an alternative representative
for the resolution of the Cyprus conflict in the international arena. Apart from
expressing Cypriot public opinion, the government also tries to influence it and even
shape it. An example of this was during the creation and after the presentation of the
s" revised Annan plan to the Cypriot people, where the Papadopoulos government
engaged in a fierce and emotional anti-plan campaign, trying to persuade the Greek
Cypriot people to reject it in the following referendum. Whether the public was
persuaded mainly by the government to reject the plan cannot be confirmed but the
result of the referendum created this impression. It would therefore be important to
explore not the Cypriot government's positions (as political analysts could have done)
but the Cypriot public's opinion on the Cypriot government, some years after the
pressure of the anti-plan campaign, and to understand the role this plays in the
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progress of the conflict, especially as official statistics show a progressive decrease in
political trust in Cyprus (Eurobarometers, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2006).
There are three social psychological theoretical bases (Hewstone & Cairns, 2001) for
the study of conflict resolution. The first one goes back to a sociological analysis of
conflicts separating groups into the "we group" and the "others group" by Sumner
(1906, in Hewstone & Cairns, 2001), who used the term of "ethnocentrism" in order
to describe inter-group discrimination and bias. Sumner defined "ethnocentrism" as
the "view of things in which one's own group is the centre of everything, and all
others are scaled or rated with reference to it" (p.16). Ethnocentrism and inter-group
bias at different levels were seen as a result of inter-group competition, and of an
effort to maintain the in-group's solidarity and explain out-group exploitation
(Hewstone & Cairns, 2001).
The second theory in reference to conflict was the "realistic group conflict theory" of
Sherif (1966). According to this theory, conflict erupts from competition between two
previously interdependent groups for incompatible interests, goals and needs.
However, as later research showed, conflict could erupt before any competition
appeared; just the presence of the other group was enough to raise conflict between
the two groups. The importance of categorization led to the development of the third
theory, "social identity theory" (SIT) by Tajfel (1978). SIT argued that self-definition
occurs through social group memberships and that positive/negative self-identity
depends on positive/negative social comparison. However, social comparison does
not take place on all dimensions; it is selective, groups choose to differentiate
themselves on those dimensions that make them feel good about their in-group and
about themselves. Both in laboratory and in real-life research, social categorization
has been shown to lead to inter-group discrimination and bias, influenced, especially
in real-life research, by issues of power and legitimacy. This theory has been
extensively discussed in reference to the conflict in Northern Ireland, where the issue
of identity has constituted both a crucial reason and factor leading to the escalation of
the conflict. SIT has helped to understand the behaviour of those groups whose
identity is threatened and which in other terms would seem irrational (Hewstone &
Cairns, 2001).
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The Cyprus conflict involves two different ethnic groups: the Greek Cypriot and the
Turkish Cypriot people. These two groups are considered ethnically distinct based on
Hutchinson and Smith's (1996) criteria of common ethnicity which are: a collective
name, a myth of common ancestry, a symbolic link to an ancestral homeland, shared
historical memories, common traditions, customs and practices, a common religion
and/or common language. However, despite their ethnic difference, these two groups
share a common Cypriot citizen identity, they are both Cypriots. Both the ethnic and
the citizen identity of the groups have been in the centre of the Cyprus conflict and
disputed by both of the groups. Identity has played a crucial role in the Cyprus
conflict and therefore different types of identifications should be further examined if
resolution is to be achieved (Fisher, 2001).
3.2 Types of conflict
Based on the aforementioned socio-psychological theories, a distinction has been
made between "explicit" and "implicit" conflicts (Hewstone & Cairns, 2001).
"Explicit" conflicts are those considered legitimate and have different laws and rules
set in order to structure their proceedings (Taj fel & Turner, 1979). There are two
kinds of "explicit" conflicts based on the behaviour of the in-group towards the out-
group: the instrumental and the non-instrumental ones. In instrumental behaviour
conflicts, the in-group is motivated to beat the out-group in a sort of competition,
based on real norms and rules, while in non-instrumental behaviour conflicts, the in-
group becomes discriminatory and biased against the out-group in non-official ways,
like ascribing the same negative characteristics to an out-group and its members and
behaving accordingly towards them. The in-group uses these negative characteristics
to differentiate itself from the out-group, and to justify its negative behaviour towards
it.
On the other hand, "implicit" contlicts take place despite the lack of obvious
differences between the groups. Discrimination between groups becomes salient only
on certain dimensions, which do not have a real reason for existence; they do not
satisfy any real need of the groups, except for the solidification and the accentuation
of the boundaries of the groups, many times provoked by a third agent. An example of
this kind of conflict is that between the Hutu and the Tutsi in Africa, whose
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differences were constructed and pointed out by the colonialist powers. Despite the
fact that both groups had the same language, religion, ethnicity and a long history of
contact and intermarriages, they led to genocide, based on physical differences, like
height and skin colour (Hewstone & Cairns, 200 I). This distinction could also be
relevant to the Cyprus issue as the two communities used to live together
harmoniously in the past (Hadjipavlou, 2003), despite their ethnic and religious
differences. This past experience of peaceful co-existence raises questions about the
originating factors and evolution of the conflict. Why did the groups feel that they had
to re-define, solidify and protect their boundaries?
Another distinction between conflicts made later (Rothman, 1997; Rothman & Olson,
2001), which could explain the "apparent differences" and the "non-apparent
differences" between the groups of the two types of conflicts, is between "subjective"
conflicts (also called identity-based conflicts) and "objective" conflicts (also called
resource- or interest-based conflicts) (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). "Subjective" conflicts
involve the "social identities" (values, beliefs and needs) of identity groups, while
"objective" conflicts are based on more concrete issues, such as land, power and
resources distribution. The theory suggests that "subjective" and "objective" conflicts
could coexist, since they could just constitute different aspects of the same conflict;
however, "subjective" conflicts are harder to understand and resolve because of their
non-tangible character. Due to this difficulty, they could even continue to exist for
much longer after an "objective" conflict has been resolved (Hewstone & Cairns,
2001) and also, in contrast to the interest-based conflicts, they are more resistant to
solutions based on classic negotiation techniques; they require different techniques
touching on the "true" roots of these conflicts (Rothman & Olson, 2001).
Ross (1993) also supported the idea that, in order to understand these conflicts and be
able to construct or work towards a solution, first the "psychocnltural" dynamics of
the conflict and the groups involved should be addressed, before moving to the more
concrete differences and issues of dispute that need to be addressed. The Cyprus
conflict has been primarily characterised as an identity-based contlict (Fisher, 2001),
even though the crucial role of trust and power in the progress of the negotiation
outcomes and therefore the conflict have been recognised; the existence of elements
of both types of conflict is not an incongruity of the theory since, according to it, both
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types of contlict can coexist or alternate. In real conflict situations, different
elements/factors can either influence each other or exist in parallel without being
inter-connected; therefore consideration of both of these types of relationships is also
required in research. Social researchers have recognized and endorsed it, addressing it
through the development of complex models trying to explain the relationship of these
factors.
3.3 A comprehensive model of conflict resolution
One comprehensive model, which has tried to explain the ways many factors and
processes affect conflict resolution, was developed by Fisher (1990). He developed
this model, called the "Eclectic Model", trying to include most of the factors that have
been found to influence conflict resolution, both at a theoretical and a practical level.
In order to better organise these factors, he created the model along two dimensions:
the level of analysis of the variables (individual, group and inter-group level) and the
temporal identity of these variables (antecedents, orientations, processes and
outcomes). This multilevel view of inter-groupconflict consists of examining how
factors from different levels (individual, interpersonal, group and inter-group level)
and from different temporal occurrence (antecedents, processes, outcomes etc) affect
the evolution of a conflict. However, the model tried not only to describe the structure
but also the process of inter-group conflict. It looked at the dynamics of conflict and
at the conditions that underlie these dynamics. Due to the specific focus of the present
thesis, as well as the complexity of the model and methodological and
operationalisation difficulties related to many of the concepts included, not all paths
of the original model were tested; only those that involved trust and its antecedents
and outcomes at a group and inter-group level:
40
Diagram 3.1: Paths involving trust in the Eclectic Model (Fisher, 1990)
Antecedents Orientations Processes Outcomes
Cognitive
bias
Identity Mistrust
~
+ Reduced
Ethno- productivity
centrism
t Contentious Escalationtactics +-
Cultural differences Perceived
Hist. of antagonism threat Inadequate
Conflict of values t coordination____.
Confl. of interests Competitive
Confl. of needs orientation Ineffective
Confl. of power Communication
According to the model, the antecedent of the conflict at a group level is identity,
which influences ethnocentrism which has a direct effect on trust and cognitive bias.
Ethnocentrism reduces trust, contributing in this way to conflict escalation (principle
5), while it also increases cognitive bias, which also through other paths (not
presented in this diagram) leads to the escalation of the conflict. The antecedents at an
inter-group level, on the other hand, are cultural differences, history of antagonism,
contlict of values, of interests, of needs and power, which influence competitive
orientation, which then influences perceived threat by adversaries. It is perceived
threat which then influences ethnocentrism, which has a direct effect on trust. There
are many other paths that lead to ethnocentrism or perceived threat involving
variables at different levels and temporal occurrences, such as the one where "self-
esteem is positively related to group identity and group cohesion (which are
categorised as antecedents), and negatively related to perceived threat and
ethnocentrism" (principle 16), or the path where "ethnocentrism decreases problem-
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solving competence and increases constituent pressure (which are categorised as
processes)" (principle 8). In terms of the outcomes of mistrust, according to the model
mistrust does not lead to a specific outcome by itself; the model suggests that mistrust
with competitive orientation, perceived threat and ethnocentrism escalate contlict
again through the mediation of ineffective communication, inadequate coordination,
contentious tactics and reduced productivity (p.l 00). This is considered to be one of
the core principles of the model because it links four major orientations directly with
the outcome of the contlict. However, the consideration of only the combined
influence of trust with other factors on the escalation of the contlict raises questions
on the strength of trust in explaining conflict escalation. What is the power of trust in
explaining conflict? Does it have to be moderated/mediated by other factors or does it
also have a direct effect?
The variables of this model can take particular values in particular situations
according to Fisher (1990). In an effort to explore an aspect of these situations, two
"system states" were applied based on the intensity of the contlict. He argued that the
values of the variables change depending on the intensity of the conflict. The
transition from low intensity conflict to high intensity contlict is made through
escalation while the transition from high intensity contlict to low intensity conflict is
through de-escalation. It is suggested that it is easier to move from a low to a high
intensity conflict than the opposite, and that cultural differences as well as a history of
antagonism facilitate this transition. While the process of escalation has been studied,
the opposite process of de-escalation has not received the adequate attention of
researchers (Fisher, 1991).
This model has taken into consideration variables of different levels (of different
temporal identity and of level of analysis of the variables) and created possible
relationships amongst them, based on existing social psychological and political
theories (see Fisher, 1990 for a review); however, it has been admitted by Fisher
(1990) that it did not consider a wide range of organisational realities (political
conditions, political organisation and regimes) or the complexity of the wider social
environment. Based on this limitation of the model on the one hand and on the
model's comprehensiveness, in comparison to other models of the literature (see
further sections of the present chapter), on the other hand, it was considered
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appropriate to use this model. amending it where necessary. in the present thesis in
order to explore young Greek Cypriot attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots and conflict
resolution.
The concepts which Fisher (1990. 2000) chose to include in this model have been
highlighted and studied by many political and social researchers in the context of
inter-group conflict resolution. In the following section of the present chapter these
factors along with the factors, not included by Fisher in the model. which we consider
relevant to the Cyprus conflict were identified in the existing literature and reviewed.
3.4 Sources and moderators of interethnic conflicts
3.4.1 Incompatibility of needs andfears
One of the main sources of inter-group conflict, according to social psychological
research and theory (Fisher, 1990; Kelman. 2004) is the perceived or real
incompatibility of inter-group needs and fears. These needs and fears can be either
material or psychological or both. People need to feel able to cover both their basic
physical needs such as food, shelter and physical security, and also their
psychological ones, such as their "identity. recognition, autonomy. self-esteem and a
sense of justice" (Kelman. 2004, p.60). Although these needs and fears are
experienced at an individual level. they are expressed and many times satisfied within
a group level, which is what has attracted the interest of social psychologists. Most
international conflicts involve these elements, which sometimes constitute the
underlying true causes of the conflict. Kelman has suggested that by looking carefully
into the needs and fears of adversary groups, one can analyse and understand deeply
the causes of a conflict as well as the behaviour and attitudes of adversary groups
which make up the history of the conflict. The fears hidden behind groups'
willingness/unwillingness to negotiate and to make concessions are revealed and
hence the ways to help the groups to overcome them and reach a mutually satisfactory
solution to the conflict.
In this process, it is very important that adversary groups start believing that the
ongoing conflict is not "zero-sum" (which means that one party's gain is not the other
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party's loss) (Gallagher, 1994). However, examining only conflicting interests and
power in a conflicting relationship can easily lead us to zero-sum conclusions, in
contrast to examining subjective factors, which can lead to a different situation.
Conflicting needs and fears for identity, recognition or security, can lead us to
different conclusions since they are not innately zero-sum (Burton, 1988). The need
for identity, recognition and security are not mutually exclusive from any other's
identity, recognition and security. On the contrary, it has been found (Kelman, 1987)
that when groups recognise each other, one group's feelings and beliefs of secure
identity and existence enhance the other group's similar feelings and beliefs. It would
be therefore more effective in the context of conflict resolution, first to examine and
satisfy one's needs and fears for identity and security, which are not innately zero-
sum, and then to move to the examination and satisfaction of the material needs of
each group, which could then be satisfied in a more distributive way, instead of an
"all or nothing" way. In order to satisfy their needs and fears, Kelman (2004)
suggested that adversary groups should start showing empathy to each other, through
learning and examining each other's perspective. In the case of the Cyprus conflict,
this has been pursued only through the problem-solving workshops that Doob (1986),
Kelman (1979), Fisher (1991, 1992, 1994) and others have organised but there has not
been any official or public discussion or effort in that direction. The present thesis is
going to take into consideration these issues and try to see if, 35 years after the
Turkish invasion, Greek Cypriot young people now recognise that there are mutual
needs and fears and to what degree they think they are conflicting and therefore
contributing to the escalation of the conflict.
It is important, however, to also examine the object of these needs and fears. As
mentioned above, in their theory of inter-group conflict (1979), Tajfel and Turner
have distinguished between conflicts which are about power, resources or land, and
conflicts which are about psychological and symbolic issues. In conflicts, like the one
taking place in Cyprus, the differentiation of these two aspects could contribute to the
understanding and the explanation of their intractability. Both aspects should be taken
into consideration when trying to find a solution, as the failure to address one of them
could lead to an impasse, as there appears to be currently on the CYP,rus issue.
Conflicts over land or resources could just be the result or the "objectification" of the
groups' fear in certain cases for their security and identity. In the case of the Cyprus
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conflict, these fears are constantly expressed by both Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots (Hadjipavlou, 2002). Greek Cypriots fear that Turkish "imperialism" and the
solidification of the Turkish presence in the northern part of Cyprus threaten Greek
Cypriot identity while Turkish Cypriots fear that Greek Cypriot bonds and demands
for union (enos is) with Greece, as well as the integration of Cyprus in the EU,
threaten their own Turkish Cypriot identity. Concerning the incompatibility of
interests between the two communities, it could easily be explained in terms of geo-
strategic and economic dynamics (Cooper & Berdal, 1993; Tank, 2002) while the fear
of security that both communities feel could be traced to the history of the relationship
and their mutual traumas. However, as these could be just the consequences of deeper
reasons, reasons of a "subjective" nature (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), one of the first
objects would be to examine the identity incompatibility between the two
communities. There has been little research on the exact way group identity
influences "actual" political conflict (Leach & Williams, 1999). It is necessary then to
explore as many dimensions of group identity as possible in order to find which
dimensions are related and in which way to the different aspects of the conflict.
3.4.2 Ethnic and religious differences
In the Cyprus conflict, as in many inter-ethnic conflicts (Northern Irish, lsraeli-
Palestinian), besides the real or perceived incompatibility of needs, fears and interests,
groups also differ in cultural terms. Turkish Cypriots are culturally aligned with
Turkish civilization, they speak Turkish, and they are Muslim in their majority while
Greek Cypriots speak Greek, share a common historical background with Greece and
share Greek traditions, and are Christian Orthodox in their majority. These differences
have been presented by members of both communities as insurmountable within the
context of the contlict. This could be based, on the one hand, on Social Identity
Theory (Tajfel, 1978, Tajfel & Turner, t 979) which argues that the mere existence of
certain differences, without the presence of any threatening behaviour, could lead to
perceived threat and therefore to conflicting inter-group attitudes or, on the other
hand, on theories such as the "resurgence hypothesis" (Leak & Randall, 1995;
Kirkpatrick, 1993) according to which religious dogmatism leads to authoritarianism
and intolerance of religious and ethnic divergence. However, in the Cyprus case, even
though religion plays an important role in each community's identity (Polis, 1996),
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Turkish Cypriots used to live peacefully with Greek Cypriots up to 1960; this raises
the question as to why these ethno-cultural differences became salient and disruptive
in the relationship of the two communities only from a certain historical time
onwards.
The response to this question in reference to the role of religious identity could come
from the "salience hypothesis", according to which it is not religion in itself that, even
partly, causes ethnic discrimination; it is the conflict for economic resources that has
just made the presence of group identity characteristics, such as religion, more salient,
and has led to in-group out-group polarisation in reference to specific traits/domains
that make the differences between the groups more salient (Kunovich & Hodson,
1999). During this process, group members become more aware of and try to
reinforce in-group cohesion by reinforcing in-group commonalities and out-group
differences. Within these processes, religion or ethnicity could become the domains
on which groups differentiate themselves from other groups (by making them more
salient in the group's identity) (Olzak & West, 1991). In this conflict/competition
context, it has been argued that an important factor which leads to group polarisation
is perceived threat. It has been found that the threat of economic difficulties can lead
to prejudice and discrimination towards minority ethnic groups in Europe (Quillian,
1995) and also that perceived threat is a significant predictor of ethnic and political
intolerance (Kunovich & Hodson, 1999). Kunovich and Hodson (1999), who studied
the case of Croatia, which is a religiously and ethnically differentiated country, found
evidence that supported the claims of the salience hypothesis; religiosity did not affect
et~nic intolerance; its effect was just spurious.
Ethnic and religious identities involve not only knowledge-based characteristics but
also emotional ones, as most memberships do (Brewer, 1997). However, the emotions
associated especially with these particular memberships can be so deep and so strong
that they lead people to self-sacrifice or murder of members of adversary groups,
when they are perceived as threatening for their in-group. One common set of
emotions and belief's present at the onset and in the maintenance or strengthening of
ethno-national groups is associated with collective victimisation. International
conflicts consist of many cycles of violence, often due to perceptions of unilateral
victimisation and efforts to put an end to it. Violence in the form of vengeance for
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previous hostilities or in the form of defensive attacks is a common phenomenon in
protracted conflicts, also present in the Cyprus conflict (see chapter 2).
3.4.3 Unilateral group victimisation
In most inter-ethnic conflicts (e.g. Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, Cyprus)
there are numerous examples of inter-group violence, initiated either by the official
government or para-military organisations,. which can lead parties to regard
themselves as the only victims of the conflict (Fisher, 2001). In the Cyprus conflict,
such incidents took place especially during the thirteen years of independence (1960-
1973), when Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots started feeling threatened by each
other and engaged in a succession of acts of violence. The incidents that took place
during this period traumatised both communities and, for both of them, became part
of their narratives of unilateral victimisation, which were thereafter used to justify
mutual consequent negative violent behaviours.
Mack (1979, 1983), examining this phenomenon 111 a psychodynamic 'Yay, has
suggested that unilateral victimisation is associated with a type of "egoism", which
does not let adversary parties empathise with each other. People who have a friendly
relationship try to resolve their differences in a way that accommodates all parties; in
order to achieve such a solution, parties make an effort to understand the other party's
perceptions and points of view, and empathise with its grief and suffering. However,
in protracted conflicts, where both parties consider themselves to be the sole victims,
this process does not and cannot take place. Conflicting parties focus only on their
own sufferings and completely dismiss the other party's suffering, almost showing an
inability to accept or comprehend the other party's feelings and thoughts. Collective
or group victimisation is usually funned and reinforced after a certain mythical
representation of historical events in a group's narratives. These narratives transcend
generations through the official educational curriculum of a country or of an ethnic
group, and through everyday interaction with older members of the group, either
family or friends. Since early childhood, people are exposed to these narratives, and
internalise them as a part of their sense of self, the inner concept of their identity.
Their reinforcement and solidification occur through the association of the meaning of
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their own and their group's identity with more practical objects and events, like nags,
passports, food, music, language, physical appearance and their land (either where
they were born or where they lived) (Stein & Niederland, 1989), which emphasise
once more the importance and the relationship of "psychocultural" factors with
conflict resolution.
Group victimisation occurs and solidifies through these associations, as it is also
supported by psychoanalytic theories, and then passes into the group's social memory;
however, it could not be attributed solely to a form of group "egoism". The existential
threat and fear as well as the emotional pain involved in the reality of inter-group
conflict and violence, which members of conflicting groups experience in everyday
life could not and should not be underestimated or overlooked.
The aforementioned associations carry both cognitive and emotional aspects, which
leaders know and manipulate in order to influence people either to accept peace or to
continue fighting. Emotional manipulation constitutes one of the most effective tools
that leaders lise, both officially and unofficially, in the context of protracted conflicts
in order to mobilise or to reassure people. Hate, fear and variations or different levels
of these emotions, constitute the most prevalent emotions which recur in such
contexts and which should be taken seriously into consideration in the evaluation of
conflict elements (Mack, 1990).
3.4.4 Infer-group negative emotions
Emotions were systematically ignored in conflict research until the early 1990s and
negotiation studies have always argued that adversaries should not take them into
consideration; they should act based only on cognitive cues and rationality (Retzinger
& Scheff, 2006). However, since the 1990s, this gap in the research into contlict
resolution has been identified and different studies have emerged trying to explain the
role and the significance of emotions in conflict resolution. Similarly, while emotions
were not included in Fisher's original model (1990). their significance was later
recognised and taken into consideration (2000), even though the exact paths linking
emotions with the rest of factors were still not specified. Within this turn towards the
study of emotions it has even been suggested that not only should emotions be
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seriously considered but also that in certain cases they should be dealt with before any
further negotiation between adversary parties takes place (Fisher, Ury & Patton,
1991).
Emotions are generated by different inherent elements of international conflicts;
identity differences, the history of the conflict and the perceived future of it,
victimisation and enemy demonisation are all both generators and enhancers of
emotions in a conflict. Retzinger and Scheff (2006) have developed a theory, based on
Marx's theory of class conflict and alienation, where not only disparities between the
.'
economic/political interests of adversaries cause the conflict, but also emotional and
relational ones. They developed further the role of communication and emotions in
conflicts and suggested that in intractable conflicts, which appear to have reached an
impasse, emotions should be further analysed and studied because they might
constitute the real causes of the conflict, hiding underneath the obvious "objective"
I
differences between adversaries. This has been an opinion shared by different
researchers concerning international conflicts like the Second World War (Retzinger
& Scheff, 2006) and the Northern Ireland conflict (Whyte, 1990).
Based on the emotional/relational aspect of intractable conflicts, Retzinger and Scheff
(2006) divided conflicts into two categories; the "interminable quarrels" and the
"impasse" quarrels. The former involve "irrational anger, resentment or hatred"
(p.244), while the latter are characterised by politeness on the one hand but dead-end,
"stuck" negotiations on the other. According to their theory, in the relational part of
adversary groups' relationships, there is a "bimodal alienation". Members of one
group become alienated with members of the other group while they even abandon
parts of their identity in order to 11tbetter with the ideology of their own group. In the
emotional part of their relationship, in the "interminable quarrels" there are cycles of
shame and anger that are perpetuated between adversaries, both within and between
them. Shame, of course, is the emotion that exists but remains hidden even from the
group itself. In the "impasse" relationships, on the other hand, parties remain polite
because they hide both the anger and the shame they feel. However, the element that
makes both types of contlict "intractable" is the hidden shame. It is suggested that
shame is the cause of anger (see Retzinger & Scheff: 2006) and if shame does not
resurface both in the individual himself and his in-group and out-group, the
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relationship cannot move forward. Therefore, it is not only the emotion that causes the
intractability of the conflict but also the actual denial of this emotion by the people.
According to this theory, the resolution of an "intractable" conflict could come only if
adversaries acknowledged their personal and in-group's emotions as well as those of
the out-group. The denial of the out-group's emotions in the context of a conflict
does not refer only to the negative emotions of the out-group towards the in-group but
also to the suffering of the out-group, the pain it has suffered during the conflict, as it
is perceived by the out-group.
The process of shame leading to anger is based on Volkan's (2003) theory of
"vulnerable emotions" and of collective violence. There are four steps in this process:
first, parties select from the events of the history of their relationship those that show
they are the victims of the conflict. Then, because they feel secretly humiliated
because of their defeat and inadequacy in those traumas, they fail to grieve for them
and their only way to cope with it is to create this constructed inter-group rivalry,
which can only lead them to take revenge for these traumas by attacking their
adversaries. At this stage, it is suggested that a "collective regression" takes place,
where people regress to their childhood, no longer recognise that there can be a
mixture of right and wrong in everything, and just assign people and groups into
either a "good" or "bad" category; in the context of an inter-group conflict, the in-
group leaders and members are the "good" ones, while the out-group leaders and
members are the "bad" ones.
Many studies (see Retzinger & Scheff, 2006 for a review) have emphasised the role of
shame and anger in the perpetuation of violence, while specifically terror-
management studies (Landau, Solomon, Greenberg, Cohen, Pyszcynski, Arndt et al,
2004) have also pointed out the role of fear in this process. Fear is also considered to
be both an important cause of violence and a response to it, also creating an
inescapable cycle of emotional and physical hostility (Bar-Tal, 2001).
An important factor influencing the prevalence and therefore the' study of these
, emotions is culture and its particular prescriptions for each gender. In Western
cultures, manhood is associated with an image of power, being cold and
imperturbable, which implies hiding certain emotions which show vulnerability or
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weakness, like shame, fear and grief (Retzinger & Scheff, 2006; Fischer, Rodriguez,
van Vianen & Manstead, 2004; Jansz, 2000). The most culturally acceptable emotion
for men among those aforementioned is therefore anger; no matter what has generated
it, it shows power and dominance (Fischer et al., 2004). So, anger is the most
accessible emotion to men (Jansz, 2000) when they might be feeling shame, grief or
fear towards a situation or a group. It is argued (Retzinger & Scheff, 2006), therefore,
that since men are the most active members in conflicts, research should start focusing
not on anger, but on the underlying emotions, shame, grief and fear as the real
emotions in interplay in intractable conflicts.
While emphasizing an area which has been neglected by conflict theorists and
practitioners, in their effort to explain inter-group conflict, psychoanalytic theories
have focused on isolated feelings and individual processes disregarding factors which
have been found to have both a personal and a group effect (i.e. history of the
relationship, incompatible interests and needs, Fisher, 1990, 2000). Likewise, research
and theories suggesting that shame is the only underlying source of anger and fear
should be treated with suspicion especially since no evidence relating to a real inter-
group context has yet been presented. Different factors might have generated these
inter-group conflicting feelings, which are not addressed by this theory, and which
could be responsible for the perpetuation of violence through the experience of the
emotions. The present thesis took into consideration the importance of anger and fear
and addressed the issue of various potential sources and consequences of both
emotions at an inter-group real life conflict context.
An important aspect of emotions which has also not been sufficiently addressed and
explained in this theory is the "subject" of emotions, who feels the emotions.
Traditionally, emotions have been studied and measured at an individual level but it
becomes clear that they should also be studied at an inter-group level. Mackie, Silver
and Smith (2004) developed the Intergroup Emotions Theory (lET) in their effort to
study the relevance of emotions in inter-group relations and behaviour. lET suggests
that "distinct reactions (both psychological and behavioural) to social groups are
determined by differentiated emotional reactions to those groups based on appraisals
of the in-group vis-it-vis other groups." (p.228). Inter-group emotions are not
experienced by individuals based on their personal interaction with the out-group, but
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based on their in-group's interaction and feelings towards the out-group. The strength
of these inter-group emotions has been found to be regulated by the level of a
person's sense of identification with the group. It has also been found that different
aspects of the in-group identification, can predict different emotional reactions under
certain conditions. In particular, Mackie, Silver and Smith have found that while the
affective aspect of identification was more important in predicting anger reactions,
oneness was more important in predicting fear reactions.
Inter-group emotions have also been hypothesized and empirically found to provide
individuals with the willingness to act in specific ways towards members of the out-
group. Differentiated behaviour towards the out-group is found to be mediated by
specific inter-group emotions under certain conditions (Devos, Silver, Mackie &
Smith, 2003; Mackie, Silver & Smith 2004). Research, by the aforementioned
researchers, has shown that in situations of inter-group conflict, fear, anger and
exclusion emotions (such as disgust and contempt) mediate specific inter-group
behavioural tendencies, such as avoiding the out-group or moving against it, based on
the evaluation of the power balance between the groups. Anger has been associated
with moving against the out-group (an offensive behavioural tendency) while fear has
been associated with avoiding it (a defensive behavioural tendency) (Devos et al.,
2003). Inter-group emotions have also been found to lead to certain behavioural
tendencies towards out-groups through their association with stereotypes and
prejudice, which have been found to affect discriminatory inter-group behaviour, such
as physical attacks, ranging from an individual to a mass scale. The link between
these specific emotions and action tendencies has been established, however, only in a
controlled environment and virtual situations, leaving a gap for the confirmation of
these findings in real life situations. In the Cyprus conflict, the role of emotions has
not been studied systematically, which constitutes a big gap in the existing literature.
The present thesis addressed the role of emotions and examined their link with
specific action tendencies and attitudes to conflict resolution.
In contrast to the aforementioned experimental studies, most research in conflict
resolution uses qualitative methods to address emotions. However, even qualitative
research on emotions has not been extensive in the context of interethnic conflicts.
Hate is one of the emotions which have been less studied (especially in comparison to
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fear and anger) probably due to the difficulty of measuring this emotion owing to its
low social desirability, its changing nature and its association with other concepts, like
inter-group prejudice, aggression and racism (Yanay, 1996). Most of the theories
which have tried to address it have attributed it either to individual differences or to
the cultural and social environment. Hate has been studied in the context of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and identified as one of the most important barriers to
peace in the Middle East. In many studies, feelings of hatred have been reported
among Israeli youth towards Arabs and it has been found that its experience does not
depend or does not follow from some individual characteristic but it is the language
and the position of the individual that shape its expression and experience (see Yanay,
1996, for a review).
Yanay (1996) conducted one of the rare social psychological studies on this issue,
where hate was studied in relation to religion amongst middle-class girls aged 15-16 ..
Despite the fact that both secular and religious Israeli girls identified highly with the
Zionist ideology and Jewish national identity, their emotional experience of hate was
very different. While secular girls expressed both negative (such as fear, rage and
frustration) and positive emotions towards the Arabs and the way the Arabs perceived
the situation, the religious girls expressed only negative emotions towards them. In
the religious girls' discourse, Arabs were portrayed as the "natural", unified enemy of
the Israeli people who felt deep hatred towards them and tried to achieve the
extinction of Jews. In participants' discourses, the Arabs' point of view was not
examined or mentioned at any point; participants only expressed their in-group's
claim to the land and their perception of the situation as legitimate: they expressed
feeling threatened in terms of "their land", which was extended to an "existential"
fear, justified for them by the ongoing "terrorist" attacks targeted at them. While none
of the participants had been personally injured in any incident, and only one of them
knew someone who had been injured, they all felt strong fear of the Arabs.
Yanay (1996) argued about these findings that these di fferences between the
discourses of the secular and religious girls could be explained by the way Jewish
ideology constructs not only womanhood but also identity (making salient the crucial
role of culture in the accessibility and processing of emotions). Secular girls have not
experienced the strict catechism of a unique point of view, which excludes all other
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possible explanations, that religious girls have; on the contrary, they have experienced
a pluralism of opinions and attitudes which has allowed them to accept social
diversity and show empathy towards adversary groups. Apart from having shown the
link of emotions with different attitudes towards adversary groups, this study provided
support for the "resurgence" theory on religion, showing that the exposure to strict
religious messages could atfect inter-group attitudes and feelings, which consequently
influenced attitudes to conflict resolution.
Religious identification and emotions have appeared to interconnect and influence
public attitudes in inter-ethnic conflicts when religion is used as a group marker
between the conflicting sides, as it is in Cyprus, which is why they were also taken
into consideration in the present thesis.
3.4.5 Distrust
Finally, one of the most important and least studied factors in relation to conflict
resolution is dis/trust (Kelman, 2005; Slovic, 1993). Due to the importance of trust,
the present thesis focused on it and an extensive review of origins, dimensions and
consequences of trust for conflict resolutions is presented in the following chapter (4).
None of these factors, which can be identified at the roots of conflicts or acting as
moderators/mediators in conflict escalation, act separately or unilaterally. An
important social psychological proposition concerning the processes that generate,
maintain or enhance a conflicting relationship is that conflicts are interactive. Each
party's positions and actions are influenced by the interaction with the other party
(Fisher, 1990; Kelman, 2004). However, in conflict, interaction is usually escalatory
because of the powerful effect of the "enemy" image of the adversary group. The
needs and fears of each group lead to the construction of an "enemy" image for the
adversary group, which consists of specific negative attributes and action tendencies
(Hadjipavlou 2002, 2003). This image solidifies through the history of the conflict
and makes both groups cognitively rigid. In a non-conflict relationship, parties
continuously assess each other's needs, fears,' and wishes and act accordingly, trying
always to accommodate all parties involved. However, in a conflict-relationship, this
process does not take place. Dehumanisation, mirror imaging, and self-fulfilling
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prophecies are the processes that replace it and reinforce parties' cognitive rigidity,
pushing adversaries to a relationship impasse (Kelman, 2004).
3.5 Outcome of conflict: Reconciliation
Conflict resolution is a generic term referring to the ending of a conflict. Nonetheless,
a conflict can be resolved in many ways. There are two major distinctions between
these conflict resolutions: violent, where one party conquers another one or
establishes its will in a coercive way, and peaceful, where adversary parties come to a
mutual agreement. Due to the specific context of the Cyprus issue and the existing
efforts towards the creation of a reconciliation plan, the present thesis focused on the
peaceful ways of resolution and more particularly on reconciliation. In this direction,
Burton (1990) distinguished between three types of peaceful contlict resolution:
reconciliation, conflict settlement and conflict resolution. Since reconciliation is the
most modern and the most recently studied of the three, there is still general confusion
about its exact meaning. Researchers either use it interchangeably with the other
terms or have separated it in terms of its relationship with forgiveness, and cultural
and religious characteristics (Wink, 1998).
In contrast to reconciliation, conflict settlement happens only at a governmental level
and does not involve the people, at grass roots level; it is based on the interests of the
two parties but the final settlement plan does not necessarily represent equally the
rights of both parties. Power relations are very much present in this kind of resolution
(e.g. the Iran-Iraq settlement in 1975). On the other hand, cont1ict resolution (the third
type of conflict resolution) does not reflect these power relations. The resolution
processes try to find the cause of the conflict and to find a solution to it, which can
come in the form of an "historic compromise". However, there is a more active
participation by the people in this type of resolution, and a mutual effort towards
cooperation and "warm" coexistence between the two societies (e.g. the conflict
resolution between Israel and Jordan in 1995); nevertheless, it still remains very
different to reconciliation (Rouhana, 2004).
Finally, reconciliation became prevalent recently as a separate concept due to the
international emergence and discussion of issues of historical truth, justice and
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making peace with history. These issues emerged especially in countries either facing
radical political regime transitions, or in countries where distinctive groups
collaborated with the occupiers, or in countries where the majority population was
being either discriminated against or oppressed, as in South Africa (Rouhana, 2004).
Reconciliation is qualitatively different from the other two forms of conflict
resolution as its goal is above all to create a different relationship based on mutual
legitimacy, mutual recognition and security, through public and open processes. The
processes of reconciliation involve not only political but also psychological and social
changes concerning the peoples involved and not only the governments or the
reconciliation organisations. South Africa is the most characteristic example of a
country where these processes took place.
Rouhana (2004), who was particularly interested in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
defined reconciliation and what it should involve, based on the above arguments and
analysis. FIe defined reconciliation as a combination of a process and an end state.
The process, according to his definition, involves three stages: first, the
acknowledgement of historic truths, second, the agreement on the perpetrator's
injustice and responsibility for the harm that was caused and, third, the restructuring
of the social context with a new political arrangement that would try to resolve past
injustices and support, even "guarantee" the security of human rights for all groups.
As an end state, reconciliation involves mutual recognition and acceptance of the
justice of the peace agreement by both parties, which mark the end of the contlict and
the beginning of a thereafter peaceful cooperation between them. The first two stages
of reconciliation as a process address and assume the resolution of very important
sources of disagreement between adversaries, which are often the milestones of the
conflict; these steps should therefore be treated with care and not be considered in an
absolute way, otherwise reconciliation might become just an idealistic form of
conflict resolution. Furthermore, the second stage, the agreement on the perpetrator,
assumes that th~re is only one perpetrator causing all the injustice while in most
conflicts both parties usually engage in a cycle of injustices and violence. Assuming
therefore that only one was the perpetrator might be both unrealistic and unfair
towards either party.
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Due to the difficulty of these stages, people's willingness even to engage in
reconciliatory processes is an important issue which has been found to be affected by
different factors. The first factor is the power position of the group; generally since
the risks that have to be undertaken by the most powerful are greater than those
undertaken by the less powerful, the most powerful appear less willing to reconcile in
comparison to the less powerful groups, who have not so much to lose, just to gain
from reconciliation. The second factor is the level up to which injustice can be undone
and justice restored. It is very difficult for the perpetrator to accept responsibility for
the harm that is done, and it has proved especially difficult to assume responsibility
for injustice that realistically can be partly undone (like the expulsion of a group of
people). The third factor is whether there is a clear case for the morality of one's
claims. Powerful parties/nations can be morally protected by developing a series of
arguments to refute the victims' moral demands, therefore the less powerful should
have a "clear case" and not "contaminate" it with actions (like terrorist actions) which
would blur the morality of their claims. Finally, it is also important to have reached a
point historically and demographically where the generation of the perpetrators is no
longer the dominant one; some time must have passed since the "painful" events so
that reconciliation takes place between people who were not directly involved in those
events. The longer the time that has passed, the easier it is for people to accept past
wrongdoing and for victims to move forward (Rouhana, 2004).
3.5.1 Reconciliation through acceptance
One factor which appears to be embedded in the concept of reconciliation is
acceptance of the "other", both in terms of existence and legitimacy (Kelman, 1978).
Acceptance is one of the first and most important steps to reconciliation and one of
the most ditlicult ones to take since it assumes legitimisation of the other's beliefs and
actions. Kelman recognized its importance and developed six psychological
prerequisites for it, which should accompany real objective changes in each party's
actions or perceptions, in order to reach acceptance of the adversary and
reconciliation:
1. Each side should try to understand how the other is viewing the conflict and why.
2. Each side should reach the belief that there are people to talk to on the other side, as
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well as something to talk about; that there is possibility for change and people are
willing to take steps in that direction.
3. Each side should try to differentiate between their hopes and what can actually be
done.
4. Both sides should come to the understanding that only through mutual concessions
can they achieve mutual change.
S. Both sides have to understand and believe that changes have already taken place, or
could take place, in the leadership of the other party, even though they might have
been "trivial" or not very radical in their eyes.
6. Both sides should become responsive to and understanding of the needs and
worries of the other party and try with symbolic gestures to show acknowledgement
and reassurance.
In order to create these psychological conditions for acceptance, parties would have to
engage in direct communication, sending clear and significant messages both publicly
and privately (Kelman, 1978, 1986; Long and Brecke, 2003). Only mutual efforts
would lead to mutual acceptance and recognition and therefore to reconciliation.
When parties have finally accepted each other, one effective form of showing one's
acceptance of the adversary, is to publicly acknowledge an adversary group's status,
or identity, or experience and grievances. Acknowledgements are very important
because usually, during the conflict, adversaries do not acknowledge any of each
other's narratives or arguments and, therefore, when they finally happen, they can
have very strong effects on the progress of the conflict. For instance, in the Palestinian
narrative, the issue of injustice is very important, in that Israelis took away land from
Palestinians, their society, and, in many cases, their lives. It would, therefore, be very
important if an Israeli official made a declaration acknowledging one of these
injustices towards the Palestinians. Similarly, in the Cyprus contlict, Greek Cypriots
believe that the occupation of 1/3 of their territory by Turkish armed forces and the
displacement of 113 of the population in 1974 should finally be acknowledged by
Turkey and Turkish Cypriots while the word "invasion" should be officially used to
refer to the events of 1974. Due to the history of the conflict and the vulnerability that
parties feel in making such acknowledgements, it is also important when they happen,
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first, that parties negotiate about these acknowledgements before they finally make
them, and, second, that both parties commit to proceed with acknowledgements.
3.5.2 Reconciliation throughforgiveness
Another important step to reconciliation, which has taken into consideration the
importance of mutual legitimacy, recognition and security - through open and public
processes - (Rouhana 2004; Kelman, 1978) and emphasised the importance of inter-
group emotions in the conceptualisation of reconciliation is forgiveness (McLernon,
Cairns, Lewis & Hewstone, 2003). Forgiveness is considered to be an important step
in the transformation of a relationship and has proven to be very effective in the
resolution of interethnic conflicts. Attention started being paid to forgiveness after the
recognition of the role of the principles of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
in the successful abolition of apartheid in South Africa.
However, forgiveness has mainly been studied at an interpersonal level, with few
attempts at an inter-group level. One attempt was made by McLernon et al. (2003)
who looked at forgiveness at an inter-group level in the context of the conflict in
Northern Ireland. Despite the disagreement among theorists on the definition of
forgiveness, McLernon et al. (2003) adopted the definition by Enright and The
Human Development Study Group (1991), which connected the concept of
forgiveness also with the concept of mercy. Enright defined forgiveness as the
"willingness to abandon one's right to resentment, negative judgement and indifferent
behaviour toward one who unjustly injured us, while fostering the undeserved
qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love toward him or her" (p.123). The
main addition that the concept of forgiveness offers to the conceptualisation by
Rouhana (2004) is the need to change also the inter-group negative emotions. The
relationship between forgiveness and reconciliation has recently been repeatedly
supported to a point that there is now an ongoing debate in the literature about
whether forgiveness can exist without reconciliation and/or reconciliation without
forgiveness (Hewstone et al., 2004).
The concept of forgiveness involves addressing many and difficult issues that lie at
the source of conflicting relationships; therefore, it has not often been on people's or
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politicians' agenda for the resolution of conflicts (e.g. in the Northern Ireland
conflict). Only a few politicians and Christian church leaders have dared to mention it
in their speeches:
"I believe that it is helpful for that part of the community to which one does not
belong to hear some acknowledgement of responsibility being accepted for things that
were wrong which caused them to be disadvantaged or to suffer. That admission
might, in turn, help those who have suffered to offer forgiveness to those that made
them suffer" John Dunlop, former moderator of the Presbyterian Church in Ireland,
1996 (McLernon et al., 2003).
"The stupid neither forgive nor forget; the naive forgive and forget; the wise forgive
but do not forget" Gerry Adams, Sinn Fein President, 24 November 1999 (McLernon
et al., 2003).
These reports, however, have been scarce as people who have dared to express such
opinions have had to deal with two types of accusations: either of betraying and
disrespecting people's grief and religious beliefs, or of talking about an irrelevant and
inapplicable issue since acts of violence are totally justified (McLernon et al., 2003).
In order to understand the meaning and the effect of this difficult concept, it is
essential to examine the constituents and the factors affecting forgiveness. Looking
into the process of forgiving, it is argued that two processes take place: the first one is
interpersonal, during which the forgiver has to stop perceiving the "other" only as the
"wrongdoer" (and start recognising his/her different roles and attributes), and the
second one is intrapersonal, during which the forgiver has to find "inner peace".
However, empirical research on forgiveness has failed to provide any consis,tent
results on these constituent processes, since even correlates of forgiveness have not
been systematically confirmed.
Long and Brecke (2003) focused on the importance of forgiveness in reconciliation
and developed two different models of forgiveness/reconciliation (taking into
consideration the inter-state and intra-state level of conflicts). These models used
some of the aforementioned factors related to reconciliation (e.g. transforming the
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"enemy" identity of the wrongdoer, McLernon, 2003; acknowledging each party's
harm doing, Kelman, 1978), but more details were given and more factors were
emphasised. These factors emerged through the review of the solutions already
implemented in several conflicts around the world and the progress of different
interethnic conflicts currently taking place which have not yet been resolved.
At an intra-state level, they developed a forgiveness model based on the assumption
that reconciliation occurs when shame and anger, which often lead to violence and
revenge, are substituted by a different set of emotions for affiliation. This model
included four stages:
1. People have to acknowledge, to face openly via different ways, the harm and
the injustice that they have perpetrated.
2. People have to stop considering themselves victims and start transforming
themselves, expelling feelings of anger or revenge, and also change, reframe
the identity of the perpetrators (the "enemy"), attributing thereafter more
human and understanding characteristics to them.
3. Both parties have to decide to stop the circle of injury, without of course
abandoning all forms of punishment or admitting the wrong and the injustice;
just stop the injury continuum.
4. One of the two parties or both parties should make a move so that the two
parties come in contact and ask for public forgiveness, while calling for the
beginning of a new relationship based on affiliation, and not anger or hostility.
This is the final reconciliation event.
This model was considered suitable to address forgiveness for civil conflicts but not
international wars, where much less is shared between the belligerents and there is no
common history or culture. At an inter-state level, Long and Brecke (2003) argued
that reconciliation could not be based on forgiveness as it was in the previous model
but that some of the stages of forgiveness, such as public acceptance of the harm that
was caused, could still contribute to reconciliation between conflicting parties,
In particular, at an inter-state level, Long and Brecke (2003) emphasised that the best
way to stop hostility and initiate reconciliation between the two parties is to start
sending signals that keep showing a persistent commitment to the beginning of a new
and improved relationship. They argued that communication and its forms are very
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important at this level since the signals that are sent have to be costly (the acceptance
of reconciliation has to have a cost for both parties), vulnerable (including risk), novel
(to be completely new, so that people can distance themselves from the painful history
of the relationship, Dasgupta, 1988), voluntary (especially from the stronger party)
and irrevocable. These are the five characteristics that the signals should have in order
to promote the reconciliation process between two states, and the more the signals
have these characteristics, the more successful the process will be.
All of the aforementioned steps/actions have taken into consideration the issues of
acknowledging the harm and the injustice committed by one's group, the need for
new identities, the need to stop the violence, the need for justice and the need for
creating a new relationship (following the definitions of reconciliation and
forgiveness); however, none of these models has been empirically measured or tested;
their factors were deducted only from a theoretical analysis of post- and on-going
conflicts. Furthermore, the distinction between inter-state and intra-state contlicts
cannot be applied in conflicts like the Cyprus contlict, where the two parties are
ethnically different, have been culturally and politically aligned with different nations
and have also, at different points in history, requested their separate union with
different nations/countries (Greek Cypriots with Greece, and Turkish Cypriots with
Turkey). Additionally, the operationalisation of the steps of either model to reach
levels where internal validity could be achieved is considered very difficult and,
therefore, due to all these reasons, these two models were not examined further by the
present thesis. Nevertheless, since the concept of forgiveness was considered a very
important one, it was integrated in the measurement of reconciliation which was used
in the empirical studies (see chapters 6 and 8).
In order to understand further the role of forgiveness, the factors which could affect
willingness to forgive were also examined; however, research results in the literature
have been inconsistent. Certain socio-developmental studies have shown that
forgiving is a process that evolves during lifetime, with adolescents forgiving less
than young adults, and young adults forgiving less than older adults (Mullet & Girard,
1999; Enright, Santos & Al-Mabuk, 1989) while other studies have failed to replicate
this (McLernon, Cairns & Hewstone, 1999). The same lack of consistency exists in
reference to the relationship between gender and forgiving, religious denominations
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and forgiving, and even levels of suffering from political violence and forgiving
(McLernon et al., 2003). This inconsistency and the lack of extensive research,
especially in relation to social psychological concepts, has revealed the difficulty that
lies in the concept of forgiveness and therefore also in its measurement. These issues
were taken into consideration and addressed by the empirical studies of the present
thesis.
All of the above approaches to reconciliation are integrative relying on a combination
of factors coming from different social psychological theories, such as the "contact
hypothesis" theory (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew 1998; Hewstone & Brown, 1986b), the
"identity" theories (Tajfel, 1978; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell 1987;
Hewstone & Cairns, 2001) and inter-group emotions theory (Smith et al., 2003).
However, due to the extensive literature on certain of these theories and due to the
different focus of the present thesis (looking mainly at the role of trust and emotions
in reconciliation), these theories ~ere not further addressed. Furthermore, it has to be
mentioned that the same reasons apply for the non-description of many strategies
which have been developed for conflict resolution based on concepts different to
those of interest to the present thesis (e.g. strategies based on cooperativeness-
assertiveness, Fisher, 1991; strategies based on third party consultation, Blake,
Shepard & Mouton, 1964; Burton, 1969; Doob, 1970; Kelman, 1972; Fisher, 1972;
strategies based on the combination of positive and negative incentives, one of them
being the "Graduated Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction", Osgood, 1962;
Etzioni, 1962).
3.6 People's perceptions of the solutions to the conflict
In the process of trying to achieve conflict resolution, through the development of an
array of theories and strategies, negotiators, politicians and researchers often disregard
people's opinion at grass roots level concerning the solutions to the contlict. The main
reason this happens is because they do not believe that people have an informed
opinion on the possible solutions to complex conflicts where so much is at stake at
different levels and for so many people. However, people's knowledge or lack of
knowledge should not be assumed before it is empirically confirmed. Research at
grass roots level concerning the solutions available is limited, which shows the lack of
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importance attributed to the people, even though they constitute the conflicting parties
and they are those called to live peacefully after a solution has been agreed upon by
politicians. In the referendum that took place in Cyprus in 2004, people were called to
vote for or against a certain agreement plan only 20 days after the plan was officially
presented to the public by the UN and the Cypriot government. The resulting rejection
of the reconciliation plan by the majority of the Greek Cypriot community appeared
to surprise and disappoint not only the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan but also
other international agents. However, the results of the referendum should have been
expected; not only did the population have little time to think about the specific
measures of the plan and their meaning for the present and the future but also the
people were not previously consulted about the available solutions.
This lack of communication between the official negotiators/politicians and the public
in conflict contexts has been studied by Barzilai, Goldberg and Inbar (1991), who
looked at the differences between Israeli politicians' and the Israeli public's views on
the solutions to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It was found that politicians supported
the federal solutions more than the public did while the public supported autonomy
arrangements for the Palestinians more (p.191). While the majority had reported
trusting the government in the domain of national security, it still did not endorse the
leadership's opinions on a reconciliation plan. The researchers suggested that one of
the reasons why this difference existed was because the reconciliation plans which
involved federal schemes were very complex and had not been explained sufficiently
and effectively to the public. Therefore, while politicians could understand them and
their implications for the future, the public was left just to speculate based on the
limited knowledge available to them in the media or through politicians' short and
emotional speeches.
The isolation and disregard of the public's views could be related, however, to two
other reasons: Barzilai et al. (1991) suggested that the dynamics of internal politics
and the influence of external powers, which try to promote their own interests through
the national political parties' standpoints, could also be responsible for these results.
The same reasons could be considered in the understanding of the rejection of the
Annan plan in the 2004 referendum in Cyprus, since, on the one hand, the plan was
not presented to the public in a detailed way, and, on the other hand, public opinions
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on reconciliation were not examined prior to the referendum. As for the role of the
dynamics of internal politics and of the influence of external powers, they have been
both considered influential in Cyprus (Trimikliniwti, 2006) but not linked to the
people's views. This gap in the literature concerning people's opinions on the
solutions to the conflict was addressed by the present thesis, which explored not only
the prevalence of different solutions amongst the Greek Cypriot youth but also the
factors which affect these preferences.
However, one of the prerequisites for acceptance of the "other" (Kelman, 1978) is that
people understand that their desires and hopes for a solution do not always correspond
to what could realistically happen. They have to differentiate between their preferred
solutions for the conflict and the solutions they find feasible/acceptable, even if these
do not correspond exactly to their preferences. Inbar and Yuchtman- Yaar (1989)
conducted one of the rare studies on people's attitudes to different solutions in the
context of an interethnic conflict. This study was conducted in Israel and Palestine,
where Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs and West Bank Arabs were asked about the solutions
they desired versus those they considered acceptable. Great disparity amongst the
desired and the acceptable solutions was found, both at an inter-community level
between the Israelis and Palestinians, but also at an intra-group level within the Israeli
community. It was also found that people differentiated between the desired and the
acceptable solutions, and that the solutions of either type (preferred/acceptable)
changed depending on the time of the study. Age and economic status did not have a
strong predictive power on either choice of solution, education and religiosity had a
limited power within each nationality, and only locality (rural/urban environment)
appeared to play an important role. The importance of location revealed that,
especially in rural settings, local political and social agents should be given more
credit for their role and work due to their influence on the local people. Since only
socio-demographic factors were considered in their study, questions are raised about
the influence of psychological factors on the choice of a desired or an acceptable
solution. In order to better understand this potential differentiation, as well as its role
in conflict resolution, the present study examined the role of different potential
demographic and social psychological factors in the choice of a solution in terms of
preference and feasibility.
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3.7 Conflict resolution and young people
All the aforementioned theories and research have been developed in reference to an
adult population which in most conflicts has had direct experience of the violence of
the conflict; in contrast, the present research was interested in the views of Greek
Cypriot young people, who are, at the same time, the future active citizens of the
country who will take decisions on the future of the conflict, and a generation of
people who never had any direct personal experience of the violent events of the
conflict. The direct experience of the conflict assumed by the concepts discussed
earlier and the lack of research on young people could not allow a direct transfer of
the effects of these concepts from an adult population to a young population without
previous research. It is necessary, therefore, to examine both the reasoning processes
as well as the emotional processes of this specific population in order to understand
how the aforementioned factors relate to their attitudes toward reconciliation.
Similarly, also in the literature, an important differentiation should also be made
between research that has been conducted on young people who have experienced
both the everyday threat of violence and violence per se within a conflict (e.g.
Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine) and research which has been conducted on
young people who have not had any experience of protracted conflicts (e.g. in
Norway or Hoiland). However, Cyprus's young people could be considered in-
between these two cases since young Greek Cypriots have never had any personal
experience of violence but have lived all their lives in a divided society where the
presence of the army and the threat of a future attack by the "enemy" out-group have
always existed. Based on this particularity, examples of both types of literature are
going to be included in the present section, as they could both be informative about
this population's attitudes.
It has to be emphasised that, reviewing the literature on conflict resolution and young
people, the majority of research on young people who have had direct experience of
political violence focuses on the psychological effects of the violence 011 young
people (Cairns, 1987; Dyregrov, Gupta, Gjestad & Mukanoheli, 2000; Thabet, Abed,
Vostanis, 2002; Muldoon, 2004; Gallagher, 20(4) and on the role and meaning of
national and religious identification for them in the context of the conflict (Trew,
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2004; Muldoon, McLaughlin, Trew, 2007). On the other hand, research on young
people who did not have experience of conflict violence, has focused on more general
proeessesrelated to attitudes towards conflict such as the meaning of the concepts of
"war" and "peace" and moral reasoning (Alvik, 1968; Cooper, 1965; Hakvoort &
Oppenheimer, 1993).
Both in developmental and in social studies, the conceptualisation of "peace" and
"war" and the relationship of these conceptualisations with demographic
characteristics have been considered crucial for understanding young people's
attitudes to conflict situations. Alvik (1968) studied the development of school
children's views on war and peace in Norway and found that although age did not
play an important role for the knowledge of concrete information about war and
peace, it did seem to play an important role when the ability for reciprocal reasoning
was involved. Children tended to view conflict from only one point of view and when
people tried to present to them the wider context in order to facilitate the examination
of the conflict from the two conflicting sides, children had difficulty in following the
logical reasoning. Children tended to prefer to take just a receptive role and not a
participative one in such conversations and to get information about these issues
generally from the source that would present the facts in the most simplistic way
(which was often their parents).
However, with age, children increasingly appeared to make use of more sources of
information from their environment and to associate reconciliation with peace. With
age, there was also a decline in the tendency to regard parties as either wrong or right,
although, at least in the research reviewed by Alvik, there were still a few cases in
adolescence where the possibility of right-wrong persisted. This was attributed to an
"invariant of morality" characteristic of adolescence, according to which teenagers
conceive only a certain amount of morality to distribute among parties; when one
party is right, the other cannot be right as well, it has to be wrong. Alvik (1968) also
found evidence for the importance of the socio-economic status of the children for the
conception of abstract and concrete aspects of war and peace and reciprocal
reasoning. High socio-economic status parents appeared to engage more in
conversation with the children and differential interpretation of the information which
seemed to playa role in the conception of both abstract and concrete aspects of war
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and peace by their children; furthermore, high socio-economic status seemed to be
related to higher ability in reciprocal reasoning although this was not found in the
analysis in reference to the concept of peace. Both of these factors, socio-economic
status and ability of reciprocal reasoning, were also found to be related to moral
judgement of war, since the conception of both parties being right in a war (both the
attacker and the defender) increased with age and the conception of the defender
being right and the attacker being wrong decreased. Both moral judgement and
reciprocal reasoning were found to change and become more subtle with age, given
that subjects made increasing use of all sources ofinformation around them and not
only of their parents.
On the other hand, research on children who have had direct experience of conflict
(McLernon, Ferguson & Cairns, 1997) has shown that it is not only age which can
shift children's one-sided perception of the conflict towards a mutual perception of it
but also the experience of peace events. In their study which was conducted on 14-15
year old Northern Irish adolescents before and after the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires,
they found a shift in the view first of the concept of war and peace and second of the
causes of the contlict before and after the cease tires. Adolescents who were 14-15
year old before the ceasefires tended to view the conflict as a one-sided conflict
initiated by one national leader, attributing therefore the causes of the conflict only to
one side whereas those who were 14-15 year old after the ceasefire tended to view the
contlict in terms of an ensemble of war activities, in terms of the consequences of war
activities and mutual conflicting acts, attributing therefore the causes of the conflict to
both Sides. As the age was the same, age could not have been the factor which
triggered this shift. Schwebel (1982) argued that this shift (which must have been also
related to some "acknowledgement of the responsibility of their own group and
consequent willingness towards negotiation and resolution", p.724) must have been
related to a change in the perception of threat coming from the "enemy". Before the
ceasefires, children might have used denial of the threat and their own group's
responsibility in order to cope with the threat and the anxiety related to them while,
after the ceasefires, when they no longer felt the threat and therefore there was no
anxiety to cope with, they could easily view contlict in more general and mutual
terms (which is a view of war characterised as appropriate to their age group).
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Concerning the change in the perception of peace (McLernon et al., 1997), it was also
found that after the ceasefires participants felt less urgency to engage in inter-
communal talks or co-operation although they had a clearer idea of strategies to
maintain peace (the majority had selected disarmament). These results are very
important in that they show that after the end of conflicting acts, the consequent
decrease of threat leads to a decrease in young people's urgency to engage in active
peace building despite their increased awareness of the ways to maintain it; this
finding could also be indicative of Greek Cypriot youth's attitudes towards the
resolution of the Cyprus conflict.
The aforementioned studies have shown that young people's perceptions of the
concepts of war and peace vary with age but also with experience of conflict events.
Even though it has been shown that by adolescence people developmentally are able
to perceive the mutuality both of the causes and of the acts of violence within
conflicts (Cooper, 1965), research has shown that this perception could be hindered
by certain experience or lack of experience of events related to the relationship of the
two conflicting parties. The low or non significant role of age can also be shown by
research, which has revealed a similar lack of perception in adult populations of the
mutuality of conflict, in cases of protracted contlict (Bizman & Hofman, 1993). It has
been argued (Volkan, 2002) that the inability of people to view their own or their own
group's share of responsibility in the conflict is due to the tendency of large groups to
regress to the pre-adolescence stage in situations of severe anxiety; in these situations
the defence mechanism to protect oneself/one's group from the perceived threat is to
separate oneself/one's group as much as possible from the source of threat (the
threatening out-group in protracted conflicts). In this particular context, this process
involves demonization and dehumanisation of the enemy and denial of any
responsibility for the violence experienced. Therefore, whether developmentally
people are able to perceive certain processes does not appear meaningful in assessing
attitudes in conflict situations; it appears to be the perception of the events of the
conflict that mediates people's attitudes and should therefore be further researched to
understand these attitudes.
Apart from the conceptualisation of "war" and "peace", research on young people in
conflict environments has also focused on the role and meaning of national and
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religious identification. National identity is particularly important when conducting
research on this population since it is argued that it is shaped during adolescence
(Volkan, 1988). This is the time when all aspects of it take form and start becoming
clear in a young person's mind. Who someone is, what his/her aspirations are, all start
taking shape while emotions begin to be associated with certain ideas concerning
one's behaviour and attitudes. Subsequently, adolescence is the time when people
choose some of their memberships, the groups they belong to. Through these
memberships, they try to complete or just come closer to their desired self-image,
which makes them engage in these memberships with strong dedication and
determination. This is the reason why most dedicated volunteers, in religious groups
or the army, belong to this age group. In the present thesis, young people are therefore
expected not only to be aware of their own ethno-national group, its meaning and its
boundaries, but also to hold a considered opinion concerning their in-group, and the
ongoing conflict with the most salient out-group. Existing research (Muldoon et al.,
2007a) in conflict environments supports this expectation since it has been found that
adolescents think and use national and religious identity in very strategic ways.
Although at a personal level it has been found that young people ascribe very broad
boundaries to national and religious identity, their everyday life actions and choices
show that these boundaries are much stricter and more clear cut. Both what is
involved in a certain identity is clear as well as what is not involved in this identity,
which emphasises the differences between different groups of people.
It also has to be highlighted that national and religious identities are not distinct for
young people in certain conflicts; they have been found to overlap and the effect of
this overlap for the conflict has been increased inter-group rivalry and intolerance
(Muldoon et al., 200r; Muldoon, Trew, Todd, Rougier & McLaughlin, 2007). These
results emphasise the need to study both of these identifications in countries where
both religion and nationality have been used as boundary markers between groups,
like in Cyprus. However, these identity boundaries are not only present before a
solution has been found; they are very pervasive and have been found to constitute
points of inter-group division, also in the post-solution era (Muldoon et al., 2007b). In
reference to the Cyprus conflict, then, where the efforts for a solution have resumed, it
is necessary to study the relevance of these identities as it appears that, if they are not
70
dealt with before the solution, their effect could continue to be disruptive fur the inter-
group relationship after the solution as well.
Tolerance of the "other" appears to be the factor that the strength of an identification
moderates to influence inter-group relations. However, tolerance has also been
connected with political attitudes (left/right, "socialist/laissez-faire" and
"libertarian/authoritarian" attitudes) and education (Emler, 2002). More educated
people have been found to be more tolerant of people with different beliefs and
opinions than less educated people. The links have been mainly social and
psychological but there is also extensive research supporting the link between
cognitive abilities and tolerance through democratic values. Childhood prejudice has
been found to be related inversely to the development of moral reasoning while
democratic concepts and political tolerance have been found to be positively related to
cognitive development (Emler, 2002). The contribution of this cognitive constructivist
approach has been to show empirically that social knowledge and consequently moral
judgements change progressively in life.
All these processes have been confirmed and also linked to conflict through research
(Adelson, 1971) which found a decreasing preference lor authoritarian solutions to
political conflicts during adolescence as well as an increased understanding of conflict
and of the need for political organisations later in adolescence (Berti, 1988). More
precisely, Berti found that 8-9 year olds were found to mention only "chiefs"
governing with orders and prohibitions, 10-11 year olds mentioned collective needs
and the existence of political organisation, 12-13 year olds thought that the whole
community made the laws and finally that the 14-15 year olds showed a deeper
understanding of conflict and of the need for political organisations.
In reference to conflict resolution and finding a solution which could accommodate
either of the conflicting parties or both parties at different/the same levels,
developmental studies have also studied whether there is also a development in
people's perception of personal and social interests and roles with age. Torney-Purta
(1983) has argued that there is a developmental aspect in the egocentrism of children
and their ability to perceive social roles; they tend to see civil rights and political
rights as more important than social or economic rights, and to see laws and policy as
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ways of protecting themselves from the general chaos of society. However, Torney-
Purta (1983) has also recognised that there are two processes taking place in all these
changes in the concepts of equality and justice/injustice: a developmental-constructive
process and a societal-transmission process. Gender but also social factors Stich as the
socio-economic background of the children and their environment, their place of
residence and their perceived self-efficacy, have been found to affect judgements of
equality and justice/injustice (Torney-Purta, 1983; Abrams & Emler, 1992).
In all of the aforementioned issues, an important question which has often been raised
by researchers is the role of parental choices on their children's attitudes. The
influence of both parental political identity and ideology (Niemi & Jennings, 1991)
and parental identity socialisation (Muldoon et al., 200711) on children's own choice of
political identity, ideology and national and religious identity socialisation has heen
documented. It is also worth noticing that parental influence has been found to he
"natural" and "inevitable" (p.579) without parental conscious effort to educate, to
transmit these values/beliefs to their children. Everyday experience appeared to make
young people understand how their parents differentiated between people and what
the boundaries were (Muldoon et al., 20078).
Concerning political ideology, Converse (1964) has argued that it is not just an issue
of who is influencing whom in order to see the direction of a person's ideology hut
that the same person can hold different opinions or opinions of different strength on
the same issue, and that these opinions can change over time. Emler (2002) has also
identified five factors that seem to play an important role affecting young people's
choices, apart from parental choices: interest in political matters, attentiveness,
knowledge, opinionation and ideologically based consistency. All these factors seem
to be related to each other and any change in any of them could provoke a change in
some of the other factors as well (Emler, 2002).
Many factors seem to influence young people's political attitudes and moral reasoning
and as an extension to that their attitudes to conflict situations. Amongst all of these
factors, the present thesis focused only on a small, number of factors which were
widely accepted, already empirically tested and operationalised, since the aim of the
present research was not to explore or to confirm the developmental existence of these
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factors but to understand in depth the psychological barriers of conflict resolution for
young Greek Cypriots who never had any personal experience of the causes or the
violence of the Cyprus conflict.
3.8 Research Questions
The above review has identified a range of social psychological factors and processes
which could affect the willingness to resolve a conflict in adults and young people.
These include identities, distrust, inter-group negative emotions, unilateral
victimisation, cultural differences, incompatibility of interests, needs and power,
political ideology, knowledge of political issues and political interest. However,
different solutions to a conflict exist and reconciliation is one of the most difficult to
achieve because it involves complex processes, such as mutual acceptance and
forgiveness.
Amongst the models which have tried to describe and explain in psychological terms
the process of contlict resolution, Fisher's model (1990, 2000) is the most
comprehensive one, incorporating most of the aforementioned factors. However,
despite its comprehensiveness, it does not take into consideration and does not
describe in detail the effect of certain factors, such as distinct inter-group emotions,
inter-group political trust and reconciliation. The present thesis aims therefore to
assess the usefulness of Fisher's model for examining the relationship between social
psychological factors (including the factors which were not originally included by
Fisher) and willingness to reconcile. Willingness to reconcile was considered both in
general terms and in terms of willingness to accept a specific reconciliation plan. The
question which the present thesis tries to answer is: What is the explanatory power of
each of these factors for willingness to reconcile and willingness to accept a
reconciliation plan?
Apart from the model by Fisher (1990, 2000), the present thesis also considered it
essential to assess the relationship of Kelman's (1978) prerequisites of acceptance
with reconciliation, since acceptance is argued to be one of the first steps of
reconciliation (Kelman, 1978; Long & Brecke, 2003; Rouhana, 2004). Their
explanatory power was also studied in relation to willingness to reconcile and
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willingness to accept a reconciliation plan. Assessing the explanatory power of
different social psychological factors and the prerequisites of acceptance for
willingness to reconcile in general and willingness to accept a reconciliation plan, the
present study aims to explore the potential difference between these two attitudes. Do
they constitute the same attitude or should they be considered as two separate
attitudes?
Following the pre-requisite which states that members of conflicting groups have to
differentiate between their wishes and what could realistically happen (Kelman, 1978;
Inbar & Yuchtman- Yaar, 1989), young Greek Cypriots' preferred solutions and those
considered feasible were examined in terms of both prevalence and their constituent
factors. The explanatory power of the prerequisites of acceptance and of social
psychological factors (such as inter-group trust, patterns of identification, inter-group
negative emotions, unilateral victimization, cultural differences, conflict of interests,
needs, power) were examined for solutions in terms of feasibility and in terms of
preference. The aim was to explore whether young Greek Cypriots differentiate
between the solutions they consider feasible and those they prefer and where these
differences lie in social psychological terms.
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· Chapter 4: Trust in the context of conflict resolution
" ... the most important thing is that after this period the Germans win back trust"
Helmut Kohl to Alexei Kosygin, when he visited the Soviet Union in 1975
(Ash, 1993, p.11 0).
This chapter examines, first, the usefulness of the concept of trust in the context of
inter-group conflict, second, how the concept was defined, third, the mechanisms and
factors affecting inter-group trust and, fourth, the actions necessary to re-build trust in
contlict situations.
4.1 The relevance of the concept of trust for conflict resolution and the
conceptualisation of trust
As, described in chapter 3, trust is one of the most recently acknowledged and studied
concepts in relation to inter-group contlict resolution (Kelman, 2005; Siovic, 1993).
Despite the only recent focus on trust, the relationship between trust and contliet has
been characterised as "obvious" (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000, p.86). based on the
property of trust to promote peoples' relationships and facilitate the resolution of
conflicts. On the other hand, lack of trust makes people suspicious and generates
"animosity" and "pain that is not easily forgotten" (p.86). Therefore, trust constitutes
a key factor for relationships, both at an individual and at a group level (Luhman,
1979).
A trusting relationship has been recognised not only as the ultimate goal of a
reconciliation process in conflict situations but also as an important factor during the
negotiation period between adversaries, due to its effect on communication (Kelman,
20(5). When there is trust, communication becomes smooth and effective while when
there is lack of trust, communication becomes problematic and unsatisfactory (Slovic,
1993). Siovic (1993) has highlighted processes of human psychology that lead to an
asymmetry of perseverance between trust and distrust. He has argued that events that
destroy trust are more visible and carry more weight for people than trust-building
events. Additionally, more credibility tends to be attributed to sources that destroy
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trust than sources that build trust. Finally, as with trust, distrust has the ability to form
and affect future beliefs and perceptions of events which lead to its perpetuation.
Therefore, much more effort is necessary in order to build trust than to destroy it. In a
. protracted conflict, like the conflict in Cyprus, mutual distrust is taken for granted by
adversaries. However, it has been argued that peace cannot be achieved without even
some signs of mutual trust. Building these initials signs of trust is, therefore, one of
the first challenges of conflict resolution.
In the literature of conflict resolution concerning personal and professional
relationships, Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) took into consideration the effect of risk
involved in a trusting relationship and argued that trust is often the first component of
a relationship to be affected when something starts to "break" and one of the most
difficult ones to repair. When conflict erupts, trust expectations are violated and
distrust starts generating. The more distrust generated, the more people consider the
other person unreliable and threatening, and the more they try to defend themselves or
win in the conflict. In order to explain 110W the concept of trust emerges and operates
in group/individual professional/personal conflict resolution, Lewicki and Wiethoff
argued for the division of trust relationships in two types. This proposed division
followed the general divide of the conceptualisation of trust in the trust literature
(Tyler & Degoey, 1996), according to which, the psychological dynamics of trust
operate based either on a calculative/instrumental model (where trust depends on
previous experience and the evaluation of the gains and costs of having a trusting
relationship) or on an emotional/relational model (where trust is based on the motives
of the target, the ethics of the target's behaviour, as perceived by the trustee).
Following this divide, Lewicki and Wiethoff have argued for the division of trust
relationships in "calculus-based" and "identification-based" relationships, often one
following the other; a relationship is often first "calculus-based" and then becomes
"identification-based". First, people respect the terms of the relationship because they
are afraid of the consequences if they do otherwise, since the gains of a trusting
relationship are more important than the costs of losing it. However, it is not fear that
can strengthen a relationship, but the common goals, values and identities that
develop through time. These factors then constitute the "identification-based" trust,
which can be either the continuation of "calculus-based" trust or a different type of
trust from the beginning. It is argued that "calculus-based" and "identification-based"
76
trust can coexist within most relationships as they can refer to different aspects of the
same relationship; based on that, elements of both trust and distrust in a certain target
could also coexist, since each one could be about a different issue (Lewicki &
Wiethoff, 2000).
This distinction between "calculus-based" and "identification-based" trust also
follows and reflects a divide concerning the two types of criteria based on which trust
has been conceptualised in theories of general trust; it has been argued that trust
depends on two distinct issues (Easton, 1975; Barber, 1983; Metlay, 1999; Tyler &
Huo, 2002), the performance (in terms of efficiency and effectiveness) of the target of
trust and the moral/emotional characteristics of the target of trust, However, in
contrast to Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000), none of these theorists has emphasised the
importance of the aspect of the relationship trust refers to, and, therefore, the
possibility that the same target can be trusted about certain issues and distrusted about
others.
On the other hand, particularly in international relations, which is the context of
interest in the present thesis, although there is no theory on trust, its importance has
long been emphasised but only as a consequence or as an "epiphenomenon" (Larson,
1997, p.703). There are two dominant views 011 trust in international relations: one is
that adversaries should not count on trust because an opponent can never be trusted,
and the other is that trust should exist in terms of cooperation between adversaries
only as long as one can monitor the other's actions. Both views follow a
conceptualisation of trust based only on the "calculus-based" type of trust
relationships. The "identification-based" type of relationship has not been fully
addressed; however, the latter theorists also believe that along with the conflicting
interests, insecurity and uncertainty play an important role in the creation of
trust/distrust and therefore in the de-escalation/escalation of the conflict. This indirect
mention of trust has given rise to three theories which have supported the importance
of trust as a separate concept in international relations: a theory of rational choice, a
theory of domestic structures and legitimacy and a psychological theory (Larson,
1997).
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In the theory of rational choice, economists have defined trust "as a particular level of
subjective probability that this other will perform an action upon which one's own
decision depends and in a context where one must decide before the other's behaviour
can be monitored" (Gambetta 1988). According to this definition, the level of trust
during a peace agreement varies and depends on the perceived seriousness and the
gravity of the concessions that both parties are willing to make. In order to make a
judgement on the gravity and the seriousness of one's concessions, a party looks at
the reputation and the public record of behaviour of its opponent. The more times a
party has cooperated, respected commitments, and told the truth, the more likely it is
to be considered trustworthy. This theory is very calculative and excludes any
emotional or ethical consideration of the target of trust.
On the other hand, the theory of domestic structures and legitimacy assumes that
people do not only distrust based on the calculative examination of the benefits and
costs of cooperation, as the first theory did, but that their trust levels are manipulated
by politicians and policy makers for the benefit of their own positions in conflict. This
theory suggests that some politicians, negotiators and policy makers try to validate
and promote the legitimacy of their ideology and of themselves by maintaining an
external enemy for their in-group. Maney, Ibrahim, Higgins and Herzog's (2006) have
argued in support of this theory that political leaders play sometimes on the trust
levels of their electorate towards specific threatening out-groups in order to persuade
the electorate to vote for them or to persuade them to vote for specific actions to be
taken. In order to achieve this they manipulate the image of the enemy and reinforce
the levels of distrust in the opponent. They argued that the example of Slobodan
Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman who reinforced feelings of hatred and mistrust towards
the adversary ethnic groups to maintain their power was characteristic of this function
of trust in the context of a contlict. Larson (1997) has also argued that the same
strategy was used by US politicians who exaggerated the Soviet threat in order to
persuade the people of the correctness of the government's positions and actions
towards the Soviet Union, overshadowing any other conflicting positions by different
organisations within the country. In this way they aimed to suppress any mixed
feelings of the in-group people towards the out-group, and of the opponent out-group
people towards the in-group. Even though this theory does not argue that political
leaders try to suppress ideological pluralism to increase inter-group trust, (but to
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decrease it), it should be pointed out that it has been argued that ideological pluralism
within a country/a group, leads to the decrease of the group's trustworthiness vis-a-vis
its opponent groups. The possibility that the government could change its position due
to pressure from non-governmental organisations or that a group's position could
change due to the change of leadership renders a government and the whole group
more susceptible to failure to fulfil their guarantees, and therefore, less trustworthy in
its opponents' eyes.
In contrast to the previous two theories, in the psychological theory, trust has been
defined (Deutsch, 1958) as the feeling of relying on another party at the risk of
negative consequences, should the other party decide to cheat or take revenge. In
particular, therefore, in conflict resolution, parties would not be able to engage in any
sort of negotiation or agreement if there was no trust. Larson (1997), reviewing the
literature on trust in psychological terms, narrowed down the meaning of trust to three
concepts: predictability, credibility and good intentions. Predictability refers to the
expectancy that the other person/group will behave in a certain way, based on his/its
past behaviour. Predictability promotes trust through the assumption of continuity and
generalisability in a party's behaviour. Credibility refers to the belief that the other
party will "fulfil its commitments and promises"; however, as with predictability, it
does not involve any reassurance that the other party will not harm one's. interests.
The least fragile of the three is believing in the other party's good intentions. When a
person or a group believes that the other party is well intended, it can discard any lies
or inconsistencies in its behaviour in order to maintain the coherence with the initial
belief of good intentions. In this theory, as well as in the theory of rational choice, the
importance of the context and of the target is crucial. Not everyone can be trusted and
not on any issue. The level of trust varies according to the issues treated and
according to the target's current and past positions and behaviour, as well as the
history of the relationship between adversaries.
In contrast to the theories of general trust (Barber, 1983; Peter, 1997; Metlay, ]999),
of political trust (Stokes, 1962; Tyler & Degoey, 1996; Mishler & Rose, 1997) or of
trust in the context of conflict resolution at a professional/personal level (Lewicki &
Wiethoff 2000), the aforementioned theories of trust in the context of international
conflict resolution are not integrative; each one has emphasised only one aspect of
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trust. Furthermore, none of the three theories refers to the trustee's emotions towards
the target of trust or the evaluation of the target's emotions towards the trustee. Even
the psychological theory which addresses the issue of "good intentions" does not
specify whether these intentions are ethical or emotional/relational, or whether they
refer just to the processes followed by the target (Easton, 1975; Tyler & Huo, 2002).
Only Nadler and Saguy (2004) referred to the distinction between "calculus-" and
"identification't-based trust. (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000) in the context of
international/intra-national contlict resolution arguing that they correspond to the
divide of barriers to contlict resolution in the interest and socio-emotional differences
between adversaries. Concerning the latter in particular, they argued that there are two
blocks of emotions that have to be overcome in international/intra-national contlict
resolution: the emotions of distrust and the emotions of feeling victimised. In
reference to the calculus- and identification-based trust, they argued that the process
of rebuilding trust (trust-building reconciliation) aims at the establishment of calculus-
based trust and the process of overcoming victimisation (socio-emotional
reconciliation) 'aims at the establishment of identification-based trust. Trust-building
is a long slow process which allows people to coexist peacefully, though separately
from each other. On the other hand, the socio-emotional reconciliation is supposed to
be a quicker process; once there is a consensus on who the victim is and who the
perpetrator, and once the perpetrator decides to apologise for their past wrong-doing,
adversaries can move to a new relationship, under a common group identity, leaving
behind them the old identification differences that were preserving the conflict. Also,
following Lewicki and Wiethoff's claim that calculus-based trust should precede
identification-based trust, Nadler and Saguy (2004) argued that some 1rust should
exist before adversaries tried to overcome the victim-perpetrator feelings, otherwise
the actions to be taken during the socio-emotional reconciliation would not succeed.
Even if this theory addresses the emotional aspect of distrust, it associates trust again
only with "calculus"-based trust and differentiates it from the socio-emotional and
"identification't-based dimension, which it associates with victimisation. Trust is
again conceptualised based on interest differences and the calculation of gains and
costs. The gap of the relationship between trust and emotions and the dialogic aspect
of emotions is addressed by the present thesis in reference to willingness to reconcile.
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The relationship between trust and reconciliation has been made salient by Nadler and
Liviatan (2007), even if only as a mediator. Their results showed that trust is an
important mediator of responses of one party to expressions of empathy and assuming
of responsibility by the other party for its wrongdoing. They found that, under
conditions of trust, expressions of empathy by one group tended to elicit consequent
mutual expressions of empathy and acceptance of responsibility while, in low trust
situations, expressions of empathy tended not to elicit any reciprocal empathy and
sometimes even elicited stronger beliefs of victimisation. The same relationship has
also been found during the negotiation process, as adversaries who do not trust each
other tend to see cooperative moves as deceptive efforts at exploitation and not as true
expressions of good intentions (Rothbart & Hallmark, 1988). Darby and Schlenker
(1989) have also found that apologies made by adversaries are differently perceived
by recipient groups depending on the trustworthiness of the group that apologised.
When the group was considered as trustworthy, apologies led to more positive
evaluation by the recipient group than when it had not apologised. On the other hand,
when the group that apologised was considered untrustworthy, apologies led to a
worse evaluation than when there was no apology. This was due to the perception of
apology as a deceitful effort of manipulation, instead of a sign of willingness to
cooperate. Trust is therefore a key factor when considering processes of contlict
resolution. Acknowledgement of one's own wrongdoing and expressions of apology,
regret and empathy for the victim should not always be considered effective in
leading to reconciliation, as their effect appears to be mediated by perceptions of trust.
In the process of reconciliation, after the expression of empathy and apology by the
perpetrator, the "agreed" victim has to express their forgiveness to the perpetrator, so
that the feelings of victimisation are overcome and the conflict is resolved. The link
between trust and forgiveness has also been acknowledged and studied in the context
of the conflict in South Africa and Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, politicians
have emphasised the crucial role of forgiveness and its link with trust tor the
termination of the conflict in their public speeches. Senator Edward Kennedy said in a
speech while visiting Londonderry/Derry in January 1998:
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" ... the best way to ease these feelings (of tragedy) is to forgive and carryon - not to
lash out in fury, but to reach in trust and hope" (McLernon et al., 2003. p.15-16).
Empirical findings, both qualitative and quantitative (McLernon, Cairns & Hewstone,
2000), have confirmed the link between trust and forgiveness; trust has been reported
as an essential prerequisite for forgiveness. However, a differentiation has been found
between trust and forgiveness in the individual and trust and forgiveness in the group;
it has been found that it is easier to forgive an individual than a whole group because
it is easier to trust one person than a whole group of people. When trusting only one
person, one can evaluate or monitor his/her behaviour or feelings more easily than
those of a whole group. Furthermore, trusting a whole group would mean trusting all
its members, and no-one can be sure about all group members' beliefs or general
tendencies. Another differentiation has also been found between forgiveness of the
leaders ofa group and forgiveness of the members of the group; it has been found that
it is harder to forgive leaders of a group than members of the group. Quantitative
results (McLernon et al, 2000) on this relationship also showed that trust in the out-
group was positively correlated witb Torgiveness, independently of religious
denomination. In a later study, willingness to forgive was also negatively correlated
with experience of violence; participants who had experienced high levels of violence
had less contact and less trust in the out-group and showed less willingness to forgive
(Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, Niens, Noor, 2004). All these findings have not
only shown the important role of trust in conflict resolution, they have also shown its
close relationship with one of the constituents of reconciliation, forgiveness. Even
though forgiveness has not yet been officially or unofficially reported or addressed by
either conflicting side in Cyprus, it was taken into consideration in the present thesis
and its relationship with trust was further explored.
In most of the above theories and studies on trust in the context of conflict resolution,
the target of trust has not been addressed; there is no consideration or distinction
between the exact targets of trust. However, during a contliet and also during the
reconciliation process, adversary nations mainly communicate between themselves
through their (official and unofficial) negotiators and their political leaders (either
directly or indirectly through 3rd parties), and not at grassroots level. Therefore, apart
from inter-group social trust, another important factor which should be taken into
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consideration in conflict resolution is political trust (Watier & Markova, 2004). Since
mainly political leaders engage in communication between conflicting adversaries, the
issues of trust and forgiveness would also not be initially discussed directly between
grassroots communities, but, like all the other issues, at an inter-state level. Since
inter-state inter-group interaction appears to precede inter-people interaction, the trust
that citizens show in their leaders or the leaders of the adversary group is very
important for the resolution of the conflict. It has been argued that in very high-
control societies, where people do not have much freedom of choice or even
knowledge of the "actual" events, trust in the officials or in the institutions is higher,
than in less controlled, open and democratic societies. It is a form of "blind" trust,
related to the history of action of these institutions and to the lack of political
alternatives for people in these kinds of regime (Slovic, 1993) which leads people to
trust their officials. In democratic societies, it has been found that it is especially in
crisis situations, where people tend to have more trust in their government and their
president and to show support more for their decisions against threatening out-groups
(Baker & Oneal, 2001).
In the case of Cyprus, the results of the 2004 referendum showed the importance of
citizens' trust in their political leaders for the progress of the contlict and the
negotiation agreements. The people rejected the compromise plan proposed by the
UN, following the official position of their government, which confirmed the reported
high levels of trust in the government and the low levels of trust in the UN in the 2004
Eurobarometer.
Since political trust has not been addressed in the context of protracted conflicts,
theories of political trust will be considered from non-conflict contexts in the present.
review. Political trust has been generally conceptualized in similar terms to general
trust (Tyler & Degoey, t 996; Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000), with the
calculative/instrumental model and the social/relational model reflecting a big part of
its conceptualisation in the literature; however, these two models of general trust do
not cover two very prevalent aspects of political trust in the literature; first, the focus
of theories on the target of political trust and, second, the conceptualisation of
political trust through other concepts.
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The first important aspect which the above models did not address also constitutes
one important difference in the conceptualisation of political trust in contrast to
general trust (Luhman, 1979; Watier & Markova, 2004) and trust in contlict
resolution: the distinction amongst targets of trust (Gamson, 1968; Easton, 1975;
Weatherford, 1987; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Citrin & Muste, 1999; Citrin (1974);
Citrin & Green, 1986). Gamson (1968) has identified four targets of political trust: the
political institutions, the political regime, the political community and the incumbent
authorities while Easton (1975) has argued for only two targets, the political regime
and the political community; on the other hand, Citrin (1974) and Citrin and Green,
(1986) have argued for a differentiation between specific components of the general
target (e.g. the Congress, the President etc.) and later Mishler and Ro~e (1997) argued
for a more qualitative differentiation of trust taking into consideration the role of
institutions: trust in political institutions, in civil institutions and in institutions of
traditional authority. Even though theorists have not agreed on the exact number or
type of targets, they have emphasised the importance of the target of trust in the
conceptualisation of political trust since it determines the level of the effect of
different events on political trust and therefore the levels of trust in these targets
(Easton, 1975; Weatherford, 1987; Citrin & Green, 1986). However, in the conflict
resolution literature, this issue has not been addressed. Trust has always been
considered at an inter-group level, without any specification of either the trustee or the
target of trust. The present study took into consideration the importance of the target
of trust and further examined its role for trust in the context of conflict resolution
through the contlict in Cyprus.
Finally, the third prevalent issue in the conceptualisation of political trust in the
literature, which creates confusion for research focusing only on the concept of trust,
is that many theorists have conceptualized trust either through other concepts, or as
part of other concepts; Gamson (1968), Easton (1975) and Craig (1993) have argued
that trust is one form (along with legitimacy) of support for political targets while
Weatherford (1992) has argued that trust is part of legitimacy, part of the "fairness of
the political process". However, there are also other researchers who have not
differentiated at all between trust and other concepts such as confidence, faith
(Hupsey et aI, 2000) or belief and hope (Hornby, 2000), and they have just used them
interchangeably. The present study also took into consideration this confusion of the
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concept of political trust with these other concepts, and in combination with the
aforementioned importance of the target of trust, explored the relationship of these
concepts with trust in reference to different political and social targets in the context
of conflict resolution in Cyprus.
The present thesis addressed most of the identified gaps in the literature of trust in
conflict resolution, first by conceptualising trust along three distinct 'dimensions, a
cognitive, an emotional, and a behavioural one, based on Lewis and Weigert's (1985)
theory of general trust. Lewis and Weigert have argued that these three dimensions
are involved in all social experiences, in a temporal sequence; first, the cognitive and
the emotional bases of trust are being built and then the behavioural one. Concerning
the first one, people decide whom to trust or distrust based on their level of
knowledge or familiarity, via experiences, with the target of trust. It has also been
argued that people trust based on the assumption that others trust as well, however,
the degree people rely on the experiences and their former knowledge depends on the
type of the relationship.
Complementary to the cognitive base is the emotional component of the process of
trust. It has been argued that this component is also present in all forms of trust, but
mostly in interpersonal trust, since it focuses on the affective bonds among people.
However, research has shown that its role is also very important in institutional
relationships; people feel betrayed or outraged when they learn that politicians,
authorities, or other recipients of public trust are involved in scandals, which prove
their abuse of public trust and public interests. The role of emotions has also been
emphasised by other researchers (Macek & Markova, 200 I), who have found that
perceived justice, certainty, and confidence affect the view and the evaluation both of
society and daily experiences. Justice is related to the parliamentary and the legal
system as well as to many positive and negative emotions, especially when
democratic rules and norms are just developing. However, the emotional pain caused
when there is betrayal of trust influences not only the betrayed but also the violators.
Therefore, the emotional component of trust is also reciprocal and inter-subjective,
like the cognitive one. Finally, the third component of trust is the behavioural one,
which leads to the practical implications of trust. It is this component of trust that
involves risk since, on the one hand, people take the risk to trust other people based
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on the assumption that others will trust them as well but, on the other hand, it helps to
create the cognitive and the emotional base of trust. When people see others acting in
a trustful way, they become more eager to trust them themselves, while actions
implying trust also reinforce positive feelings amongst people who trust each other.
Lewis and Weigert (1985) explained the relationship of these three components and
the relationship of trust with other concepts by arguing that in every kind of
relationship these three elements co-exist, but each at different levels. If the "dosage"
of any component changes, then trust can be confused with other types of feelings or
processes; for instance, trust in everyday life may turn to faith and prediction, if either
feelings or knowledge are missing. In the "dosage" of the three components, the
influence of the environment in which trust is developed becomes very important. In
small societies, for instance, interpersonal trust is more likely to develop while, in
large and complex societies, where social relationships are based mostly on cognitive
rather than emotional trust, "system trust" is more frequent. The lack of consideration
of the "dosage" of these three components has been one of the major disadvantages in
the conceptualisation of trust in conflict resolution.
The present thesis endorsed this conceptualisation of trust, first because it is very
integrative and addresses three important and often neglected aspects of trust in the
context of conflict resolution and, second, because the theory's emphasis on the
dosage of the different aspects of trust and the influence from the environment on this
dosage addresses the gaps found in the literature of trust in inter-ethnic conflict
resolution concerning both the different concepts related to trust and the influence of
the target on the role of these concepts for trust.
4.2 Mechanisms affecting trust and correlates of trust in conflict resolution
After having looked at the importance of trust in the process of contlict resolution and
particularly of reconciliation, and the different conceptualisations of trust, different
mechanisms and correlates of trust were also examined since the creation,
maintenance, and intractability of a conflict are the result of an ensemble of
interrelated processes and factors.
86
Based on the theories of trust and conflict resolution, trust depends mainly on either
the assessment of the costs/gains ratio for the trustee, and/or the assessment of the
motives (ethical characteristics) of the target (Larson, 1997; Lewicki & Wiethoff,
2000). However, these processes are not considered sufficient to explain the whole
concept and function of trust/distrust in conflict resolution. There are more
mechanisms and factors that trigger, reinforce and finally solidify trust/distrust
between adversaries in a conflict.
One way a group assesses whether to trust/distrust an out-group is by looking into the
history of their relationship; the history of the relationship involves past actions,
positions and emotions of one party towards another. When one group has
experienced directly or indirectly or has even just heard about another group's
continuous disrespectful and deceitful or violent behaviour, belief's or emotions, first
it becomes suspicious towards it and then it turns against it. The more direct and
regular the experience of untrustworthy behaviour, the higher the suspicion and the
more intense the conflict. Untrustworthy behaviour could consist of both physically
violent behaviour, such as military or terrorist attacks, and morally or identity
threatening claims or actions (as described in chapter 3). Groups can feel insecure and
threatened both "existentially" but also in terms of their identity or dignity
(Breakwell, 1986).
In the Cyprus conflict, both communities have been feeling insecure and threatened at
different levels at different times. During the early years of the creation of the Cypriot
state, the Turkish Cypriots, felt threatened at both levels by Greek Cypriots, due to
institutional attempts to lower their institutional power, due to citizen and paramilitary
attacks against their properties and their people by Greek Cypriots, and due to the
possibility of Cyprus' union (enosis) with Greece, which they saw as the end to their
rights in their country Cyprus. After the Turkish invasion in 1974, their "existential
security" was granted, but not their institutional one, since they started living in a self-
acclaimed independent country isolated economically by the international community
(except for Turkey). On the other hand, Greek Cypriots also felt threatened by
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey both existentially and institutionally during the early
years of their newly formed state since they also suffered from Turkish Cypriot
paramilitary attacks and from what they saw as an attempt by a minority group to
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institutionally rule the country, or even to divide the country (taksim) through the
intervention of Turkey. Their fear became real with the 1974 Turkish invasion since
when Greek Cypriots have continued to feel "existentially" threatened (Hadjipavlou,
2002) by Turkey.
Concerning now the perception and attribution of untrustworthy inter-group
behaviour, Larson (1997) has argued that an opponent's hostile behaviour or feelings
tend to be attributed to the ideology or the bad character of the opponent and are never
perceived as a response to one's own hostile positions or actions. On the other hand,
one tends to attribute one's own hostile behaviour mainly to situational factors or to
the behaviour of the opponent and never to endogenous factors; it is being perceived
as a security necessity, attributed to defensive reasons, and not to imperialist
aspirations, as the behaviour of the opponent group would have been. This difference
in attribution happens partly because people do not understand the repercussions of
their actions, or the way their actions could be perceived by an out-group. In the
context of protracted conflicts, groups often consider themselves as the victims of
their opponent's hostile behaviour while they do not acknowledge the same feelings
of victimisation for their opponents. This is directly also linked with the differences in
the way history is perceived and portrayed by conflicting groups. Historical events are
taught at schools and become embedded in people's memory, consciousness and
"heart", in an opposing way between adversary groups. Heroes of one group are
considered murderers by the other group and vice versa. In the context of the Cyprus
conflict, both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot educators have admitted that this is
the way history is taught in both communities, a phenomenon which results 111
reinforcement of the inter-communal distance and distrust (Hadjipavlou, 2002).
Apart from the history of the relationship, there are also mechanisms which do not
cause but contribute to the maintenance or increase of distrust (Larson, 1997) like
cognitive rigidity, mirror images, "us versus them" thinking, and self-fulfilling
prophecies (initially mentioned by Charles Osgood 1959, 1962, in Larson, 1997). The
cognitive rigidity of the target group towards which reconciliatory moves are made,
and especially that of the negotiators, plays an important role in that respect. During
. the negotiations adversaries have to see and understand the existence of points of
view or interpretations of events other than their own and to accept that the opponent
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party might be genuinely willing to cooperate and that its reconciliatory moves do not
hide any deception (Larson, 1997). However, these are very big and difficult steps to
take since they require a change of one's well-established and sometimes long-held
beliefs and positions about the adversary group and the "reality" of events that have
taken place. These well-established beliefs have often been built upon or reinforced
by mirror imaging and "us versus them" thinking which are very prevalent processes
in conflict situations (Hadjipavlou, 2003). During these processes, positive attributes
are used for the in-group, for "us" while negative ones are used for the "others", for
"them". The negative attributes then often turn into a "demonisation" of the "other",
which not only preserves the conflicting status quo but also escalates it (Rouhana &
Kelman, 1994). This inverse thinking and treatment of the in-group and the out-group
is very characteristic of inter-group relations in conflicts. In the context of the Cyprus
conflict, however, existing research (Hadjipavlou, 2003) has not found the same
pattern in both groups. While Greek Cypriots were using negative attributes for the
Turkish Cypriots and positive ones for themselves, the Turkish Cypriots used positive
attributes for both themselves and the Greek Cypriots. These results reveal that the
link between trust and mirror imaging may not be direct in all cases. Low levels of
trust are not necessarily negatively related to mirror-imaging.
Along with mirror-imaging, self-fulfilling prophecies (Deutsch, 2006) also lead to the
reinforcement of distrust and the escalation of the conflict. This mechanism refers to
each party's expectancies about the behaviour of the other party or the progress of the
conflict, which finally become reality. People tend to provoke what they think might
happen or what they fear the most, without realising it. Expecting that the other party
will behave in a certain way, they act in a way that provokes this specific behaviour
by the other party; adversaries, fearing that they will be treated violently or unfairly,
themselves behave unfairly or violently, thus provoking the unfair or violent
behaviour towards them which is expected by the other party. In this way adversaries
end up believing that the other party is violent, unfair, and untrustworthy based on
rea] events.
In a conflicting relationship, all of these mechanisms reinforce each other's views and
finally reinforce distrust, based on the dynamic and reciprocal character of trust and
conflicts. While these mechanisms reinforce distrust and the intensification of the
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conflict, different factors affect the creation and the maintenance of either trust or
distrust.
As described in chapter 3, Fisher (1990) has identified conflict of power, of values, of
needs and of interests, the history of antagonism, cultural differences and identity as
indirect antecedents of trust, through the perception of threat, but since he perceived
this relationship only as indirect, he did not elaborate on their relationship with trust.
However, the direct relationship of some of these factors with trust has been made
salient in different studies on conflict resolution and reconciliation (Nadler & Saguy,
2004; Davidson, McElwee, Hannan, 2004; Maney, Ibrahim, Higgins & Herzog,
2006).
Rubin and Brown (1975), looking empirically at the relationship of trust, cooperation
and power, found that equal power and high trust situations promote cooperativeness
at a higher level, than lower trust and unequal power situations do. This argument was
also taken into consideration by Davidson, McElwee and Hannan (2004), who then
examined the relationship of trust and power with conflict resolution at an
occupational context. They argued that low trust was related to low concern for the
other party, which finally inhibited the use of cooperative strategies to resolve conflict
situations. Although the study was conducted in an occupational/small-scale conflict
environment, it is worth mentioning that it was found that high trust situations
promoted the extensive use of cooperative strategies and provoked higher levels of
satisfaction with the outcomes. These findings are also consistent with research
showing that high levels of trust reduce subjects' risk taking of losing their dignity,
their honour, which leads people to focus on more practical issues of contlict, which
makes conflict resolution quicker and more likely to succeed. It was also found that
people not only gained instant satisfaction from the resolution of the conflict, under
high trust levels, but were also motivated to avoid further conflict in the long term as
well (Rubin & Brown, 1975; Zand, 1972; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). The effect of
power however extends also to the strategies employed to resolve conflicts and
achieve an outcome. Davidson et at (2004) have found that participants in unequal
power situations use more dominating and authoritarian strategies to resolve conflicts
than people in equal power situations. This has also been consistent with research that
has found that it was the people who were in power positions who tended to use more
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dominating strategies and that the reasons this happened were, first, because they had
the power to do it and, second, because they managed to achieve their goals more
easily this way (Drory & Ritov, 1997; Rahim, 1986; Olekalns, 1997).
The importance of power in a trust relationship between adversaries has also been
emphasised by research that has compared the strengths and weaknesses of one
"successful" (The Belfast Good Friday Agreement) peace process and one "failed"
(the Oslo process) peace process (Maney, Ibrahim, Higgins & Herzog, 2006). In this
analysis, trust was linked with certainty (they were used almost interchangeably)
which made the factors found relevant to certainty also relevant to trust. In this study,
the role of empowerment was emphasised both between the parties and within each
party. On the one hand, for a successful peace agreement, it was found that power has
to be balanced between the adversaries in such a way that neither of them feels they
are being undermined because this balance reduces the violence and also makes the
parties commit more to the peace process. The higher the numbers of domains of
empowerment, the more adversaries support the peace process. On the other hand,
this empowerment has to take place also within the parties. Elites have to
acknowledge the power of the people, represented in some cases by certain unofficial
organisations, and to understand their demands and needs. Lack of communication
among people, across and within communities, leads to distrust and uncertainty. Both
in the Oslo peace process and in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement (BOFA),
paramilitary groups were involved in the negotiations and were given the power to
support their positions and finally implement some of their propositions, which
proved not only the adversary's goodwill to listen and negotiate but also the
willingness of their own elite to cooperate and acknowledge the paramilitary groups
as important representatives of the country.
However, while in the BGFA referenda were also conducted to ask for the people's
consent to the signing of the agreement, in the Oslo process, only the elites signed the
agreements without consulting the people at grassroots level. This had a very big
effect on the implementation of the Oslo agreement since many groups opposed the
agreement that was signed and did not allow. its implementation. In the Oslo process,
this lack of empowerment extended also to the protection of minority human rights,
which left the less dominant group, the Palestinians, insecure and unprotected again
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while in the BGFA, appropriate measures were taken immediately so as to protect the
less powerful group (the Unionists).
However, power is not only directly regulative of trust and cooperation, it has also
been found to influence them indirectly, by affecting three more factors that are
directly linked with trust-building: social identity processes, cultural differences and
third party intervention (Fisher, 1990; Nadler & Saguy, 2004).
The role of identity has been recognised as crucial for certain con1licts (see chapter 3),
especially those which have been characterised as "identity-based" conflicts, Cyprus
being one of them. However, identity has been found not only to constitute the source
(through the negation of the identity of the other, Kelman, 2004) of the conflict but
also to affect the factors, such as trust, through the accentuation or de-emphasis of the
conflicting identities between adversaries that lead to its escalation/de-escalation,
whether this is extended violence or some form of peaceful resolution (Nadler &
Saguy, 2004). The implication of power in this process is that power relationships
between conflicting parties and third-parties determine the level the interests and the
needs (including needs for identity recognition) of each party will be addressed in the
negotiation process and also the ways these will be addressed. The more powerful a
party is or is perceived to be, the more satisfactory the negotiation outcome for its
material and identity needs is going to be (Kelman, 2004).
Apart from identity differences, cultural differences also constitute an important
factor that leads to distrust and uncertainty both during negotiations and after the
agreement ofa reconciliation plan. The relationship of power with cultural differences
was highlighted by Nadler and Saguy (2004), who found that Palestinians were at a
disadvantage, in comparison to Israelis, in a westernised context of negotiations
because of these differences. Definitions of basic concepts in international relations,
which play a crucial role in the relationship of adversary groups, are culturally
dependent. For instance, what constitutes a "binding commitment" can diner from
one culture to another, leading to misunderstandings, when these differences are not
identified. Symbolic gestures can also be and have often been misunderstood due to
cultural differences and language deficiencies, contributing also to the reinforcement
of distrust and the escalation of the contlict. Even if it could be only a
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misunderstanding that caused the escalation, the result would still have to be the
creation of very detailed, strict and costly contracts/agreements in order to de-escalate
the situation. The implementation of a common language that would help avoid or
resolve any linguistic or behavioural misunderstanding and a detailed programme of
the concessions to be made by each party would help to avoid such costly
contracts/agreements that only reinforce the feelings of lack of security and the
necessity to protect oneself from the other party. Examining the two aforementioned
peace processes and the importance of communicating openly all details of a peace
agreement, Maney et al (2006) explained that while in the Oslo process many issues
were not dealt with sufficiently, such as the political status of Jerusalem or the fate of
the Jewish settlers in the occupied territories, many subsequent agreements were
signed specifying the exact timetable of implementation of different concessions,
which gave people a feeling of certainty and trust in the opponent party and the peace
process. In contrast, in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement, while the measures
included in the agreement covered both parties' objectives and wishes, there was not
an exact timetable of the measures to be implemented. Although this part of the
agreement was left ambiguous on purpose, it reinforced uncertainty and distrust.
Another factor that could negatively affect certainty/trust among opponent parties is
the existence of a third party which is untrustworthy and shows favouritism to either
of the opponents. The USA's role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a characteristic
example of a third untrustworthy party which claims to work for the resolution of the
conflict but whose efforts have never been successful. The US government has always
acted as a protector of Israel while it has never taken a protective role for the
Palestinians (Nadler & Saguy, 2004). This factor has also been very important in the
Cyprus conflict since many international powers have been involved in the Cyprus
issue, trying to find a solution to the conflict. Even though international institutions,
such as the UN, the EU, Great Britain and the United States of America, have not
"rejected" any of the conflicting parties or have not expressed openly their
favouritism to either side, it is assumed that the strong favouritism of Greek and
Turkish politics to their respective "supported" side must have played a determinant
role in the historical and political situation of Cyprus, perpetuating a non-solution.
However, even if international institutions have not expressed their favouritism
directly to either side in reference to the conflict, there have been secret talks between
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the different parties, and economic and military agreements have 'been signed on the
side of the conflict between some of these third parties and the official state of Cyprus
or Turkey, which have reinforced the climate of distrust between the two conflicting
sides. Examples of such agreements are the US and Turkey nuclear and trade
agreements
(http://www .state.gov /p/ eur/rls/fs/ 105492.htm;http://www .state.gov /r/palei/bgn/343 2.
html) and the accession of Cyprus into the EU. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
have perceived these official agreements as expressions of favouritism towards either
of the sides, which could extend also to the resolution of the Cyprus issue, and have
solidi tied their initial belief that the only third party they could realistically rely upon
is their respective "motherland" (Greece and Turkey).
An important element in all of the above factors, which was described by Fisher
(1990) as the mediator of all of the aforementioned factors for trust, is threat. The
more threatening a group perceives the other group to be, the less trustworthy it finds
it and the more difficult and complex the process of conflict resolution becomes. The
importance and the complexity of threat lie one the one hand in the fact that it can be
symbolic or material (Stephan, Ybarra & Bachman, 1999); threat can touch many
aspects of individual and group needs, such as existential (needs for survival and
security) and identity needs (need for recognition, for belonging) which can be very
easily at risk (Breakwell, 1986; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Rousseau & Garcia-
Retamero, 2007). On the other hand, the difficulty of threat lies in the subjectivity of
perceived threat; what is perceived as threatening by one individual/group, can be
perceived as non-threatening/harmless by another. Levels of threat vary both across
individuals/groups and within groups or within individuals across time, based both on
macro and micro factors (Breakwell, 1986).
Threat is, however, not only a source of distrust but also a factor that
affects/moderates trust during the negotiation process. Peace processes, as described
by Maney et al (2006), are both disempowering and threatening, when perceived
under zero-sum assumptions. The concessions required by adversaries are by
definition disempowering unless people can view them from a more general and
longer-term perspective. People have to understand that agreement clauses, which
might appear disempowering and threatening to the ultimate cause of fighting, could
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be beneficial in the long term, or when considered in relation to the concessions made
by the other party. These fears of threat and insecurity could be and have been
exploited both by politicians towards their own people and by the "enemy". In both
aforementioned peace processes (BGF A and the Oslo process), there were events
which confirmed it; both religious and political leaders played upon the fears of their
in-group in order to be elected and supported in their decisions and their objectives.
Distrust, in this case, was found to playa moderating role, determining the extent of
the impact politicians have on the people or of the impact of the adversary group's
decisions.
Since political trust has not been extensively addressed in social psychological terms
in the context of inter-ethnic conflict resolution, certain factors that affect political
trust in general were considered since they could inform the aims of the present thesis.
Religion and political orientation are two factors which have been found to affect
political trust, Since the role of religion was recognised in the literature of social
sciences, there has been an increasing number of studies on its influence on different
domains of political, social and personal life. Concerning political trust, religion has
played an important role in the creation of international institutions and also in their
maintenance after the Second World War. Institutions are created in order to establish
and maintain stability and order in society (Devos, Spini & Schwartz, 2002).
However, in order for institutions to survive over time and influence nations' lives,
people have to trust them. Trust in institutions has been found to be associated with
values that prioritise stability and tradition (Devos, Spini & Schwartz, 2002), in
contrast to low trust in institutions which has been related to values promoting
independence and change. However, values do not exist independently. Religious
affiliation, which is also associated with traditional practices (Schwartz & Huismans,
1995), has been also found to be positively related directly to trust in institutions; the
more religious people are, the more they trust different institutions. However, it has
been found that it is not an one-way causal relationship between religious affiliation,
trust in institutions and this specific set of values, but a two-way influence.
Based on the examination of human values of people with different political
orientation and different religious beliefs, Devos et al (2002) also found that right-
95
wing supporters were also more likely to trust the government and its institutions. The
reason attributed to this result was again based on the values associated with
institutions and political orientations; the values of right-wing supporters appeared to
coincide more with the values promoted by public/governmental institutions. In
particular, right-wing supporters (along with religious individuals) believed In
preserving the status quo, the traditions and generally values such as certainty and
security in society, which are also promoted by institutions. On the other hand, left-
wing supporters (along with non-religious individuals) valued the independent and
individual, intellectual and emotional interests higher and showed more scepticism
towards institutions. However, distrust in institutions was found to be encouraged not
only by non-religious and left-wing supporters but also by the values promoted by
modem society; openness to change, self-direction and freedom were incompatible
with the sense of conformity, of security, and the promotion of traditions, which were
relevant to the preservation of institutions (Devos et al, 2002). In the context of
contlict resolution, where the dynamics of political parties have been found to play an
important role in the progress of the conflict (see chapter 3), political orientation is
expected to influence therefore inter-group social and political trust.
Furthermore, demographics, such as gender, age, place of residence, race, education
and income have also been found to influence, even if it is only at a low level
(Mishler & Rose, 2001), different types of trust and political trust in particular
(Abramson, 1983; Kanter & Mirvis, 1989) and they should also be taken into
consideration. In terms of gender differences, it has been found that women score
higher than men in measures of general trust (Wrightsman, 1964; Chun & Campbell,
1974; Rosenberg, 1957) and that men and women think only about interpersonal trust
in a different way. On the other hand, existing research on trust in the context of inter-
group conflict resolution has not found any significant gender differences (Nadler &
Liviatan, 2007). In terms of political trust, Mishler and Rose (2001) have found that
older people as well as people living in rural and smaller communities show higher
trust in institutions than younger people and people living in urban centres. In terms
of education, results have not been consistent across both western and eastern
European countries; education has appeared to be a signi ficant predictor in western
countries but not in eastern post-communist countries. The inconsistency of the results
concerning many demographic factors has shown that these factors are also related to
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more general societal characteristics such as the political system or the culture of the
country and could not be used in isolation to explain political or general trust.
The importance of culture in a group's levels of political trust has been argued by
different studies (Kim, Helgesen, Ahn, 2002; Macek & Markova, 2001; Sjoberg,
1999; Mishler & Rose, 1997). They have all emphasised and empirically shown that
even the meaning of trust changes from one country to another, from one language to
another. In Kim et al's (2002) study assessing and comparing democracy, trust, and
political efficacy in Denmark and Korea, it was found that it was the different culture
that led people to attribute different levels of trust in the government. Although the
basic principles of democracy, such as political participation, representation, liberty,
and decision making were accepted and followed, they were differently
operationalised and integrated in each country. While Danish participants showed that
they trusted their government and that they felt that the system was working well, .
Korean participants showed distrust and dissatisfaction with the performance of their
government. Very high governmental corruption indices, lack of transparency,
integrity, or accountability in the decision making of the elected officials in Korea
could probably explain the different level of political trust between the two countries.
The traditional moral and religious values, policies and practices differ from the
democratic ideals recognised in the West, and the coexistence of the two constitutes a
significant challenge for the Korean government and the people.
All of these factors, which have been found to affect inter-group social and political
trust, were taken into consideration in the present thesis and tested in relation both to
trust in different social and political targets relevant to the Cyprus contlict and in
relation to reconciliation as a form of conflict resolution.
4.3 Actions to promote trust
Based on the above concepts, specific actions - at a practical level - could be taken in
order to decrease some of the above factors and facilitate the building oftrust.
In a trust-building process, re~earchers (Nadler & Saguy 2004; Maney et al, 2006)
have argued that there are two main possible and sometimes opposing approaches to
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the use of social identity processes: the "re-categorisation" and the "sub-
categorisation" process. The former would try to find a group membership both
adversaries could identify with and try to promote it to them, leaving aside the
conflicting identifications that separate them. Within this new and common identity, it
is argued that adversaries would be able to cooperate effectively and develop their
mutual trust. Within this approach, another strategy would be, instead of finding a
new identity for both groups, just to focus on the existing non-conflicting identities
that transcend the conflicting ones (e.g. if conflicting identities concern ethnic
boundaries, then, gender, professional, ideological, class identities could be the ones
adversaries should focus upon) (Maney et al, 2006). On the other hand, according to
the latter approach, the different conflicting identifications should not be left on the
side but should be brought along in an effort to find common ground. While keeping
their separate identities, adversary parties should try to see what each one could
contribute to the benefit of the common goal. Power relationships have been found to
become regulative of the trust-building process at this point, by the control of the
choice of perspective by the groups. Nadler and Saguy (2004) have found that high
power groups tended to chose the "re-categorisation" perspective, while low power
groups chose the "sub-categorisation" perspective; while Palestinians, the low power
group, wanted to keep their national identity and emphasise their differences with the
Israelis in order to achieve a change in the status quo, Israelis, the powerful group,
tried to de-emphasise their differences with Palestinians and maintain the status quo.
Another practical step to promote inter-group trust is to ensure that the third party
monitoring the implication of the agreement is accepted by all conflicting sides. An
important factor for a third-party to be accepted is to be perceived as more po~erful
than the adversary parties. This would equalise the adversary groups' perceived power
and would therefore make the trust-building process and the whole reconciliation
process easier (Nadler & Saguy, 2004). For instance, during the Belfast Good Friday
Agreement (BGFA), international pressure was put on both parties to accept and
support the peace process, which either conflicting party would have found difficult to
oppose. The pressure was mainly coming from the US government, which is
perceived as more powerful than either adversary; an example of this pressure was the
fact that the Clinton government acknowledged both parties and gave a visa permit to
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the Sinn Fein president, putting pressure on the British government to include the
Republicans in the negotiations.
However, not only a third-party can promote trust, actions to win back trust are
required by both conflicting sides since trust and conflict are both identified as
interactive processes. States can use in combination "persuasion", "coercion" andlor
"accommodation" to encourage other parties to cooperate with them, however,
"accommodation" is what mostly induces the other parties' trust. "Accommodation"
involves making concessions in order to prove to the other party one's seriousness,
commitment and good intentions to transform the relationship and rebuild trust,
However, parties must be willing to make concessions even unilaterally in order to
prove their claims, without expecting reciprocation. These concessions will have to be
costly, to involve important sacrifices in order to convince the other party. Both
symbolic gestures and costly words can be an initial way to show one's willingness to
make concessions, even though actions have the most important and trust building
role. There are many examples of politicians who tried to build trust in this way and
achieved their goal. One characteristic example is the visit of Egyptian President
Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem after continuous conflicts and the refusal of Arab states to
recognise Israel. With this visit and in the speech he delivered during it, he showed
his recognition of Israel as a separate state within secure borders and declared that he
did not want any more war (Maoz & Felsenthal, 1987). In this case, both the gesture
of visiting Israel and the verbal public declaration of his willingness to terminate any
conflict and build a different relationship between the two countries were examples of
unilateral conciliatory actions that can lead to future cooperation.
In these efforts to overcome cognitive rigidity and suspicion and increase one's
trustworthiness, Larson (1997) argued that the messages conveyed from one party to
the other have to be first of all consistent. Since it is impossible to know one's "real"
intentions or ultimate goals, one looks for similar responses or similar reactions in
different situations, which could reveal the "real" motives and interests of that party.
Only if the different sources of information give similar responses will the target be
convinced about one's good intentions and decide to trust them again. This is the
reason why it is confusing for adversaries when different organisations or political
parties within a country support different resolution schemes (as it happens in
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pluralistic regimes). If one party perceives the other party's conciliatory moves to be
mere artefacts or to be hiding ulterior motives, then not only will these moves be
ignored but they will also increase the target's reservation and distrust. The power that
the party making the conciliatory moves is perceived to have, has been found to affect
also its acceptance by the adversary party. If it is perceived as less powerful than the
in-group, it can be considered as just trying to protect itself and not actually make
concessions on its demands or its positions.
Along with the concessions and the reconciliatory moves that both parties have to
make, cooperation is a factor embedded in the concept of reconciliation, which should
be considered in the present research because it has already been used by bi-
communal organisations in Cyprus working for the reconciliation of the two
communities. Nadler and Saguy (2004) have argued that cooperation is an important
condition not only for reconciliation in general but precisely for the process of trust-
building. Adversaries have to start working together towards a common goal on
frequent occasions, during which they will pay attention to the satisfaction not only of
their in-group' s interests but also of the out-group's interests. Jn this way, inter-group
interests will stop being antithetical, or mutually exclusive and become independent,
and in some cases even interdependent. Cooperation can make groups realise that they
can start trusting each other and relying on each other's words and actions. The
importance of cooperation for trust-building has also been argued by the contact-
hypothesis, which has been one of the most studied (theoretically and empirically)
and prevalent theories in conflict resolution in the last fitly years (see chapter 3).
Based on this theory, bi-communal organisations in Cyprus have organised bi-
communal seminars and activities, bringing into contact children from the two
communities.
Another very important factor in the practical building of trust between adversaries is
the passage of time. The Cyprus issue started at least 35 years ago and trust-building
moves have been scarce between the adversary parties, while, when they have
happened they have been treated with suspicion. There are plenty of examples in
world history which have shown that despite one party's conciliatory moves, the
target party remained suspicious and perceived the other party's moves as deceptive
or hiding ulterior motives. One example is the scepticism of George Bush towards
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Mikhail Gorbachev, despite the latter's numerous conciliatory moves such as the
release of political prisoners and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan
and from Eastern Europe in the late 1980s (Beschloss & Talbot, 1993). The target
party needs time to verify the promises and the reconciliatory actions undertaken by
their adversary. The faster the actions are undertaken or the results of the promises
become apparent, the faster their verification and the faster the development of trust
between the adversaries. However, it can sometimes take a long time to implement all
the concessions that one is willing to make in order to prove one's goodwill and one's
peace intentions. It is not an easy and fast process to rebuild trust, therefore, people
should not expect a rapid transformation of a distrusting relationship into a trusting
one. The more evidence the target has of one's honesty and trustworthiness, the easier
it is to reciprocate these feelings (Larson, 1997) but the more these new promises or
actions contradict the prior positions, feelings and actions of the opponent party, the
longer it takes for the target party to accept them.
Based on the above concepts related to trust and actions proposed to build trust,
Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000) have argued that repairing trust takes a long time, but it
can happen if people manage to re-establish the reliability that existed before the
conflict. Although strategies of restoration of trust depend on the kind of relationship,
they argued that managing the distrust can be more effective, especially for short-term
conflicts than trying to build trust. Activities to manage distrust include addressing the
behaviours that caused the distrust, apologising for the acts that violated the mutual
trust, renegotiating the expectations of each party, agreeing on the procedures to be
followed to monitor these behaviours thereafter and, finally, trying to minimise the
dependability of one party on the other in the areas where distrust was created.
However, these activities on the one hand concern mainly the political leaders of each
conflicting party and on the other hand do not address the creation of a new
relationship between people at grassroots level based on mutual trust.
Kelman (2005) on the other hand, who has conducted many workshops with
influential people from conflicting communities, including with Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots, put together five facilitative conditions for the building of trust
between adversaries. These have some commonalities with the activities proposed by
Lewicki and Wiethoff (2000), but mainly try to achieve the creation of a new
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relationship based on honest and warm feelings and not on minimising
interdependence and monitoring each other's actions, which can generate more
suspicion in the long term. First, he proposed that each side should make gradual
moves that show commitment to the resolution and reassurance to the other side's
needs or fears. Second, he proposed that it is important to have a third neutrally
positioned party which would facilitate the negotiations and which the adversaries
would both trust. Third, he proposed that each side should make a serious effort to
build trust, not based on the norms of a friendly relationship, but on the self-interest of
each side. Especially in the beginning, working trust could not and should not be
based on interpersonal trust; later on, it could merge with interpersonal trust, which
would be an ideal condition for the establishment of the new relationship. Fourth, he
proposed that while adversaries should engage in negotiations, the people who
manage these negotiations should not come very close to the adversary side. This
could cause distrust in them from their group members and they could lose their
influence on the group they represent. Both sides have to start trusting the other side
without forgetting the identity and interest group differences. Finally, he proposed
that throughout the negotiations parties have to continue reassuring each other as new
risks, and therefore new reasons for suspicions, arise. Symbolic gestures, confidence-
building measures, public acknowledgements all promote mutual trustworthiness. It is
important to emphasise that responsiveness and reciprocity are at the basis of these
steps so that all parties' interests and perceptions of justice begin to be mutually
considered (Kelman, 2005).
These steps are not only in line with the tripartite conceptualisation of trust (Lewis &
Weigert. 1985) but are also integrative of most factors studied in reference to trust and
reconciliation. Therefore, they were considered the most comprehensive set of pre-
requisites for trust which could be used in the present thesis to examine the
relationship of trust with reconciliation.
4.4 Questions addressed by the present thesis
Based on the above literature review, the present thesis considers trust to be an
important factor in conflict resolution processes which should be further studied in
this specific context. Since many differences/gaps have been identified in the
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literature of conflict resolution in reference to trust, in contrast to theories of general
trust, it is therefore, considered important to treat inter-group political and social trust
both theoretically and empirically as context specific constructs. The present thesis
addressed this by pursuing the following research aims:
The first research aim is to examine whether young people trust in-group and out-
group social and political targets involved in inter-ethnic contlict at varying levels and
what is the meaning of trust in different in-group and out-group social and political
targets in the context of conflict resolution.
The second research aim is to determine the correlates of trust (including emotions) in
understanding willingness to compromise, both amongst the existing factors in the
literature and the factors that young Greek Cypriots report themselves.
The third general research aim is to determine the relationship of inter-group ~ocial
and political trust with reconciliation and acceptance of a specific reconciliation plan,
as well as with conflict solutions that young Greek Cypriots prefer or consider
feasible.
Finally, the fourth research aim is to explore the relationship of the facilitative
conditions for inter-group trust proposed by Kelman (2005) with willingness to
reconcile, as well as with the solutions to the Cyprus conflict that young Greek
Cypriots prefer or consider feasible.
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Chapter 5: Methodology
5.1 The present study
The questions of the present thesis were addressed using a multi-methodological
approach. Since different methodological approaches generate different types of data
and a different insight on the data, a combination of quantitative and qualitative
methods was considered appropriate in order to address the different research
questions of the present thesis in an informed and complete way. Certain research
questions were addressed with a quantitative methodology, others with a qualitative
one, depending on the particular nature and the aims of each one. The first two
empirical studies of the thesis were conducted simultaneously while the third study
was conducted after the analysis of the Previous two in order to take into
consideration their findings. The first study used a quantitative approach (see chapter
6), the second a qualitative approach (see chapter 7) and the third a quantitative
approach (see chapter 8).
Due to the lack of existing research on young people on the issue of social and
political trust in the context of conflict resolution, the first issues addressed in the first
study were young people's levels of trust in different targets, the phenomenological
meaning of trust in different social and political targets for young people and the use
of trust amongst young people in reference to compromise attitudes in conflict
resolution. These issues were addressed quantitatively with a comprehensive
questionnaire administered to a significant number of participants in order to ensure
the external validity of the results (Walliman, 2004).
In the qualitative study, on the other hand, which was conducted at the same time as
the first quantitative one, the research aims were different. Semi-structured interviews
were used in order to explore the role of different barriers to conflict resolution,
including trust and emotions. It was considered that interviews, in contrast to a
survey, would allow adolescents to express themselves more freely, without the
restrictive pre-existing choices of a questionnaire, which would have been built
mainly on the adult literature (due to the lack of existing relevant research on young
people). Furthermore, because of the young age of the majority of the participants,
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interviews could make them feel more comfortable discussing sensitive national
issues and any additional clarifications they needed on difficult concepts or contexts
could be given. When there is an ongoing conflict, expressing an opinion on the
causes of the conflict, on the referendum or on one's preferred solution to the conflict
are all sensitive issues to discuss in public. This was illustrated during the post-
referendum period in Cyprus by the occurrence of violent incidents between Greek
Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot students in private schools and by the treatment of
students publicly supporting the Annan plan as traitors. Taking into consideration this
precarious climate and the sensitivity of the issue, conducting individual interviews in
the context of a qualitative study was deemed the most appropriate method to be
followed in order to explore in depth the different barriers to conflict resolution.
The aim of the third study was to test different theoretical models which explained the
processes leading to reconciliatory attitudes (e.g. favourability towards reconciliation,
favourability towards a reconciliation plan, trust, acceptance etc). These consisted,
first, of a theoretical model of cont1ict resolution (Fisher, 1990, 2000), which would
take into consideration the factors which were identified in the previous two studies as
relevant to the Cyprus conflict, and which would test their in-between relationships,
second, a set of practical steps to achieve acceptance and, third, a set of practical steps
to achieve trust (Kelman, 1978, 2005). A quantitative methodology was considered
more appropriate since pre-existent and very complex models, with a lot of.
parameters, were to be tested.
5.2 Quantitative and qualitative methods and epistemologies
As can be seen, quantitative and qualitative methods have been combined in a mixed
methods design and paradigm in the present research, informing each other on the
ways to proceed. Mixed methods have only recently been developed and accepted as
scientifically valid since qualitative methods were not and still are not wholly
accepted as a "scientific enough" alternative to the quantitative methodology by many
strong supporters of traditional quantitative research. There has been a lengthy debate
on the validity and the use of qualitative versus quantitative methods. The differences
and therefore the choice between the two methodologies are based, according to
Bryman (1988), on two dimensions: the "technical" and the "epistemological". In
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terms of the "technical" dimension, partly described in the previous paragraphs in
reference to the present study, researchers generally choose their research
methodology based on practical issues related to the needs of the research, such as the
operationalisation of the variables, the time schedule (e.g. on-line resources or the
statistical analysis of questionnaires are much less time consuming than the
qualitative analysis of long interviews), the resources availability and sampling issues.
The "epistemological" dimension involves the broader philosophical paradigm within
which each method sets its aims, its assumptions and its rules for data collection,
analysis and interpretation. This philosophical paradigm concerns the stance
researchers take towards knowledge and its accessibility, "how we can know and what
we can know" (Coyle, 2007, p. 11).
It is on the epistemological dimension that most of conflict between quantitative and
qualitative researchers has been based. Since the beginning of the 20th century,
quantitative methods have been the dominant and the unquestioned scientific method
across most sciences. The philosophical paradigms, which have been developed in
accordance with these methods, include positivism, empiricism and hypothetico-
deductivism. According to positivism, "the goal of research is to produce objective
knowledge" and researchers can produce it, since "it is possible to describe what is
out there and get it right" (Willig, 2001, p.3). The role of the researcher is then to be
as objective as possible and approach and explain reality in a completely unbiased
way. Empiricism, similar to positivism, supports the idea that reality can be
approached through our senses. Theory generation comes from our observations,
including experimental manipulations, while theory can also influence our
observations. However, the accessibility of absolute objectiveness and the possibility
of talking about causation through a collection of observations have been questioned
by quantitative researchers, who developed the third main quantitative epistemology,
hypothetico-deductivism. According to it, research should be based on testing
hypotheses taken from existing theories, which would lead either to their rejection or
confirmation. Psychology embraced these paradigms and their methodologies for
many decades and its development was mainly based on them.
It was only in the 1960s that, having recognised the limitations of purely quantitative
methods, social scientists started looking for other methods in order to find better
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answers to the growing number of questions. Then a need for 'a more "naturalistic,
contextual and holistic understanding" (Todd, Nerlich & McKeown, 2004, p.4) of
human activities and attitudes pushed them to use different methods of data
collection, analysis and interpretation. In those terms, direct social observation,
interviews, surveys, and different types of analysis for the data were used, such as
discourse analytic methods, conversation analyses and other methods, which could
lead to an interpretative understanding of human actions and attitudes, instead of a
descriptive or a causal one. These were qualitative methods, and they were all
characterised by epistemologies quite different from those of quantitative methods.
However, there is not just one epistemology behind all qualitative methods; different
ones are behind different methods.
Henwood and Pidgeon (1994) have described three epistemologies in qualitative
research. The closest to quantitative methods, associated with "data display" method
(Miles & Huberman, 1994), is empiricism as described above, but it uses qualitative
instead of quantitative observations. The second epistemology is contextualism and it
is linked with grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
According to contextualism, researchers recognise that there are different meanings to
human experience, which they try to tie together in order to create a meaningful and
coherent account. The aim of research according to them is the generation of new
theories, based on these inter-subjective meanings, which are derived from
"participants' worlds" (Henwood & Pidgeon, 1994, p.231). The third epistemology
presented is constructivism which is linked with discourse analysis (Potter &
Wetherell, 1987; Edwards & Potter, 1992; Burman & Parker, 1993). According to
constructivism, there is no objective reality but "realities" are constructed through the
linguistic reflexivity between participants and researchers. The range of qualitative
epistemologies has been described by Madill et al. (2000, in Lyons, 2007) as a
continuum extending from more "realistic" epistemologies to more "constructionist"
ones.
Even though there is not just one single epistemology associated with each type of
methodology, the main difference between the epistemologies of quantitative and
those of qualitative methods is the degree of belief in an "objective" truth. In the
epistemologies of traditional (quantitative) scientific methods any individual
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perception or inference should be eliminated as subjective and potentially inaccurate
whereas, in the epistemologies of qualitative methods, individual perception, shapes
what human experience actually is since it is influenced by socio-cultural
characteristics and values,; "objective" truth is therefore not possible in qualitative
epistemologies, since no-one could ever leave aside the strong influences which
mediate for human experience (Yardley & Bishop, 2008).
Based on this fundamental difference, it is understandable that strong supporters of
each methodology consider them incompatible in terms of their aims and their
methods. For researchers who do not believe in "objective" truth, quantitative
methods, using experiments or questionnaires, deprive human experience of its real
depth, since it is examined in a very strict and controlled environment, cut off from
the real world, and since participants are not allowed to offer a view of things
complimentary or counter to the ones pre-supposed and pre-arranged by the
researchers. This could lead not only to the (mis)understanding of events, which do
not exist in real world, but also to the misleading of science away from the real factors
influencing human experience. On the other hand, researchers who believe in an
"objective" truth, consider qualitative methods to be a portal to endless subjectivity
and therefore to an attitude of "laissez-faire", which abolishes credibility in scientific
research and the ability to validate one opinion over another, or even distinguish
science from non-science.
It should be noted that before Lincoln and Guba (1985, in Teddlie & Tashakkori,
2003) emphasised these epistemological differences between qualitative and
quantitative methods in their "incompatibility thesis", many researchers had, without
taking these differences into consideration, already started using both of them in their
effort to better answer their questions and achieve the aims of their research. Since the
"incompatibility thesis", different viewpoints on this quality versus quantity conflict
have been developed: "methodological eclecticism", according to which both types of
methods are equal but used for different purposes, "methodological pluralism",
according to which all methods should be accepted and considered valid as long as
they serve the interests of science (Todd et al, 2007) and "mixing methods", which is
the method of integrating quantitative and qualitative methods within the same
research project and which is the approach adopted in the present research.
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5.3 Mixed Methods
Using mixed methods was based on the advantages offered by a multi-methodological
approach in comparison to a single-methodology one. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003)
have identified three main utilities for using mixed methods instead of single method
research designs: first, they can answer questions that single method designs cannot
second, they allow stronger inferences to be made and, third, they allow the
presentation of a broader spectrum of conflicting views. In reference to the first
utility, the main argument is that based on the fact that quantitative research is mostly
confirmatory, while qualitative is mostly exploratory and theory generating (even
though many qualitative researchers will not agree 'Withthis); integrating both of these
methods would allow the researcher to explore both in depth and in breadth certain
areas, dis/confirm existing theories and generate new theory, creating a more
complete research project.
In reference to the possibility of making stronger inferences, the use of quantitative
and qualitative methods allows researchers to explore a certain phenomenon in a
complementary way, one method "covering up" for the other's weaknesses. Obtaining
results on two different dimensions allows researchers to make stronger inferences.
This argument was also supported by Greene et al. (1989) who saw it as explaining
the two first functions of mixed methods as he described them, "triangulation" and
"complementarity" (which were also about inferences complementing or
dis/confirming each other). Making stronger inferences is also possible when the
results obtained at the end of one study/method lead to or help develop the design of
the following study/method. This was also supported by Greene et al.' s (1989)
functions, "development", "initiation" and "expansion". Social phenomena function
on so many levels and dimensions that the more ways/methods used in order to
capture their multidimensionality, the stronger and more accurate the results obtained
and the inferences to be made.
Finally, in reference to the third utility identified by Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003),
contradictory results emerging from different methods examining the same
phenomenon also confirm the usefulness of mixed methods by revealing the
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complexity of the phenomenon that is being studied. The use of a quantitative and a
qualitative method sheds light on different aspects of the same phenomenon since
each method has different assumptions and different aims. Contradicting results then
should not be considered as the product of a methodological failure but as the
revelation of complementary dimensions of the phenomenon under examination or as
the empirical proof to disconfirm existing theories on it. Either way, the finding of
these contradictory results can only help to make theoretical and empirical progress
on the issues studied.
The present thesis addressed gaps in the existing literature by examining concepts in a
context not been examined before (both in terms of the cultural specificity and the age
of the population within which they were examined). Therefore, answering as many
questions as possible, making strong inferences about these new findings and
capturing different aspects of them, are crucial to the validity and the reliability of the
present thesis.
In order to achieve these, it would be important to benefit from different
methodologies' capacities, as sometimes results of one method can only be interpreted
after their additional examination by another method (Todd et aI, 2004). This was
strongly appreciated in the present thesis as the literature on the concepts it examined
touched on different social sciences i.e. psychology, political sciences and sociology,
which use different methodologies to address different aspects of the same issues. In
this case, mixed methodologies would help, on the one hand, to incorporate the
elements of all these different disciplines and allow the social psychological
phenomena (based on the perspective of the present thesis) to be considered in a more
holistic way and, on the other hand, to show that researchers are not invisible behind
scientific objectivity, but they both exist and should start being visible in way research
is being conducted. Using both types of methods is therefore beneficial because it
allows the exchange of opinions and co-operation between different scientists (even
within the same discipline e.g. psychology) who were previously divided into
qualitative and quantitative camps and did not communicate between them. Contact
between researchers using different methodologies cannot but enhance their scientific
effectiveness.
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Interdisciplinary contact could however also be scientifically beneficial through
another function of multi-methodological research: using mixed methods offers
researchers further reassurance for the validity of their results and further arguments
in support of their claims, when they have to face people with contradicting views.
This is also relevant to the present research because of the serious nature of its subject
and the existing opposing camps; any claims made in an area of on-going real
conflict, are very likely to meet strong opposition from supporters of opposing
historical, socio-economical and political views on the conflict.. Researchers have
therefore to be well-prepared and able to support their claims against any possible
argument. This is however beneficial to the promotion of scientific research since it
motivates researchers to improve the quality of their research both theoretically and
empirically.
Finally, another benefit of mixed-methods, which led to its endorsement by the
present thesis, is that it allows a relationship to be established between academic
research and the non-academic community (Todd et al, 2004). Using both methods
allows better communication between academics, practitioners and the general
community. A wider range of methods and types of results offers an increased
possibility of communication among people who work in different disciplines and
therefore use different methods in their own field (as above). In reference to the
present thesis and the issue of conflict, if academic research is to be taken into
consideration by politicians, negotiators and non-academic practitioners, then research
results will have to be presented in different ways so that non-academic recipients can
understand them.
5.3.1 Mixed-methods paradigms
Following the possible functions of mixed methods and the stance researchers have
taken towards them, different paradigms have been created in mixed methods
literature, which serve as the foundation for their use. Teddlie and Tashakkori (2003)
have identified five "theses" in mixed methods, apart from the "incompatibility"
thesis, which has been extensively analysed already. The first one is the "a-
paradigmatic" thesis according to which researchers do not believe in the link
between epistemology and method and therefore do not see any conflict between
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using quantitative and qualitative methods. There is the "complementary strengths"
thesis according to which both methods could be used but as separately as possible,
because only in this Way could each method's advantages be fully exploited. There is
the "single paradigm" thesis according to which while both methodologies can be
used, only one single paradigm should be used for mixed methods research; some
researchers have suggested that this should be pragmatism, while others that this is the
transformative-emancipatory paradigm. There is the "dialectic" thesis, according to
which all paradigms are important and they should be examined in combination in
every study, because there is never one standing out from the others, and, finally,
there is the "multiple-paradigm" thesis, according to which, while all paradigms are
important, as in the previous thesis, there is one that stands out for each study
depending on the research questions and the aims of the study.
Among all these theses, a "multiple-paradigm" thesis has been adopted for the design
of the present research and the use of mixed methods. Despite the recognised
importance of all paradigms, the one that stood out for the present thesis was
pragmatism because of the compatibility of its assumptions and its beliefs with the
aims of the present research. Through a combination of qualitative and quantitative
studies the present research aims to reveal what young Greek Cypriots believe about
the resolution of the Cyprus issue in the specific context of a post-referendum era and
a negative climate towards the UN due to a perceived "forceful", pro-Turkish
reconciliation plan. The influential role of the national identity and the scientific
status of the (Greek) researcher conducting the studies is taken into consideration and
recognised as an influencing factor in all stages of the research process (data
collection, analysis and interpretation). Pragmatism is the paradigm that best complies
with the above considerations since it claims that there is not an "objective"
knowledge and truth, only a "relative" one, which depends on the goals to be achieved
and the context within which actions are being conducted and finally evaluated.
Pragmatism addresses "the concerns of both qualitative and quantitative researchers
by pointing out that all human inquiry involves imagination and interpretation.
intentions and values, but must also necessarily be grounded in empirical, embodied
experience ... the aim of inquiry is not to seek a truth that is independent from human
experience, but to achieve a better, richer experience ... " (Yardley & Bishop, 2008,
p.355).
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Pragmatism considers this goal to be common to both quantitative and qualitative
research which means that it does not see an epistemological incompatibility between
the two methodologies, despite the practical differences in the data collection and
their analysis (Yardley & Bishop, 2008). It accepts, however, that 'these practical
differences exist, and that is the reason why each methodology is more appropriate to .
answer different types of research questions. When greater internal validity is needed
and causal claims need to be made, then quantitative methods would be more
appropriate (as in the two quantitative studies in chapters 6 and 8); however, when
greater external validity is needed and results need to be examined in terms of their
meanings and therefore the context within which these are made, then qualitative
methods would be more appropriate (as in the qualitative study in chapter 7). It
appears then, according to pragmatism, that a mixture of qualitative and quantitative
methods, of internal and external validity, could offer to a research project the validity
and effectiveness that it ideally seeks. In the present research project, the above
criteria were taken into consideration when deciding the exact methods that would be
used; research questions based on theory testing were addressed with quantitative
methods, such as the relationship of trust with different factors and the testing of
Fisher's (1990, 2000) and Kelman's (1978, 2005) models, while exploratory research
questions on the correlates of trust and reconciliation and of the role of emotions and
trust in willingness to reconcile were addressed with qualitative methods.
5.3.2 Reflexivity
One of the main considerations in the research process related to the epistemological
stance is the role of the researcher. Each epistemology has different expectations of
the ways researchers should use their personal knowledge and experiences in
reference to the research project. Pragmatism argues for relativity and contextuality in
the research process, which also affects the role of the researcher and which should be
taken into consideration in the present thesis. The influence of the research status and
the nationality of the researcher will be discussed in reference to the conduct of the
quantitative and the qualitative studies, as well as the advantages and the limitations
of representing the specific target population of this research.
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At the first stage of the research process, it was recognised that an approach to school
directors and then children made by a Greek female researcher working in the UK
might have an influence on the collection of data (both qualitative and quantitative).
Contact with schools was made by telephone, where the first point of identification
for the Greek researcher was the Greek accent. While Greek Cypriots and Greek
people both speak Greek, the Greek Cypriot accent is very different from that of
mainland Greece, which allows immediate identification of someone as Greek or
Cypriot. Therefore, while contact was much easier since the same language was
spoken between the researcher and the school administration and the school children,
there was always the different accent as a reminder of the researcher's different
nationality. This immediately positioned the researcher as a member of an out-group,
with a specific historical, political and cultural significance to the Greek Cypriots. The
school staff, secretaries and teachers, used to refer to the researcher even in her
presence as the "Greek girl from Greece" (Elladitisa) or as the "Kalamarou";
however, the terms "kalamaras" (masculine), "kalamarou" (feminine) are used in an
ironic, derogative way to refer to Greek people, due to their supposed arrogance for
their education and their civilisation. These terms are widely used in everyday
language when referring to Greek people and therefore they were also used in front of
the researcher. This open "derogatory" reference to the researcher could have been
also facilitated by the...age and gender of the researcher. It is pos~ible that if the
researcher had been male or maybe a little older, people would not have dared to
refer to himlher, in front of himlher, in such a way. As Cypriot society is still very
male-dominated and a society where age, in itself, is a source of respect, a young
woman may have been considered more powerless and therefore more tolerant and
open to politically incorrect behaviour than a man. However, this remains a
speculation which would need further exploration to be confirmed.
The students, on the other hand, never seemed to be affected by the gender or the age
of the researcher but they almost always commented on the nationality of the
researcher, either positively or negatively. They used to ask about Greek football
teams and about how teenagers looked or spoke in Greece, what sort of slang they
used for specific words or phrases. While all these comments helped to build up a
relationship between the researcher and the school students and make them feel more
comfortable and keener to speak or write about their views on the Cyprus issue, it also
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immediately positioned the researcher as an outsider coming from a different country
which was for some children "intriguing" and for others "suspicious". Some older
students were not keen on completing the questionnaire even before looking at or
reading it, or they would treat it in a dismissive way. When asked why the
questionnaire made them angry, they were dismissive towards the Greek people and
the role Greece and Greek politics have played in the Cyprus issue. Since they had not
read the questionnaire, it is assumed that these attitudes were created based on the
researcher's Greek identity.
One of the factors mentioned as the source of this dismissiveness, either by the
students themselves who expressed this dismissiveness, or by their fellow students
who interfered to explain this attitude, was the role of Greece in the Cyprus issue.
Greece was judged to have betrayed Cyprus, as the Greek junta had allowed the
-Turkish invasion in 1974 and had not protected the Greek Cypriot people and territory
from the Turkish troops. Furthermore, in the present day, Greece is seen as exploiting
Cyprus and treating Cyprus as a bargaining tool to solve its own differences with
Turkey. As mentioned by certain students, these were the views of the students who
were affiliated to the Communist party of Cyprus. On the other hand, there were many
students, who openly expressed their admiration for Greece and their pride in their
own Greek identity, due to the support and help of Greece in the Cyprus issue, as well
as the cultural "superiority" of Greece, in comparison with Cyprus. Students who
expressed these views, openly also identified themselves, and were also characterised
by their fellow students, as supporters of the right-wing party of Cyprus.
Another identification which also influenced how the studies were conducted was the
university research status of the researcher. This influence was also both positive and
negative. On the positive side, it helped both the school headmasters, teachers and
students to understand the importance of their contribution and the seriousness of the
project. Some of the headmasters and teachers asked questions about the literature
background of the research questions as well as the implications of the results of the
studies. The fact that the results would be presented at international scientific
conferences and published in scientific journals on conflict resolution, where
academics from different universities would have the chance to hear and read about
the young Cypriots' opinions on the conflict, motivated many of the schools to
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participate and the students to make the effort to answer seriously the lengthy
questionnaire. On the other hand, it might have been the reason why some students
were apprehensive of participating and especially of being interviewed. The formality
and the fact that their personal views would be used in official scientific research
might have overwhelmed them, placing too much responsibility on them. Some of the
students who did not want to be interviewed attributed it to their fear of not knowing
much about the Cyprus issue and not knowing how to answer the questions, even
though they were reassured repeatedly that the interviews did not require any specific
knowledge.
One characteristic of the research conducted, which might have also influenced the
conduct of the empirical studies, was that the researcher's university was British. On
the one hand, this might have facilitated different English-speaking private schools'
decisions to participate in the different studies but on the other hand it might have
raised suspicions about the neutrality and the objectivity of the research conducted
and the dissemination of the results. The latter was raised both by students and by the
Cypriot Ministry of Education when they were trying to learn more about the research
and its goals. The fact that the researchers would have the opportunity to publish their
results in foreign countries, and particularly in Britain, one of the most recent
conquerors of Cyprus (see chapter 2), raised fears of exploitation or misrepresentation
of the situation in Cyprus.
While taking into account the ways that Greek Cypriot education officials and
students viewed the researcher and the research that was being conducted, it is also
important to consider how the researcher herself viewed the target population of her
studies and the Cyprus issue, before and during the empirical studies. These are all
factors that might have affected all the stages of the research, from the design of the
research to the collection of the data, the analysis of the data and finally the
dissemination and the interpretation of the results (Lyons, 2007).
Being a Greek national and having been educated and having lived in Greece all my
life, I already had some knowledge of the Cyprus issue, its causes, the different agents
involved, and especially who the perpetrator and who the victim was in the cont1ict.
For me the Cyprus conflict was always part of the Greek-Turkish conflict, another
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event which proved the imperialistic attitude of Turkey towards Greece. I perceived
Cyprus not only as an ally of Greece, but almost as a Greek brother-nation, which was
distinct from Greece only for politically constructed reasons and not due to cultural or
historical differences. In those terms, Turkey, as I had been taught at all levels of
education (including during my university degree), was undoubtedly the permanently
threatening enemy of Greece, always trying not only to show its power superiority
over Greece but also its sovereignty over Greek territory. Therefore, the invasive
character of the landing of Turkish troops in Cyprus in 1974 was never a contested
event for me. This construction of the Cyprus conflict and its agents, which might be
contested especially by people of different national/ethnic backgrounds, was deeply
embedded in me emotionally and cognitively.
However, when I started studying the Cyprus issue at doctoral level and read about
each side's position and different narration of historical events, my attitude towards
Turkey and its relationship with Greece and Cyprus changed at some level; the
reasons behind Turkey's foreign policy, as well as the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot
behaviour at grass roots level, were better understood, although still not accepted
concerning certain issues,. Second, my preconceptions of Cypriot people, their
relationship with Greek people and their role in the conflict also changed, especially
when I started meeting Cypriot people and working with them (it has to be noted that
I had never met a Cypriot person before the beginning of this thesis).
From the first time I contacted Cypriot people to talk to them about my work, I came
across different issues, for some of which I had no prior knowledge, while for others I
had a different opinion. The first thing that I identified, as they did as well, was the
difference of language; the use of a different accent and of a different dialect in oral
speech, as well as the use of many English words by people of all ages not only
estranged me but also made communication difficult sometimes. This fact made me
feel many times as an out-group member and started shaking my original conception
of a common ethnic identity between Greek and Cypriot people. Along with language,
I discovered some cultural differences as well, in terms of traditions and customs
concerning different domains of everyday life. However, my discovery of the
existence of two different opinions about Greece in the Cypriot society (as described
above) changed my preconception of Cyprus as a Greek brother nation. Some Greek
117
Cypriots seemed really happy to meet a Greek national and to be able to participate in
a study conducted by a Greek person, since it showed Greek people's interest in the
Cyprus affairs and, on the other hand, some people would be dismissive and consider
Greece and its people "traitors". For me this cognitive dissonance was reinforced by
the fact that left-wing supporters, to whom I felt closer politically, were those that
exhibited the negative attitude.
Apart from making the conduct of the empirical studies more difficult for me
psychologically than I had originally expected, the realisation of these differences and
of this dichotomy in people's attitudes and feelings about my Greek identity, made me
distance myself emotionally from the Greek Cypriot victimisation, which originally I
had unambiguously endorsed. This hopefully allowed me to view the conflict in more
objective terms and to evaluate the historical, political and psychological events more
critically. However, although my level of uncritical psychological involvement
changed, I still did not consider myself as a complete out-group member to Greek
Cypriots. On the one hand, a vast number of common historical (e.g. the ancient
Greek civilisation, the later Turkish domination etc), political (e.g. level of corruption
of political officials and bureaucracy) and religious (being all Christian Orthodox)
experiences, and, on the other hand, a wide range of common values concerning inter-
personal relationships (family, friendships, intimate relationships etc) and cultural
habits (e.g. entertainment, food etc) still created a supra-identity with which I could
identify.
The existence of these perceptions and emotions towards the Greek Cypriot people
and the Cyprus conflict were acknowledged by the researcher and, based on the
pragmatist epistemology which was endorsed in the present thesis, these were not
eliminated. Their effect on the interpretation of the findings of the empirical studies
was acknowledged and discussed in the thesis.
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Chapter 6: The concept of social and political trust, their meaning and their
correlates for young Greek Cypriots within the context of conflict
resolution in Cyprus
The present study explored the concept of social and political trust within the specific
context of the Cyprus conflict. As discussed in chapter 3 different socio-political and
psychological stances on trust have created a plethora of definitions, meanings and
dimensions, creating a confused "landscape" for trust researchers. Thus, the main
aims of the first study were to determine whether young people trust in-group and out-
group targets involved in inter-ethnic conflict at varying levels, the meaning of trust in
different in-group and out-group targets in the context of contlict resolution and the
role of trust (in different targets) and its correlates in understanding willingness to
compromise.
6.1 Introduction
Even though the present study (and the whole thesis) addressed general gaps (non-
population specific) in the existing conflict resolution literature on the concept of trust
and attitudes towards compromise, these gaps were addressed in reference to young
people. The main reasons the present study/thesis was interested in young people,
were the following: first, the necessity of time passing since the actual conflict, so that
the generations actually involved in the conflict have passed (Rouhana, 2004) (it is
now over thirty five years since the occupation and division of Cyprus); second, as
detailed in chapter 3, the highly prognostic significance of adolescents' attitudes
towards politics for their adult voting behaviour and general political participation
(Krampen, 1998; Boehnke & Boehnke, 2005); thirdly, and most importantly, since
today's young people are exposed to the same influences (of the social and political
context) as the general public, but have not had personal experience of the onset
events and violence of the conflict, examining their views could on the one hand help
us better understand the present situation of the conflict in reference to the general
public, and on the other hand, understand what these attitudes are formed when
personal experience is missing.
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6.1.1 The concept of trust
In different types of conflicts, inter-ethnic, inter-state or intra-state conflicts, different
factors ("acceptance", Kelman, 1978, 1986; "intergroup contact", Pettigrew, 1998;
Nadler & Saguy, 2004; "conflict ethos", Bar-Tal, 2000) have been identified as
crucial for their de-escalation and resolution. "Trust", 011 the other hand, has long
been acknowledged as an important concept related to conflict resolution but it has
not received systematic attention until recently (Kelman, 2005; Lewicki & Wiethoff,
2000; Slovic, 1993). The relationship between trust and conflict has been
characterised as "obvious" (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000, p.86) as it has been found to
promote peoples' relationships and facilitate the resolution of conflicts between them.
Lack of trust on the other hand has been found to make people suspicious and
generate "animosity" and "pain that is not easily forgotten" (Lewicki & Wiethoff,
2000, p.86). A trusting relationship has long been recognised as the ultimate goal of a
reconciliation process as well as the most difficult one since it is very difficult to
restore once it has been betrayed or lost. Events that destroy trust are more visible and
carry more weight for people than trust-building events. Much more effort is therefore
necessary to build it than to destroy it (Slovic, 1993).
However, trust is not only the goal of a reconciliation process; it is also present and
influential throughout the process of reconciliation, first through its effect on the
communication between adversary negotiators, and second through its effect on the
relationship between the people at grassroots level and the political
leaders/negotiators. In a reconciliation process, adversary groups mainly communicate
through their official negotiators and their political leaders who engage in official
communication with the other side. When people trust the decision-makers, or the
policy-makers, communication then becomes smoother and more effective. On the
other hand, lack of trust renders communication problematic and unsatisfactory
(Slovic, 1993). It is therefore important ap~rt from inter-group social trust, to study
also in-group and out-group political trust in order to understand the psychological
processes involved in inter-group reconciliation.
As detailed in chapter 4, in the context of conflicr resolution, trust has been
recognised as an important factor in compromise (Slovic, 1993; Kelman, 2004, 2005).
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However, different researchers, through their different approaches, have created a
wide array of definitions, meanings and dimensions of tmst (Barber, 1983; Rotter,
1971; Blesdoe, 1979; Gambetta, ]988; Lewis & Weigert, ]985, see chapter 4 for a
review). One of the important factors emphasised in the literature, especially in
reference to political trust is the target of trust. Therefore the first research aim of the
present study was to examine the effect of the target of trust both on the levels of trust
and on the phenomenological meaning of the concept of trust.
There is however a wide array of possible targets in the literature, based on which
trust has been conceptualised. As discussed in chapter 4, while Easton (1965) and
Gamson (1968) identified specific groups of targets as possible targets of political
trust, Mishler and Rose (1997) conceptualised political trust based on specific groups
of political targets. These groups of political targets, supported by different theorists,
vary from political institutions, civil institutions, institutions of traditional authority,
to more general targets such as the general political community, or even the regime of
a country. In the present study different in-group and out-group social and political
targets involved in the Cyprus contlict, such as the Greek Cypriot government and the
Turkish Cypriot people, were considered both in reference to the levels of trust and
the meaning of trust.
In the literature, trust (both social and political trust) has also been either associated or
interchangeably used with different concepts, such as "support", "confidence" and
"legitimacy" (Gamson, 1968; Easton, 1965; Craig, ]993). However, the relationship
between trust and these concepts has not been either consistent or definite. It is
therefore necessary to examine in the present study, which is a first approach to the
concept of trust amongst young Greek Cypriots, whether trust is distinguished from
all these concepts and what the effect of the target of trust is on this distinction (if
there is any); this constitutes the second research aim of the present study.
6.1.2 Correlates of/rust
Furthermore, in order to enhance our understanding of the concept of trust, its
correlates were also examined. Rotter (1971), in his review of studies on trust before
1971, reported that trust was found to be influenced both by demographic factors such
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as age and gender and social influence factors such as religion, socio-economic status,
power, and parental trust attitude (which could be both developmentally and socially
influential). Younger children were found to be less trusting than middle or oldest
children, Jewish students were found to be more trusting than Protestant and Catholic
students and a decrease of trust was found to be linked with a decrease of socio-
economic status. Furthermore, children with high levels of trust were also found to
have fathers perceived as trustworthier and more trusting and to have high levels of
perceived control over the situation (for a review, see Rotter, 1971). Along with the
influence of age and gender (Skinner, Giokas & Hornstein, 1976; Blesdoe, 1979;
OUendick & Otto, 1984; Foubert & Sholley, 1996) other social characteristics have
also been studied, as discussed in chapter 4, such as political orientation, strength of
national identification and strength of religious identification (Devos et al., 2002;
Kelman, 2004). All these factors were taken into consideration and examined in
reference to trust also in the present study.
However, as most of the aforementioned studies and theories have been developed
and used in reference only to an adult population, examining the concept of trust in
reference to young people, it was necessary to measure also certain factors that were
specific to young people's political reasoning and attitudes to conflict. As discussed in
chapter 3, interest in political matters, knowledge of political matters (Emler, 2002)
and frequency of conversation (Lalljee & Evans, 1998) are factors identified as
affecting adolescents' political attitudes and reasoning. These factors were also taken
into consideration in the present study, due to their relevance to young people.
Finally, since the relationship of trust and reconciliation/compromise has been
established in the literature, and since compromise has always been claimed to be the
main objective of negotiations for both communities in Cyprus (this is what the
Annan plan has supposedly attempted to achieve through the arrangement of the
economic and political points in dispute between the two conflicting sides),
compromise was examined as a potential solution to the conflict, and therefore as a
correlate of trust.
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6./.3 Research Questions
The present study addressed three main issues: first, the trust levels and the meanings
that young people attach to trust in different political institutions and ethnic/national
groups, second, the correlates of trust in different political institutions and
ethnic/national groups, and, third, the role of trust in different political institutions and
ethnic/national groups in willingness to compromise. In particular, the present study
was designed to address the following research questions:
a. Do young people trust different political institutions and ethnic/national
groups in varying degrees?
h. Is the meaning of trust in different political institutions and ethnic/national
groups the same?
c. What are the correlates of trust in different political institutions and
ethnic/national groups? In particular, how does trust relate to age, gender, origins of
parents, Greek, Greek Cypriot, Cypriot identification, religious identification,
European identification, political interest, political knowledge, exposure to political
issues and political ideology?
d. What is the relative power of age, gender, origins of parents, levels of
identification with Greek, Greek Cypriot, Cypriot and European identity, political
knowledge, political interest, exposure to political issues and political ideology for
explaining levels of trust in the in-group and the out-group social and political targets
and for levels of willingness to compromise?
e. What is the relative power of trust III different political institutions and
ethnic/national groups for explaining levels of willingness to compromise?
6.2 Method
6.2./ Procedure
The present study was conducted in Cyprus in May 2005. Permission was sought to
conduct the study in state schools in January 2005 but since the Cypriot Ministry of
Education failed to give a response due to its declared fear of "propaganda in favour
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of the Annan plan by the researchers", the decision was taken to conduct the study
mainly in private educational institutions while, where possible, a snowball technique
was used in state educational institutions. Private institutions of secondary and of
higher education were contacted in Nicosia and Limassol, the two largest cities in
Cyprus, and, with the headmaster's permission, two researchers were allowed into the
classes to administer the questionnaires to pupils and help them to complete them.
Participants were briefed on the purposes of the study before they started completing
the questionnaires and were asked to complete the questionnaires only if they
consented to it. There was no pressure either by the teachers or the researchers on the
pupils to participate. They were given 45 minutes to complete the questionnaires,
which corresponded to the -length of a school class. The teachers and the researchers
tried to maintain silence in the classroom and prevent participants from copying each
other's answers. Pupils attending state schools were contacted through a snowball
technique while consent was given by their parents for their participation in the study.
These participants were asked either to complete the questionnaire at home and bring
it back to the researchers or complete it in the presence of the researcher in a friend's
house. They were also debriefed on the purposes of the study and were asked to
complete the questionnaire only if they also consented personally to it. Forty five
minutes was also the time they were allocated to complete it and they were prompted
to ask for the researcher's help when they needed it.
6.2.2 Participants
Two hundred and eighty seven Greek Cypriot students (boys and girls) 13 to 22 years
old participated in the present study: They were students of private or state
educational institutions in Nicosia and Limassol, the two largest cities of Cyprus. In
the present research there were in total 84 students from Limassol and 203 from
Nicosia.
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Table 6.1: Distribution of male and female students in the two cities of Cyprus
Cities of C~~rus Total
LlMASSOL NICOSIA
sex male 31 114 145
female 53 89 142
Total 84 203 287
Only 8.4% of these students attended a state school, the rest attended private English
schools. Concerning the age of the participants, 140 students were 13-15 years old,
127 were 16-18 years old, and 21 students were 19-22 years old. In the present study
we considered two age groups, the students below 16 years old and the students above
16 years old, as 16 was the median of the sample. The distribution of the two age
groups in the two cities is demonstrated in the table below.
Table 6.2: Mean age of students in the two cities of Cyprus
Cities of Cyprus Total
Limassol Nicosia
N 84
16.76
203
15.71
287
Mean age
Table 6.3: Distribution of participants by age and by city
City
Age groups Total
Below 16 Above 16
Limassol Count 25 36 61
% of Total 10.3% 14.9% 25.2%
Nicosia Count 115 66 181
%ofTotal 47.5% 27.3% 74.8%
COllnt 140 102 242
% or TOlal 57.9% 42.1% 100.0%
Total
We did not categorise participants into age groups based on their school class because
students of different ages might still have attended the same classes. For instance,
although there were 97 students who said they were 15 years old, 49 were in the third
grade and 48 were in the fourth grade. Fourth grade had students of 15 and 16 years
old, while the third grade had students of 14 and 15 years old. The sixth and seventh
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grade included mostly students of 17 and 18 years old, while there were also some 19
years olds. Most 19 year olds had reported attending the first year of a private higher
educational institution.
The present study was also interested in the place of origin of the parents of the
participants; therefore, participants were asked whether one of their immediate parents
came from the occupied part of Cyprus. Out of 287 participants, 130 were found to
have at least one of their parents coming from the occupied part of Cyprus while only
14 out of the 287 participants claimed to have relatives or members of the family still
living in that area.
Table 6.4: Distribution of participants according to the origin of their parents in the two cities
of Cyprus
Parents from North Cyprus
cities of C~~rus Total
Limassol Nicosia
yes Count 32 98 130
% within cities 38.1% 48.3% 45.3%
no Count 52 105 157
% within cities 61.9% 51.7% 54.7%
Count 84 203 287
% within cities 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Total
6.2.3 Measures
Participants completed a questionnaire of 252 questions. This questionnaire consisted
of a combination of scales originally written in the English language and certain
scales originally written in the Greek language. The whole questionnaire was
translated into Greek, and back translated into English, to ensure an accurate
translation in the Greek language. In order to ensure that the terms corresponded to
the politically acceptable terms for the Greek Cypriot people, the questionnaire was
also checked by a Greek Cypriot sociologist, who made all the necessary adjustments
to the Greek Cypriot politically acceptable vocabulary.
The questionnaire contained initial questions on demographics; age, sex, and parents'
origins. Concerning parents' origin, participants were asked if their mother's or
father's origin was from the occupied part of Cyprus and if they still had relatives
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living in that part. These were asked with two single item questions on a "yes or no"
answer scale.
Political interest and perceived political knowledge were measured with two single
item questions ("How much are you interested in politics in Cyprus?" and "How
much do you think you know about politics in Cyprus?" respectively) on a 7-point
Likert scale, ranging from 1, to an extremely small extent, to 7, to an extremely great
extent.
Political ideology was also measured with a single item question ("Where do you
place yourself from extreme left wing ideology to extreme right wing ideology") on a
7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1, which stood for extreme left wing ideology to 7,
for extreme right-wing ideology.
Exposure to political issues was measured with three questions on a 7-point Iikert
scale, ranging from 1, never, to 7, every day ("How often do you watch the news 01'
political discussions on television?", "How often do you read the political sections in
newspapers?", "Do you discuss politics with your parents at home?").
Natlonal identification was measured with the Cinnirella's (1997) 7-item scale on
national and European identities. This scale has been used previously in research
conducted on the Greek population and has proven to have very high reliability
(Chrysanthaki, 2007). The scale was adjusted to the context ofthe present study and
was consisted of the following items: "To what extent do you feel Cypriot?", "To
what extent do you feel strong ties with the Cypriot people?", "To what extent do you
feel pleased to be Cypriot?", "How similar do you think you are to the average
Cypriot person?", "How important to you is being Cypriot?", "How much are your
views about Cyprus shared by other Cypriot people?" and "When you hear someone
who is not Cypriot criticise the Cypriot, to what extent to you feel personally
criticised?". The scale was measured on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1, to a
small extent to 7, to a great extent. Cronbach's alpha was 0.82, which allowed us to
create a new variable measuring national identification, using the mean of these seven
items.
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Greek identification, Greek Cypriot identifleatlon and European identification
were measured with single item questions ("To what extent do you feel Greek?" "To
what extent do you feel Greek Cypriot?" "To what extent do you feel European?") on
a 7-point Likert scale, ranging from 1, to a small extent to 7, to a great extent.
Religious identification was measured using the same scale as national identification,
adjusted to a religious target (CinnireJla, 1997). We used Christian Orthodoxy as the
religious target of the seven items, due to the fact that the majority of students in
Cyprus are Christian Orthodox (90.39% of Cypriot population, Statistical Services,
2004/2005). When the questionnaire was administered, we invited participants who
were not Christian Orthodox to answer the questionnaire as if it was about their own
religious identification since we were interested not in the Christian Orthodox
identification specifically but in religious identification in general, independently of
the specific religion of the subjects. Christian Orthodox identification was only used
as an example to facilitate participants' understanding of religious identification. The
items were: "To what extent do you feel Christian Orthodox?", "To what extent do
you feel strong ties with the Christian Orthodox people?", "To what extent do you feel
pleased to be Christian Orthodox?", "How similar do you think you are to the average
Christian Orthodox person?", "How important to you is being Christian Orthodox?",
"How much are your views about Orthodoxy shared by other Christian Orthodox
people?" and "When you hear someone who is not Christian Orthodox criticise the
Christian Orthodox, to what extend to you feel personally criticised'?". Cronbach's
alpha was very high, u=0.90, which also allowed us to create a new variable
measuring religious identification, using the mean of these seven items.
Political and Social Trust were measured with scales constructed for the specific
aims of the present study. These scales consisted of the same II items, measured on a
7-point Likert scale (l/strongly disagree-7/strongly agree), asking about participants'
level of agreement or disagreement with attributes to different political and social
targets in the context of the Cyprus conflict. These attributes corresponded to concepts
related with or interchangeably used with the concept of trust in the literature. Each of
the 11 items started with "To what extent do you agree/disagree that the Cypriot
government is ... " and ended with" ... trustful"; " ... worthy of support"; " worthy of
pride"; " ... legitimate"; " ... trustworthy"; " ... fair"; " ... effective"; " efficient";
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" ... responsive"; " ... compassionate"; " ... has integrity". "Trustful" and "trustworthy"
are two clearly distinct concepts in the Greek language, which correspond to the
Oxford dictionary definitions of these concepts; "trustful is the person who has or
shows total trust in someone" and "trustworthy is the person able to be relied on as
truthful, honest and reliable" (www.askoxford.com). These 11 items were then
repeated for the following 12 targets: the Cypriot government, the Greek government,
the Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Turkish government, the European Union, the United
Nations, the American government, the British government, the Greek Cypriot
people, the Greek people, the Turkish people and the Turkish Cypriot people.
In order to triangulate the results of the previous scales on political trust (whether
participants could differentiate between the concepts of political trust and "political
support", "political legitimacy" and "political confidence"), a scale was constructed
with four statements on different targets of political trust in relation to different
aspects of the Cyprus issue. The four items, which they were measured on a 7-point
Likert scale, ranging from 1, I strongly disagree, to 7, I strongly agree, were: "I trust
the government for the resolution of the Cyprus issue", "I trust the UN for the
resolution of the present conflict with Turkey", "I trust the EU for the creation of a
united Cypriot Nation" and "I trust Cypriot politicians for the final establishment and
maintenance of peace". These four items were repeated four times replacing the word
"trust" each time with "support", "I am confident that" and "I find legitimate".
Finally, a scale on compromise (Devine-Wright, 1999) was used consisting of three
parts. Each part consisted of six items. The first part assessed participants' perception
of the relationship between power (strength/weakness) and compromise, the second
part assessed the perceived role of forgiveness and the third one the perceived role of
public apology in conflict resolution. The reliability of each part was very low for our
sample (a =0.38, a =0.18 and a =0.07 respectively); even when items were deleted,
Cronbach's alpha coefficients were still lower than .60. A factor analysis was then
conducted on all the items, using Principal Component Analysis and Direct Oblimin
rotation, forcing for three factors, since there were three subscales (see Table 5).
Factor loadings under .3 were suppressed to facilitate interpretation (Field, 2005). The
three factors extracted explained respectively 30.73%, 12.55% and 8.25% of total
variance. Item 12 and 13 were considered as part of the second factor, and items 4, 5,
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7 and 8 were considered as part of the first factor, due to their higher loading with the
corresponding factors. Amongst the three factors, two factors were correlated, had
high internal reliability and were semantically meaningful. The first factor, after
recoding the two positive items, had an internal reliability of a=0.85 while the third
factor, without any recoding had an internal reliability of a =0.71. They were
correlated at .30 (see table 6.6). The second factor had very low internal reliability (a
=0.58), and the statements comprising it did not reflect a coherent theoretical
construct. This led to the decision not to consider it (or decision to omit it from) for
any further analysis. Only two new variables were constructed then, using the mean of
their constituent items, corresponding to the first and to the third factor of the factor
analysis, measuring compromise and intransigence respectively.
Table 6.5: Factor loadings of the items pertaining to compromise
I.Public apologies for the past by both communities would be
beneficial for both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
2. Apologising for the past will benefit both communities
3. Both communities should apologise for the past wrongs that they
have committed
4. The Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities need to
forgive each other for the past
5. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should never apologise for
their past atrocities
6. The Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities need to
compromise with each other
7. Turkish Cypriots would show strength by compromising with Greek
Cypriots
8. Both communities should never forgive each other for what
happened in the past
9. Greek Cypriots would show strength by compromising with the
Turkish Cypriots over the issue of a United Cyprus
10. Turkish Cypriots would be surrendering to Greek Cypriots by
compromising with the Annan plan
I I. The Turkish Cypriot community should never forgive Greek
Cypriots for their past actions
12. Turkish Cypriots should not apologise to Greek Cypriots for their
past
13. Turkish Cypriots would show how strength by forgiving Greek
Cypriots for their past atrocities
14. If Greek Cypriots apologise to Turkish Cypriots for the past, it
would be a betrayal of previous generations
15. The Greek Cypriot community should never forgive Turkish
Cypriots for their past actions
16. Greek Cypriots would look weak by forgiving the Turkish Cypriot
community for their past atrocities
17. There is no need for compromise between Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots
18. Greek Cypriots would be surrendering to Turkish Cypriots by
compromising with the Annan plan over a United Cyprus
Factors
2 3
-.82
-.81
-.78
-.64 -.33
.54 .31
-.50
-.47 .46
.47 .43
.67
.64
.58
.31 .55
-.39 .53
.73
.71
.63
.61
.54
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Table 6.6: Correlations amongst the three factors extracted from the items
pertaining to compromise
Component 2
1 1.00
2 -.01 1.00
3 .30 .07
3
1.00
Below is a table summarising all measures used further in the present study.
Table 6.7: Summary table of all measures used ill the present study
Measures NCronbach's a Mean SD
Targets of trust
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders
Trust in the Cypriot Government
Trust in the Greek Government
Trust in the Turkish Government
Trust in the British Government
Trust in the American Government
Trust in the European Union
Trust in the United Nations
Trust in the Greek Cypriot people
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot people
Trust in the Greek people
Trust in the Turkish people
Political interest (I item question)
Political knowledge (I item question)
Political ideology (I item question)
Exposure to political issues
National identification
Greek identification (I item question)
Greek Cypriot identi fication (I item
question)
European identification (I item
question)
Religious identification
Compromise
Intransigence
0.91
0.96
0.97
0.93
0.95
0.96
0.95
0.96
0.96
0.97
0.97
0.96
1.82
4.71
4.44
1.53
2.28
1.86
3.52
2.99
4.74
2.37
4.66
1.86
.89
1.41
1.46
.85
.85
.88
.87
.97
1.36
1.31
1.44
1.07
1.80
1.61
1.81
1.23
1.01
1.85
1.70
1.46
1.30
1.31
1.35
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
283
0.65
3.89
3.60
3.93
3.50
0.82 4.90
3.77
4.75
0.90
4.06
4.91
0.85
0.71
3.62
3.86
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6.3 Results
6.3.1 Do young people trust/distrust different political institutions and ethnic/national
groups in varying degrees?
In order to answer the first research question, three different factor analyses were run
in order to see if participants would distinguish between different political targets
which were involved in the Cyprus issue. The reasons why three factor analyses were
conducted instead of one including all trust items were, first, because theoretically, we
expected that people, international institutions, and governments and leaders directly
involved in the Cyprus issue would be differentially considered by the participants
and, second, because the total number of our participants (N) was not large enough to
allow a factor analysis with so many items. A repeated measures ANOV A was then
carried out to examine whether participants placed different levels of trust in different
targets.
6.3.1.1 Trust in political leaders of peoples directly involved in theCyprus issue
A factor analysis was conducted on the items of the first four targets of trust, which
consisted of the four governments/political leaders directly involved in the Cyprus
issue (the Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Turkish, the Cypriot and the Greek
government). The method of factor extraction used was Principal Component analysis
and the method of rotation was Direct Oblimin, since we did not know if the factors
were correlated. Furthermore, factor loadings under .3 were suppressed to facilitate
interpretation (Field, 2005). We requested four factors as on theoretical grounds we
expected that the target of trust would play an important role. The factor analysis
showed that the items grouped according to their target; 66.9% of total variance was
explained by these four factors. All the items concerning the Greek government (items
61-71) grouped under factor I, all the items concerning the Turkish government (items
39~49) grouped under factor II, all items concerning the Cypriot government (items
50-60) grouped under factor III and finally all items concerning the Turkish Cypriot
leaders (items 28-38) grouped under factor IV.
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Table 6.8: Factor loadings of the items of trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Turkish, the Greek
Cypriot and the Greek Government
Factor
I II III IV
the Greek government is trustworthy .92
the Greek government is effective .90
the Greek government is worthy of pride .89
the Greek government is efficient .89
the Greek government is legitimate .88
the Greek government is responsive .88
the Greek government is fair .87
the Greek government has integrity .87
the Greek government is worthy of support .85
the Greek government is compassionate .84
the Greek government is trustful .81
the Turkish government is worthy of pride .87
the Turkish government is fair .85
the Turkish government is compassionate .84
the Turkish government is responsive .82
the Turkish government is trustworthy .78
the Turkish government is legitimate .75
the Turkish government is worthy of support .74
the Turkish government is efficient .72
the Turkish government is trustful .72
the Turkish government is effective .69
the Turkish government has integrity .60
the Cypriot government is trustworthy .93
the Cypriot government is worthy of support .89
the Cypriot government is legitimate .89
the Cypriot government is trustful .86
the Cypriot government is fair .85
the Cypriot government is worthy of pride .82
the Cypriot government is effective .82
the Cypriot government has integrity .81
the Cypriot government is efficient .79
the Cypriot government is compassionate .77
the Cypriot govemment is responsive .76
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are worthy of support .81
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are trustful .79
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are trustworthy .78
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are worthy of pride .77
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are integrity .74
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are compassionate .70
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are legitimate .67
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are responsive .62
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are fair .62
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are efficient .55
the Turkish Cypriot leaders are effective .52
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6.3.1.2 Trust in international organisations and foreign governments involved in the
Cyprus issue
Then, a factor analysis was run to see if participants would trust/distrust in general or
if they distinguished between international political targets. The method of factor
extraction used was Principal Component analysis and the method of rotation was
Direct Oblimin, since we did not know if extracted factors were correlated.
Furthermore, factor loadings under .3 were suppressed to facilitate interpretation
(Field, 2005). The items grouped according to their target; 70% of the variance was
explained by the four factors. All the items concerning the British government (items
72-82) grouped together under factor I, all the items concerning the European Union
(items 94-104) grouped together under factor II, all the items concerning the United
Nations (items 105-115) grouped together (factor III) and finally all the items
concerning the American government (items 83-93) grouped together under factor IV.
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Table 6.9: Factor loadings of the items of trust inthe British government the American government,
the United Nations and the European Union
Factor
II III IV
The British government is fair .85
The British government is trustful .85
The British government is legitimate .83
The British government is compassionate .81
The British government is effective .80
The British government is worthy of support .79
TIle British government is trustworthy .77
The British government has integrity .76
The British government is responsive .73
The British government is efficient .72
The British government is worthy of pride .71
The European Union is efficient .86
The European Union is worthy of support .85
The European Union is effective .83
The European Union is trustful .83
TIle European Union is fair .82
The European Union is legitimate .81
111e European Union is worthy of pride .80
The European Union is compassionate .79
The European Union has integrity .79
The European Union is trustworthy .78
The European Union is responsive .78
The United Nations are compassionate -.89
The United Nations are worthy of pride -.89
The United Nations are trustworthy -.88
The United Nations are fair -.87
TIle United Nations are responsive -.85
The United Nations have integrity -.85
111eUnited Nations are legitimate -.85
The United Nations are trustful -.83
The United Nations are efficient -.81
The United Nations are worthy of support -.80
The United Nations are effective -.72
111eAmerican government is worthy of support .90
10e American government is worthy of pride .89
10e American government is trustworthy .88
'111eAmerican government is trustful .87
The American government is fair .86
TIle American government is compassionate .84
TIle American government is legitimate .81
111eAmerican government has integrity .76
The American government is responsive .76
The American government is efficient .76
The American government is effective .64
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6.3.1.3 Trust in people directly involved in the Cyprus issue
Finally, a factor analysis was run on the items of trust in different people directly
involved in the Cyprus issue (the Turkish Cypriot, the Turkish, the Greek and the
Greek Cypriot people).The method of factor extraction used was Principal Component
analysis and the method of rotation was Direct Oblimin, since extracted factors might
be correlated. Furthermore, factor loadings under .3 were suppressed to facilitate
interpretation (Field, 2005). It was revealed that the items grouped according to their
target. The four factors accounted for 73.6% of the variance. All items concerning
Greek people (items 172-182) grouped under factor I, all items concerning Turkish
Cypriot people (items 161-171) grouped under factor II, all items concerning Turkish
people (items 183-193) grouped under factor III and finally all items concerning
Greek Cypriot people (items 150-160) grouped under factor IV.
136
Table 6.10; Factor loadings for the items of trust in the Turkish Cypriot, the Turkish, the Greek and
the Greek Cypriot people
Factor-----_
II III IV
The Greek people are worthy of support .93
The Greek people are trustworthy .92
The Greek people are fair .91
The Greek people are responsive .90
The Greek people are trustful .88
The Greek people are legitimate .88
The Greek people are efficient .84
TIle Greek people have integrity .84
The Greek people are effective .82
The Greek people are compassionate .81
TIle Greek people are worthy of pride .74
TIle Turkish Cypriot people are worthy of support .93
The Turkish Cypriot people are effective .90
The Turkish Cypriot people are legitimate .89
The Turkish Cypriot people are fair .88
The Turkish Cypriot people are trustworthy .88
The Turkish Cypriot people are worthy of pride .86
The Turkish Cypriot people are efficient .85
The Turkish Cypriot people are compassionate .85
The Turkish Cypriot people have integrity .84
The Turkish Cypriot people are trustful .82
TIle Turkish Cypriot people are responsive .80
The Turkish people are compassionate .91
The Turkish people are fair .90
The Turkish people are responsive .88
The Turkish people are trustworthy .86
The Turkish people are legitimate .85
The Turkish people have integrity .82
The Turkish people are W011hyof support .82
TIle Turkish people are effective .78
The Turkish people are efficient .78
The Turkish people are trustful .77
The Turkish people are worthy of pride .76
The Greek Cypriot people are legitimate .89
111eGreek Cypriot people are worthy of support .88
The Greek Cypriot people are trustworthy .86
The Greek Cypriot people are responsive .84
The Greek Cypriot people are fair .84
The Greek Cypriot people are trustful .84
The Greek Cypriot people are effective .81
The Greek Cypriot people are efficient .81
The Greek Cypriot people are compassionate .78
The Greek Cypriot people are worthy of pride .74
The Greek Cypriot people have integrity .70
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6.3.1.4 Triangulation for the importance of the target of trust
In order to triangulate the above results, due to the possibility of a halo effect, another
factor analysis was conducted on the items pertaining to the scale created about
participants' level of "trust", "support", "confidence" and evaluation of "legitimacy"
of Cypriot politicians, Cypriot government, the United Nations and the European
Union. The method of factor extraction was Principal Component analysis and the
method of rotation was Direct Oblimin since we did not know if factors were
correlated. Item loadings under .3 were suppressed to facilitate interpretation (Field,
2005). It was found that the items grouped not according to the verb, the action, but
according to the target of the verbs. All the items, across our initial 4 groups,
concerning the Government and the Cypriot politicians grouped under factor I, all the
items concerning the United Nations grouped under factor II and all the items
concerning the European Union grouped under factor III (see table below).
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Table 6.11: Pattern matrix of the structural coefficients of the three factors
] support the government for the resolution of the issue of Cyprus
I trust the government for the resolution of the issue of Cyprus
I am confident that the government works hard for the resolution
of the issue of Cyprus
Isupport Cypriot politicians for the final restoration of peace
I trust Cypriot politicians for the final restoration of peace
I find legitimate the action taken by Cypriot politicians for the
final restoration of peace
I find legitimate the action taken by the Government for the
resolution of the issue of Cyprus
I am confident that Cypriot politicians work hard for the final
restoration of peace
I support the United Nations for the resolution of the current
conflict with Turkey
I am confident the United Nations will help for the resolution to
the current conflict with Turkey
I trust the United Nations for the resolution of the current conflict
with Turkey
I find legitimate the action taken by the United Nations for the
resolution of the current conflict with Turkey
I trust the European Union for the creation of a united Cypriot
state
I am confident that the European Union will help for the creation
of a united Cypriot state
I support the European Union for the creation of a united Cypriot
state
I find legitimate the action taken by the European Union for the
creation of a united Cypriot state
Factors~.._-- .. --
II III
.82
.82
.82
.81
.77
.66
.66
.63
.82
.82
.76
.59
-.85
-.79
-.77
-.66
The three factors were correlated moderately to strong between them and all the
correlations were negative apart from the one between factor I and II, which was also
the lowest one.
Table 6.12: Correlation matrix for the three factors extracted from the factor analysis of the
synonyms of trust
Factors II III
I Cypriot government and Cypriot politicians
II United Nations
III European Union
.37
-.59 -.64
Then, each of these three factors was correlated respectively with trust in the Cypriot
government, trust in the UN, and trust in the EU, as they emerged from the previous
factor analyses. The correlation between the factors which referred to the same target
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was in all three cases significant at .001 level and strong positive (r=.60 between the
two factors of trust in the Cypriot government, r= .66 between the two factors of trust
in the UN and r= .65 between the two factors of trust in the EU). These results
indicate the constituent validity of these factors and therefore support the previous
findings.
6.3.1.5 Examining Differences in Levels of Trust in different targets
After the results of triangulation, we considered the eleven items on trust, which were
found to group together in the same factor, as a measure of trust in this specific target.
Various researchers have looked at separate concepts related to trust; however, our
data indicate that all of these concepts are important for trust. For each target,
participants use these concepts interchangeably, which suggests that they all measure
an underlying construct, which we argue is trust.
A reliability test was run then for the eleven items of each one of the twelve targets of
trust. It was found that all of them had very high reliability (see table below).
Table 6.13: Reliability of scales of trust in the twelve targets
Targets of trust Cronbach's Cl Mean SD N
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders 0.91 1.82 .89 283
Trust in the Cypriot Government 0.96 4.71 1.41 283
Trust in the Greek Government 0.97 4.44 1.46 283
Trust in the Turkish Government 0.93 1.53 .85 283
Trust in the British Government 0.95 2.28 .85 283
Trust in the American Government 0.96 1.86 .88 283
Trust in the European Union 0.95 3.52 .87 283
Trust in the United Nations 0.96 2.99 .97 283
Trust in the Greek Cypriot people 0.96 4.74 1.36 283
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot people 0.97 2.37 1.31 283
Trust in the Greek people 0.97 4.66 1.44 283
Trust in the Turkish people 0.96 1.86 1.07 283
One new variable for every target of trust was constructed by the mean of the items
that were found to group together in the previous factor analyses. Descriptive statistics
showed that participants' levels of trust were not very high and they depended on the
target of trust; the scores varied from 1.53 to 4.74 on a 7-point scale. Participants
trusted the Greek Cypriot people more and the Cypriot government and then the
Greek people and the Greek government. However, even though these targets were
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the most trusted, the scores were no higher than 4.74 on the 7-point scale. The least
trusted targets were the Turkish government, the Turkish Cypriot leaders and the
Turkish people.
In order to find out which of these means were significantly different, a repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted. The twelve targets were: the Cypriot government,
the Greek government, the Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Turkish government, the EU
and then the UN, the American government and the British government, the Greek
Cypriot people and the Greek people, the Turkish people and the Turkish Cypriot
people. The main effect of the target of trust on participants' ratings of trust was
significant F(l1 ,272)=124.51, while a post-hoc Bonferroni test correcting for Type I
error revealed significant differences between trust levels in certain only targets. It
revealed that trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders, was not significantly different from
trust in the American government and trust in the Turkish people (p=l.OO and p=l.OO
respectively). It was also found that trust in the Cypriot government was not
significantly different from trust in the Greek government (p=.11), trust in the Greek
Cypriot people (p=l.OO) and trust in the Greek people (p=1.00). Trust in the Greek
government was also not significantly different from trust in the Greek people
(p=.13). Trust in the British government was not significantly different from trust in
the Turkish Cypriot people (p=l.OO). Concerning trust in the American government it
was not significantly different from trust in the Turkish people (p=I.OO). Finally trust
in the Greek Cypriot people did not differ significantly from trust in the Greek people
(p=I.00). All the other targets were significantly different between them at p< 0.001
except for trust in the Greek government which was significantly different from trust
in the Greek Cypriot people at p < 0.05 (see figure 6.1).
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Figure 6.1: Levels of trust *type of target
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6.3. 2 What is the meaning of trust in different political institutions and ethnic/national
groups?
Since the concepts/constructs related to trust in the literature appeared to be
interchangeably used by participants, and at the same time the target of trust appeared
to determine the level of participants' trust, a repeated measures ANOVA was
conducted to also explore the relationship between the targets of trust and these
different concepts. The twelve targets were: the Cypriot government, the Greek
government, the Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Turkish government, the EU and then
the UN, the American government and the British government, the Greek Cypriot
people and the Greek people, the Turkish people and the Turkish Cypriot people; and
the eleven concepts/constructs were: " ... trustfulness", " ... support", " ... pride",
" 1 .. " " hiness";" ~. "" ffecti "" ff!' "... egitimacy", ... trustwort m , ... latmeSS, ... e veness", ... e lClency ,
" ... responsiveness", " ... compassion" and " ... integrity".
Mauchly's test indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated for all
three main effects: trust targets, X2(65) = 1383.44, p<.001, the eleven constructs,
X2(54) = 451.23, p<.OOI, and the trust targets with the eleven constructs, t(6104) =
15250.34, p<.OOl. Therefore, degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-
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Geisser estimates of sphericity (e =.39 for the main effect of trust targets, s =.75 for
the main effects of the constructs and E =.42 for the main effect of trust targets and
constructs).
All effects were reported as significant at p<.OOl. There was a significant main effect
of the target of trust on participants' ratings of trust, F(4.26,1191.69) = 430.10, where
the pairwise comparisons revealed the differences amongst the twelve targets as
described in the previous section of the results. There was also a significant main
effect of the constructs on participants' ratings of trust, F(7.S3,2107.62) = 10.03.
Pairwise comparisons revealed the following differences: that trustfulness was
significantly lower than legitimacy and effectiveness, that support was significantly
higher than trustworthiness, responsiveness, compassion and pride, that legitimacy
was significantly higher than trustfulness, trustworthiness, responsiveness,
compassion, integrity and pride, that trustworthiness was signiticantly lower than
support, legitimacy, fairness, effectiveness and efficiency, that fairness was
significantly higher than trustworthiness, responsiveness and compassion, that
effectiveness was significantly higher than trustfulness, trustworthiness,
responsiveness, compassion and pride, that efficiency was significantly higher than
trustworthiness, responsiveness, compassion, that responsiveness and compassion
were significantly lower than support, legitimacy, fairness, effectiveness and
efficiency, that integrity was significantly lower than legitimacy and that pride was
significantly lower than worthy of support, legitimacy and effectiveness (see means,
df and significance levels in Table 1 in Appendix IT).
Finally, there was also a significant interaction effect between the targets of trust and
the constructs, F(46.53,13027.54) = 8.32, which indicates that the constructs had
different effects on people's ratings depending on which target was rated. To
understand this interaction we looked at the profile plot of the estimated means of the
ratings for the different constructs for each target separately, and it was revealed that
there was variability amongst the ratings of the constructs only for some of the
targets; for the Turkish government, the Turkish Cypriot leaders, the American
government, the British government, the Cypriot government, the Turkish people and
the Greek Cypriot people (see figure 6.2 below).
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The difference of the effect size of the target of trust, versus the constructs of and the
interaction of the two, was revealed in the partial eta squared, which was .60 for the
targets oftrust, .04 for the constructs of trust and .03 for the interaction of the two.
Figure 6.2: Mean scores of the 11 constructs for each of the twelve targets
6~------------------------------------,
o legitimate
t/)
t5
::J,_.....
t/)
coo
o trustworthy
5 o fair
effective
4.....c
Q),_
&
is
'0
t/)
Q),_
oo
t/)
c
co
ID
:2
efficient
3
o responsive
o . tcompasslona e
o has integrity
Social and political in-group and out-group targets
scores
N.B. The circles indicate the targets for which there is greater discrepancy between the 11 constructs'
6.3.2.1 Variability amongst the eleven constructs
Even though the eleven constructs were found to be interchangeably used in the first
factor analyses, the ratings of the constructs were not the same in reference to each of
the targets. Constructs were rated differently, which showed that participants
differentiated between these concepts and did not consider these concepts as
indistinguishable parts of a general evaluation of the target.
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Trust in the Turkish Government
There were differences in the way people rated the Turkish government in relation to
the 11 constructs of trust F (5.7,1631.22)=14.138, p<O.OOl. Participants tended to
believe that the Turkish government was more effective (p<0.05, p<O.OOl, p<O.OOl,
p<O.OOI, p<0.05, p<O.OOI, p<O.OOI, p<O.OOI respectively to the following constructs)
than trustful, trustworthy, fair, responsive, compassionate, and worthy of pride or of
their support; and also more efficient (p<0.05, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<0.05,
p<O.OOI, p<O.OOI, p<O.OOl respectively to the following constructs) than trustful,
trustworthy, fair, responsive, compassionate, and worthy of pride or of their support.
They also tended to believe that it was more legitimate than worthy of their support,
trustworthy or fair, compassionate or worthy of pride (p<O.05, p<O.OO1, p<O.05,
p<O.05, p<O.OOl respectively). Finally they believed that it had more integrity than it
was worthy of pride (p<0.05). The highest means were for effectiveness (1.82) and
efficiency (1.77) and the lowest ones for pride (1.34) and trustworthiness (1.38).
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders
The results revealed that there were differences in the way people rated the Turkish
Cypriot government in relation to the 11 constructs of trust F (7.67,2193.43)=9.761,
p<O.OOl. Participants tended to believe that the Turkish-Cypriot leaders were more
trustful, deserved one's support and were more legitimate than they were trustworthy
(p<0.05, p<O.05 and p<O.OOl respectively). They also tended to believe that they were
more effective and efficient than trustworthy (p<O.OO1 and p<O.05 respectively) and
more effective than fair and compassionate (p<0.05 and p<0.05 respectively). They
also believed that they were more efficient and legitimate than compassionate (p<O.05
and p<0.05 respectively). Finally they believed that they were less worthy of pride
than anything else (p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OOI, p<0.05, p<O.OOI, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1,
p<O.OO1, p<O.05, and p<O.OO1 respectively). The highest mean was for effectiveness
(2.02) , then for legitimacy (1.94) and efficiency (1.93) and the lowest mean was for
worthy of pride (1.46).
Trust in the Cypriot Government
There were differences in the way people rated the Cypriot government in relation to
the 11 constructs of trust F (7.8,2232.54)= 10.60, p<O.OO1. Participants tended to
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believe that the Cypriot government was more worthy of their support than it was
trustful, legitimate, trustworthy, effective, efficient, or had integrity (p<O.OO1, p<0.05,
p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OOI, p<0.05 respectively) . However, they thought it was more
legitimate, trustworthy, fair, worthy of support, responsive, compassionate, and
worthy of pride than effective (p<O.OOI, p<O.OO1, p<0.05, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1
and p<O.OOl respectively). They also believed that it was more worthy of pride than it
was trustful or efficient (p<0.05 and p<O.OOI respectively). Concerning efficiency,
they believed it was also less efficient than worthy of support, of pride, and less than
fair, responsive and compassionate (p<O.OOI, p<0.05, p<0.05, p<O.05 and p<O.OOI
respectively). The highest means were for support (4.99), pride (4.88) and
responsiveness (4.84), while the lowest ones were for effectiveness (4.37) and
efficiency (4.47).
Table 6.14: Descriptive statistics for the constructs of trust in the Turkish Government, the
Turkish Cypriot leaders and the Cypriot Government
Trust in the
Turkishgovernment TurkishCypriot leaders Cypriotgovernment
(N=287) (N=287) (N=287)
Mean SD Mean SI) Mean SD
Trustworthiness 1.38 .96 1.65 1.10 4.68 1.68
Trustfulness 1.48 .95 1.89 1.28 4.54 1.68
Worthyof support 1.43 .96 1.90 1.27 4.99 1.68
Legitimacy 1.67 1.17 1.94 1.28 4.74 1.60
fairness 1.43 .93 1.79 1.19 4.74 1.63
Effectiveness 1.82 1.41 2.02 1.39 4.37 1.72
Efficiency 1.77 1.36 1.93 1.29 4.47 1.70
Responsiveness 1.51 1.04 1.76 1.15 4.84 1.68
Compassion 1.42 .93 1.68 1.10 4.76 1.59
Integrity 1.59 1.16 1.90 1.38 4.64 1.70
Worthyof pride 1.34 .96 1.46 .96 4.88 - 1.78
Trust in the Turkish people
Concerning Turkish people, there were differences in the way people rated them in
relation to the 11 constructs of trust F (10,2820)=7.205, p<O.O1. Participants tended to
believe that Turkish people were more legitimate, more effective and more efficient
than worthy of support (p<0.05, p<O.Ol and p<O.Ol respectively) and pride (p<0.05,
p<O.OI and p<O.OI respectively). They also believed that they were more efficient
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than trustworthy, responsive, compassionate and worthy of pride (p<0.05, p<O.OOI,
p<0.05 and p<O.OI respectively). The highest means were for effectiveness (2.04) and
efficiency (2.06) and the lowest ones for pride (1.70), responsiveness (1.74) and
support (1.74)
Trust in the Greek Cypriot people
Concerning the Greek Cypriot people, there were differences in the way people rated
them in relation to the 11 constructs of trust F (10,2840)=6.041, p<O.OO1. Participants
tended to believe that Greek Cypriots were more worthy of support than they were
trustful, effective, efficient and they had integrity (p<O.OOl, p<O.OI, p<O.OOI and
p<0.05 respectively). They also believed that Greek Cypriots were more legitimate,
responsive and worthy of pride than they were effective (p<O.OOI, p<O.Ol, and p<0.05
respectively). Finally, they believed that they were more worthy of pride than efficient
and they had integrity. The highest means were for worthy of support (4.96) and
worthy of pride (4.96) and the lowest ones for efficiency (4.51) and effectiveness
(4.59).
Table 6.15: Descriptive statistics for the constructs of trust in the Turkish people and the
Greek Cypriot people
Trust in the Turkish Trust in the Greek
eeoele (N=283) C~Eriot eeoEle (N=285)
Mean SD Mean SD
Trust fu Iness 1.86 1.23 4.67 1.63
Support 1.74 1.17 4.96 1.61
Legitimacy 1.92 1.31 4.77 1.57
Trustworthiness 1.80 1.21 4.78 1.60
Fairness 1.90 1.31 4.72 1.60
Effectiveness 2.04 1.45 4.59 1.60
Efficiency 2.06 1.47 4.51 1.64
Responsiveness 1.74 1.14 4.75 1.67
Compassion 1.83 1.21 4.71 1.63
Integrity 1.90 1.31 4.66 1.68
Worthy of pride 1.70 1.25 4.96 1.76
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Trust in the American Government
Concerning the American government, there were differences in the way people rated
it in relation to the 11 constructs of trust F (6.84,1958.24)=20.405, p<O.OOI.
Participants tended to believe that it was more effective (p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1,
p<O.O1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1 and p<O.OO1 respectively to the following
constructs) and efficient (p<O.OOI, p<O.OOI, p<O.OI, p<O.05, p<0.05, p<O.OOI,
p<O.OOl and p<O.05 respectively to the following constructs) than trustful, worthy of
pride or support, legitimate, fair, responsive, compassionate, trustworthy or than it had
integrity. However, they also believed that it was more legitimate and it had more
integrity than it was trustful (p<O.OI and p<O.05 respectively), trustworthy (p<O.05
and p=0.07 respectively) or worthy of support (p<O.Ol and p<O.05 respectively). The
highest means were for effectiveness (2.21) and efficiency (2.14) and the lowest ones
for trustfulness (1.74), support (1.74) and trustworthiness (1.76).
Trust in the British Government
Concerning the British government, there were differences in the way people rated it
in relation to the 11 constructs of trust F (7.76,2212.78)=22.768, p<O.OOl. Participants
tended to believe that it was more effective (p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OOI,
p<O.OOI, p<O.OOI, p<O.OOI, respectively to the following constructs) and efficient
(p<{).OOI, p<O.OO1, p<O.O1, p<O.OO1, p<O.05, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, respectively to the
following constructs) than it was trustful, trustworthy, worthy of support and pride,
fair, responsive or it had integrity. They also believed that it was less trustworthy than
it was legitimate, fair and it had integrity (p<O.OOI, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1). Furthermore,
they believed that it was more legitimate than trustful, worthy of support or pride,
responsive, compassionate (p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1, p<O.OO1 and p<O.OO1
respectively). They also believed that it was more fair than responsive and worthy of
support (p<O.05 and p<O.OOl respectively). Finally, they believed that it had integrity
more than it was responsive and trustworthy (p<O.05 and p<O.OOI respectively). The
highest means were for effectiveness (2.61) and efficiency (2.56) and the lowest ones
for trustworthiness (2.04).
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Table 6.16: Descriptive statistics for the constructs of trust in the American Government and
the British Government
Trust in the American Trust in the British
government (N=287) government (N=286)
Mean SD Mean SO
Trustfulness 1.74 .99 2.20 1.00
Worthy of support 1.74 1.02 2.14 1.07
Legitimacy 1.93 1.13 2.46 1.10
Effectiveness 2.21 1.23 2.61 1.12
Fairness 1.80 1.05 2.32 1.07
Efficiency 2.14 1.21 2.56 I.) I
Responsiveness 1.78 .94 2.14 1.01
Compassion 1.77 1.02 2.19 1.03
Integrity 1.91 1.06 2.32 1.07
W011hy of pride 1.78 1.08 2.16 1.08
trustworthiness 1.76 1.06 2.05 1.04
6.3.2.2 Multiple regressionsfor every target's trustworthiness:
After conducting the repeated analyses of variance, stepwise multiple regressions
were conducted for every target of trust in order to see if and how much each of the
different terms contributed to the prediction of the trustworthiness of each of these
targets. Trustworthiness was chosen as the dependent variable because its translation
in Greek was semantically the nearest to participants' evaluation of trust in the
different targets. Each target was examined separately.
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders
All the correlations were very high amongst the different constructs (see Table 2
Appendix II). When trustworthiness of Turkish Cypriot leaders was regressed based
on all the other constructs, the model accounted for 64.9% of the variability of the
outcome (F(7,279)=76.38, p<0.001). The standardised Beta coefficients indicated that
Turkish Cypriot leaders' trustworthiness was significantly predicted by pride (P=·20),
legitimacy (P=.17), support (P=.20), effectiveness (P=.15), responsiveness (p=.15),
trustfulness (p=.1 0) and fairness (p=.11) (see Table 6.17).
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Trust in the Turkish Government
Looking at the correlations (see table 2, Appendix II) of all constructs for the Turkish
government, the highest correlations were between trustfulness and worth of support
(R==0.78) and between trustworthiness and worth of pride (R==0.75). The model of
multiple regression was significant (F(7,279)==85.28, p<O.OOI) and accounted for 67%
of the variance of the outcome. All predictors were significant apart from compassion,
and they all had a positive relationship with trustworthiness, apart from effectiveness,
which had a negative onc. However, since the residuals were not normally distributed,
a logistic regression was conducted. Legitimacy and pride were the only significant
predictors using logistic regression (see Table 6.17). Model X2 (1) = 41.03, R2==.l4
(Cox & Snell), .60 (Nagelkerke), 0.43 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) (see 6.17).
Trust in the Cypriot Government
Looking at the correlations of the constructs for the Cypriot government, the highest
con·elations were between trustworthiness and worth of support (R=0.82) and
legitimacy (R=0.83), but apart from those, there were also high correlations between
trustfulness and support (R=0.80) and between compassion and integrity (R=0.79).
The model of multiple regression was significant (F(5,281)=237.76, p<O.OOI) and
accounted for 81% of the variability of the outcome .. However, the residuals were not
normally distributed, therefore a logistic regression was run and the predictors which
were found significant were support, effectiveness, pride and integrity. Model X2 (1) =
155.79, R2=.51 (Cox & Snell), .76 (Nagelkerke), 0.36 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) (see
Table 6.17).
Trust in the Greek Government
Looking at the correlations between the constructs for the Greek government (see
table 2, Appendix II), the highest correlations were between effectiveness and
efficiency (R=0.84) and between responsiveness and compassion (R=0.82). Apart
from those, the correlations between trustworthiness and fairness (R=0.83), between
trustfulness and support (R=.82) and between support and legitimacy (R=.82) were
very high. Generally all the correlations are very high, above 0.70. The model of
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multiple regression was significant (F(S,281)=228.81, p<O.OOI) and accounted for
80.3% of the variability of trustworthiness. However, the residuals were not normally
distributed, so a stepwise logistic regression was run. Trustworthiness of the Greek
government was significantly predicted by fairness, legitimacy, integrity and
trustfulness. Model "I: (I) = 197.14, R2=.62 (Cox & Snell), .86 (Nagelkerke), 0.24
(Hosmer & Lemeshow) (see table below).
Table 6.17: Multiple and logistic regression for trust in "enemy" and in-group governments
Trust in the
Turkish Cypriot Turkish Cypriot Greek
leaders Government Government Government
B B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Constant -.8.20(1.54) -9.30(1.64) -14.85(2.73)
Trustfulness .10** 2.16 .62**(.27)
Worthy of support .20* 4.47 .57*(.21)
Legitimacy .17* 3.66 .96*(.30) 1.07**(.33)
fairness .11 ** 2.06 1.31 *(.32)
Effectiveness .15* 3.36 .75*(.21)
Efficiency
Responsiveness .15* 3.51
Compassion
Integrity .67**(.21) .65**(.26)
W0I1h of ride .20* 3.97 .91 *(.26) .47**(.21)
* p<O.OOI ** p< 0.05
Trust in the British Government
Looking at the correlations of the different constructs for the British government, the
highest correlations were between worthy of support and worthy of pride (R=0.76),
between effectiveness and efficiency (R=0.7S) and between worthy of support and
compassion (R=0.72). The correlations amongst the items ranged from average to
high (0.48<R<0.76). The model of multiple regression was significant
(F(4,281)= 108.43, p<O.OO1) and accounted for 60.1% of the variability of the
outcome. All of the constructs were significant but none of them was especially
strong. The highest one was worthy of pride (standardised ~=0.29, p<O.OOI) and the
lowest was responsiveness (standardised ~=0.18, p<O.OO1) (see Table 6.18).
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Trust in the American Government
Looking at the correlations amongst the constructs for the American government (see
table 2, Appendix II), the highest correlation was between trustfulness and worthy of
support (R=0.85) and then between effectiveness and efficiency (R=0.79), between
trustworthiness and worthy of support (R=0.77) and between responsiveness and
compassion (R=0.75). The model of multiple regression was significant
(F(4,282)=190.32, p<O.OOI) and accounted for 73% of the variability of the outcome.
However, because the residuals were not normally distributed, we conducted a
stepwise logistic regression. Only effectiveness was found to be a significant predictor
of trustworthiness._Model X} (1) = 41.51, R2=.14 (Cox & Snell), .56 (Nagelkerke),
0.48 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) (see Table 6.18).
Trust in the European Union
The strongest correlations for the constructs in respect to the EU were between
trustfulness and worthy of support (R=0.79), trustworthiness and worthy of support
(R=0.75), and worthy of support with legitimacy (R=0.74). The correlations between
effectiveness and efficiency (R=0.72) and between fairness and efficiency (R=0.73)
were also strong (see table 2, Appendix II). The model of multiple regression
including all the constructs was significant (F(5,279)=I13.77, p<O.OOI) and accounted
for 67.1 % of the variability of trustworthiness towards the EU. The strongest predictor
was worthy of support (standardised P=0.30, F=5.15, p<O.OOI) and the weakest was
responsiveness (standardised P=0.12, F=2.l7, p<0.05) (see Table 6.18).
Trust in the United Nations
Concerning the UN, trustfulness and worthy of support were strongly correlated
(R=0.79), as well as fairness and worthy of pride (R=0.78), trustworthiness and
worthy of pride (R=0.76), efficiency and responsiveness (R=0.75) and legitimacy and
worthy of support and fairness (R=0.75). The model of multiple regression with all
the constructs was significant (F(6,279)=118.97, p<O.OOI) and accounted for 71.9%
of the variability of the outcome .. The power of the significant predictors was very
low. The strongest one was responsiveness (standardised P=0.19, F=3.55, p<O.OO1)
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and the weakest was trustfulness (standardised P=0.12, F=2.09, p<0.05) (see Table
below).
Table 6.18: Multiple and logistic regressions for trust in international institutions
Trust in the
European Union United Nations British American
Government Government
B B B t B (SE)
Constant -Il.ll (2.22)
Trustfulness .12** 2.09 .22* 3.97
Worthy of support .30* 5.15 .13** 2.23 .66(.36) NS
Legitimacy .83(.44) NS
Fairness .17* 3.48 .18** 3.01 .22* 3.68
Effectiveness 1.06**(.51)
Efficiency
Responsiveness .12** 2.18 .19* 3.55 .18** 3.15
Compassion .13** 2.52 .18* 3.26
Integrity
Worth of ride .24* 4.59 .18** 2.97 .29* 5.15
• p<O.OOI ** p< 0.05 NS= non-significant
Trust in the Greek Cypriots
Concerning the Greek Cypriots, effectiveness and efficiency (R=0.86), worthy of
support and legitimacy (R=0.82), and worthy of support and trustfulness (R=0.81)
were highly correlated, while all the correlations were above 0.57 (see table 2,
Appendix II). The model of multiple regression with all the constructs was significant
(F(4,280)=140.55, 1'<0.001) and accounted for 66.8% of the variability of the
outcome. The strongest predictors of trustworthiness of Greek Cypriots were
legitimacy (standardised P=0.30, F=5.07, p<O.OOI) and fairness (standardised P=0.28,
F=5.04, p<O.OOI) and the weakest was compassion (standardised P=0.16, 1'=3.26,
p<0.05) (see Table 6.19).
Trust in the Turkish Cypriots
Looking at the correlations of the constructs for the Turkish Cypriots, effectiveness
and efficiency (R=0.85), trustworthiness and fairness (R=0.84), trustworthiness and
worthy of support (R=0.83), and trustfulness and worth of support (R=0.83) were all
highly correlated. All the correlations were above 0.66 (see table 2, Appendix II). The
model of multiple regression with all the items was significant (F(3,280)=385.28,
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p<O.OOI), however, since, the residuals were not normally distributed, a logistic
regression was run. Fairness, pride and support were found to be significant
predictors of trustworthiness of Turkish Cypriots. Model 'l (1) = 265.22, R2=.68 (Cox
& Snell), .90 (Nagelkerke), .82 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) (see Table 6.19)
Trust in the Greek people
Looking at the correlations between the constructs for the Greek people, trustfulness
and worth of support (R=O.89), responsiveness and compassion (R=O.87),
effectiveness and efficiency (R=O.86), worthy of support and legitimacy (R=O.84),
worthy of support and trustworthiness (R=0.84), and trustworthiness and legitimacy
(R=0.83) were highly correlated. All the con-elations were above 0.66 (see table 2,
Appendix II). The model of multiple regression was significant (F(4,278)=265.61,
p<O.OO1) and accounted for 79.3% of the variability of the outcome. However, since,
the residuals were not normally distributed, a stepwise logistic regression was run.
Fairness, legitimacy and responsiveness were found to be the significant predictors of
trustworthiness. Model X2 (1) = 248.11, R2=.66 (Cox & Snell), .88 (Nagelkerke), .78
(Hosmer & Lemeshow) (see Table 6.19).
Trust in the Turkish People
Looking at the correlations between the constructs for the Turkish people,
effectiveness and efficiency (R=0.91), trustworthiness and fairness (R=O.82), and
finally trustfulness and worthy of support (R=O.81) were strongly correlated. The
weakest correlation was between efficiency and worth of pride (R=0.49). The model
of multiple regression was significant (F(6,276)= 151.11, p<O.OO1) and accounted for
76.8% of the variability of the outcome and the model was significantly better at
predicting the outcome than using the mean as "best guess". llowever since the
residuals were not normally distributed, we conducted a stepwise logistic regression.
Only fairness was found to be a significant predictor of trustworthiness. Model X2 (1)
= 30.38, R2=.11 (Cox & Snell), .46 (Nagelkerke), .43 (Hosmer & Lemeshow) (see
Table below).
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Table 6.19: Multiple and logistic regressions for trust in the people
Trust in the
Greek Cypriots Greek
B
Constant -8.21 (1.25) -18.90(2.84)
Trustfulness .19* 3.71
Worthy of support 1.19*(.33)
Legitimacy .30* 5.07 1.97*(.39)
Fairness .28* 5.04 1.52*(.38) .65*(.22)
Effectiveness
Efficiency
Responsiveness .93 ....(.36)
Compassion .16* 3.26
Integrity
Worth of ride .93**(.36)
'" p<O.OOI .... p< 0.05
Turkish
eo le
B(SE)
-6.89(1.14)
1.28"'(.29)
Even though all of these concepts/constructs might be interchangeably used with trust,
the above results showed that their relative power was different in explaining trust in
particular targets.
Looking first at trust in the two in-group targets, the Cypriot government and the
Greek Cypriot people, trust in each target was related to different concepts; it was a
matter of support, effectiveness, integrity and pride for the Cypriot government, while
it was a matter of trustfulness, legitimacy, fairness and compassion, for the Greek
Cypriot people. There was also a di fferentiation in the concepts related to trust
between the Turkish Cypriot institutions and people, and between the Turkish
institutions and people. Trust in the Turkish government consisted only of legitimacy
and pride, while trust in the Turkish people only of fairness. On the other hand, the
criteria for trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders were support, pride, legitimacy,
effectiveness, responsiveness, fairness and trustfulness while for trust in the Turkish
Cypriot people they were only support, fairness and pride.
Similarities, on the other hand, were found between the constituents of trust in the
institutions, independently of their in-group/"enemy" status, as well as between the
constituents of trust in different people; e.g. pride was important for trusting the
"enemy" and the in-group institution while fairness was important for trusting both
the "enemy" and the in-group people.
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Concerning the international institutions, the EU, the UN, and the British government
were the targets for which the meaning of trust appeared to consist of the same
elements. There was only one different factor amongst the significant factors for the
EU and the UN and only two different factors between the British government and
EU and UN. However, while the significant factors were almost the same for these
targets, the effect sizes of the significant factors were very different.
Amongst the eleven constructs rated, only fairness and legitimacy appeared to be
important for the concept of trust independently of the nationality of the targets and
their political or social character.
6.3.3 Which variables are related to trust and compromise?
Finally in our research we were interested to see if and how different variables were
related to trust and compromise. We were interested in the relationship between age,
sex, origin of participants' parents, national identification (Cypriot identification),
religious identification, Greek Cypriot identification, Greek identification, European
identification, political interest, perceived political knowledge, political ideology,
trust in different targets and compromise.
6.3.3. J Frequencies
First the frequencies, of the whole sample were examined. Participants' level of
national and religious identification were relatively high (M = 4.90 and 4.91
respectively), while the strength of Greek Cypriot and European identification were
also above 4; only Greek identification was below 4, but still above the average (M =
3.77). Political interest, perceived political knowledge and political ideology scores
were also moderate, just above the average.
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Table 6.20: Descriptives of national identification, religious identification, Greek Cypriot
identification, Greek identification, European identification, political interest,
. perceived political knowledge and political ideology for the whole sample
Mean Median Mode SD N
National 4.90 5.00 4.57 1.02 287identification
Religious 4.91 5.15 5.43 1.30 287identification
Greek Cypriot 4.57 5.00 5 1.70 287identification
Greek identification 3.77 4.00 4 1.85 287
European 4.06 4.00 4 1.46 287identification
Political Interest 3.60 3.50 2.25 1.25 287
Perceived political 3.60 4.00 4 1.61 286knowledge
Political Ideology 3.93 4.00 4 1.81 257
Scores were then compared between participants whose parents were originally from
the occupied part of Cyprus and those whose parents were originally from the
southern part of the island. Although the means of the two groups were not very
different, people whose parents were from north Cyprus more often gave a score of 5
in the Greek identification scale while those whose parents were not from north
Cyprus gave a score of 1.
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Table 6.21: Independent samples t-tests and descriptive statistics for national identification,
Greek Cypriot identification, Greek identification, European identification and
Religious identification based on parents' origin
Std. Error Sig. (2-
Mean SO Mean N df tailed)
Parents from
occup.
C~Erus
National
identification yes 5.07 .92 .08 130 2.70 285 .01
no 4.75 1.07 .09 157
Greek Cypriot
identification yes 4.52 1.74 .15 130 -.47 285 ns
no 4.62 1.67 .13 157
Greek
identi fication yes 3.90 1.90 .17 130 1.05 285 ns
no 3.67 1.81 .14 157
European
identification yes 4.09 1.52 .13 130 .35 285 ns
no 4.03 1.41 .11 157
Religions yes 5.00 1.18 .10 130 1.00 285 nsidentification
no 4.84 1.38 .11 157
ns: not significant
However, independent samples t-tests showed that there was a significant difference
between the two groups only concerning their national identification levels. The t-
tests for their levels of political interest, perceived political knowledge, and political
ideology did not reveal any significant difference between the two groups.
Table 6.22: Descriptive statistics and independent samples t-tests: Political interest, perceived
political knowledge, political ideology according to parents' origin
Std.
Error Sig. (2-
Mean SD Mean N df tailed)
Parents from occliE. C~Erus
Political yes 3.68 1.26 .11 130 1.0I 285 nsInterest
no 3.53 1.24 .10 157
Perceived yes
Political 3.71 1.66 .15 129 1.03 284 ns
Knowledge
no 3.51 1.57 .13 157
Political yes 3.92 1.99 .18 118 -.12 227.601 nsIdeology
no 3.94 1.64 .14 139
ns: not significant
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6.3.3.2 Correlations
After exploring the differences in the levels of trust in different political institutions
and ethnic/national groups based on these variables, we examined the correlations
among all the variables used up to that point. We examined their correlations in order
to find out which variables should be used later on in the regressions of trust in the
"enemy" and the in-group targets and of attitudes to compromise. The variables
considered were: age, sex, parent's origin from north Cyprus, Greek Cypriot
identification, Greek identification, European identification, national identification
and religious identification, political interest, perceived political knowledge, political
ideology, trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders, in the Turkish government, in the
Cypriot government, in the Greek government, in the British government, in the
American government, in the EU, in the UN, in the Greek Cypriot people, in the
Greek people, in the Turkish people and in the Turkish Cypriot people.
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It was found that within the in-group and the out-group targets, although there were
commonalities, trust in the institutions was correlated differently from trust in the
respective people with many of the variables. Trust in the Turkish government was
significantly correlated with many more factors than trust in the Turkish people was,
such as the Greek identity, the Cypriot identity, religious identity and trust in the
Greek people. There were other factors as well with which trust in the Turkish
government was more strongly correlated than trust in the Turkish people (e.g. trust in
the Turkish Cypriot leaders) and vice versa (e.g. intransigence).
Similarly, trust in the Greek Cypriot government was more strongly correlated with
certain identifications (the Greek Cypriot, the Greek identity), age, trust in the Turkish
Cypriot leaders, than trust in the Greek Cypriot people was. On the other hand trust in
the Greek Cypriot people, in contrast to trust in the Cypriot government, was
correlated with the British government, and more strongly with trust in the Greek
people. All the other factors were either not correlated with trust in either target, or
almost equally correlated.
Concerning trust in the Turkish Cypriot targets, trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders
was significantly correlated with the Greek identity while trust in the Turkish Cypriot
people was not correlated with it, and also more strongly correlated with trust in the
American government, the Turkish government, trust in the Greek Cypriot people,
and the Greek people; on the other hand, trust in the Turkish Cypriot people was
significantly correlated with political ideology and trust in the EU while trust in the
Turkish Cypriot leaders was not correlated with them.
Finally, trust in the Greek government was also more strongly correlated with
European identification, trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders, trust in the Cypriot
government, trust in the EU and the UN, than trust in the Greek people was. All the
other factors were either not correlated with trust in either target, or almost equally
correlated.
Differences were also found between the correlates of compromise and intransigence
both in terms of significant correlation (e.g. with Greek Cypriot identity, Greek
identity, trust in the Greek and the Cypriot government etc.) and in terms of the
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strength of the correlation (e.g. trust in the Turkish Cypriot people). Furthermore,
concerning the relationship of these concepts with certain variables emphasised by the
literature (i.e. age, parents' origin, national identification), they were not significant.
6.3.3.3 Trust in political and social groups, demographics and identifications
After looking at the correlations, we tried to find out if there were any 2-way or 3-
way interactions between trust in different targets and age, gender, national and
religious identification. As trust appeared to be context specific, it was also
hypothesised that different groups of people would have different norms as to which
they trust and to what extent they trust each target We did not have any specific
hypotheses for the combinations of the 3-way interactions; however, in an exploratory
way, we ran two MANOV As, one for demographics and one for identifications, in
order to see the between-subjects and the within-subjects effects in the 2-way and the
3-way interactions between trust and these variables.
Trust, gender and age
A MANOV A was run first between the twelve targets of trust and gender and age
group. For this analysis, a new variable was created where the participants were
divided into two groups, the students below 16 years old and the students above 16
years old (16 years old was the median score in the sample). In the between-subjects
effects, we saw that gender was not significant, while the age group of the participants
was. Older children had lower overall trust scores than younger children. The
interaction between the two groups was not significant. However, in the within-
subjects effects, both two-way interactions were significant; both trust by gender
(F(4.5,6)= 4.28, p< 0.001) and trust by age group (F(4.5,6)= 10.61, p< 0.00 I). The
three-way interaction on the other hand between trust, gender and age group was not
significant (F(4.5,6)=337.17, p==0.16).
Then, independent samples t-tests were run between trust and age, and trust and
gender in order to see the differences between females and males and between older
and younger children.
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Trust and gender
Concerning gender, the difference between males and females was significant for trust
in the Cypriot government, the Greek government, the British government, the Greek
Cypriot people and the Greek people. Boys trusted these targets more than the girls,
except for the British government, which the girls trusted significantly more than the
boys. Using a Bonferroni correction of the p values, at p<O.OI, due to the II multiple
tests, trust in the British government, the Greek Cypriot people and the Greek people
were not significant.
Table 6.24: Descriptive statistics of males and females across the twelve targets
N Mean SD df Sig. (2-tailed)
Trust in the sex
Turkish Cypriot male 145 1.77 .89 ns .government
female 142 1.85 .90
Cypriot government male 145 4.95 JJ6 3.07 285 .00female 142 4.44 1.43
Greek government male 145 4.75 1.52 3.66 285 .00female 142 4.12 1.33
British government male 145 2.15 .94 -2.83 275.51 .01female 142 2.43 .76
American government male 145 1.79 .94 ns
female 142 1.96 .84
EuropeanUnion male 144 3.60 .85 ns
female 142 3.45 .89
UnitedNations male 144 3.03 1.01 ns
female 142 2.95 .93
Greek Cypriot people male 143 4.96 1.33 2.78 283 .01female 142 4.51 1.37
Turkish Cypriot people male 142 2.24 1.32 ns
female 142 2.50 1.28
Greek people male 141 4.87 1.53 2.56 273.91 .01female 142 4.44 1.31
Turkish people male 141 1.79 1.03 ns
female 142 1.9 1.11
Turkish government male 145 1.51 .79 ns
female 142 1.56 .90
ns: not significant
Trust and age
Concerning age groups, there was a significant difference between younger (1) and
older (2) children concerning trust in the Cypriot government, the Greek government,
the EU, the UN, the Greek Cypriot people and the Greek people. Younger children
showed more trust than older children in all of these targets. However, after using a
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Bonferroni correction of the p values, at p<O.OI, due to the 11 multiple tests, trust in
the UN was not significant.
Table 6.25: Descriptive statistics of age groups across the twelve targets
Mean SD N df Sig. (2-tailed)
Age
Trust in the: group
s
Turkish Cypriot government 1.84 .88 140 .415 240 ns
2 1.79 .92 102
Cypriot government I 4.89 1.43 140
2.957 240 .00
2 4.35 1.37 102
Greek government I 4.86 1,43 140
5.540 240 .00
2 3.86 1.32 102
British government 1 2.28 .85 140
-.058 240 ns
2 2.29 .85 102
American government 1.90 .89 140
-.260 240 ns
2 1.93 .92 102
European Union I 3.62 .84 139
3.108 239 .00
2 3.27 .88 102
United Nations 3.13 .98 139 2.795 239 .01
2 2.79 .91 102
Greek Cypriot people I 5.10 1.23 139 5.594 238 .00
2 4.14 1,40 101
Turkish Cypriot people I 2.34 1.32 139 -.197 237 ns
2 2.37 1.37 lOO
Greek people 5.12 1.22 139 7.065 236 .00
2 3.91 1.42 99
Turkish people 1.89 1.05 139
.372 236 ns
2 1.83 1.09 99
Turkish government 1.55 .82 140
-.035 240 ns
2 1.55 .95 102
(I) younger children (2) older children ns: not significant
Trust and religious, national identification
A MANOV A was then run between the twelve targets of trust and national and
religious identification. For this reason two new variables were created where the
participants were divided in two groups, the high identifiers and the low identifiers for
each of these identifications (the groups were divided at the median), In the between-
subjects effects, both national identification and religious identification were
significant but the interaction between the two variables was not. High identifiers in
both religion and nationality tended to trust more than the low identifiers. In the
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within-subjects effects, both of the two-way interactions were also significant; both
trust by national identification (F(4.5,11)= 3.55, p< 0.001) and trust by religious
identification (F(4.5,11 )=6.68, p< 0.05). The three-way interaction on the other hand
between trust, national identification and religious identification was not significant
(F(4.5,11)= 1.52, p=0.19).
The results showed that there was not a 3-way interaction between the variables that
we measured in the ratings of trust in different targets. Age did not interact with
gender, and national identification did not interact with religious identification.
6.3.3.4lvlultiple regressionsfor social, political trust and compromise
A multiple regression was first conducted for trust in the in-group (trust in the Greek
Cypriots) with the factors it was correlated with, which were age, gender, Greek
Cypriot identification, Greek identification, European identification, national
identification, religious identification, political ideology, political interest and
perceived political knowledge. The regression equation was significant F
(10,243)=18.58, p<.OOI and the model accounted for 41% of total variance in trust.
The significant predictors were age, gender, Greek Cypriot identification, Greek
identification, national identification and religious identification.
A multiple regression was then conducted for trust in the in-group government (trust
in the Cypriot government) with the factors it was correlated with, which were age,
gender, Greek Cypriot identification, Greek identification, European identification,
national identification, religious identification, political interest and perceived
political knowledge. The regression equation was significant F (9,276)=10.68, p<.OOI
and the model accounted for 23% of total variance in trust. The significant predictors
were age, gender, European identification, national identification and religious
identification.
165
Table 6.26: Predicting levels of social and political trust in the in-group
Trust in the Greek Cypriots Trust in the Cypriot
government
Variables B SEll P B SEll P
Constant 3.35 .87 3.36 .90
age -.13 .04 -.15* -.10 .05 -.11 **
gender -.27 .14 -.10** -.37 .16 -.13**
Greek Cypriot identification .16 .05 .20* .09 .06 .11
Greek identification .11 .05 .15** -.04 .05 -.05
European identification .05 .05 .05 .16 .05 .16*
National identification .17 .08 .13* .26 .09 .19*
Religious identification .29 .06 .27** .23 .06 .21*
Perceived political knowledge .02 .06 .02 .01 .06 .01
Political ideology -.03 .04 -.03
Political interest .07 .05 .09 .03 .06 .04
* significant at p<O.OI ** significant at p<O.05
Then social and political trust in the out-group was examined. A linear regression was
conducted then for trust in the out-group people (trust in the Turkish Cypriots), since
trust in the Turkish Cypriot people was correlated significantly only with political
ideology. The regression equation was significant F (1,252)=5.73, p<.05 and the
political ideology accounted for 2% of total variance in trust,
A linear regression was then conducted for trust in the out-group government (trust in
the Turkish Cypriot leaders), since trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders was only
correlated significantly with Greek identification. The regression equation was
significant F (1,285)= 1.19, p<O.05 and Greek identification accounted for 3% of total
variance in trust in the Turkish Cypriot. leaders.
Table 6.27: Predicting levels of social and political trust in the out-group
Trust in the Turkish Cypriots Trust in the Turkish Cypriot
leaders
Variables B SEll B SEll P
Constant 2.79 .20 2.11 .12
Political ideology -.11 .05 -.15**
Greek identification -.08 .03 -.17*
* significant at p<O.OI ** significant at p<0.05
Finally, regressions were then run on compromise and intransigence, the two factors
which emerged from the scale of compromise, in order to see which demographics,
identifications and trust targets significantly predicted them. For the first factor of
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compromise which involves both communities forgiving or asking for public
forgiveness or apologising to the other party, a multiple regression analysis was run
including the variables that were significantly correlated with it; these were religious
identity, political interest and perceived political knowledge, trust in the Turkish
Cypriot government, trust in the Turkish government, trust in the EU, trust in the UN,
trust in the Turkish Cypriot people and trust in the Turkish people. This model was
significant (F(9,272)= 13.25, p<O.OOI) and accounted for 28% of the variability of the
dependent variable, which was compromise. Among all the factors that were included
in this model, the factors that were significant were the following: religious
identification (standardised ~=-O.16, p<O.05) and trust in the Turkish Cypriot people
(standardised p=O.36, p<O.OO1). Trust in the Turkish people (standardised ~=O.13,
p=O.058), trust in the EU (standardised ~=O.11, p=O.064) were marginally not
significant (see table below).
Table 6.28: Predicting compromise and intransigence
Compromise Intransigence
Variables B SEn [1 B SEB P
Constant 2.724 .40 3.419 .44
Religious identification -.17 .05 -.16** .00 .06 .0
Political interest .10 .06 .12
Perceived political knowledge .05 .05 .06
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot -.04 .11 -.03 -.20 .11 -.13
government
Trust in the Turkish government -.02 .12 -.01 .10 .13 .06
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot .36 .07 .36* -.28 .07 -.27*
people
Trust in the Turkish people .16 .09 .13 -.07 .09 -.05
Trust in the European Union .17 .09 .11
Trust in the United Nations .09 .08 .07
Greek Cypriot identification -.05 .06 -.06
Greek identification .06 .06 .08
Trust in the Cypriot government .17 .07 .18**
Trust in the Greek government -.02 .07 -.02
Trust in the British government -.04 .09 -.03
Trust in the Greek Cypriot people .22 .09 .22**
Trust in the Greek people -.05 .08 -.05
* significant at p<O.OI ** significant at p<0.05
For the third factor of compromise which is a measure of intransigence (it involves
each community separately to forgive or apologise or show strength or weakness
towards the other party) a multiple regression was also run including the variables that
had a significant correlation with this factor. These were: Greek Cypriot
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identification, Greek identification, religious identification, trust in the Turkish
Cypriot Government, trust in the Cypriot government, trust in the Greek government,
trust in the Turkish government, trust in the British government, trust in the Greek
Cypriot people, trust in the Turkish Cypriot people, trust in the Greek people and trust
in the Turkish people. The above model was significant (F(12,270)=7.90, p<O.OOI)
and accounted for 23% of the variability of the dependent variable, which was
intransigence (the third factor of compromise). Among the above factors, there were
three factors that were significant predictors of intransigence: trust in the Cypriot
Government (standardised P=0.18, p<0.05), trust in the Greek Cypriot people
(standardised p=0.22, p<0.05) and trust in the Turkish Cypriot people (standardised
p=-0.27, p<O.OOI) (see table above).
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Do young people trust/distrust different political and et/mic/national groups in
varying degrees?
The first aim of the study was to identify whether young people trust different
political and ethnic/national groups in varying degrees. The results showed that young
people differentiate between the different targets and while this could be expected for
trust in the in-group versus the out-group targets, differences were also found that
transcended the in-group/out-group status.
The importance of the target in the evaluation of trust was shown through the factor
analyses of the scales of trust in different targets, where the items did not group
according to the constructs or in a differential way across targets, they grouped
according to the target of trust; the factor loadings were so high and so distinctive they
did not leave any doubt about the importance of the target. The construct of "trust"
seemed to be interchangeably used with the constructs "support", "pride".
"confidence", "legitimacy", "compassion", "effectiveness". "efficiency", "fairness",
"integrity", "trustfulness". "responsiveness" vis-it-vis the power of the target of trust
in all sets of factor analyses. However. the fact that these concepts were consistently
grouped together. independently of the target, shows that there is an underlying
concept for all of them, which we think is trust. Researchers (Gamson, 1968; Easton,
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1965; Craig, 1993) have examined and argued for the relationship of trust with
separate concepts while the present study shows that they are all important in the
conceptualisation of trust. However, even though they are all important, their relative
power in explaining trust in particular targets is different.
This was shown first by the results of the repeated measures analysis of variance with
the constructs and the targets of trust, which revealed that both the effect of the target
and the constructs used, as well as their combined effect, were all significant. The
effect size of the target was very high, in comparison to the other two effect sizes,
which confirmed on the one hand the results of the factor analyses, but on the other
hand, the significance of the other two effect sizes showed that participants did
differentiate between the twelve constructs depending on the target of these
constructs.
Concerning the effect of the target, it affected the ratings of trust at a very high level,
which confirmed the literature on the importance of the target of trust (Levi &
Stroker, 2000). The presence and absence of significant differences of trust ratings
amongst the different targets were very interesting in understanding the attitudes of
young people towards the most important agents and parties in the Cyprus conflict.
The most trusted targets were the two national in-group targets, the Cypriot
government and the Greek Cypriot people; however, the levels of trust for these were
not significantly different from the levels of trust in the Greek government and the
Greek people, despite their different national membership This result could be
considered as striking in the present times due to the decrease of the demand for
"enosis" (union) with Greece (either privately or publicly) and the decrease of
"Greekness" in Greek Cypriot expressions of national identity; in the last decades,
"Greekness" has been replaced by "Cypriot ness" (Papadakis, 1998; Loizides, 2007).
The relationship between the Greek Cypriot people and the Greek people has always
been a very close one. Historic and cultural commonalities have pushed Greek
Cypriot people not only to fight for their union with Greece (in the mid-1950s against
British colonialism) but also to express repeatedly their dependence on Greece for
support against the Turkish threat. It appears that the bond between the two peoples
and the two countries still exists, despite the recent decrease in the strength of
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identification with the Greek nation (moderate levels of Greek identification also in
our sample).
Concerning participants' trust levels in international organisations (the British
government, the American government, the EU and the UN), they were very low but
still different amongst them. Trust in the EU was significantly higher than trust in the
UN and they were both also significantly higher than trust in the British and the
American governments. The EU's increased popularity and trustworthiness when
compared with the UN's amongst Greek Cypriots confirmed the official statistical
trust ratings of the Eurobarometer 2004 which indicated that Cypriots trusted the UN
less than any other EU people (see chapter 2). Greek Cypriots' disappointment with
the UN's failure to find a working satisfactory solution to the Cyprus problem has
obviously affected their trust levels in it since it has been the main international
organisation responsible for this issue until now. Continuous talks, followed by a
plethora of compromise plans unable to satisfy both conflicting sides' demands and
hopes simultaneously, have led to people's alienation from it, in contrast to their
attitudes to the EU. The role and the motives of the UN intervention were even put
into doubt when the Cypriot ex-president (T. Papadopoulos) publicly accused the UN
of bribing the Greek Cypriots to accept a particular settlement plan (Loizides, 2007).
On the other hand, the EU represented a new hope for a solution; Cyprus' access to
the EU was still not completed and the people had high expectations for the role of the
EU in the Cyprus conflict. Since they would now be part of the European "family"
(which the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots had not yet joined), they believed that
either the EU would help them resolve the Cyprus issues the way they wanted or that
the presence of the EU as an ally of Cyprus would make Turkey and the Turkish
Cypriots yield In their demands under this pressure (Stavrinides,
http://website.lineone.net/-acgta/Long%20Journey .doc).
Trust in the British government was significantly higher than trust in the American
government but they were both very low. The fact that trust in the British government
was not signiticantly different from trust in the Turkish Cypriot people and that trust
in the American government was not significantly different from trust in the Turkish
people showed that these two foreign governments were by no means considered
allies or neutral parties; on the contrary, they were viewed as negatively as the
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"enemies". It is also worth noting that despite the British rule in Cyprus, and the
armed struggle of the Greek Cypriots against the British, Greek Cypriots seemed to
trust them more than the Americans, with whom they never had any direct contact.
This could be either part of a general feeling of anti-Americanism that has existed
worldwide since the 19th century (Tai, Peterson & Gurr, 1973; Larrabee, 1981) or a
more specific result of the role American foreign policy has played in the Cyprus
issue, from the Turkish invasion of 1974 (Camp, 1980) to their latest perceived
interference in and obstruction of the UN's authority on the Cyprus issue (Tsakona,
2003).
Finally, concerning the ratings of trust in the "enemy" out-groups, trust in the Turkish
Cypriot leaders and people and trust in the Turkish government and people were
significantly different. Turkish Cypriot people were the most trusted out of these four
targets, followed by the Turkish people and the Turkish Cypriot leaders, which were
the only ones not significantly different between them. The least trusted of all the 12
targets was the Turkish government. Between the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot
people, Greek Cypriots seemed to trust significantly more the Turkish Cypriot people.
The distinction between the two Turkish ethnic populations revealed that Greek
Cypriots did not view them in the same way; they differentiated between them. The
reasons for this distinction remain to be examined in future studies. Another
noticeable result was that for both Turkish Cypriot and Turkish targets, the political
targets (the Turkish Cypriot leaders and the Turkish government) were less trusted
than the respective people. This confirmed the low levels of trust in political
institutions in comparison to social ones, even when these belong to a different
national, and in this case an opponent group. People seemed to be able to trust "other"
people at higher levels than "other" official institutions. This separation follows
results of research on both political trust and political alienation (Markova, 2004).
The different trust levels in targets both within the in-group and out-groups showed
that targets cannot be as roughly clustered as it has been suggested in the literature;
the present study showed that people's trust levels in different targets transcended the
social or political character of a group and its in-group or out-group status. In terms of
conflict resolution, this differentiation showed that the important step of breaking
down the homogeneous image of the enemy (Kelman 2005), despite the opposite
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portrayal by the media, politicians or national stereotypes, could happen in Cyprus,
since people were found to distinguish amongst sub-groups of the "enemy" out-group.
Even in situations where a dead-end seems to have been reached, there can still be
hope of finding a solution, if researchers and negotiators look closer into people's
attitudes. The fact that people are able to see past these sweeping generalisations that
the media and political/religious leaders might be promoting should become salient
and be used in favour of peaceful reconciliation.
6.4.2 The meaning of trust in political institutions and ethnic/national groups
The findings suggested that there were differences in young people's perceptions of
some of the target institutions and groups in relation to some of the constructs used.
The targets for which differences were found were the Turkish government, the
Turkish Cypriot leaders, the American government, the British government, the
Cypriot government and the Greek Cypriot people.
It was revealed that these differences in the phenomenological meaning/use of trust
were' between political and social groups and also between ethnically different targets.
Looking first at trust within the two in-group targets, the Cypriot government and the
Greek Cypriot people, trust in each target had a different meaning; it was a matter of
support, effectiveness, integrity and pride for the Cypriot government while it was a
matter of trustfulness, legitimacy, fairness and compassion, for the Greek Cypriot
people. The high predictive power of support in trust in the Cypriot government could
reflect the citizens' role towards the government in the voting process, which is either
to support it or reject it, as had just happened a year before in the April 2004
referendum on the Cyprus issue. The significance of effectiveness showed that the in-
group government was evaluated based on the results of its actions, probably at both
an international and at a national level. The two next constructs contributing to the
meaning of trust in the in-group government were pride and integrity, two ethically-
based characteristics, confirming the literature, which supported their importance
(Stokes, 1962). Despite the low evaluation of the Cypriot government's effectiveness
and the moderately rated integrity, pride, on the other hand, was one of the highest
rated characteristics. It could be that the issue of pride was independent of the
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government's actual competence but more an issue of national pride, which the
government of one's country should probably represent, at least for our participants.
On the other hand, trust in the Greek Cypriot people consisted of totally different
elements. Greek Cypriots were trusted based on their legitimacy, their fairness, their
trustfulness and their compassion. There were therefore two types of criteria: one
which referred to the Cyprus conflict contested issue of legitimacy and a
"humanitarian'Yemotional criterion. Thus, Greek Cypriot young people were forming
their trust attitude towards their in-group based on these potentially controversial
factors since people with different national backgrounds or with different experience
could easily dispute them.
While the meaning of trust in the government was based on the results of its actions
and its ethical characteristics, the meaning of trust in the in-group people was based
on the emotionality and the fairness of the people. The main difference between trust
in these two targets was clearly related to the difference between people's
expectations from the government and from their fellow citizens; the government is
expected to produce the work it has promised in an ethical way (Lewicki & Wiethoff,
2000), on which it will be later judged, while fellow in-group members are expected
to have the characteristics which will allow them to live peacefully with other people
(be fair, be compassionate and trustful). These differences were also noted concerning
trust in the out-group targets. There was also a differentiation in the meaning of trust
between the Turkish Cypriot institutions and people and between the Turkish
institutions and people. Trust in the Turkish government consisted only of legitimacy
and pride while trust in the Turkish people only of fairness. Fairness was the only one
significant factor in evaluating Turkish people's trustworthiness as it had been
important for Greek Cypriot people's trustworthiness as well. Greek Cypriot young
people probably having lived all their lives in this climate of conflict and disparity as
to whose claims are fairer or more legitimate on the Cyprus issue, theirs or the
Turkish Cypriots' and the Turkish people's, have obviously based their trust in these
people on that factor.
There were some similarities therefore between the meaning of trust in the in-group
and the out-group institution as well as between the meaning of trust in the in-group
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and this out-group people. Pride was as important for trusting the out-group and the
in-group institution as fairness was for trusting both the out-group and the in-group
people. These differences make salient the difference between the meaning of social
and political trust which appears in some cases to transcend the in-group/out-group
status of the target.
Having said that, the findings revealed differences also between the meaning of trust
in the two "enemy"/out-group targets, the Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot targets.
Many more factors were related to trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders (trustfulness,
support, fairness, effectiveness, responsiveness) in comparison to trust in the Turkish
government, as well as to trust in the Turkish Cypriot people (pride and support) in
comparison to trust in the Turkish people.
Similarly, looking at trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders and trust in the Turkish
Cypriot people, trust in the latter target consisted only of a few elements/constructs in
comparison to trust in the former target. The criteria for trust in the Turkish Cypriot
leaders were support, pride, legitimacy, effectiveness, responsiveness, fairness and
trustfulness while for trust in the Turkish Cypriot people they were only support,
fairness and pride. Even though there were some common elements in the meaning of
trustworthiness in these two targets, there were still many differences. Therefore the
meaning of trust was once more very different between this outgroup institution and
its respective people.
Looking then at the constituent elements of trust in the international institutions,
results seemed very similar for the EU, the UN and the British government. These
were the only targets for which the meaning of trust seemed to consist of the same
elements. There was only one different factor amongst the significant factors for the
EU and the UN and only two different factors between the British government and the
EU and the UN. However, while the significant factors were almost the same for these
targets, the effect sizes of the significant factors were very different. These differences
showed that while trust in these targets could consist of the same clements, these
elements contributed to a different degree to the meaning of trust. Despite the fact that
many factors were significant, evaluations on these institutions' competence were
missing ("effectiveness" and "efficiency"). Only evaluative elements and elements
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relevant to the Cyprus issue, such as fairness, responsiveness, compassion, and pride
were mentioned.
Only trust in the American government was an issue of effectiveness, which also
received the highest rating amongst all the constructs, along with efficiency, The
difference in the meaning of trust amongst the first three institutions and the American
government showed how different the bases of evaluation are for these institutions,
which is probably related to their respective roles in the Cyprus issue and the Greek
Cypriot experience with these institutions during the Cyprus contlict. While Greek
Cypriot young people's hopes for a satisfying solution were still with the EU and the
UN and probably the British government, because of their past relationship, the same
thing did not happen for the American government, which was not evaluated in any
emotional or ethical or moral basis, in contrast to the other three institutions.
Amongst the eleven constructs tested for all of the targets, only fairness and
legitimacy seemed to transcend the nationality of the targets and their political or
social character. It was therefore apparent that the issue of fairness and legitimacy is
crucial in the Cyprus issue for young Greek Cypriots and it should be further
investigated. Furthermore, the differences in the meaning of trust in different targets
emphasised both the difference between political and social trust and also between the
different targets of trust, even when they belong to the "same" group (in-group/out-
group). This shows that a generalisation should not be made on the meaning of trust
because many factors specific to particular targets alter the phenomenology of the
meamng.
Looking especially at the meaning of trust in the out-group targets, the differences
between the Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish targets also showed that young people
differentiated amongst their "opponent" out-groups, not only in terms of level of trust
but also in terms of the quality and the meaning of trust. These differences should be
made even more salient by researchers and officials since they already exist, because
homogenisation of the enemy only hinders conflict resolution by making the
differences even sharper and therefore more difficult to overcome. The results from
both the levels of trust and the meanings of trust showed that there is still ground for
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effective steps to be taken towards successful conflict resolution, as long as they are
recognised and there is the will to reach a mutually satisfying result.
6.4.3 Correlates a/trust in political institutions and ethnic/national groups
As it has already been argued (see introduction and chapter 4), trust is affected by
different factors. Our findings have shown that trust in different targets is related
differentially to different demographic characteristics, identifications, and political
interest, knowledge and ideology.
Concerning first the relationship between trust targets and demographics, it was
shown while the origins of parents did not relate to the levels of trust in any target (in-
group/out-group, political or social), both age and gender (separately) affected levels
of trust in different targets. The results on the origins of parents showed that, based on
their own lack of experience with the "lost" land, either young people do not let their
parents' experiences (through story telling) influence their own trust levels, or that
refugee families have not tried, or have not succeeded, to influence their children's
attitudes towards different parties. In both cases, the influence of the family appears
not to be very influential on the second or third generation people, who have not lived
through the events themselves. There is little evidence then in support of the literature
which suggests that parental trust attitudes influence children's trust attitudes (Rotter,
1971), at least in the context of conflict resolution.
Concerning in particular trust and gender, it was shown that gender was related to
trust levels in the Greek Cypriot and Greek targets and the British government. Boys'
higher levels of trust in the first four targets disconfirmed the literature, which
suggested that women are more trustful than men. Girls appeared to be more trustful
than boys only in one target, the British government. Men's more negative attitudes
could be related to the more active male, as opposed to female, participation in the
struggle against the British in the 1950s or to the stereotypical image or identity of
Greek Cypriot manhood. Part of the stereotypical masculine identity and of Gilligan's
moral development theory (1982) is that males are expected to be stronger, fearless,
more prone to master (Eagly & Steffen, 2000) and politically and morally more aware
than females. These expectations, in the case of living in a conflicting environment,
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would consist of showing' greater animosity against one's enemies and greater
support, camaraderie, towards one's own group, which could explain in this case
males' higher levels of trust in the in-group and the Greek targets, and lower levels of
trust in the British government. However, these are only assumptions; no relevant
studies have been found. Further research would be necessary to explore masculine
identity, in contrast to the feminine one, in the Cypriot context.
Concerning trust and age, the results showed that older young people tended to trust
certain targets less than younger ones did, which also disconfirmed the literature
which argued that younger children trusted less than older children (Rotter, 1971).
The results of the present study show that there is no definite answer as to which age
groups trust generally more or less, since trust levels depend on the target that is being
evaluated. The higher levels of trust of younger participants for certain political and
social targets could be due to the fact that they are less disappointed by some
established institutions, such as the UN and the EU due to their youthfulness. They
are therefore more trustful and maybe still hold more hope towards them. According
to research by Feshbach (1991, in Durkin, 1995) and Kirkpatrick (1992, in Durkin,
1995), older adolescents and young adults have developed a sense of attachment to
other people, places and symbols which because it provides them with a sense of
security, indispensable in exploring the world, would make them probably experience
a deeper disappointment when their expectations are shattered. It is therefore
understandable that older adolescents and young adults, who have longer experience
of the unsuccessful efforts at conflict resolution by different agents, such as the
Cypriot government, the Greek government, the EU, the UN, the Greek Cypriot and
the Greek people, trust these targets less than younger children do.
Concerning now the relationship of trust with national, religious, ethnic, Greek and
European identifications, the results revealed that these identifications did affect
participants' levels of trust also only in certain targets. Concerning national and
religious identification, both higher national and religious identifiers appeared to be
more trustful in those targets than low identifiers were. The targets of significant
higher levels of trust for both types of high identifiers were the Greek and Greek
Cypriot targets and the European Union, for national high identifiers. Both the in-
group targets and the Greek targets were affected, again even if they belonged to
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different national groups. These results confirmed only in part the literature on the
role of national identity (Kelman, 2004, Kraus, 2006), because while high national
identifiers were expected to trust their in-group more and the out-group less, mainly
only the former happened in the present study. The lack of significance of national
and religious identification for the directly involved in the contlict Turkish Cypriot
targets, signified that either there are other factors affecting trust that should be
identified and examined or that the relationship between them and trust was not direct.
The fact that trust in the American government was only related to national
identification, and not religious, must be related to the significance of the American
policies in the Cyprus issue only in political terms and not religious in any way.
The positive relationship of Greek Orthodox religious identitication with trust only in
the Cypriot and the Greek targets and not the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot targets, on
the one hand disconfirmed research which argues that Eastern Orthodox religion is
related to distrust (La Porta et al., 1997), but confirmed empirical research which has
shown the relationship of religiosity with certain types of social trust (Welch, Sikkink,
Sartain, Bond, 2004). The present study revealed that religious identification
increased in-group social trust, but did not affect inter-group social trust. Furthermore,
the similarity of the relationship between religion and trust and between national
identification and trust in the Greek and Cypriot targets could be explained by the fact
that religion has always been associated with nationalist ideologies and therefore
greater support for one's national group. Greek Orthodox religious leaders have often
supported nationalist ideologies and nationalist groups. In national issues, both in
Greece and Cyprus, the Church has always expressed a pro-national in-group opinion
and has supported nationalistic demonstrations (as happened recently on the name
issue of FYROM and as happened just before the 2004 Cypriot referendum, Eleutheri
ora (newspaper), 28-02-
2008.http://www.elora.gr/portallindex.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=570
&Itemid=2).
Apart from national and religious identification, Greek, Greek Cypriot and European
identification were also examined in reference to trust in different targets because of
the significance of these identifications in Cypriot national politics and the Cyprus
contlict (Loizides, 2007). The results showed that all of these identifications affected
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trust levels in several targets, confirming their importance in the specific SOCIO-
political context of Cyprus. Greek identification was found to be related to trust in the
same targets as national identification (the Cypriot targets, the Greek targets and the
EU). These results confirmed in a way the meaning and the role pro-Hellenic
ideologies have played in Cypriot politics and therefore the Cyprus issue. Greek
Cypriot nationalism has often associated with a belief in the Great Idea (Megali Idea),
according to which Cyprus is part ofa big Hellenic nation (ethnos).
Concerning Greek Cypriot identification, it was also found to be related to trust in the
same targets as Greek and national identification, along with trust in the UN and in
the Turkish targets (the Turkish government and the Turkish people). According to
Loizides (2007), Greek Cypriot identification is a recent kind of identification, which
was originally created as a way to attract voters from both the "motherland
nationalist" and the "Cypriot nationalist" parties but which found wide support and
has been on the rise since then. The term "Greek Cypriots" has been increasingly used
instead of the terms "Cypriots" or "Greeks" that were previously used both privately
and publicly; the ex-President of Cyprus, T. Papadopoulos, used it in his speech to the
Cypriot people just before the 2004 referendum in order to persuade the people to
vote against the Annan plan (Loizides, 2007). This new form of identification focuses
strictly on the Greek Cypriot community of the island of Cyprus, differentiating its
supporters both from those that argued for the republic of Cyprus and those that
argued for Cyprus' union with Greece (Loizides, 2007). While it has been on the rise
but has not yet become a dominant type of identification in Cyprus (it was lower than
national identification in the present study), it has become stronger than the Greek
identification (it was higher than the Greek identification in the present study), and
was found to affect trust in several targets, both of the in-group and the out-group, as
aforementioned.
Concerning now the explanatory power of the significant factors for trust in the two
groups of targets directly involved in the Cyprus issue, the Greek Cypriot people and
government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders and people, the findings showed that only
a small number of factors helped explain trust levels in these specific targets.
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Trust in the two in-group targets was predicted by age, gender, national and religious
identification while political trust was also predicted by European identification, and
social trust by Greek Cypriot identification and Greek identification. These results
showed that amongst all the correlates of trust in these in-group targets, only these
ones had a significant power in explaining it. The relationship of these factors with
trust has been discussed previously but it is important to emphasise that social and
political trust are not only related to different factors but also explained by different
factors.
Similarly, the findings showed that different factors also help explain trust in the out-
group political institution (the Turkish Cypriot leaders) and trust in the out-group
people (Turkish Cypriot people). Trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders was only
significantly predicted by Greek identification. The more participants identified with
the Greek identity, the less they trusted the Turkish Cypriot leaders. Greek
identification has always been a characteristic of more radical and more nationalistic
Greek Cypriots, who rely and focus on the Greek element of their identity and not the
Cypriot one, since they have been strong supporters of Cyprus' union with Greece.
Trust therefore in the Turkish Cypriot leaders could be incongruent with these "plans"
since the Turkish Cypriot leadership has historically argued for Cyprus' union with
Turkey.
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot people, on the other hand, was significantly predicted
only by political ideology. The more right-wing the adolescents' ideology was, the
less they trusted the Turkish Cypriot people. This result is very challenging because
right wing political parties in Cyprus have been more positive towards the Annan plan
and therefore reconciliation with the Turkish Cypriots. Therefore, the results of the
present study could show that political ideologies do not correspond to specific
parties' policies and therefore the issue of trust in the "enemy" is related not with
specific parties' positions, but to the values of the "original" political ideologies.
6.4.4 The role of in-group/out-group social and political trust in compromise
The factor analysis of the scales on compromise differentiated between two aspects of
it: the first consisted purely of items expressing compromise between two
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communities and common action taken, consisting of forgiveness, public apology and
equal power relations, while the second one consisted of items expressing
intransigence (the complete opposite of the previous factors) between the two
communities. It was found that compromise could only be predicted by people's trust
in the Turkish Cypriot people and people's religious identification. The more people
trusted the Turkish Cypriot people, the outgroup with which they were called to live,
the more they favoured compromise. None of the other institutions was found to be a
significant predictor. Although the possibility of a statistical artifact due to the high
correlation between trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders and trust in the Turkish
Cypriot people should not be ignored, the role of social trust, and not political trust, in
their willingness to compromise should be the main point to consider. People's
attitudes towards other people appear to make the difference in this kind of process
and not their trust in institutions. This could be due to the fact that a compromise
solution, involving public apology, forgiveness, and power relations is more relevant
to inter-people relations than to inter-institutions relationships.
Religious identification was also a significant predictor of compromise, showing that
the more religious people were, the less they favoured compromise. Religious
identification was important for both trust and compromise, which showed how
important it still is in Cypriot society and how the strength of religious ideologies was
also related to issues of a political nature. Even though love of fellow man,
selflessness, forgiveness, and apology constitute core values of Christianity, they did
not encourage people to want to compromise (despite the fact that compromise was
measured by the same values, forgiveness and apology). This property of religion
emerged probably due to the specific context of this study, an interethnic conflict
which turned into an international bloodshed conflict between two ethnic
communities fighting for their rights to a piece of land. While these two communities
have different religions, religion has played an important factor in each community's
connectedness (Smidt, 1999) and everyday life. It has often been linked with
nationalist ideologies (Marty, 1997) and religious and political leaders have often
used it not to improve the conflicting communities' relationship but to insist on their
rights, emphasising their differences and the theological consequences if they
accepted anything less than what they "deserved". Priests and bishops, together with
the Archbishop of both the Greek Orthodox and the Cypriot Orthodox Church, had
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expressed their opposition to the Annan plan since the weeks leading up to the
referendum. The Church of CYPnIS used even theological "threats" in order to urge
the people in a certain direction; the Bishop of Paphos in one of his sermons had said
that the "yes" voters would go to hell
(http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/deltia typou/2002-11-20.html;
http://www.aegean.gr/agios-therapontas/magazine/special/Cyprus/Ecclesia.html;
http://\vww.wnnea.com/archives/June 2004/0406040.html ). These contextual facts
and the results of the present study reveal the need for more detailed research on the
role of religion and its aspects in relation to willingness to compromise, since it
appears to have an important role in conflict resolution attitudes.
Concerning intransigence, the more people trusted the Cypriot government and the
Greek Cypriot people, the more they believed in the intransigence between the Greek
Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community; on the other hand, the more they trusted
the Turkish Cypriot people the less they believed in it. Amongst all the correlates of
intransigence (Greek Cypriot identification, Greek identification, religious
identification, trust in the Turkish Cypriot government, trust in the Cypriot
government, trust in the Greek government, trust in the Turkish government, trust in
the British government, trust in the Greek Cypriot people, trust in the Turkish Cypriot
people, trust in the Greek people and trust in the Turkish people), only trust in these
three targets significantly predicted intransigence. However, this time it was an issue
of trust both in people and in institutions. The significance of trust in the Cypriot
government could be easily explained taking into consideration the negative position
of the Cypriot government towards the Annan plan and the fierce campaign to
persuade the people to vote against it in the 2004 referendum. The significance of
trust in the Greek Cypriot people and in the Turkish Cypriot people showed on the
other hand that what adolescents thought of the two peoples and the way they
evaluated their trust levels in them were the main factors influencing how they viewed
these compromise processes (Le. forgiveness, apology) between the two peoples.
Improving, therefore, the relationship between the two peoples, and not only in terms
of increasing the contact between the two peoples, as has been argued by the
supporters of the contact hypothesis, but changing the information one community
receives about the other community and emphasising the positive attributes and the
similarities between them could constitute a successful way forward. The role of inter-
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people trust and the factors that lead to it should therefore be the focus of future
studies in these kinds of settlement/compromise plans.
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Chapter 7: Living within a federal state with two equal constituent
communities; exploring the factors affecting emotions and trust in
bi-communal national institutions and the development of bonds
between the two communities
In parallel to the previous quantitative study on (the levels, the meaning and the
explanatory power of) in-group/out-group social and political trust, the present study
explored factors affecting emotions and inter-group social and political trust and ways
they (inter-group emotions and inter-group social and political trust) affect conflict
resolution. This was realised in the present study through the presentation of a
fictitious future scenario of a unified Cyprus, according to which the two communities
live together peacefully; participants were asked to place themselves within this
scenario and talk about their attitudes and emotions. This fictitious reconciliatory
scenario was created based on the fact that reconciliation was the 2004 Annan plan's
expected outcome, and based on the existing literature (Gallagher, 2004; Rouhana,
2004; Burton, 1990) on reconciliation, according to which it involves building new
harmonious close inter-group relationships.
7.1 Introduction
Due to the exploratory nature of the present study's research aims, it was designed to
allow young people to express freely their own opinions/perceptions without the
restraints of pre-existing choices (as IS the case with close-ended
questions/questionnaires).
The first gap addressed by the present study concerns the under-research of emotions
in contlict resolution. Conflict, apart from a cognitive dimension, also has an
emotional dimension (Hewstone, 1988; Nadler & Saguy, 2004) but, until recently,
research has focused mainly on the cognitive dimension, leaving the emotional
dimension relatively unexplored (Gould, 2004). The same has happened with the
concept of trust; mainly its cognitive dimension has been researched while the
emotional one has been either ignored or denied (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Macek &
Markova, 2001). This has been due to the direction of the general focus of social and
political disciplines, until recently, towards cognitive issues, which is also related to
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the difficulty that lies in the study of emotions (Hewstone, 1988). However, recent
theories and research have provided an important background for the study of
emotions in the context of conflict resolution, which the present study took into
consideration. In particular, Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie, Silver & Smith,
2004) has created the link between individual emotions and intergroup emotions, and
also between intergroup emotions and behavioural tendencies, that are necessary for
the deeper and more accurate examination of emotions in the context of intergroup
conflicts. According to this theory, different inter-group emotional reactions are
responsible for different inter-group behavioural and attitudinal reactions, based on
the in-group's "appraisals" of the out-group. These appraisals are mediated by the
emergence of emotions, which are independent of the individual's direct involvement
in the situation, but dependent on the individual's strength of identification with the
in-group. The present study focused on three issues in reference to emotions: first, the
different emotions young people refer to when they give reasons for their relative
willingness (and that of their group) to accept particular solutions to the Cyprus
conflict, second, the factors which influence emotions and the ways this is done, and
third, the functions that are achieved when young people talk about the emotions they
hold as individuals, or as members of their in-group, or the emotions that other
members of their in-group hold.
The present study also explored the ways different factors affect inter-group political
and social trust both in reference to public/citizen life, as well as within personal
(friendly or conjugal) relationships (Turner, Hewstone, Voci, Paolini, Christ, 2007;
Stephan & Stephan, 1991). The most prevalent factors in the literature for political
trust have been the motives, the procedure, specific components and policies of the
institutions, political orientation and culture (see chapter 4 for a review) while,
particularly in the context of conflict resolution, the most prevalent ones for inter-
group social trust have been history of the relationship, power, identity, culture, threat
and the passing of time (see chapter 3 for a review). However, there are important
gaps in the literature of trust which the present study addressed. First, most of these
factors have been studied only in adult populations and not in young people; second,
the majority of the factors related to political trust have not been studied in the context
of conflict resolution, and, third, emotions have not been part of the factors which
have been studied either in reference to trust or in the context of conflict resolution.
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7.1.1 Research questions
Through the examination of young people's perceptions of the Cyprus issue and their
anticipated attitudes within a post-solution scenario of a united Cypriot society, the
present study was designed to answer the following main research questions:
1. How are emotions implicated m a. processes of conflict resolution and h.
judgments of trust?
2. a. Which factors (apart from emotions) influence inter-group trust in the
reconciliation process? b. what is the role of trust in conflict resolution?
7.2 Method
7.2.1 Participants
Twenty Greek Cypriot young people, attending public/state and private schools in
Nicosia and Limassol participated in the present study. They were selected using a
snowball technique due to the lack of permission from the Cypriot Ministry of
Education to conduct the study in public/state schools. The age range of the
participants was 15 to 19 years old; 10 of them were 15-16 years old, and 10 were 17-
19 years old. The 20 participants consisted of 12 girls and 8 boys.
The majority of the participants (17 participants) were Greek Orthodox Christians
while the rest characterised themselves as atheists. Concerning the refugee status of
participants' parents, 11 participants had at least one parent from northern Cyprus.
Concerning participants' experience of Turkish Cypriot and Turkish people, up to the
time of the interview, 18 participants reported never having had either direct or
indirect contact with Turkish people, while 19 participants reported already having
direct or indirect contact with Turkish Cypriot people.
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7.2.2 Procedure
The study was conducted in Cyprus, in May 2005. Participants were contacted
through two Greek Cypriot students, one attending a private school in Limassol, and
one attending a state school in Nicosia. In order to avoid spill over effects, care was
taken to ensure that those who agreed to participate in the present study had not also
participated in our simultaneous quantitative study. The parents of the students who
were attending state schools were then contacted and debriefed on the purpose of the
study as well as the procedure to be followed. Their consent was requested for their
children's participation in the study and only if this consent was given, were their
children invited to participate in the study. On the other hand, for the participation of
students from private schools, the consent of the headmaster of the school was
required, after he/she had been also debriefed on the purpose of the study and the
procedure to be followed. One-to-one interviews with the participants attending
private schools were conducted in a private room at their school, while the interviews
of the participants attending state schools were conducted in a quiet room in the house
of the Greek Cypriot adolescent who helped to recruit these participants.
Twenty semi-structured interviews were conducted in the Greek language, the
researcher's and participants' mother tongue. All interviews were taped also with the
informed consent of the parents and/or of the head-master of the schools attended by
the children; their duration ranged from 20 to 45 minutes. All the interviews were
transcribed and stored onto a computer until they were analysed.
7.2.3 Interview Design
Initially, participants were given a very general briefing about the researchers and the
university which was conducting the study, as well as about the purpose of the study
and its procedure; they were told that it was a study on young people's attitudes
towards political issues. The exact purpose/aims of the study were not revealed to
them at any point of the interview.
The interview started by asking participants generic questions on their age, the place
of birth of their parents (whether they came from the occupied part of Cyprus), the
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form. and level of contact they had had with Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people,
their religious aspirations and their practice of religion. After the generic questions,
participants were asked, with open-ended questions, about their knowledge of the
referendum which took place in April 2004, and their personal opinion on its result.
After referring to this specific and current to them event, participants were asked
about their knowledge of the Cyprus issue, its perceived responsible agents, as well as
their personal preferred solution to it.
Participants were then asked to think of themselves in a fictitious scenario, where the
two communities, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot one, were united and
lived together, participating equally in all aspects of social and political life. In
reference to this scenario, they were then asked open-ended questions about their
level of trust/distrust, and the reasons for it, in Turkish Cypriots within different
national institutions. These institutions were the politicians, the judges, the police, the
army and the Turkish Cypriot universities. They were then asked about their attitudes
to a temporary economic policy which would favour northern Cyprus until it became
stronger and reached the same level of economic development as southern Cyprus.
Participants were then asked about their level of trust/distrust and the reasons for it, in
Turkish Cypriots in terms of working for them, living with them, renting them their
property, and developing friendly and intimate relationships with them.
Finally, participants were asked about their level of trust in different international
institutions (the European Union, the United Nations, Great Britain, United States,
Greece and Turkey) and the role they thought these institutions should have in finding
a solution to the Cyprus issue.
All the questions (see Appendix I) were open-ended and only in cases where
participants could not express any opinion, because they could not understand the
question, were further explanations of the question or different options of responses
given to them, e.g. quest: "How do you feel about the Cyprus issue? What
feelings ... Nice, angry, contented, sad, you don't feel anything .... ?" The interview
schedule was not intended to be prescriptive but questions were adapted to the context
of the conversation and, when they arose, interesting issues were probed.
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7.2.4 Analytic strategy
All the interviews were transcribed in Greek and analysed using content and thematic
analysis, following the principles and the procedures described by Boyatzis (1998),
Joffe and Yardley (2004) and Braun and Clarke (2006). Thematic analysis was used
to answer our main research questions while content analysis was used in order to
obtain the perceptual context within which our research questions were answered.
The constituent elements of this context were the responsible agents of the conflict
(who is to blame) (Rosenberg & Wolfsfeld, 1977; Hewstone, 1988), the preferred
solutions (lnbar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1989; Barzilai, Goldberg & lnbar, 1991), the
agency of a possible solution to the conflict, as well as the evaluation of the events
taking place during their current historical era. In content analysis, categories were
established in reference to our research questions, based either on the manifest
wording, or the meaning conveyed by participants' wording; these were then
quantified to measure the number of instances they appeared in the data (Joffe &
Yardley, 2004). The categories were checked by two coders, whose agreement was
over .70 (Ryan & Bernard, 2005), ensuring inter-coder reliability. This type of
analysis was considered to be appropriate to determine, in an exploratory and
descriptive way, young people's perceptions of different aspects of the Cyprus issue
(attribution of responsibility, solutions, and agents). While the sample size was not
large enough to allow complex statistical analyses, the exploratory descriptive aim of
this analysis, to study young people's attitudes and their prevalence, was adequately
achieved.
Thematic analysis was then conducted to identify and explore the factors that affect
the prevalence of trust/distrust and different emotions in the context that was
previously described (Joffe & Yardley, 2004). Thematic analysis is often
underestimated or considered to be similar to content analysis; however, it is a distinct
method of qualitative analysis, which "stands on its own", and not only "reflects
reality" but also "unpicks or unravels the surface of reality" (Braun & Clarke, 2006,
p.8! ).
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Thematic analysis, due to its epistemological flexibility (since it can be applied within
any epistemological framework from essentialism to constructionism, Braun &
Clarke, 2006), was considered the most appropriate method to be used within the
pragmatist epistemological framework which was adopted throughout this thesis. In
order to approach the pragmatist goal which was to approach the "relative"
knowledge and truth, based on the context and the exact goals (as already described in
chapter 4) of the study, the use of semi-quantitative and qualitative methods was
considered necessary. Another reason for the choice of thematic analysis was that
because it is not bound to any strict theoretical background and is also not committed
to develop a certain theory (Braun & Clarke, 2006), in contrast to other qualitative
analytic methods such as grounded theory or JPA, it would therefore better serve the
exploratory aims of the present study.
Both semantic (having a "manifest" presence, i.e. repeated words across the
interviews) and latent (based on the underlying meaning of the manifest wording)
themes were identified in the data (Joffe & Yardley, 2004) and analysed after repeated
readings. In this process, first categories were generated based on the elements of the
data relevant to the present study, and then these were combined into themes (Braun
& Clarke, 2006). The themes were constantly reviewed and checked for their
uniqueness and concordance with the extracts of the data to achieve confidence in
their presence and their significance.
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7.3 Results
7.3.1 Content analysis
Initially, content analysis was conducted on the interview data. Questions and answers
were coded and quantified and then stored in SPSS. Despite the limited number of
participants and due to the exploratory nature/aims of the present study, it was
considered important to examine in the beginning the frequencies of the emerging
categories and sub-categories in order to obtain an overview of young people's
perceptions of the Cyprus issue and their attitudes to the prospect of a unified federal
state. For reasons of clarity and focus, the content analysis has been included in
Appendix III and only a summary of the results is produced in this section.
Attribution of the causes of the Cyprus issue, the preferred solution to the conflict, the
agent/s of the preferred solution and the perceived reasons for the results of the 2004
referendum (see Table 1 in Appendix III for a detailed description) were the
categories/themes which were quantified and analysed.
In summary it was found that the majority of participants attributed responsibility to
both conflicting sides even though each side's responsibilities were different. Only a
very small number of participants attributed responsibility to one side only or to
external agents. On the other hand, concerning the preferred solution to the conflict,
the sample appeared more divided. Almost an equal number of participants (7 and 9
participants respectively) wanted compromise or the return to the situation of Cyprus
before 1974 while very few participants showed preference to the maintenance of the
status quo.
Concerning now the agents of a solution to the Cyprus issues, the most popular agents
were the Greek Cypriots together with the Turkish Cypriots; politicians and people at
a grassroots level. Then, there was equal support for the EU, the UN along with Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and the belief that no one could realistically find a
solution to the conflict. It is also very interesting that two participants thought that
young people could find a solution, in contrast to what adults have so far produced.
Finally, Greece and Turkey, two traditionally involved countries, were supported the
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least (amongst the other agents) and only in conjunction with the international
institutions, the EU and the UN (see Table 1 in Appendix III for the detailed results).
Finally, concerning participants' attitudes to the 2004 referendum, the majority of
participants rejected the Annan plan and the reasons presented for this rejection
covered a spectrum, from moral to economic reasons. The most popular reason was of
an economic/political nature: the failure of the plan to satisfy Greek Cypriot interests
(10 out of 20 participants) in contrast to its success in satisfying Turkish Cypriot
interests (3 out of 20 participants). The second most popular reason was of a social
nature: Greek Cypriot unwillingness to be unified with the Turkish Cypriots (8 out of
20 participants). The third and fourth most popular reasons were the plan's lack of
fairness and "rightness" for Greek Cypriots (4 participants supported each of these
reasons). Greek Cypriot willingness to maintain the status quo, the unrealistic nature
of the plan, and the plan's lack of trust in the Greek Cypriots were the reasons which
were reported the least. In contrast to the reasons for rejecting the plan, the reasons in
favour of the Annan plan were not based on the characteristics of the plan itself but on
the chance for unification the plan represented for the Greek Cypriots (5 out of 20
participants).
Attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots (within national institutions, within interpersonal
relationships and between the public and private domains)
Participants' attitudes to Turkish Cypriots within national institutions or inter-
personal relationships were categorised as "positive", "negative" or "ambivalent".
Attitudes which were 111 favour and trusting of the Turkish Cypriot
representatives/members of common national institutions or positive in developing an
inter-personal relationship with a Turkish Cypriot were considered "positive".
Attitudes which were untrusting and against Turkish Cypriot representatives or
against developing a personal relationship with them were considered "negative".
The attitudes which were considered as "ambivalent" were either those that were
indecisive/inconclusive, based on the consideration of both positive and negative
factors involved, or which were dependent on conditions such as time, use of common
language and the target's ethnicity (Turkish Cypriot or Turkish).
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Within the public domain attitudes, the sample appeared to be mostly divided in
reference to Turkish Cypriot judges, politicians, Turkish Cypriot universities and an
economic policy in favour of northern Cyprus. In reference to the rest of national
institutions, (Turkish Cypriot soldiers, policemen, employers, elected MPs and
President of the federal state) participants were in their majority positive towards
them. Amongst these institutions, the largest number of positive participants was in
reference to the common police and the intention to vote for a Turkish Cypriot
Member of Parliament. The number of participants who were negative was the same
across all institutions, while the number of ambivalent participants varied across
institutions.
In reference to inter-personal relationships, participants appeared to be positive in
their majority towards developing a friendly relationship, or an intimate relationship,
or renting one's property to Turkish Cypriots; they were not positive towards inter-
marriage, moving to northern Cyprus (negative attitudes were more than the positive
and ambivalent ones) and towards Turkish Cypriot employers (where positive
attitudes were equal to the ambivalent ones). The three relationships, towards which
participants were positive, had a very low number of negative attitudes; the
ambivalent number was the second highest one.
The results between the private and the public domain were very different. There was
no negative majority for any of the public domain attitudes, in contrast to the private
domain ones; on the other hand, the number of negative attitudes towards public
domain targets was never as low as it was for the interpersonal relationships towards
which participants were positive in their majority. There seems to be a higher
polarisation of participants either negatively or positively, concerning the different
interpersonal relationships, which does not exist concerning the public domain
attitudes.
7.3.2 Thematic analysis
After the content analysis, thematic analysis was conducted on the same interview
data to identify the themes which could address the two main research questions on
the role of emotions and trust in the reconciliation process.
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These themes were: Emotions, Differences/Commonalities of the Greek Cypriots with
the Turkish Cypriots/Turks, History, Ingroup/Outgroup bias, Familiarity/Proximity
and Identity.
7.3.2.1 What is the role of emotions in the reconciliation process?
The role of emotions was explored through the direct questions "What do you feel
about the Cyprus issue?" or e.g. "How do you/eel about Turkish Cypriot policemen?"
However, the theme of emotions also emerged at other times during the interviews,
and not in response to a direct question from the interviewer. The emotions that
emerged (fear, anger, frustration, sadness, hate and emotional apathy) were used for
three purposes: first, to explain distrust in national, international institutions and the
Turkish Cypriot and the Turkish people under a common state, second, to explain the
perceived difficulty or even impossibility of everyday coexistence, and, third, to
explain one's views on the Cyprus issue. Different emotions emerged in reference to
different targets and they were differentially related to them.
1. Justifying institutional distrust (in - prospective common - national institutions)
The emotions that emerged in reference to trust in national institutions were: fear, hate
and emotional apathy. All of these emotions were used as an explanation of the
expression of distrust in national institutions, either in the current Cypriot ones or in
the prospective joined ones (consisting of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
together).
Fear
"Existential" fear emerged in reference to a common army; "existential" fear was
defined as fear of invasion, fear of being physically hurt. What appeared to be hiding
behind "existential" fear were events of the history of the intergroup relation,
which led participants to feel insecure about the future.
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"No, I would be worried ....because it is the army thai did the invasion to start with,
so, how do we know that they will not turn against us in the future?" part. 16, line
181-184, p.4.
The [Turkish] army in this report was directly associated with the invasion of 1974.
This reminiscence of the hurtful events of the past not only caused insecurity about
the future but also made more salient and legitimised in a way the existence of the two
groups and their hostile relationship. The salience of the two groups was also marked
by the current military division between the two groups:
"No, I wouldn't feel secure, like now ...thefact that we both have separate armies and
military camps, I believe that it can happen any time ...like in 1963, this can happen
again now or afterwards ... "part 19, line 237-240, p.5.
Although the question was about a future common army, the participant in this report
referred to the present condition and the past events, which created an uncertainty for
the present and the future. The existence of two separate camps and armies at the
present time in Cyprus was considered to create a very "fragile" condition, liable to
erupt any time in the present or the future and lead to more violence.
Apart from the "existential" fear there were also mentions of fear of "threat of
values". This kind of fear involved the fear of injustice, of being unfairly treated. The
factor which seemed to trigger this emotion was mainly the difference of ethnic
identity of the target. In reference to working for Turkish Cypriot employers, a pre-
existent fear towards them appeared and a general "uneasiness" with the idea of
working for Turkish Cypriot employers; this was expressed either at a personal level
or at an in-group level (of all the Greek Cypriots). However, when talking at a
personal level, opinions were more positive, or at least there was the willingness by
some participants to put this relationship to the test.
HI would be afraid ...(of him being unfair) ....ifI saw that he wasn't fair towards me I
would tell him something about it, or if he carried on ... I would surely leave, but I
wouldn't like a lot even the idea to start with ... (of working for a Turkish Cypriot
employer)" P8, line 198-199, p.5.
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" ....His decisions would be unfair to me but not to ...a great point, there are many
people who are afraid of that .... " PI, line 325-326, p. 7.
In reference to the Turkish Cypriot judges, fear was also expressed only in the case
where the decision depended on the personal opinion of the judge and not on the laws;
as if the judge would not go as far as breaking the law to be unfair to the participant
because of his Greek Cypriot identity, but he would take advantage of his power on
the final decision, if it depended solely on him.
" ... if 1 knew 1 was innocent, 1 wouldn 't be velY afraid, but ... if I knew it lllas
ambivalent, I would be afraid that he would definitely see me as guilty" P19, line
351-352, p.8.
Almost all of the reports of fear on the issue of trust were individual. Participants
expressed their personal feelings in most of the cases, apart from participant 1 who in
reference to trust in the Turkish Cypriot employers referred also to the feelings of a
large group of Greek Cypriots, in order to show the contrast with his personal
feelings.
Hate
In contrast to the other feelings, hate was one feeling that emerged only at a group
level. There were six reports in total of hate: four reports of hate from the Greek
Cypriots towards the Turks, and two reports of hate from Turkish Cypriots and Turks
towards the Greek Cypriots.
The factors that appeared to influence participants' expression of hatred were the
division between the two communities, the out-group's perceived hostile
emotions towards the in-group, and the direct experience of the events of 1974.
The division between the two communities, which in relation to hatred was not
specified, appeared to be related to the hatred Greek Cypriots felt towards the Turkish
Cypriots/Turks and it emerged in reference to Turkish Cypriot policemen. However, it
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was reported in order to show that Turkish Cypriot policemen would be like the Greek
Cypriot ones, which led to participant's trust in them.
"I: Would you feel security if a Turkish Cypriot policeman came to rescue you?
P: If it was in my interest no, if it was to hurt me yes ..... it depends on the person ...
I: Do you believe that Greek Cypriots would do the same? Or do you believe that
Greek Cypriots would be fair towards the Turkish Cypriots?
P: No, they would be the same
I: Why? What do you think is happening now?
P: Like now that they are divided ....Greeksfeel hatred towards Turks ...
I: Do you believe that if the island is unified, this hatred will disappear?
P: No, those that went through the war, the hatred they have inside them, won't go
I: What about your generation? Which is later on and you haven't lived all these ...
P: It depends, there are people who have relatives still missing and trapped, they may
still have it inside them" P6, line 123-148, p.3-4.
Hate was reported as a feeling that a group of people felt towards another group of
people, and not what the participant felt personally. However, the two groups were
salient based on their ethnic identity, which could either give an idea to the reader
about the participant's feelings as well, knowing his/her ethnic identity. Feelings of
hatred towards the "Turkish" people by the "Greek" people were reported in terms of
the exclusive ethnic identities of each group; there was no mention of the common
Cypriot element of the identity of either of the two groups. They were both
characterised by their super-ordinate exclusive identities of "Greeks" and "Turks",
which refer to this older and broader ethnic conflict, and with which the Greek
Cypriots identify, as found in previous studies.
In reference to the same question, another sub-theme also emerged: the mutuality of
this emotion between the two communities:
"I: Ifyou knew that the police employ Turkish Cypriots, how would youfeel?
P: Hmm, not at all safe because I don't know them to trust them, and ...llley would
also/eel some hatred towards us and they mightfind something small to arrest us ... ,
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but these things they would do them every day and it would be difficult for us to live
with them" P8, line 138-142, p.3.
In this report, the differentiation of the two groups was also made salient, although
this time the participant positioned himself openly as a member of one of the groups,
the Greek Cypriots. While participant 8 admits not knowing the Turkish Cypriots'
feelings, he anticipated them, almost in a way to justify his in-group's feelings.
However, not only did he anticipate hate's existence hut he also anticipated that it
would be accompanied by harmful actions. He presented Turkish Cypriots as trying to
harm the Greek Cypriots on any occasion, even within the context of a common state,
with "a solution accepted by both communities", according to the fictional scenario
presented to the participants.
Finally, in reference to Greek Cypriot employers' attitude to Turkish Cypriot
employees, hatred was attributed to older generations, as if the younger generations,
to which participants belonged, did not share it. They were, however, affected by it
since the current adults/employers belonged to these "older" generations.
"...Older ones have a sort of hatred towards Turkish Cypriots, that's why ....! don't
know, some of them wouldn't ... (befair)" P12, line 115,117, p.3.
Emotional Apathy
Finally, the emotion that was very prominent was apathy. Ten participants expressed
apathy as an individual existent feeling and two participants reported it as a group
feeling. The main factors affecting feelings of apathy were corruption and lack of
responsiveness by politicians. Apathy was reported in reference to politics (in five
extracts) and the Cyprus issue (in seven extracts).
Participant 3 when asked why he doesn't trust the politicians of his country answered
"Eh l am not interested in politics, but from what I can see, they are all
liars "P3, line 247, p.6.
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HIfeel something, bUII don 'I lake it out, because / know that nobody is going 10 listen
to me ... therefore, lfeel indifferent" P5, line 72-77, p.2.
Participant 3 felt he had to justify it as if it was not a "good" feeling to have.
Politicians' immorality could he an extra reason for people to be apathetic towards
politics, apart from the fact that politics did not interest him.
2. Explain difficulty of co-existence/acceptance between the two peoples (at a
personal level)
Anger
The anger that people felt was about the Muslim religion and its implications for
people's everyday life. The factors which triggered this anger were about the
perceived forceful character, the lack of freedom and the devalued position of
women in Muslim religion and practices. In the following examples, anger was not
only apparent in the meaning of the words used but also in the repetition of certain
phrases and the derogative way perceived elements of the Muslim religion were
described.
"In a Muslim environment ... there is no freedom, women are below men, / could
never accept this thing ..... even if I didn't have to do the same as them, / don't like it, /
don 't like this thing, that you wear lets say ... to be dressed like that ..with the chadors,
let's say, and us being dressed normally" P11, line 141-153, p.3-4.
Gender discrimination and lack of freedom were viewed as characteristics of the
Muslim world. Participant 11 felt angry with these restrictions and the position of
women in this environment. She mentioned that even if she was not forced to follow
the rules or the discrimination "imposed" by Muslim religion, she did not like this
religion. At the end of the discussion of this issue, she also mentioned that she did not
want to see people "suffering" while she and the other Greek Cypriots would live
their lives "normally". Muslim religion is viewed as "not normal" and criticised for its
strictness especially towards women. It is surprising how anger emerged concerning
an issue which the participant was not directly involved with and had not directly
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experienced in her life; just the possibility of seeing it happening around her in the
future was enough to raise this negative emotion.
"It 'would seem very strange, I would be angry.., I can 'I, let's say, ...bUI wearing
chadors - I can 't understand this thing ...what do they 'want to show? That they
believe? they are forced to believe ...you cannot believe something you are forced 10
do ...and ·wear...what happened in France, these things I think are ridiculous, let's
say, every time that the Hotza chants the fact that they are not allowed to have any
car in the street ...these are unacceptable, I don 't know .... "Pl, line 239-248, p.5-6.
The phrasing, the repetition of words and the rhetorical questions, as in the previous
example, showed once more how much anger this issue could provoke. This particular
participant also presented the restrictions "imposed" by the Muslim religion as
something irrational, not understandable. The Muslim religion was presented as the
most salient characteristic of northern Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots, based on which
participant 1 evaluated his moving to northern Cyprus. This view of Turkish Cypriots
should be emphasised as it is paradoxical since Turkish Cypriots are considered to be
a more secular part of the Turkish population. This already existing strong view on a
perceived characteristic of Turkish Cypriots constitutes for our participants a barrier
to their co-existence in a common state, which should be seriously taken into
consideration and studied in relation to the way the Muslim religion is projected in
Cyprus through the media and the school books.
Fear
Fear also appeared as a factor hindering the possibility of the two communities
coming together, emerging especially in reference to moving to northern Cyprus (after,
a solution has been found and there is only one state). However, there was a
differentiation depending on the object of fear; in this case, fear of aggressive
behaviour, as portrayed to characterise Greek Cypriot feelings about Turkish Cypriot
behaviour, was rejected (which was presented as a point of incompatibility of the.
individual with the in-group) while fear of indifference and lack of communication
was endorsed.
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HI cannot understand those •••being afraid .••1 don't believe this fear tilat everybody
feels oh my God they are Turkish Cypriots, he wants to kill you, to do this and that
to you " P 1, line 309-311, p.7.
On the one hand, individual feelings towards the Turkish Cypriots seemed to differ
from those of the Greek Cypriots as a group, who were presented as being afraid of
Turkish Cypriot aggressiveness. Greek Cypriots were presented as fearing that their
lives were threatened by the Turkish Cypriots because Turkish Cypriots were
dangerous and violent. These characteristics appeared to be related to the ethnicity of
this out-group, without any further explanation, which probably meant that the
participant supposed that the interviewer knew what this was related to. Again it is
assumed that this characteristic of Turkish Cypriots is probably related to history and
the invasion of 1974 by the Turkish army.
On the other hand, fear of Turkish Cypriot indifference towards Greek Cypriot needs,
due to their difference of ethnic identity, was endorsed. Common ethnic identity is
considered to create a feeling of security. when help is needed. based on a perceived
"knowledge of the other", created within the same ethnic group. This lack of security
is however also related not only to the "unknown other" in terms of people but also in
terms of land, physical environment. The issue of physical separation of the two
communities in terms of the land they inhabit, which exists in the case of Cyprus, and
which only recently has become less absolute with the permitted crossing from one
side of the island to the other at certain points along the Green line, also becomes
salient in participants' speech. Each part of the island has been associated with the
people/the community that inhabits it; hence. northern Cyprus is considered an
"unknown" environment for Greek Cypriots, since they have only been living in the
southern part since 1974. This difference in ethnic identities appears therefore to be
related to different issues which lead to a clear separation between the two
communities and to a difficulty of co-existence.
"...1 would be afraid of going to Kyrenia ...because here in Cyprus of Greek people
there is security, while if you went to another place, where around me there would be
Turkish Cypriots, 'who might no/ have known yo II, they might nol help you, in an
unknown environment;, while here in Cyprus, there is security ....when the other
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person isfrom your own race, from your own country, you feel more security ... " P J,
line 220-229, p.5.
3. Influence the perception of the Cyprus issue (of its progress)
The Causes of the Cyprus issue
Participants, in reference to the causes of the Cyprus issue, expressed anger, related to
lack of understanding of the reasons why the invasion happened to their country. No
obvious reason justified the historical events for participant 20. Greek Cypriots were
the victims of an unreasonable attack against them.
"I: What do you feel when you hear about the Cyprus issue and all that is happening?
P: ...I feel sad and a little angry ...why, why should this happen, this ... " P20, line 62-
63,p.2.
This "unreasonable" attack could be related to its perceived illegitimacy, which also
gave rise to anger. The illegitimacy of the Turkish Cypriot invasion and protracted
occupation of Cyprus was based, for participants, on the seemingly simple fact that
this land did not belong to them, "it was not theirs". The right of involvement that
Turkey and Greece had after the Treaty of Guarantee (see chapter 3) has not been
mentioned or taken into consideration by certain participants; instead, they have based
their reasoning on a simpler, more direct relationship i.e. that a country belongs only
to its inhabitants.
"I feel angry because f believe that they had no right to come to CYPl'lIs and because
they don 't leave now, while it is not their country ... " P J 7, line 83-84, p.2.
Consequences of the invasion
In the progression of the Cyprus issue, emotions also emerged in relation to the
consequences of the 1974 Turkish invasion.
Anger
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Anger was expressed when participants recalled the armed conflict with the Turkish
troops which followed the Turkish invasion in 1974. However, this anger was
moderated by the existence (or not) of personal/family origins from the occupied part
of Cyprus. It is not only ethnic identity which creates ties between people and the land
but also regional identity, which creates even stronger ties; people seem to feel more
connected with and to have stronger feelings about the exact region of the country
they are originally from, in comparison to the rest of the regions of the country.
"Yes, yes, (J feel) anger because ...I have relatives who were in the war and the
stories ...and of course I am angry, ok I ani notfrom the northern part of Cyprus, so /
don 'tfeel it that strongly, but ...in a way Ifeel anger" P8, line 93-95, p.2.
"1:Ok, 'whenyou heal' abo lit the Cyprus issue, do you feel anything? Angel', apathy?
P: In the beginning, when I started to understand what the Cyprus issue is, 1felt
something ...let's say, our houses and the occupied land are over there ...now ...the
way things have evolved, Ifeel indifference" P9, line 127-8, p.3.
In the second extract, we can see that there is a passage from anger to apathy. This
could be considered, either as proof of a circle between emotions and cognitive
evaluations of the Cyprus conflict or as proof of the possibility of change of emotions
across time, depending on the situation. Emotions do not exist in isolation; it can be
seen that different emotions can either co-exist or follow from each other.
Sadness
After the end of the armed conflict, the events and the situation which followed, more
specifically the division of the island (three reports), the occupation (loss) of northern
Cyprus, and the present condition of the occupied part of Cyprus (two reports) gave
rise to sadness (both concerning the participants themselves and their relatives), as
emerged in the data. (Sadness was reported four times as an individual feeling and
twice as a group feeling.)
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H ... sadness, about the event, because it is another country, not country, but anyway,
because the capital is also divided" P17, line 88-89, p.2.
"it depends, when we watch TI7, you feel sad about what has happened to your place"
P6, line 84-85, p.2.
Sadness was also expressed in an indirect way, through the description of scenes of
refuge and emotional pain felt by family members, in 2003, when they were finally
allowed to return to see the houses they had abandoned in their flight from the
invading Turkish army in 1974.
HI: Have you heard about the Occupied part?
P: Yes, yes, a lot ... that they left their houses, that they will not get them back, things
like that ... " P8, line 26-27, p.l.
"I: Have you ever been 10 the Occupied part?
P: Yes, we went twice, first to my mother '.'I house 10 see it and then to my dad's
house ...
I: What was thefeeling?
P: My mother was crying ... " P6, line 21-25, p.l.
The consequences of the Turkish invasion, which persist up to the present day, are
therefore associated with negative and painful emotions based on the victimisation of
the ethnic in-group people, built upon their physical and emotional suffering.
Throughout the interviews, there was only unilateral victimisation; Turkish Cypriot
suffering was only mentioned by one participant.
The solution of the Cyprus issue
In the progress of the Cyprus issue, after the painful (for the Greek Cypriots)
consequences of the 1974 invasion, many efforts were made to resolve the conflict.
These efforts for a solution have also given rise to different emotions:
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Frustration
Frustration was expressed more as personal resentment, with an element of
hopelessness in it. It was reported four times as frustration with self-interest,
concerning the impossibility of the current government or the European institutions to
find a solution to the Cyprus issue. It was reported seven times only as an individual
feeling.
"Let's say the General Secretary Annan does not live here. he doesn't know. he
cannot find a solution ..... P3, line 107-108, p.3.
In the second extract, as in the previous theme, emotions seem to coexist or evolve;
initial frustration with the fact that the Cyprus issue has become the object of laughter
due to the 34 years of continuous negotiations without any solution to be found, has
evolved into apathy. Cyprus is one of the few cases in world diplomacy where
negotiations have been taking place continuously since the end of an armed conflict,
in order to reach a solution, and still a mutually acceptable solution has not been
found. Prolonged and ineffective negotiations lead to frustration and apathy, which
clearly constitute barriers to the resolution of the conflict, as the populations involved
have lost interest and belief that a solution can be found.
Emotional apathy
Apathy was a theme that emerged at several points in the interviews. Although in
their majority they had an opinion on the Cyprus issue, participants expressed apathy
towards mainly its solution. Apart from the general indifference towards politics,
which could explain indifference towards the Cyprus issue, apathy was also due to the
lack of politicians' responsiveness, general resignation and lack of personal bonds
with the Occupied part.
" ... I used 10 think, after the referendum, that nobody cares, not a politician, not
anybody, why should I be interested, I have my life, what if, ... nobody cares, since
everybody is interested in their own lives, their money ..... P 11. line 73-75, p.2
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HI didn't feel anything (when I went to North Cyprus), no sadness, no hatred, no
nothing because I never had anything to do with the Occupied part of Cyprus. " P 10,
line 21-22,p.1.
Both general apathy and apathy due to this perceived general societal and political
disinterest in Cyprus set emotions once more in between societal action and political
action.
7.3.2.2 Which factors influence inter-group social and political trust?
Looking at the factors influencing trust/distrust, it was found that certain themes
influenced both political and social trust (trust in institutions and trust in people);
these were: differences/commonalities of the Greek Cypriots with the Turkish
Cypriots/Turks, history, in-group/out-group bias, familiarity/proximity and identity.
1. Differences/commonalities between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
CypriotslTurks
When we refer to the differences and the commonalities between these groups, we
refer to participants' accounts of characteristics (Le. cultural, historical, social,
religious etc.) which emphasise the difference of the groups involved. The existence
of these differences/commonalities was used to explain the reasons why there was
distrust/trust between them. This theme emerged across the whole interview data in
reference to national institutions (like the police, the army, religion) and to inter-
personal relationships with the Turkish Cypriot people (friendship, marriage, living in
northern Cyprus, renting them an apartment, having a Turkish Cypriot employer and
Turkish people in general). Turkish Cypriots were not always perceived like the
Turkish people; they were sometimes perceived as a different group with different
characteristics. The differences between these two peoples also consisted of
differences in beliefs, behaviour and identity.
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a. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots: Differences
The perceived differences between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
which hindered Greek Cypriot trust in Turkish Cypriots were the following:
Economic and socio-political differences
One of the most prevalent perceived differences between the two peoples, which
affected Greek Cypriot trust levels in Turkish Cypriots, was the perceived "economic
and social backwardness'; and "underdevelopment" of the Turkish Cypriots. For
Greek Cypriots, these were important hindering factors in different aspects of their
coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots.
"It depends, eh, basically we have been used to this place, here it is developed, with
a special way of living, different from the 0I1e ill tile other part, ifthey get unified
and if they become the same, let's say, and if they develop as much as south Cyprus
has developed, I believe it wouldn't bother me very much, but ... it depends" P17, line
143-147, p.3
"No ... I don't 'want (to go and live in North Cyprus) ....... because, I believe 'hey are
ten years behind us" P3, line 141,143, p.9
Part of this underdevelopment was the perceived increased levels of "corruption" of
the Turkish Cypriots which would reinforce the already existing ones. In reference to
a common police, participant 9 reported:
"...if we put them (the Turkish Cypriots) a/so in the police, in this police 'where there
is already trafficking (of drugs), if we put the Turkish Cypriots in ... it is going to be
worse" P9, line 148-150, p.4.
In reference to the way of life, Turkish Cypriot habits were also perceived as different
from Greek Cypriot ones, a perceived barrier to form close relationships with
members of their community:
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"I might make friends, but not very close friends because we have different, we
have other habits and they have other habits Turkish Cypriots are much
.behind generally, meaning habits, what they like etc." P3, line
183,185,187,192, p.4.
These habits were not clearly specified; they were only evaluated as more old-
fashioned in comparison to the Greek Cypriot ones.
Within this evaluation of perceived "backwardness", the status of each community
within the EU was also included. The newly acquired European membership of
Cyprus, in contrast to the Turkish Cypriots' position in the international community,
was presented as an additional proof of each community's economic (and probably
social) level.
"...after this problem was created (meaning the invasion of 1974) and more Turks
arrived, and they were ...underdeveloped, the others, we are developed, we are in
Europe, them, from what I've understood they aren't, there is a difference ... " P17,
line 119-121. p.3.
Civilisation differences
Apart from this perceived social, political and economic difference between the two
peoples, two other differences emerged as hindering factors to Greek Cypriot
coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots; these concerned two main elements of each
people's civilisation: the language and the religion, both strongly characterising each
people's identity. Each people's language and religion are inextricably related to the
customs and traditions as well as to the place of living/the land of each people.
The geographical division of Cyprus (into the Occupied part and the free part) is
accompanied by an ethnic, social and religious division of the population; the Muslim
religion and Turkish language have been associated with the north of Cyprus by
Greek Cypriots, and Christianity and the Greek language with Cyprus, While both
religion and the language could lead to the social isolation of each community, since
the two spoken languages are very different and the two religions forbid inter-
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religious marriages, in certain cases participants seemed willing to overcome these
differences if common ground was found, although again under their own conditions.
"P: ...... eh, eh, eh .....
f: You don't know? What do you think?
P: ...it's the problem of tile language, f don't speak Turkish...
f: If it was in English?
P: f would go, f wouldn 't have any problem" P4, line 176-180, p.4.
"P: Eh ...no (f would not go to study in north Cyprus), because f don't think it 'would
have been in Greek
f: If education was in English, let's say?
P: ......... f don't think so, f wouldn't want to live there ....to go there ...it's ok for
them to come here, in ....I don 'I know" P9, line 245-251, p.5-6.
Concerning religion, even despite some participants' positive attitude to forming an
intimate relationship with a Turkish Cypriot, differences seemed insurmountable. The
difference of religion was for some participants a reason per se not to engage in an
intimate relationship, while for others, it was the interdiction of inter-religious
marriages that concealed their personal decision. In cases now where neither the
religion "regulations" nor the ethnic and religious differences were considered"
participants appeared to be very positive towards this possibility (to form an intimate
relationship with a Turkish Cypriot) as long as Turkish Cypriots were willing to
change their religion, convert to Christianity, and move to the "Greek Cypriot part" of
the island. No personal willingness to make any compromise was considered.
"It's not about if f would like that or not, it's a mailer of religion, with a Turkish
Cypriot guy, the matter is that we are two different religions, right away you cannot
have a relationship" P16, line 141-142,p.3
"P: No, l wouldn 'tmind, but I wouldn 'twant to beforced (0 ...
I: To beforced to marry her?
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P: Yes, like in the series on tv yes, 1 believe yes (I would marry her), if they
accepted a religious wedding, if she was a really good girl and she came with me, if
she didn '1do what she wanted
1: You mean, changing her religion?
P: Yes, 10 change it ...yes, to have a religious wedding and she to stay with me here
(meaning in southern Cyprus)" P1, line 283-297, p.6-7.
Both personal unwillingness for any compromise In this domain and religious
"regulations" appear to hinder personal relationships which, even in a unified state,
would keep the two communities apart.
Difference of interests
Along with these differences, participants' trust levels also seemed to be affected by
the perceived incompatibility of ethnic interests between the two communities. Ethnic
interests emerged in reference to each community's political beliefs and the existence
of a Cypriot army. Concerning the former, even though Greek Cypriot politicians
have been often presented as constantly arguing over their opinions, in this case they
were presented as a homogeneous group with one voice, which is different from that
of Turkish Cypriots.
"Yes, I think 1would (vote for a Turkish Cypriot MP or President) ....1just think our
beliefs (what we think should be done) are different, that's the only problem, that the
beliefs of a Greek Cypriot and of a Turkish Cypriot are totally different" P16, line
193-196, p.4-5
Concerning the existence of a Cypriot army with both Greek and Turkish Cypriot
officers or soldiers, disbelief and distrust were also expressed based on the "raison d'
etre'' of that army. The military service and the existence of the army in Cyprus have
been related to the Cyprus issue, not only in practice but also in the people'sminds.
This is due to the fact that before the Turkish invasion in 1974 there was not a strong
military power in Cyprus; it was only after the invasion that the island became
strongly mi~itarised. Therefore, in Greek Cypriots' minds, their army exists to protect
them from the Turks; they see no other reason for its existence, no other enemy. If
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Turks were to be included in that army, the army would lose its role, its reason for
existing, which makes the conception of a common Cypriot army difficult for Greek
Cypriots. However, they beJieve that Turkish Cypriots hold the same beliefs about
Greek Cypriots, identifying them as their "enemies". The perceived mutuality of this
belief adds to the distrust in a common Cypriot army, allocating the responsibility for
this belief to both communities:
" ... 1 would feel uncomfortable because we do our military service for one reason, to
protect our country from the Turks, generally, because of this thing that happened,
that's why we go to the army and we will never stop having a military service; to go
and do my military service and have a Turkish Cypriot as my officer? I mean for what
reason did we create the army ... because of this conflict and we now have to be
always ready ready for whatever happens let's say there is no way that this
thing (to have a common army) is going to happen, to have Turkish Cypriots in the
army; there will be no army afterwards" PI, line 336-341,351-352, p. 7-8.
"P: I believe that if a solution isfound, there will be no army
I: There will be one to protect you from the foreign countries, so that no other
countries attack Cyprus ...
P: Yes ok ...
I: How safe would you feel with a common army?
P: (laughing) Eh, that will be the problem, but I believe that ifthere is good will
everything can be solved. When my superiors are good and they actually believe that
it's not them that should be protected, no/ from the Greek Cypriots, but from the
foreigners, that would be a good way to handle it, 'while if they believed that they were
their enemies that would be a problem ... 1don't think it is right for me to go /0 a
military base where there will be only Turkish Cypriots ... eh, eh. eh. I would try them
out, to see if it's right l try it out, to know" P4,line219-228, 236, 239,p.5.
However, as can be seen, some good will was expressed by some participants, despite
the original fear and disbelief. There is the willingness to "test" whether this new
institution could work. This shows that, despite the original preconceptions, there is
the possibility that, after they experience a new situation which disproves their
preconceptions, people are willing to change and re-evaluate their attitudes.
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Unspecified differences
The identified perceived differences between the two communities, which were
perceived as hindering, were sometimes very vague without any reason provided or
any further specification of the differences. Participants just reported their existence,
without feeling they had to elaborate on them, as if their existence was taken for
granted.
"If it happens yes (to create a relationship with a Turkish Cypriot), but I won '/IIY 10
make it happen Basically lI'e have so many differences, we have nothing in
common" P9, line 176,192, p.4
However, at other times, even if there was just a vague report of their existence,
certain reasons were presented to justify them. Different personal experiences as well
as lack of knowledge of the other side were presented as the reasons for holding these
beliefs. These two reasons exclude all other historical or economic reasons and set the
inter-group relationship only on personal experiences, testifying also for the power
and the influence of individual experiences, instead of group processes.
"Idon't know if I could live that life" (Pl l, line 224, p.5) ... because ... ! have learnt
differently ... "PI I, line 229-230, p.5.
"I don 't know, I just don 't know if ! 'would rent it /0 them, they are just Turkish
Cypriots, let's say, I don't know if it is because I don'( live with them evelY day, I
don 't know what it is, I don't know some characteristics of their lives, if they are like
this or that ..... P II, line 165-157, p.4
Political advantage of Turkish Cypriots
Finally, the only perceived difference, where Turkish Cypriots were presented as
having an advantage over the Greek Cypriots, was politics. Turkish Cypriot
politicians, and in particular Rauf Denktash, were characterised very positively. These
positive remarks emerged in reference to the referendum and in reference to trust in
the agent of a solution to the Cyprus issue. This positive evaluation was sometimes
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used as a positive attribute, without further insinuations; however, at other times it
was used to reinforce Greek Cypriot victimisation:
"Denktash (to give a solution) .... even if he is Turkish, he is one of the best politicians,
ifhe was ours, our borders could have been up to Egypt ... " P 9, line 406-407, p.9.
" ... they seemed to be the good guys at the end, which is very 'wrong, they appeared to
be on top, because Denktash has a powerful and influential speech and he achieved
many things ... " PI, line 11, p.1l7-119, p.3.
b. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots: Commonalities
In contrast to the differences, participants also mentioned some commonalities
between the two communities. The sharing of the land, the concept of a common
country which the two communities could share, was reported in reference to the
common army; participants reported that they would feel secure, since the Turkish
Cypriots would fight and protect a country, which belonged to both communities. The
fact that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would be protecting the same country
has emerged as a common interest of the two communities, contradicting the beliefs
that the only reason for an army to exist is to protect the Greek Cypriots from the
Turkish Cypriots (as previously shown):
HI think yes, because it's for their own good as well, 10 protect their country" P 12,
line 126-7, p.3.
HEh, probably yes, because we live in the ... they might not protect it for our benefit
but they might protect it for their benefit, therefore ... it will be 0111' country they will
protect again" P9, line 275-7, p.6.
"I would feel security because it would have been for the same cause ........ it's not like
now where you have the Greek Cypriots versus the Turkish Cypriots, eh, that's why I
think I wouldfeel security" PlO, line 225,227-8, p.5.
However, the concept of the common country also emerged in reference to the
economy of the new country, when participants were asked if they would agree to an
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equal distribution of resources to both parts of Cyprus, with an emphasis to the
northern part, due to its current economic problems. In this case, on the one hand,
northern Cyprus was presented as a part of one country which should be equally
treated with the south of the country and on the other hand different reasons were
given to show how Greek Cypriots would also benefit from helping the northern part
of the island.
"No (/ wouldn 't mind), because the government has to help every part of the country
that needs it" P7, line 212-3, p.5.
"I will tell you, certainly, this was also the problem with the referendum, certainly we
are going to lose something economically, but 1 think that if the Cypriots have that in
mind and they don't want to go back, and they want the island to be united, these
things must happen, they cannot do something different, because otherwise what ...we
will take the island back and we will leave the other ones in a mess? This cannot be
done ... " P13, line 202-206, p.5.
Another issue, from which the theme of common land emerged and was associated
with a common identity, was moving to northern Cyprus or renting an apartment to
Turkish Cypriots; in both cases, these themes were used to explain trust in the Turkish
Cypriots. Within this context, in contrast to many reports of unilateral victimisation,
there were a few which expressed a common experience of victimisation for both
communities in the Cyprus issue:
"Why not, it is again in Cyprus, if the island was united and we were all together why
shouldn't I go to the other part, I believe that if this thing (unification of the island)
happens, the people will go back, those that are refugees" PJ3, line 157-160, p.4.
"Yes ...they are Cypriots as wel/ ...eh, they are somehow victims of the situation as
well, of this condition, and 1don't believe it would be such a huge problem ... " PI 3,
line 139-142, p.3.
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However, some of these commonalities were indirect, by rejecting both Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. These appeared in reference to studying in northern
Cyprus:
"Iwould never study in Cyprus ...I would like to get to know something else, to go to
another country, iff had to study in Cyprus, it would be better for me not to study at
all .. " P3, line 179,183-184, p.4.
Another negative commonality between the two peoples, emerged in reference to
renting one's apartment/house to a Turkish Cypriot family, even though the
participant would actually rent them his/her apartment:
"Yes, yes, why not? (f would rent them the apartment) ... (because) the same thing
happens with the Cypriots, you cannot trust them either, the same thing, you just hope
they will pay you" P5, line 108-109,p.3.
The emergence of perceived commonalities between the two communities, even if
they were set within general distrust, constitute evidence for the existence of domains
where Greek Cypriots do not consider the Turkish Cypriots so di fferent from
themselves, and could therefore consider living with them under a unified state, in
contrast to what might be more prevalent or more projected in the media and by
politicians.
c. Greek Cypriots and Turkish people: Differences and Commonalities
The majority of reports on Turkish people were negative and they were used in order
to justify participants' distrust in them. They referred to Turkish people's violent
"nature" expressed at different points in their national history and modem society, due
mainly to their economic situation:
up: ...Turks, ... is a race that through history, through the years, we can see how
barbaric they are, with the wars they had, and you cannot trust them ...sometimes we
see in the football pitches ...you can see, things that they do, they beat each other ...
l: Yes, but in Greece they do the same thing
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P: OK, but not like the Turks ... It's a barbaric people ... let's say .... because they are
poor ... they try to get in ... there is so much poverty ... the conspiracies, the the/is 'will
increase very much .... " PI, line 184-191,193-195, p.4.
One single commonality was reported between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
people in order to explain the participant's trust in Turkish people and it concerned
their physical appearance. It was the only report that brought the two peoples close:
" ... even in Turkey I have seen how the girls are dressed, how they behave ... they look
a lot like Cypriots ... I believe, I don't know ... "P 15, line 140-142, p.3.
d. Turkish Cypriot and Turkish people: Differences
Another sub-theme of the differences and commonalities could be the differences
identified between the Turkish Cypriot people and the Turkish people. Turkish
Cypriots were sometimes considered to be like Greek Cypriots, in contrast to Turkish
people, who were considered almost always as a very different group; they were
dehumanised and presented with personality flaws. The Cypriot element of their
identity was made salient between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots,
excluding therefore the settlers, who are originally Turkish and not Turkish Cypriots.
This differentiation between the two ethnicitics, the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish
people, was used to explain participants' trust level in the Turkish Cypriots, in
contrast to the Turkish people. Here are some relevant examples allowing for such
conclusions:
"the only problem now is ... look ...eh, eh, the beliefs, the behaviour of the residents, of
the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots, it's like the day and the night, the Turkish
Cypriots are like us, the settlers (who are Turks) look like some .... animals, let's say"
P4, line 102-105, p.3.
"It depend'), there are some who will take advantage and some who will not take
advantage, there are some who are Turkish Cypriot Cypriots, there are others who
are Turkish Cypriot Turks ... " P17, line 211-212, p.5
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Participant 19 also made a differentiation between the identities and origins of
Turkish Cypriots and Turks to emphasise the Turkish element of the latter and explain
his/her distrust in them.
"No, / wouldn 't like to go (to north CYPI'U5)...no, I wouldn 'I mind (about the Muslim
religion), it is all about trust, they are not all Turkish Cypriots, they are ... there are
Turks as well, like those who were brought to Cyprus after 1974 ... " P 19, line
146,151-152, p.3-4.
"Idon't have any problem with the Turkish Cypriots, they are the same for me as the
Cypriots, but it's Turkey in, that's 'what/ don't like" P 19, line J 43- J 44, p.3.
The same participant also made a differentiation between them when referring to
creating a personal relationship with either a Turkish Cypriot or a Turkish person; it
was considered "out of the question" with the Turkish people, but a possibility with
the Turkish Cypriots:
"P: -Because we had a problem in our family, the brother of my mother got married
with a Turkish girl, there was lots of trouble, 1wouldn 't even dare ..,
I: Yes, but how do you find it?
P: With a Turkish guy it's out of the question ...
I: With a Turkish Cypriot?
P: Maybe, it ispossible" part 19, line 189-/95, p.4.
In general, while Turkish Cypriots were viewed more negatively than Greek Cypriots, .
they were, however, viewed more positively than Turkish people. They were
considered to be like Greek Cypriots, or at least closer to Greek Cypriots than Turkish
people were, and therefore more easily trusted. Participants' negative opinion on
Turkey and Turkish people lead to distrust in them due to historical reasons and issues
of ethnic identity.
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2. The role of history
Both the questions about the referendum and the Cyprus issue, as well as the
questions about trust in different institutions or people, led to the emergence of the
theme of history during the interviews. Reference to history, however, was not only
made in an explicit way. Often participants seemed to use history either in order to
justify the negative feelings that would finally lead to distrust or they would refer to
history in an implicit way. We have made this suggestion about implicit reference to
history in cases where there was a negative view towards institutions or people
without an explicit reasoning, since the Greek Cypriot negative view of Turkish or
Turkish Cypriot people due to the historical events was almost taken for granted by
many Greek Cypriots. The issue of history was also linked with the previous theme of
commonality/difference, as a form of explaining why some differences existed.
Even though history was mostly used to explain distrust, it was also used to explain
trust in certain cases by some participants.
History has been found to affect distrust through different factors/processes. After the
events of 1974, Greek Cypriots started building a negative image of Turkish Cypriots,
transmitting it to younger generations, who did not have any personal experience of
the events per se, and isolating themselves and their children from the other
community. In many instances, in participants' narratives, this negative image took
the form of stereotypes which were almost taken for granted by them. However, it
should be noted that in the following reports/extracts, participants seemed willing to
change their attitudes if they were proven wrong during their personal contact with
the other community:
"Let me tell you, in the beginning ...the truth is, I think we would all feel insecurity,
because we don't have, we never had contact with these people and we never had any
relationship. and we have heard lots of ...negative things. since lve were children.
because of the problem that happened. and they have told us other things. but I
believe that, little by little, (f this thing gets tested and little by little we see, it can
happen. although I don 't believe it's easy" PI3, line 117-122, p.3.
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"If I get to know him and I see that he is ok, that he isn't what I know, what I imagine,
not that I know anything now, I am just saying what ... if I gel to know him, I cannot
deny that I could feel something, but because I have this logic I could also say ok give
it up let's say" P11, line 201-204, p.5
This negative Image, however, is also considered to be mutual, which is also
presented as a further problem tor the relationship of the two communities. It is
anticipated that mutual "negative teaching" must be taking place concerning the two
peoples' relationship, which does not allow people to trust each other and develop a
sincere and deep friendly relationship:
" ....... yes, if it happens yes, but I won't try to force it (to become friends with a
Turkish Cypriot child), but tf it happens to have them in our group of friends, why
not .... something would be a problem, it wouldn't be like he came and I knew he was
Cypriot and therefore a good person, something they must have been telling them, as
they have been telling us crazy thin{Js about the Turkish people, eh, they must be
telling them as well about us ...I imagine" P9, line 176, 196-198, p.4-5.
Along with this lack of contact and within the negative image that has been built,
history seems to have generated negative emotions, apathy, as well as a perception of
national bias, even in the possibility that a solution has been found and the two people
live in a common state. In reference to working for Turkish Cypriot employers and in
reference to voting for a Turkish Cypriot President, it was reported:
"They would (lake decisions that) look down on me ...but not to the point that, ... there
are many that think this way and many Turkish Cypriots that are more ...... their ideas
on this issue are more exaggerated, the way we are going ... there are some ,.,110 take
into consideration tile events of '74, that we hate the Greeks ...and I think this would
have some repercussions on my job .. " PI, line 325-329, p. 7.
"Why should a Turkish Cypriot President be elected? Wily? Not only tile), did those
bad things to us, he is also going to be elected as a President, and to govern us? I
believe that if a solution was found, t/le), wouldn 't care about m; let's say, he could
be the vice-President, because he cannot control Greeks as well, since they are
219
300.000 and we are 600.000, someone from those that (lit! so many bad tllings
cannot control the rest.: " PI, line 386-391. p.S.
Even in cases where participants acknowledged that the new generations of Turkish
I
Cypriots were not responsible for the events of the past, they still found it difficult to
disconnect them from their past and consider their relationship with them on a
different basis from that of their parents:
"P: I believe I would have some difficulties in envisagingfriendship with them...
I: Why? What would scare you?
P: Eh. ok, of course it's not their fault, but it 's.... due to them ...if you understand
what I am saying
I: Explain it to me
P: Eh. I know. I believe that these kids are good people, it's not their fault for tile
Cyprus issue, but I would find it difficult to become friends with them. because inside
I feel. but they are Turks ...they've caused us some problems ... that's how it is ... " P8.
line 166-174. p.4.
HI don't know, I really don', know maybe. maybe (he would be annoyed by
having Turkish Cypriot co-students or professors) due to everything that lias already
happened, all tile things we "ave heard ... a bit difficult to ... " P16. line 151.157-8.
p.4.
Finally, history has been presented as giving a very particular insight into the events
and the solution to be given to the Cyprus issue, which people who didn't experience
or were not directly linked with it could not have had. This was expressed concerning
the international institutions, like the EU, Turkey, Greece and the US, which interfere
and are called to give their opinion on a possible solution, without having experienced
the full extent of the events. Participant 1, when answering thequestion if he thought
that Great Britain should be involved in the resolution of the Cyprus issue reported:
H •••.... instead of the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot governments to negotiate,
eh. there is also Turkey, Greece; ok. tt's to our benefit that Greece participates. the
whole European Union participates, the United States are (hide) behind (IS well ... and
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on something they won't achieve anything, they take their own decisions without
having been there when they were killing tile Greek Cypriots in 1974, when tile),
came in and started killing, tile), have just "earl/ some things, and because the
Greeks do not know this stuff, but why don't we help them? I cannot believe that these
people are helping let's say but still think that we are wrong; since, ),011 weren't there
when they were killing our children, eh, is it 'wrong what they are thinking of .. " PI,
line 479-488, p.l o.
However, there were also instances where history was used to explain trust in foreign
institutions, due to the help of these institutions and countries on the Cyprus issue in
the past. There was one quote for the help offered by Great Britain, one for the United
Nations, while there were seven quotes concerning the help of Greece in the future.
The quote for Great Britain did not express full certainty, while the quote for the
United Nations, even if it was only one, it expressed confidenceand the role of the
United Nations was presented as crucial for the ending of the armed conflicts. On the
other hand, despite some instances where Greece's role was under consideration,
Greece was considered a de facto trusted ally of Cyprus. These results assume
therefore that the role already played by some of the "traditionally" involved
institutions has only been negative in people's conscience and, therefore, should be
seriously reconsidered if progress is to be made in the future.
" eh, and Great Britain, I don 'I know, maybe because they are part of Cyprus'
past the English" P12, line 163-164, p.4.
" ... if it wasn 't for the United Nations there wouldn't have been this green line to
divide us, there would have been many conflicts again, there would not even be
Cyprus ... " PI, line 492-494, p.l o.
"Greece has always helped Cyprus, basically, from some political iss lies I have heard
of, Greece has said whatever you decide, we will be with you" P2, line 280-281, p.6.
History was also used to explain trust in the Turkish Cypriots by acknowledging, even
with some restraints, their victimisation as well in the Cyprus issue. In the following
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report, we suppose that the interviewee refers to the division of the island and the
conflict taking place when mentioning the "situation", the "condition" or the "case":
"Yes .... eh, they are somehow victims of the situation as well, of this condition, and 1
don't believe it would be such a huge problem ... " P13, line 140-142, p.3.
It should also be noted that history and politics was also used in order to express trust
in the Turkish Cypriots, in contrast to expressions of distrust in the Turkish people.
"Yes, yes, 1believe that with Turkish Cypriots, what I don 'I like is the presence of
Turkey, in the whole situation .... I don't have any problem with the Turkish Cypriots
let's say, 10 talk to them, to be their friend, nothing, I don't have any problem ... bUI it
is Turkey which is involved, this is what I don't like at all" P19, line 139-143, p.3.
The role of Turkey has been an important barrier to Greek Cypriot feelings of security
and trustful coexistence with Turkish Cypriots. In reference to voting for a Turkish
Cypriot President in a common state, the role the Turkish army has played in the
Cyprus issue was brought forward. They were believed to be almost represented
indirectly in Cyprus, through the Turkish Cypriot politicians, if they get into power.
Turkish Cypriots have always been supported and backed up by the Turkish army,
which creates insecurity and therefore distrust in them by the Greek Cypriots.
"1: Do you believe that the Turkish Cypriot president wouldn't do the best for the
country?
P: No, he would do the best, but behind him, there would be some generals of Turkey,
eh ... the Prime Minister, but behind him the generals, because behind the Prime
Minister ofTurkey are the generals" PI, line 397-401, p.
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3. Presence/absence of in-group favouritism and out-group bias
The third theme that emerged from the interview data was the explicit presence or
absence of in-group/out-group bias. This theme consisted of participants' phrases
which showed that participants thought either that Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots
would be unlbiased towards their in-group/out-group; for example, reports of racism
were expressions of out-group bias, while reports that showed neutrality or which
took a subjective stand on the questions, were expressions of lack of out-group bias.
As with the previous themes, they emerged only partly due to the relevant questions
asked to the interviewees.
Factors related to the presence of in-group/out-group bias
The existence of favouritism towards the ethnic in-group, against the out-group, was
related to inter-group emotions of hatred and disinterest, and was expressed through
the speculation of potential unfairness of Greek Cypriots towards Turkish Cypriots
and vice versa. The following quotes demonstrate this in reference to trust in the
common police and in Turkish Cypriot employers:
"I would not feel sale at all ...they would also feel some hatred towards us and they
might find something small to arrest us 01' just like that ... to give us a parking ticket
let's say, something simple ........ but these things they would do every day and it would
be difficult for us to live with them" P8, line i 3 7-142, p.3
HP: (fit is like on our side I believe no (that Turkish Cypriots will not befair)
I: Do you believe that a Greek Cypriot would not be fair 10 a Turkish Cypriot
employee?
P: Yes, I believe that his place would be in disadvantage, he would show him
something disadvantageous ... " Pi], line 234-237, p.5.
Reports expressing certainty concerning the existence of favouritism exist along with
less sweeping and absolute reports. However, even with reservations, people seem to
believe that the relationship between the two communities, even when they finally
agree to coexist, will not he harmonious, especially in reference to the police and the
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domain of work. Acts of unfairness due to favouritism are expected, eventually
leading to greater distrust amongst the two groups and a greater disruption of their
relationship. In terms of the agents of this unfairness, a differentiation was made again
between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish people:
HP: It depends, there are people who take advantage of others and others who don 'I;
there are Turkish Cypriot Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriot Turks ...
f: Do you believe that the Turkish Cypriot Turks will not be so positive, they wouldn't
be fair?
P: Eh, usually Turks.from what li'e know from history they are self-seekers, so .... no, I
don't know, they might not be like that, but from what we know he might not be so
fair" P 17, line 211-217, p.5.
This favouritism appears to be based on ethnic identity and the personality stereotypes
associated with it; Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people are expected
to be biased towards each other based on each other's ethnic identity. Belonging to
the same ethnic group is expected to trigger differential behaviour from the
professionals towards both the public and their employees. The importance of ethnic
identity has become obvious in this inter-communal relationship even when these
communities share the same institutions and services.
However, apart from the domains of work and national institutions, ethnic identity
was also the triggering force of out-group bias, in reference to intimate relationships
(either an affair or getting married) with a Turkish Cypriot or a Turkish person. In
terms of intimate relationships, the perceived main agent of out-group bias was the
family and the rest of the in-group community, who were perceived as exerting
pressure on the individual not to go through with such actions. The cause of this
pressure appeared to be ethnic differentiation and the perceptions associated with each
. .
ethnic group. Social memories appear so strong in reference to these specific out-
groups that going against them would be perceived as an act against one's own in-
group:
"P: Yes, for me personally I wouldn't have any problem, I think the society, the
family ...all these ....
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I: Would have objections?
P: Yes ...they would see him just as a Turkish Cypriot, they would think of the past,
they wouldn't see ...(she means the person himself) " PlO, line 179-182, 188-9, p.4.
"I wouldn't have any problem, but maybe thefamily, the relatives ....... they would see
it as a betrayal maybe" P12, line 98,100, p.3.
In terms of either forming a relationship or marrying a Turkish Cypriot/Turkish
person, participants anticipated a reaction from their parents and their environment
varying in intensity:
"P: -Eh, eh.eh ....
I: Ifyou said that he is a good guy and you love him?
P: My mother could die ...
I: Do you think they 'wouldbe negative?
P: Yes, there is no way ...even now the way things are (she means that if she finds
someone who is Greek Cypriot, they would be negative), imagine if he was Turkish
Cypriot" Pll, line 210-217, p.5.
"P: Eh, a biiiiiit (ironically)
I: They wouldn't want her? Whodo you think would have objections?
P: Well, everybody" P9, line 236-239, p.5.
Independently of the intensity, and one's personal opinion/feelings, the existence of
this social reaction and pressure appears to hinder and lead to the exclusion of any
possibility of forming an intimate relationship with a member of these specific out-
groups, for at least half of the participants. This additional barrier to harmonious inter-
communal relationships has been linked to the same issues of history and identity,
which have already become salient within the context of other expressions of group
bias.
However, bias was expressed not only in inter-people relationships but also in
international relationships. Participants considered different international institutions
to be biased against the Greek Cypriots, in favour of Turkey, concerning the Cyprus
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issue; with regard to both its causes and its resolution. In reference to trust in the
United Nations, Great Britain and the USA, it was reported:
"It is basically external reasons as well, like let's say that Great Britain and USA that
they seem to be on Turkey's side, or at least the way we see things ... the situation JJ
P14, line 97-99, p.3.
"The United Nations are supposed to be neutral, butfrom what we understood in the
referendum they were on Turkey's side ... JJ P 12, line 177-8, p.4.
This international bias was based, according to participants, on the interests and the
.particular goals these institutions were trying to achieve through the solution of the
Cyprus issue. Helping Cyprus was presented as not being in the immediate interests of
any international institution; Cyprus was once more the victim, but this time of
international favouritism towards Turkey:
"I believe that some countries have interest to be ok one with the other, with the
USA, with Turkey which is close to the Middle East ........ JJ P15, line 249-250, p.6.
"England, and Great Britain, we were their colony for so many years, they know very
well their interests, they wouldn't mind, I think that basically they must have helped
Turkey to come here because they must have had interests ... JJ P J 7, line 275-277, p.6.
Both at an international level and at an inter-communal level within Cyprus, hias
seems to hinder harmonious inter-group interaction and to cause more distrust
amongst the two conflicting sides.
Factors related to the absence of in-group/ out-group bias
In contradiction to the former claims of in-group favouritism within national
institutions in a future federal state, there were many reports which rejected this
possibility. One reason for the absence of in-group favouritism and out-group bias in
reference to national common institutions was that the officials, independently of their
ethnicity, would have to do their job, and therefore obey the objective rules and norms
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of their job. Trust in the out-group members was guaranteed through trust in the
official processes of national institutions. In reference to trust in the Turkish Cypriot
policemen (and if they would be fair towards both Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriots), it was reported:
"Yes, why? Because ... he would lose his job ifhe wasn't fair" P3.line 135-136. p.3
"Yes, again it depends what the other person believes, because any policeman.
whatever job he does, he will do his job ... " P5, line 199-201, p.5
Another factor related to this phenomenon was that bias is an individual
characteristic, an individual difference, which does not follow group processes. The
majority of participants reported at some point that both behaviour at a personal level
and at an official level depended on the particular individual character and beliefs of
each person. Independently of the existence of ethnic groups, these reports have
shown that bias was evaluated by many participants strictly on an individual base. In
reference to the common police and to the Turkish Cypriot judges, it was reported:
"It depends on the, generally for both ours and theirs (judges she means), it depends
on their character, how they feel. and how they are as a person ...! mean generally,
maybe, there are people who if they are not from your own country they might treat
you differently, there are also people who don 'I care about their relatives, or if they
are from the same place, it '.'I the same for them, they will treat them in the same
way ... " P6, line 239-245, p.5.
"Eh, maybe not (they will not be fair), eh, eh, eh .... I don't know, I just think judges
lookfor their own good
I: Their own good?
P: Yes, something thai is beneficialfor them
I: What could be beneficialfor the judge since it is for instance a plot of land which is
in question between you and a Turkish Cypriot?
P: Eh, the plot of land is not a problem. if the judge wants 10 follow the laws he will
do it, and I might get the plot of land. but ... if the judge wants to keep a good image
I: Yes
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P: He might give the plot of land to the Turkish Cypriot, to think that the Turkish
Cypriot is on our side and not on the others' side" P5, line 212-225, p.5.
Similarly, in reference to trust in the Turkish Cypriot employers, it was reported that it
depended on the character of the employer:
"P: It would cross my mind (that he might unfair) but it depend') on the person, I
cannot say ...
I: So, it depends on his personality?
P: yes" PlO, line 208-211, p.5.
"Again, it depend') on the person, some Greek Cypriot might also be, and it happens
not to be the same with all his employees ... " P14, line 205-6, p.5.
In reference to developing a personal relationship with a Turkish Cypriot it was.,
reported:
"I: Would you have Turkish Cypriot friends?
P: No if they weren't to my taste ... no ... " P3, line J 60- J, p.4.
"P: Yes, yes, why not
I: Do you think your parents would trust them to come to your place, and you to go
their own?
P: Yes, of course, they would get to know them ... eh ... it is good to show the
relationship between the two people" P4, line 142-6, p.3-4.
A third factor, which would again "put to the test" the role of ethnic differentiation in
trust towards the out-group, was honesty of the motives of the out-group members.
This theme emerged in reference to voting for a Turkish Cypriot Member of the
Parliament. Young Greek Cypriots appeared ready to trust and be represented by
Turkish Cypriot politicians as long as their motives in their electoral programme and
in their personal beliefs were honest in terms of promising actions that could truly
benefit the Greek Cypriots as well. This attitude towards trust and towards the out-
group comes in contrast to participants' more radical views on the inter-group
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intimate relationships, setting public-domain relationships more accessible in a federal
state than intimate ones:
"Eh, if he cared for the good of the country, yes (I would vote for him), because now
we don't have many politicians who are good at what they are doing" P12, line 133-
4,p.3.
"Eh, if 1know, let's say, that he is good as a person, as a politician, that you can trust
him, eh ...different things, let's say, that 1 know for sure for some of the Cypriot
politicians as well ...why not" P17, line 239-241, p.5.
"Ifof course 1see that he can represent me correctly, yes ... " P18, line 190,p.4.
This theme, of motives, was related to both the presence and the absence of in-group
bias, as was also the effect of time on people's behaviour. In reference to the presence
of out-group bias, it was reported:
"....I don 't know, it depends on each person ....the way they are, 1 think they are going
to the other extreme, they would have the Greek Cypriot at a hetter position to show
that they don't look down on them ... " P15, line 15, line 171-3, p.4.
Turkish Cypriots were suspected to even show favouritism towards the Greek
Cypriots and not their in-group, in order to show that they are not biased towards their
in-group. The importance of the motives of people became salient as participants were
trying to decode and uncover the out-group's motives:
"Eh, yes 1 think so, hut ...1 think that he will do these things to me (showfairness) just
to show that ....1 am equal to Turkish Cypriots, would he do that because he is good
towards me or because he wants to show that he treats me equally, do you
understand?" P8, line 209-211, p.5.
Concerning the effect of time, it was reported that while people might be biased
towards their in-group in the beginning, as time passed they would start treating both
groups in the same way:
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"In the beginning not that much, I would have doubts ifthey ...would be objective, if
they would be ok (means fair) with the Greek Cypriots, but I think that as time passes
they will show that things are ok" PlO, line 129-131, p.3.
"P: I don't think so ...
J: You don't think so, you mean that there will not be any fairness?
P: No
I: Ok, you don't trust them that they could judge a situation in an objective way
P: Yes, yes, especially in the beginning
I: Do you believe that later on people would get used to it?
P: Yes, I think so, I believe yes" P16, line 163-170, p.4.
Participants appear to be split in two in what they believe about the existence of bias.
Ethnic identity, history and interests seem to be the crucial factors which stand in the
way of a fair and equal relationship, while the existence of laws, individual
differences and time were the factors that offered the Greek Cypriots the reassurances
they needed for Turkish Cypriot unbiased behaviour, leading to the belief in their
trustworthiness.
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4. Familiarity/proximity
Another theme that also emerged from the data and was also closely related to the
previous themes was the concept of familiarity/proximity. This theme consisted of
participants' reports that expressed different levels of knowledge about another group,
or institution, or about the Cyprus issue; also, reports that expressed a rejection of the
other people in terms of unification and finally reports which showed participants'
perception of the geographical/spatial distance between the two peoples. These
themes, similarly to the previous ones, re-emerged in almost all parts of the interview.
Lack of knowledge
Referring to different national and international institutions, knowledge of the "other"
and the exact events that took place appeared to be an important factor affecting
people's level of trust. In reference first to national institutions (consisting of both
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots), participants reported that the fact they did not
know the Turkish Cypriots affected their trust level in them. The lack of knowledge
appeared to affect people's trust in a negative way while increased personal
knowledge was able to change their trust level. This theme emerged in reference to
different national institutions, such as the police, the elections and studying in
universities in north Cyprus.
Two of the reasons for this lack of knowledge were lack of personal contact and
biased information transmitted either officially (through school) or unofficially
through word of mouth:
"I: ...how would youfeel if there were both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in
the police? Would you/eel a sense of security?
P: Let me tell you, in the beginning ... to tell the truth, {think we would allfeel a sense
of insecurity, because we don 't have, we never had contact 'with those people and we
never had any relationship, and we have also heard a lot of things, negative ones,
since we 'H/erechildren because (if this problem, and they have told us other things,
but { think that little, by ltttle, if we try this thing and we see little by little, it may
happen, but I don't believe it's em)' ... "PJ3, line 117-122,17.3.
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"I: ...How would you feel security with the police? if you knew the olice empoloy
Turkish Cypriots, how would you feel?
P: Hmm, not secure at all, because 1don '( know them, to trust them ....... " P8, line
137,p.3.
"I: OK, now, if once you finish high school you learn abo lit a velY good university in
north Cyprus, which offers what you want to do, in your field, imagine that it is a
common state, would you go to study in north Cyprus?
P: If1got to check that it was recognised ... this and that ....
/: Yes, everything
P: 1really don't know, !f I could live that life
1: Yes
P: I don " know if1could
1: Why couldn't you? Because you have something negative in your mind or because
you don't know?
P: Because I don 't know, because I don " know anything .... because 1have some idea,
for some things that I am not sure abo lit, they don', teach us anything .... " P11, line
218-230, p.5.
Lack of knowledge was also reported in reference to the agents of responsibility for
the Cyprus issue:
"It's somebody '.'I fault bUI I don't know who .... nobody knows who .... " P6, line 88,
p.2.
In response to the same question, participant 11 tried to avoid answering the question
and after saying that she doesn't know, continued talking about something different:
"P: 1believe that apartfrom whosefault if is, let 's say ...
1: Whose fault do you think it isfor what happened?
P: I don't know ... I don't know .... whose fault it is, but I believe that the apathy
that .... " P11, line 79-81, p.2.
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It becomes apparent from all of these extracts that people recognise either that they
need to have more information about the other people beyond what they have learnt
from older generations, or that they need to know more information in general, in
order to be able to express an opinion, an evaluation of the other group/party.
Obviously, and, as it has been expressed by some participants, school education does
not provide them with enough information/knowledge about the other party, the
Turkish Cypriots. This perceived insufficient knowledge, at different levels, is a
barrier to people forming an attitude and therefore to having a mature relationship
with the other party within a mixed society.
Lack of knowledge, however, also emerged in reference to trust in international
institutions. There were participants, who reported distrust in the international
institutions because of the lack of familiarity/proximity of these institutions with the
Cyprus issue or the Cypriot people. Trust in the EU, the UN as well as in Greece,
Great Britain and the USA appeared to be affected by this factor. Participants could
not trust institutions and countries which had only little knowledge of what had
happened because it meant they could not understand the full extent of Greek Cypriot
emotions and beliefs. Participants appeared unable to consider the fact that someone
could disagree with their beliefs even when knowing exactly what had happened and
what they had been through:
"They (the European Union. Greece. Turkey. USA) lake their own decisions without
having been there when they were killing the Greek Cypriots in 1974. when they came
in and started killing. they have just heard some things, and because the Greeks do
not know this stuff, ....you weren't there when they were killing our children, eh ... "
Pl, line 482-488, p.10.
"Let's say, the General Secretary Annan does not live here, he does not know, he
cannot find a solution, we have tofind a solution. the Greek Cypriots ...with the Turks
and the Greeks" P3, line 109-111, p.3.
Despite the perceived international institutions' lack of exact knowledge of the
Cyprus issue, the same participants nevertheless recognised a crucial positive role for
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these institutions in the Cyprus issue and a common history with Cyprus, in some
cases, which could justify their current alliance:
H •••••• ~fit wasn 't for the UN there wouldn't have been this Green Line to divide us,
there would have been many conflicts again, there would 110teven be Cyprus ... " PI,
line 492-494, p.10.
HI: What role do you think all those that have been involved should play? The States,
England, Greece ...Do you think they should play some role or not?
P: Eh, eh, eh I believe they should help Cyprus, and especially Greece, because we
are supposed to be Greek Cypriots, and since we were supposed 10 become one stale
with Greece ....
I: And what about England, Great Britain?
P: England, and Great Britain, we were their colony for so many years " P 17,
line 268-275, p.6
Alienation with the northern part of Cyprus
Concerning contact between the people at grassroots level, willingness to move to
north Cyprus constitutes one of the main elements in the evaluation of Greek Cypriot
and Turkish Cypriot future coexistence, since it is essential in breaking the spatial
isolation of each community, since the establishment of the Green Line. In the
question as to whether they would move to north Cyprus, there were eight participants
who reported that they would not want to move to that part of the island because they
have already bonded with the place where they live currently. This bond with the
place where one has been born and grown up appears to affect one's decision where
to live permanently, and therefore discourages young people from moving to the part
of their island they have never even visited. However, some reports express a more
absolute opinion than others:
"I: Would you move to north Cyprus?
P: Never
I: Never, why?
P: Eh, my life is in this part of the island" PS, line 90-92, p.2.
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"Yes, yes, but again we want some time to get used to it, / mean as I have been
growing up I've known Cyprus, Nicosia in particular ...we don't have any relationship
with the other part ... " P /4, line /61-3, p.4.
Despite, however, the vast number of reports which showed this perception of
division, of spatial/geographical distance between the two communities, in reference
to the Muslim religion, two participants reported geographical proximity/familiarity
between the two peoples, to explain why they would not mind living with Turkish
Cypriots:
"No, l wouldn't mind (about the Muslim religion} .... anyway it's not farfrom here ... "
P4, line 130, p.3.
"P: Maybe yes (/ would mind about the Muslim religion), but everywhere you go, in
any place of the world, Imean now, If/go to live, in any area ...
I: Of England?
P: Of England, I might see the same thing (referring 10 All/slim people)" P17, line
129-132, p.3.
Rejection of the other
In reference to the results of the 2004 referendum on the Annan plan, it appeared that.
for some participants. Turkish Cypriot acceptance of the plan was the expression of a
willingness to be united with the Greek Cypriots, while for the Greek Cypriots this
willingness did not exist. The results were evaluated on a purely inter-group
relationship at a grassroots level.
"The Turkish Cypriots I think wanted to live with us, to be united. to take away the
borders and 10 be united with the Greek Cypriots; for the Greek Cypriots it was the
opposite" P2, line 74-76, p.2.
"They just did not want the unification to tell us .... to become one, while the Turkish
Cypriots wanted the unification" P11, line 57-8, 1'.2.
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One of the reasons given for the rejection of the unification with the Turkish Cypriots
was Turkish Cypriot perceived lack of trust in Greek Cypriots, based on the plan
supported by the Turkish Cypriots.
" ... and also we did not feel ve,y close to the Turkish Cypriots, and the fact that they
would give us later Famagusta and other places it shows that they don 't trust us, why
should we trust them?" P19, line 71-3, p.2.
"The majority of the Greek Cypriots did not want to be united with the Turkish
Cypriots for many reasons ... " P20, line 50-I, p.2.
While in all of these extracts, Greek Cypriots have appeared to reject the Turkish
Cypriots in reference to finding a solution to the Cyprus issue, some participants
found the two communities' interest in the country to be a factor which brings them
together. On the base of their common interest for the country, they appeared to trust
the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish people more, in comparison to the foreign
insti tutions:
"The others (referring to Great Britain and the UC;;A),I don't think they care, it's
Turkey and Cyprus, the others should be all out, let '.'I say, and Greece, if it can help,
because we are supposed to be together, bill Great Britain and USA ... (means no), the
United Nations and the European Union ok they could help ...Great Britain and USA
are a hit .... J don 'tfind it right them helping" PI 7, line 293-298, p.6-7.
"P: No-one, the Cypriots and the Turks only (should find a solution to the Cyprus
issue)
I: Why?
P: Eh ...we have to solve these things, and Annan and the Annan plans, eh, these are,
idiocies, why would they care what we do? They just want to control ... " P5, line 264-
269, p.6.
Even though Greek Cypriots appeared not to want to live with the Turkish
Cypriots/Turkish people for different reasons (lack of knowledge, geographical
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alienation with north Cyprus, unwillingness to be united with them), common genuine
interest in the country and finding a solution to the Cyprus issue appeared to bring the
two peoples closer. This element of proximity should be further examined and taken
into consideration in the development of inter-group trust in conflicts, especially in
cases where the two groups Jive within the same territory.
5. Identity
The fifth theme that emerged from the data in reference to inter-group trust was
national and ethnic identification. There were no questions about identity issues
during the interview, even though ethnic differentiation between the two communities
was used to make salient the two groups. This theme emerged, in participants'
answers, in reference to their relationship with Turkish Cypriot people, and in
reference to trust in international and national institutions.
Cypriot identity
Turkish Cypriots were sometimes considered members of a super-ordinate Cypriot
identity and at other times they were excluded from it. In the former cases, trust in the
Turkish Cypriots was based on their common identity and victimisation in the Cyprus
issue, as well as on individual differences:
"Yes, let me tell you, they are also Cypriots ... , I don't believe it's theirfault to what
happened, maybe it's more our fault ...eh, they are also victims of the situation, and I
don 't think that the problem would be that huge, but we would all be cautious" PI 3,
line 139-142, p.3.
"No, no (there would not be any favouritism by the Turkish Cypriot policeman
towards a Turkish Cypriot citizen against a Greek Cypriot one) it depends on their
character, because they are both Cypriots" P7, line lID-I, p.3.
On the other hand, Turkish Cypriot exclusion from the Cypriot identity was used to
explain distrust in them and the institutions which would involve them as well. In
these cases, only Greek Cypriots were to be trusted since they were the only ones
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considered to be Cypriots. However, trust was based on the relationship of
identification with its accompanying emotions, attitudes and behaviours. Belonging to
a group is related to certain emotions, attitudes, and behaviours; only those who
belong to a group "care" about the group and what the group represents and are ready
to protect it; therefore, all those considered as "out of the group" are not expected
either to feel or think like members of the in-group:
"I: Would you feel your country is secure knowing that there are Turkish Cypriots in
the Cypriot army?
P: Of course not ...whatever country attacked Cyprus, / believe the Turkish Cypriots
would not help ... or some of them might help ... the others would avoid it
J: Why do you believe this?
P: They wouldn't care about Cyprus because they are not Cypriots to feel for it .... "
P8, line 227-236, p.5.
"Motherland" identities
The use of "motherland", the Greek and Turkish identities, emerged in reference to
trust in international agents, such as Greece and Turkey. Greeks and Greek Cypriots
were considered, in these extracts, to share the Greek identity, Turkish Cypriots and
Turkish people the Turkish identity. In the resolution of the Cyprus issue, the
involvement of Greece and Turkey was suggested based on the fact that these two
countries offer the two respective ethnic identities to the peoples in conflict, which
therefore gives them the right, the power and almost the obligation to be involved and
have their say. In-group membership came with certain rights and obligations for the
adherents.
"1: What role do you think all of the international instiuaions, which have been
involved, should play? The Stales, England, Greece ...Do you think they should play
some role or not?
P: Eh. I believe that they should help Cyprus, and most of all Greece, let's say, since
we are supposed to be Greek Cypriots. and "ve were almost about to become one state
with Greece" P17, line 271-3.17.6.
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"Ok, both Greece and Turkey should playa role ...since ...basically we are Greeks
and they are Turks.... " P14, line 306-7, p.7.
The salience of Greek Cypriot Greek identity was also reinforced by the rejection of
Turkish Cypriot Turkish identity. This was made salient in reference to creating an
intimate relationship with Turkish Cypriots. Marriage, which is considered to be a
union between people, was rejected based on the rejection of the Turkish ethnic
identity of the other community. It becomes therefore apparent that the Turkish
element of Turkish Cypriot identity is a barrier for Greek Cypriots living with the
Turkish Cypriots:
"I: If you fell in love with a Turkish Cypriot or a Turk, what do you think of that?
How do you think you and your family would react?
P: ...with a Turkish guy it is out of the question, ...with a Turkish Cypriot it's
possible ... yes, but the thing is that I wouldn't like to be Turkish" P19, line 187- 197,
p.4-5.
Further to the use of thematic analysis to explore the factors which emerged in
relation to the different identities, participants' frequency of use of the Greek Cypriot,
the Turkish Cypriot, the Greek, the Turkish and the Cypriot identity (despite the
interviewer's constant reference to Greek Cypriots as Greek Cypriots and to Turkish
Cypriots as Turkish Cypriots) was calculated. More specifically, the number of times
participants referred to Turkish Cypriots as Turks, as Turkish Cypriots and as
Cypriots, and the times they referred to Greek Cypriots as Greeks, Greek Cypriots and
Cypriots was calculated. It was found that 40% of participants did not refer to Turkish
Cypriots as Turks at all, 30% referred to them as Turks just once or twice and only
30% referred to them as Turks three times and more. It was also found that 70% of
the participants did not refer to them as Cypriots, 20% referred to them once as
Cypriots and only 10% referred to them two and three times as Cypriots. Turkish
Cypriots were mainly reported as Turkish Cypriots. Only 10% did not refer to them as
Turkish Cypriots at all. These results show that along with an indirect encouragement
to recognise both the Cypriot and the Turkish identity of Turkish Cypriots,
participants either having already an opinion on this out-group's identity or being
influenced by the interviewer's speech, they recognised first the Turkish Cypriot
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identity. then their Turkish identity and last their Cypriot identity. This image they
have of who belongs to this group is very interesting in terms of what should be
expected in their interaction with it.
Concerning how many times participants referred to Greek Cypriots as Greeks, Greek
Cypriots or Cypriots. it was found that 65% of participants did not refer to Greek
Cypriots as Greeks at all and only 35% of them referred to them as Greeks once or up
to seven times. It was also found that participants referred to Greek Cypriots mainly
as Greek Cypriots and then as Cypriots. These results also show the endorsement of a
combined Greek and Cypriot identity of Greek Cypriots. which however could be
characterised as influenced by the interviewer's speech.
Table 7.1: Number of times each identity was used for each group
Number of participants Total N=20
Turkish Cypriots as Greek Cypriots as
Number of times
mentioned
None
1
2
3
.4
5
6
7
8
9
10
II
12
20
Turkish Turks Cypriots Greek Greeks Cypriots
Cypriots Cypriots
2 8 14 2 13 6
2 5 4 3 5 3
2 I I 3 0 4
2 2 1 2 0 3
2 2 301
2 I 3 0 I
1 0 202
1 1 0 2
3 Io I
o
I
1
Finally, participants' positioning within or outside their in-group was quantified; the
number of times participants gave a response to our questions using "we" as
representing all Greek Cypriots as a group, and the number of times as not heing a
memher of this group, referring to Greek Cypriots as "they". were calculated. The
range of times participants used "we" varied from one to 13 times. It was found that
70% of participants used "we" more than five times while the majority of participants
used it six or seven times. Concerning the subjects that were discussed, half of
participants seemed to have answered using "we" and half of them speaking
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individually, using "J". Nevertheless, the subjects to which most participants referred
to using "we" instead of "1", were the referendum, the solution to the Cyprus issue,
the relationship with the EU and the UN, the equal distribution of resources across
Cyprus and when comparing themselves with the Turkish Cypriots.
On the other hand, participants referred to Greek Cypriots as an out-group (using
"they") less often then they referred to it as an in-group. The range of the times
extended from nought to six times. It was found that the majority of the participants
used "they" between three and six times. The main issues in reference to which they
referred to Greek Cypriots as an out-group were some characteristics of Greek
Cypriots, such as racism and arrogance, the referendum and the solution of the Cyprus
issue, as well as the characteristics of Greek Cypriot politicians. These results show
the importance not only of identity in the Cyprus issue, but also that the choice of
belonging to a group is conscious; participants appeared to distance themselves from
their national/ethnic in-group when referring to its negative attributes or decisions
they did not agree with.
European identity
The European super-ordinate identity/membership emerged in reference to
international institutions; trust in the EU, in Greece, in Turkey and in USA. Trust in
these institutions seemed to be related to the European membership of some of the
countries which determines their right to be involved in the Cyprus issue.
"I think that now that Turkey will be in, / believe that Europe will find a solution for
us" P3, line 260, p.6.
"Maybe it is good that they get involved (the EU and the UN) .... on this issue, because
now that ~I'eare in Europe, the issue of Turkey is discussed a lot ... " P 13, line 231-2,
p.5.
" .... now that we are in the EU / want to believe that we are all equal, let '.'I say, in the
EU, and they will help us if we have any problems" line 314-5, p.7;
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The EU is expected to offer equality amongst its country members and most of all to
be responsive to its members' problems. Therefore, as Cyprus is already a member of
it, Greek Cypriots expect that this membership will benefit them with the interest and
support of the EU they need in resolving the Cyprus issue. This membership appears
in their eyes to be so powerful and therefore so valuable that it could even mediate
their relationship with Turkey, either via the power of the EU over Turkey, or via the
fact that Turkey wants to become a member as well, and would therefore be willing to
compromise.
However, even though the European identity/membership was considered to be so
powerful, it did not seem to count in the evaluation of some countries/members'
involvement in the Cyprus issue, such as Britain.
"Ok, the fact that Britain is in the EU, ok, it plays a certain role, but I don 't think it
has anything to do with us" Pi9, line 332-3, p.7.
On the other hand, concerning the involvement of the USA, its non-membership in
the EU deprived it of the right to be involved in the resolution of the Cyprus issue:
"No, because USA is not in Europe I think they should not be involved, they should
not discuss about these things .... " P2, line 284-5, p.6.
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'Apart from these six themes that were common to trust in institutions and people,
there were three themes that emerged only in reference to institutions. These were the
processes, general distrust and power.
6. Processes (Procedural trust)
In reference to common national institutions, some of the participants who expressed
trust in them based their trust on the operational processes of these institutions (i.e. the
training of their employees). Participants evaluated the institutions based on the work
and the processes followed by the institutions, and not on the identity or the personal
or group characteristics of their representatives. Here are some examples concerning
the Turkish Cypriot policemen:
"yes .... any policeman, whatever job he does, he will do hisjob" P5, line 199-201, p.5
"I believe yes (I "would trust the Turkish Cypriot policemen), because in order to be a
policeman they went through a certain education, like the Greek Cypriots did ... " P 16,
line 108-109,1'.3.
Concerning the Turkish Cypriot judges:
"No, (he would not show favouritism), because you don 'I ... Iet 's say when YOll have 10
divide something, for instance a plot of land, YOIl have papers and only these papers
matter ... " P2, line 212-212, p.5.
Concerning the Turkish Cypriot politicians, participants expressed trust in them, on
the condition they represented them well, and the country's interests as a whole,
independently of ethnic/national identities. Politicians would be evaluated based on
their political programme:
"No, tt depends on what he believes and what he supports, ifI don't like what he
supports and I support a Greek Cypriot in the end, this doesn't mean that I don 'I like
him, just his politics" part 19, line 257-259, p.6.
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"Yes, I would vote/or him ... if he was the best ... " P20, line 173, p.4.
However, sometimes, trust was still expressed, even though the processes were
considered unable to produce fairness. In reference to international institutions, trust
was reported in the processes of the UN concerning the Cyprus issue, despite the
belief of the existence of bias. The nature of the processes could not allow for fairness
and objectivity.
HP: I believe that yes (they can be trusted), but they will never befair
I: Why do you believe that?
P: Because they try to help both sides and both sides want different things, so they
can't ... " P16, line 239-242, p.5.
7. General distrust
Another theme that emerged from the data was general distrust. When
participants were asked if they would trust certain national institutions consisting of
Turkish Cypriots, they justified their distrust with a more general attitude of distrust
towards these institutions per se, independently of Turkish Cypriots' participation.
In reference to trust in Greek Cypriot politicians, distrust was presented as a personal
characteristic only in one report:
up: Generally, I don't trust ...
I: Why is that? For what reason?
P: Because, as a person I don 't easily trust the others, the politicians to represent me,
I prefer to represent myself, somehow, because somewhere, something will happen
and I won't have the desirable results" P 18, line 221-3, p.S.
In the rest of the extracts, general distrust emerged as the result of lack of fair
operating or corruption. Ethnic/national identity seemed to be completely over-
shadowed by this general distrust towards each institution as a whole:
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"P: ...because neither f like ours (politicians) nor f prefer someone, f know (hal no-
one is going to befair, the way they are, so f don 't know ...
f: OK, so no matter if they were Greek Cypriots or Turkish Cypriots, you wouldn't
trust them?
P: (she interrupts me) Yes, yes, I wouldn't trust them" P11, line 272-274,277-78, p.6.
"P: (Jwould give) an invalid ballot
f: You wouldn't votefor a Greek Cypriot either?
P: No
f: Why?Don't you trust the politicians?
P: ...they are all crooks
I: What do you believe they do then?
P: Eh, apart from stealingfrom the people?" P9, line 299-307, p. 7.
General distrust was also expressed in reference to common police:
"No, because I don't trust them now either ... "part 12, line 71, p.2.
Institutional trust, especially in the last quotes, does not appear to be influenced by the
inclusion of more people/employees (and more ethnically diverse people) in the
institutions. It appears that people have developed this general distrust towards
specific institutions due to their disappointment with the way these institutions
operate, and which has led to their loss of hope for a change in the future. It is general
distrust associated with hopelessness and resignation.
8. Power
Another theme that emerged was power. Power emerged especially in relation to
international institutions. Participants based their trust in certain international
institutions, such as the EU and the UN, and countries, such as the US, to find a
mutually acceptable solution to the Cyprus issue because of their superior power, as it
was perceived, in comparison to that of Cyprus and Turkey. These institutions were
perceived as having the power to act as a third party, which will not be susceptible to
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the influence of the two adversaries and their individual interests, and will help find a
solution which is beneficial to both parties:
"I think that lip to a certain point they should (playa role in the resolution oj the
Cyprus issue), because I don't think we can find a solution on our own, we are both,
both sides are vely .....each one insists on what they want, so we have to find some
kind of. ...another country, another power to help, but I don't think it's right to rely
upon these countries completely, on the big powers like the USA...... " PI 3, line 222-
226, p.5.
"Yes (the EU and the UN should playa role in the resolution of the Cyprus issue)
certainly, because on our own 'we wouldn't be able to find any solution, I think we
cannot find any solution on our OH'n,because the differences are too big and we need
the .... " PlO, line 265-7, p.6.
However, at some points, the EV's power, in particular, was perceived as not
supportive of both groups' interests but only of the Greek Cypriot position and
demands in the Cyprus conflict. Participants believed that their integration in the EV
would ally the power of the EU with them in their conflict against the Turkish
Cypriots:
"The EU will expand and there will be much security, that's why I don't think this
thing (to have Turkish Cypriots in the army) can happen" PI, line 362-3, p.S.
"No, the fact that we are in the EU it means that our speech is supported by the
EU..... "part 1, line 491-2, p. I ()
In all power evaluations, Cyprus has been considered by participants to be a
powerless country at an international level. Due to its small population and its limited
influence on other countries/institutions, it is presented as not being able to take
important decisions concerning its own future, leading to its inevitable request for
help from other, more powerful international players:
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" who could take into consideration a small with 600,000 inhabitants and we
think we are somebody (important), while we are 600,000... how? ...we are just a
"mark" on the map and we think we could gain some rights and some worth, but we
say that in the EU we are all equal, some ....while ·wearen't, since we are afraid of
using a veto, because the others will come and say, you know you have used a veto so
this and this will happen ...since we are afraid of Turkey, lets say ..... " PI, line 90-96,
p.2.
"Eh, yes, because we are a small country and we cannot have any power over
Europe ... " P9, line 392-3, p.8.
This powerlessness of Cyprus, both internationally and in its relationship with the
Turkish Cypriots and Turkey, reinforces the perceived self-victimisation of Greek
Cypriots in the Cyprus conflict, which has been identified in previous themes of this
study.
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7.4 Discussion
The present study first explored how young people perceive different elements of the
Cyprus issue and Turkish Cypriot involvement in Cypriot society both at a public and
at a personal level. Second, it explored the role of emotions in trust and contlict
resolution, and, third, the factors which affect the emergence of inter-group social and
political trust/distrust.
7.4.1 What are young people's perceptions of the Cyprus issue and Turkish Cypriot
integration into Cypriot society?
It was considered important, before the exploration of the role of emotions and trust,
to describe young people's (participants') perceptions of certain elements of the
Cyprus issue, which have been identified by the literature as important in
understanding conflict resolution (Larson, 1997). These elements were the
responsibility for the conflict, the preferred solutions, the agents of potential solutions,
and the recent historical events in reference to the resolution of the conflict.
The results revealed that young people have become disentangled, to a certain degree,
from the unilateral attribution of responsibility, which dominates in protracted
conflicts (Hadjipavlou, 2007), and have moved to a joint responsibility, accepting,
even if limited, a share of the blame. Concerning the preferred solutions, the results
revealed a potential deep intra-Greek Cypriot divide between those who want to
compromise and those who want to return to the situation of Cyprus before 1974. The
popularity of the latter solution/position could potentially also explain, first, why a
large proportion of the Cypriot people feels it is neither heard nor understood by the
UN (Eurobarometers 2004, 2006) (since such a solution was at no time plausible
either for the UN or the Turkish Cypriots/Turkish people), and, second, why the
Annan plan was rejected in the 2004 referendum. Concerning the agents of a solution,
the results revealed a change in the way younger generations view the conflict as they
rejected traditional agents, such as the UN, Great Britain, Greece, Turkey and the
USA, giving their "vote of confidence" to new, untried agents, such as the Cypriot
people themselves and the EU. It is very interesting that young Greek Cypriots hold
both Cypriot communities responsible for the conflict, both in terms of the causes and
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the solution. They believe that a solution will come from the people of Cyprus tor the
people of Cyprus; this could show, on the one hand, Greek Cypriot disappointment
with the results of the involvement of other agents in the last 30 years of negotiations,
and, on the other hand, it could emphasise the necessity of a solution which will
satisfy only the two peoples living on the island, and not the strategic and politico-
economic interests of other agents, presenting themselves as "well-wishers".
In terms of participants' attitudes towards Turkish Cypriot integration into Cypriot
society, both at a public and at a personal level, participants appeared more positive
towards the former. The institutions which had a tighter internal structure, such as the
police and the army, received the highest number of positive opinions, even though
participants thought they were corrupt. This could he due probably to their belief that
the existence of a strong intra-institutional structure would not allow lor any
significant change (either positive or negative) when Turkish Cypriots are part of
them. On the other hand, institutions which had a less strict structure were not
perceived as positively. The reason could be that these institutions gave more power
to the individual, which could render Turkish Cypriots more powerful within these
institutions, and therefore more influential. These assumptions, however, emphasise
the importance of procedural trust (Citrin & Muste ,1999), showing that the more
citizens trust the processes by which institutions operate, the easier it is going to be
for them to accept the integration of new people (of any ethnic background) within
these institutions.
In terms of personal relationships, moving to northern Cyprus and inter-marriage were
seen most negatively by participants mainly due to certain perceived unappealing
characteristics of Turkish Cypriots, such as the Turkish element of their identity, lack
of common past and future in northern Cyprus and due to social pressure. It appears
that it would be easier to start relationships with Turkish Cypriots at a professional
(either dealing with them at different public services, or working with them, or renting
them one's property) and friendly level and then move to more personal levels. Young
Greek Cypriots do not appear willing (or able) to cope with the commitment and
inter-identity closeness involved in personal relationships with members of the
"enemy" out-group.
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7.4.2 How are emotions implicated in a. processes of conflict resolution and h.
judgments of trust?
The results showed that emotions have two functions which act as barriers to
reconciliation between the two peoples: a. they affect perceptions on the causes, the
progress and the solution of the Cyprus issue, b. they explain inter-group trust at a
public and at a personal level.
Based on Inter-group Emotions Theory (lET, see chapter 3), the emotions that
participants have expressed should be characterised as group emotions because, even
though reported on a personal level, they were "rooted in evaluatively laden
interactions between and among groups" (Mackie et aI, 2004, p.241) "which were not
personally impactful" (Mackie et aI, 2004, p.240). However: from the present study, a
distinction between personal/group emotions and the perceived emotions of the in-
group and the out-group also emerged. Participants appeared to refer to their own
emotions and to the emotions of their in-group differentially. Sometimes the emotions
of the in-group were revelatory of one's personal emotions and at other times they
were used in contrast with one's personal emotions (Iyer & Leach, 2008).
Anger, sadness, frustration, and, finally, emotional apathy were the emotions that
emerged in reference to perceptions about the Cyprus issue. Retzinger and Scheff
(2006) have suggested that behind "anger" and "hate", hides "hurt", and a dominant
component of hurt is "shame". Suppressed shame, humiliation tor a defeat or for
one's inadequacy in a certain situation is hidden behind anger and impedes conflict
resolution by blocking the possibility of repair of damaged bonds. However, the
present study offered no evidence in support of this theory. All of the emotions were
presented as being rooted in the events which caused the Cyprus issue (the 1974
Turkish invasion) (Weiner, Graham & Chandler, 1982) and the events which followed
(Bizman & Hoffman, 1993), which did not raise feelings of "shame" in participants.
Concerning the causes, because participants were not present at any of the events
before 1990, it was only their perception of these events which could lead them to
these emotional appraisals. The perceived "irrationality" of the invasion and the
occupation of the northern part of Cyprus based on the perception that this land "did
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not belong" to Turkish Cypriots was what caused anger and sadness. In reference now
to the consequences of the invasion, participants' perceptions still depended on story
telling and documentaries but their emotions were rooted also in their personal
experiences. On the one hand, visiting northern Cyprus and seeing the condition of
the abandoned houses as well as living through the pain of their parents when they
visited their land of origins arid, on the other hand, living for 15 years through the
ineffectiveness of national and international institutions to find a solution to the
Cyprus issue made them direct witnesses of the consequences of the conflict.
In these perceptions, it is important to highlight the link between emotions and
attribution of the conflict (which also determines who the "victim" is in a conflict),
because depending on the locus of agency, the emotions are expected to change
(Bizman & Hoffman, 1993). However, in the present study, even though the majority
of participants attributed responsibility for the contlict to both communities (accepting
a share of the blame for their in-group), they did not express any shame or guilt, as
previous research on the Israeli conflict has shown (Bizman & Hoffman, 1993;
Retzinger & Scheff, 2006)). Anger was still the dominant emotion. Existing literature
argues that the stability of causes (whether the causes of the conflict are considered to
be temporary or enduring) is a factor that mediates these relationships; the more
unstable causes are perceived, the stronger the anger expressed, (Weiner et al., 1982)
and the more hostile the preferred solutions (Bizman & Hoffman, 1993). The present
study did not measure the perceptions of stability but since the conflict has not been
resolved for 35 years, the causes must be considered by participants as stahle. If this is
true, then the results of the present study did not offer evidence to confirm either the
theory of Weiner et al. (1982) or of Bizman and Hoffman (1993). While the
participants considered the causes to be stable they did not show guilt hut anger, and
in their majority they chose a compromising solution. However, because these results
are only dependent on a very small sample and no statistical analysis was made, they
could not be considered as statistically valid. Further statistical analysis would have to
be conducted in a quantitative study with a bigger sample in order to reach a valid
conclusion.
Apart from their relationship with the perceptions of the Cyprus issue, emotions also
appeared to justify distrust in Turkish Cypriots at a public level (in the context of
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common national institutions). Fear, hate and emotional apathy were the emotions
which emerged. Both fear and hate are emotions which are supposed to emerge after a
former "symbiosis" of the two agents (Ahmed, 2004); however, in the case of young
Greek Cypriots this has only happened indirectly. Most of participants never had any
contact with Turkish Cypriots or Turkish people. The symbiosis had only been
experienced by their parents and their grand-parents, who transmitted to them these
emotions through story telling and through official means such as school books
(Hadjipavlou, 2002). Nevertheless, because both of these emotions share the
characteristic to "project us from the present into a future" (Ahmed, 2004, p.65), their
effect appeared to be maintained and be used to explain young people's distrust in an
"enemy" out-group with which they never had direct contact.
It is necessary however, in order to understand these emotions, to look in depth at
their perceived sources. The results showed that the sources of each emotion were
different as well as the subject of the emotions (those who feel these emotions).
Existential fear was based on the hostile history of the relationship between the two
communities, while fear of biased behaviour was more based on the difference of
identity of Turkish Cypriots, which could lead to biased behaviour. In both cases,
participants were mainly talking about these emotions and their causes in personal
terms; however, some of them contrasted their personal emotions towards Turkish
Cypriots to those of their in-group, in order to make salient their own more positive
attitude. In both cases, the in-group was presented as more fearful than the individual,
who was also scared, but to a lesser degree.
Hate, on the other hand, was presented only as an emotion felt by groups of people
(Greeks/Turks, lis/them, older people/Turkish Cypriot people) and not individuals. On
the one hand, this could be related to existing theories (Ahmed, 2004) which ascribe
hate a group role, as people can hate only groups of people, directly or indirectly (as
individuals could be hated only because they are members of a certain group), and, on
the other hand, to the low social desirability related with this emotion. It could be that
young people were not confident enough to express openly such a powerful emotion
towards Turkish Cypriots, while they allowed themselves more easily to attribute it to
groups of people, or different peoples, even anticipating other peoples' emotions.
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Similarly to fear, in-group's hate was also used either as an insight into the
participant's own feelings or in contrast to the participant's feelings. In certain cases
participants clearly reported not sharing the in-group's feeling, while in other cases
they clearly positioned themselves as members of the in-group which felt this
emotion, which could be a way either to justify the participant's personal emotions, or
to mask them (due to their low social desirability). It has to be highlighted that hate
was the only emotion reported as a mutual emotion between the two communities.
The mutuality of this strong emotion could be another way to justify the in-group's
and personal emotions, and to justify the distrust in the Turkish Cypriots, taking the
responsibility from the Greek Cypriots and "victimising" them once more. However,
the role of hate should be also considered in terms of the political action it could lead
to. The fact that this stereotype exists, that Greek Cypriots hate Turkish Cypriots,
could explain the support that Greek Cypriots showed to more "radical" ideological
parties in the past (parties supporting solutions which disregarded Turkish Cypriot
rights and needs completely), and possibly could show again in the future (Halperin,
2006).
Emotional apathy was expressed towards politics, politicians and the Cyprus issue, to
explain why participants would be distrustful of Turkish Cypriot officials. Although
apathy could be considered an attitude and not an emotion, in this case it was
considered an emotion because participants' reports showed lack of any feeling,
positive, negative or ambivalent. This lack of any emotion was based however on a
feeling of hopelessness and disappointment. Lack of responsiveness and lack of
honesty were the two factors that were presented as causing this disappointment
which then triggered this emotional apathy. In this case, the responsibility for this
emotion was attributed to politicians who by their behaviour led young Greek
Cypriots to this emotional alienation from what is happening. Since birth this
generation of citizens, , have been listening to politicians arguing over a possible and
fair solution. However, their ineffectiveness in finding such a solution has given rise
to disappointment with the processes for a solution and to emotional apathy to the
existing conflict.
Inter-group emotions were used to explain inter-group trust at a personal level. With
regard to the possibility of moving to northern Cyprus, a region populated in its
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majority by Turkish Cypriots, participants expressed anger and fear. These emotions
were based, on the one hand, on participants' perceptions of certain cultural
characteristics of Turkish Cypriots, and, on the other hand, the reality of being among
"others", in terms of ethnicity. The cultural characteristics concerned the different
practices related to the Muslim religion and certain perceived principles of the
Muslim religion. Perceived gender inequality within Muslim people and the perceived
strictness of this religion, as well as different daily habits related to the practice of it,
appeared to cause anger to participants. Their opposition and their anger were
presented as barriers to their moving to northern Cyprus, even though they would not
have to follow the same rituals or principles; just witnessing them appeared to
discourage participants from living with Turkish Cypriots. The way these
characteristics were presented showed a perceived cultural distance between the two
communities, which for certain people was an important barrier to their co-existence
with Turkish Cypriots.
On the other hand, fear was related to the ethnic stereotypes Greek Cypriots hold of
Turkish Cypriots, and the benefits and disadvantages of in-group/out-group
membership. The Greek Cypriot stereotype of the "violent Turkish Cypriot" was
presented in order to show the personal disagreement of the participant with this claim
and to justify his/her trust in moving to northern Cyprus. Once more the in-group's
feelings were used to highlight the personal disagreement with certain "radical"
opinions (Le. "that Turkish Cypriots want to kill Greek Cypriots") and to justify trust.
The existence of this stereotype could be one of the reasons why Greek Cypriots
could find it difficult to Jive with Turkish Cypriots. This stereotype must be rooted in
the history of the relationship between the two communities and the final occupation
of the northern part of Cyprus, which "victimised" the Greek Cypriots, and demonised
the Turkish Cypriots. The violence of the invasion and occupation has created this
violent image of Turkish Cypriots, which young Greek Cypriots still seem to take into
consideration, even if it is to reject it.
The second cause of fear concerned perceptions of the disadvantages related to out-
group membership. Lack of interest and help were reported as the expected behaviour
towards out-group members, which discouraged participants from trying to coexist
with Turkish Cypriots. Group membership was expected to come with certain benefits
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and disadvantages, and as long as the difference of ethnicity between the two
communities was salient, participants appeared to count on it. In this case, the creation
of another super-ordinate identity, i.e. the Cypriot or the citizen one, could be the way
to overcome these perceptions and these emotions.
This variety of sources of different emotions has shown that young Greek Cypriots'
distrust/trust and un/willingness to live with the Turkish Cypriots are not just
"intuitive" or "irrational" as certain types of inter-group distrust have been
characterised (Deutsch, 1973). Young Greek Cypriots, despite their age, experience
emotions which are rooted in the history of the relationship of the two conflicting
communities and in specific perceptions of the out-group. Different inter-group
emotions have different sources and are experienced by different subjects; they should
therefore be further studied separately both in terms of their antecedents (and their
outcomes) and also the subjects of the emotions (Iyer & Leach, 2008).
7.4.3 Which other factors influence inter-group social and political trust in the
reconciliation process? What is the role of inter-group social and political trust
in conflict resolution?
7.4.3.1 Differences/commonalities
The first factor that was found to influence inter-group social and political trust was
the perceived differences and commonalities between the two conflicting
communities and their constituent ethnic groups. The identified differences were used
to explain social and political distrust, a barrier to the reconciliation process, while the
identified commonalities were used to explain trust and act as facilitators to the
reconciliation process.
The differences, which were identified between the in-group (the Greek Cypriots) and
the out-group (the Turkish Cypriots), were expressed in such a way as to diminish the
out-group and to applaud the in-group, following the Social Identity Theory (Abrams
& Hogg, 1990) principle that groups choose to differentiate themselves from other
groups on domains which "provide them with a favourable view of their own group
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Hewstone & Cairns, 200), p.321). In accordance with this principle, participants'
perception of Turkish Cypriots as economically and socio-politically
"underdeveloped" made the possibility of studying, working and living in northern
Cyprus, amongst a majority population of Turkish Cypriots, unappealing. In
economic terms, the GNP of Greek Cypriots is currently three times bigger than that
of Turkish Cypriots (Hadjipavlou, 2007), which puts Greek Cypriots realistically in a
much bettcr economic situation than Turkish Cypriots; this is something which young
Greek Cypriots knew and took into consideration when evaluating the future prospect
of a move to the northern part of the island.
Apart from the economic-status group differences, inter-group social trust was also
affected by the incompatibility of the two communities' ethnic interests. The two
communities have developed over the conflicting history of their relationship different
interests and ways to achieve them; an important part of this process is to determine
who the "enemies" are and who the "allies" are. The "enemy" for the Greek Cypriots
is clearly the Turkish Cypriots and the Turks, and vice versa. In order therefore to
protect oneself from these "enemies", a strong Cypriot military force, consisting of
both Greek Cypriots and Greeks, was created on the island after 1974 as a defence
mechanism ready to protect the southern part of the island from another invasion-
attack by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. The conceptualisation therefore of the Cypriot
army is highly dependent on the recognition of Turkish Cypriots and Turks as "the
enemy" the country will have to protect itself from. Therefore, when young Greek
Cypriots evaluate their trust in Turkish Cypriots as soldiers of the Cypriot army, the
issue of redefining who the "enemy" is, if Turkish Cypriots are to be accepted and
trusted to fight for the Cypriot army, is raised. This is very important, since it
emphasises the necessity of the reconstruction of the identities of the parties involved
in the Cyprus issue. Since 1974 people have been following certain "cognitive
constants" which could not be changed or de-evaluated overnight; theywill have to be
reconstructed in such a way as to ensure continuity but also adaptation to the new
situations (Lyons, 1996).
Apart from the economic-political differences identified between the two
communities, cultural differences appeared also to hinder participants' trustful attitude
towards Turkish Cypriots: the difference of language, religion and beliefs associated
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with them. In this case, on the one hand, the practicalities of the coexistence of two
ethnically different peoples were put forward, in terms of the difficulty of
communication and the religious interdiction of inter-religious marriages, and, on the
other hand, the personal unwillingness for any personal concessions related to these
two differences. Unwillingness could be related to the age of the participants, which
does not leave them with a lot of free will (they are still under their parents' control),
but it could also be the reason behind the presentation of the practical difficulties of
contact between the two peoples. For Greek Cypriots, as previous research has shown
(Hadjipavlou, 2007),religion and language, are not highly important causes of the
Cyprus conflict; therefore, in the present study as well, these differences could be just
used to mask participants' exclusionary attitudes towards the other community.
However, in order to make this assumption, further research is needed on the role of
religion and language in Greek Cypriot attitudes.
Finally, there was a set of differences which participants did not and could not
specify; they knew they existed but could not specify them. These differences. must
have been related to the preconceptions and stereotypes that young Greek Cypriots
have been brought up with. Due to their young age, participants did not have any
personal contact or experience of life with the Turkish Cypriots and Turks; they had
however a cognitive and affective opinion of what life would be with them or how
Turkish Cypriots were. This opinion, although not entirely informed, was still
pervasive and determinant of their attitudes towards trust in Turkish Cypriots, which
showed the importance of ethnic stereotypes for young generations and the
perpetuation of contlict attitudes.
Only one perceived difference between the two communities was in favour of the
Turkish Cypriots, although it was not used by participants in their favour. This was
the high level of ability and astuteness of Turkish Cypriot politicians and it was used
to reinforce the Greek Cypriot victim role and the Turkish Cypriot perpetrator role.
No other positive difference was presented for Turkish Cypriots vis-a-vis the in-
group, the Greek Cypriots.
Despite all the differences identified between the two communities, some participants
also identified certain commonalities between them. The main commonality between
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the two peoples was sharing the same land and, eventually, the same country. The
land was a joint point of reference, which gave rise to common interests, a common
Cypriot identity and a common victimisation between the two communities. These
arguments contrasted with the previous accounts of the Turkish Cypriots as the
"enemy" whose interests were mutually exclusive from those of the Greek Cypriots.
The commonality of the land, in this case, led to interdependence between the two
communities, which was recognised and taken into consideration when evaluating
trust in a future federal state. This contrast with the previous reports could be
revealing the existence of a discrepancy amongst or within young people concerning
group boundaries in relation to Turkish Cypriots, however further research would be
necessary to confirm it.
However, participants referred to their differences/commonalities not only with
Turkish Cypriots but also to those with Turkish people. Turkish people are called "the
settlers" by Greek Cypriots, because the majority of the northern Cyprus' Turkish
population arrived from Turkey after the 1974 invasion, as part of the Turkish
government's strategy to reinforce the Turkish population living on the island. Based
on that, participants made a distinction between Turkish Cypriots and Turkish people
in terms of their ethnic origins; Turkish Cypriots were born in Cyprus while Turkish
people were born in Turkey. Between the two, Greek Cypriots appeared to be more
distrustful towards the Turkish people, expressing stereotypes towards them
consisting of dehumanising and "endogenous" negative attributes. In many cases
participants' cautiousness or negativity about Turkish Cypriot participation in national
institutions was based on the fact that there would not only be Turkish Cypriots but
also Turkish people, who would gain access to these institutions in a future federal
state. In order to emphasise this distinction between the two Turkish communities,
participants made more salient the commonalities between Greek Cypriots and
Turkish Cypriots, such as their Cypriot common identity and their origins.
It can be seen that not all differences and commonalities between the three
communities were used across all contexts; however, even though certain factors were
differentially considered, the role of the use of differences and commonalities was the
same across all contexts; differences played a separating role between the groups and
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were used to explain distrust while commonalities were always used to bring the
groups closer together, explaining inter-group social trust.
7.4.3.2 The role of history
Another factor which appeared to influence inter-group social and political trust was
the perception of the historical events: of the events per se, of the involvement of
different agents in these events and the emotions related to these events. The
participants were all too young to have experienced themselves either the beginning
of the inter-communal fights, or the 1974 invasion and occupation of northern Cyprus
by Turkish troops, or the displacement of the Greek Cypriot refugees after the
invasion. However, participants referred very often to these events and the emotions
and attitudes which were caused by them. Social memory was the process which
allowed these memories to be maintained (Lyons, 1996). Story telling by people who
experienced the events, documentaries with real footage of Greek Cypriot refugees, as
well as official school history textbooks (Hadjipavlou, 2002), have all helped to
construct these historical memories in Cyprus, which constitute a central part of the
social memory of the Greek Cypriot people.
The maintenance of social memory, as it emerged from participants' quotes, was also
facilitated by the distancing of the two conflicting communities, which eliminated any
contact between them. The lack of contact, across the last 50 years, since the
beginning of inter-communal conflicts, solidified the "enemy" image (Hewstone &
Cairns, 2001) and perpetuated the beliefs and emotions of people who had
experienced the events by transmitting them to the next generations. The
transmittance of these memories (both their cognitive and their affective components)
is very important because not only they have defined the identity of the in-group but
they also appear able to determine the future action of the members of the group.
These in-group historic memories were endorsed by some participants, while they
were challenged by others. Those who accepted them used them to explain their
distrust in common national institutions and their negativity to inter-personal
relationships with members of the out-group. They admitted not being able to
disconnect the younger generations of Turkish Cypriots, who were neither directly
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involved nor responsible for the events which initiated the conflict, from the
perceived past of the out-group. On the other hand, those who challenged these
historic memories did not question their "truth", but at least appeared willing to "put
to the test" their relationship with the out-group and obtain a personal opinion on
Turkish Cypriot trustworthiness.
Trust in international institutions was also perceived through the social memory of the
in-group. On the one hand, the non-experience of the 1974 invasion, and on the other
hand, the interference of the UN in the ending of the armed conflict between the two
communities and the maintenance of the Green Line and the buffer zones, were
considered and used to explain either trust or distrust in these institutions, as agents of
the solution to the conflict.
7.4.3.3 Presence/absence of in-group favouritism and out-group bias
Inter-group trust was also affected by the perceived presence/absence of in-group
favouritism and out-group bias. However, in contrast to Brewer's (1997) "in-group -
out-group schema", which suggested that in-group favouritism could exist
independently of out-group bias, in the present study, these two were inter-dependent
due to the nature of the questions/the dilemmas participants faced. Furthermore, both
of these concepts appeared to have a cognitive, an affective and an attitudinal
component, in contrast to the above schema which only referred to the affective
content of the concept of in-groupfavouritism.
The difference between the presence and the absence of bias lay in the factors which
were related to them. The presence of out-group bias and in-group favouritism was
related to the presence of strong negative emotions (i.e. hatred), identity stereotypes,
social pressure and the perception of individual interests, while the absence of in-
group favouritism/out-group bias was related to individuality/personality, procedural
trust, honesty of motives and time. The presence of bias and favouritism was
expressed in reference to national institutions, international institutions and personal
relationships while the absence of favouritism and bias was expressed in reference
only to national institutions and personal relationships.
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In reference to international institutions, the UN, Great Britain and the USA were
repeatedly perceived as untrustworthy due to their exhibited favouritism to Turkey in
the Cyprus issue, which was due to their individual interests and not their genuine
interest in the resolution of the conflict. This favouritism to Turkey, which signifies
the existence of bias against Cyprus, reinforced the victimisation of the Greek
Cypriots in the Cyprus issue, through the increase in the number of perpetrators and
the level of injustice against them.
In reference to trust in Turkish Cypriots as representatives of national institutions,
negative emotions between the two communities as well as ethnic stereotypes
associated with the Turkish people (who were distinguished from Turkish Cypriots)
led to the perception of in-group favouritism and out-group bias. On the counterpart,
the factors which seemed to affect/ lead to the absence of in-group favouritism and
out-group bias were procedural trust, individuality and time. It appeared that the way
to overcome bias based on group differentiation (which in this case is ethnic
differentiation) was either to move from the group level to an individual level or to
emphasise external factors, such the processes as means to control bias. This could
explain the results of the content analysis as well, which showed more negative or
ambivalent attitudes towards institutions where there was low procedural control of
the representatives' actions, such as with the judges and the politicians. The positive
effect of time, in accordance with the existing literature on conflict resolution
(Rouhana, 2004), should also be highlighted, because it showed that once a solution is
found, time is still necessary for the two communities to re-build and establish a new
relationship; time was necessary both for the Turkish Cypriots to prove their
trustworthiness and for Greek Cypriots to witness it. Another condition which was
linked to the absence of group bias was the perception of motives (Tyler & Oegoey
1996) for the target's actions. Ulterior motives could lead to biased behaviour which
would lead to Greek Cypriot distrust.
On the other hand, in reference to personal relationships, the main factor related to
out-group bias was social pressure (Muldoon et al., 2007), consisting of mainly family
but also community pressure. In many cases, participants differentiated their personal
opinion from that of their community/family but declared they were not able to
oppose to their families and experience the consequences of disregarding their will.
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Examples of people who had gone against their families' wish and had married a
member of the out-group were only recalled to discourage participants from doing the
same thing. Ethnic intermarriage in conflict situations is not an easy step to take;
existing research (Paluck, 2009) on real conflict contexts has shown that the majority
of people who have not had any official reconciliation training, as was the case for all
the participants in this study, are initially very negative to it. However, the fact that
participants, even though they had no reconciliation training, expressed a positive
personal opinion on this issue, shows the importance of the effect of time on change.
In contrast to public domain inter-group relationships, intimate inter-personal
relationships were not dependent on participants' personal opinions but on the
existing social norms of the group. It is important therefore, on the one hand, that
individuals are willing to change through their direct experience of new inter-group
relationships but that, on the other hand, the norms of the society change as well.
Otherwise, social norms will not allow individual change to be expressed, maintained
or generalised.
7.4.3.4 Familiarity/proximity
An important factor which was closely related to all the previous ones was
familiarity/proximity with the target which was evaluated. The perceived level of
knowledge of the "other" appeared to be very important in the evaluation of its
trustworthiness. Lack of knowledge was found to lead to cautiousness and distrust.
The perceived reasons for the lack of knowledge were lack of contact and lack of
official unbiased information about the "other".
Participants have been living segregated from Turkish Cypriots for almost 40 years,
therefore the contact, especially for the younger generations, is practically. non-
existent; only children who have participated in hi-communal programmes or studied
in bi-communal schools have been subject to some form of contact. However, their
percentage is almost negligent; for instance, only one of the participants of this study
had participated in a bi-comrnunal programme. The reality is that the vast majority of
young Greek Cypriots has never seen or talked to or interacted in any form or way
with Turkish and Turkish Cypriot people. The effects of lack of contact and the
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necessity of inter-group contact for effective inter-group conflict resolution have long
been studied (Allport, 195411979; Hewstone & Brown, 1986; Pettigrew, 1998)
arguing for the necessity not only of contact but also of quality contact between the
conflicting groups. The participants of the present study acknowledged this lack and
how it led them to distrust, Trust only appeared to come after a proven record of
trustworthiness; when there was no personal record of any behaviour or attitude, then
distrust was the easiest and the most accessible attitude (Gambetta 1988; Larson,
1997).
However, young Greek Cypriots have been receiving information throughout their
whole life about the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish people through the social
memory processes of their in-group (Hadjipavlou, 2002). Despite their continual
exposure to all this information, it is worth noting that some participants differentiated
between the stereotypes and the historic memories, which constitute the majority of
the information they have been exposed to, and the unbiased and objective
information they should have been receiving instead in order to be able to evaluate
Turkish Cypriots.
Despite this occasional differentiation, alienation and rejection were expressed by
many participants in reference to northern Cyprus, to the causes of the Cyprus issue
and to the results of the 2004 referendum. In reference to northern Cyprus, young
Greek Cypriot lack of any experience of that area, lack of any familiar people in that
area, and lack of any psychological bond with the place were all reported as reasons
for not considering moving to northern Cyprus even within a federal state. Since
young Greek Cypriots have been born into a segregated environment, and southern
Cyprus is all they know, all they have experienced, it is clear that, for some of them,
just the social memory of a lost part of their homeland (patrida) is not enough to
make them overcome their fear of the unknown.
However, the knowledge of the "other" was also related to trustworthiness, through
the legitimacy of action that knowledge brings. This emerged in reference to the
trustworthiness of international institutions, in terms of their involvement in the
resolution of the Cyprus conflict. The fact that certain international institutions did not
have a deep knowledge of the events did not qualify them to have a "say" on the
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issue, according to some participants. On the other hand, this was the only issue
where Greek Cypriots felt close to Turkish people and Turkish Cypriots; their direct
knowledge and involvement in the contlict which gave them the right, the legitimacy,
to find a solution to the Cyprus conflict.
7.4.3.5 The role of identity
All of the above factors, differences/commonalities, the role of history, in-group
favouritism/out-group bias, and familiarity/proximity have all been based on the
categorisation of people in either the Greek Cypriot group or the Turkish Cypriot
group. The Cyprus conflict has been based around this dichotomy since the roles of
the "victim" and the "perpetrator" have been assigned to either of these groups,
depending on the standpoint of the evaluator. Following this existing categorisation,
the aim of the present study was to see the relationship between these two ethnic
groups; therefore, the questions to participants were framed around this
categorisation, making salient the ethnic boundaries of each group. However,despite
the fact that the interviewer was only making salient the Greek Cypriot and the
Turkish Cypriot identities, other different identities emerged in participants' accounts
in relation to trust in different targets.
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot identities, which are two identities which emerged
on both sides of the island in the late 1990s (Loizides, 2007), were associated with the
"Motherland identity" of each community, the Cypriot identity, and the European
identity. Each of these identities played a differential role in the evaluation of trust in
different targets.
The two "Motherland" identities are the oldest identities the two communities have
been using and the ones that have been in decline recently (Loizides, 2007). The
results on the frequencies of use of each identity to refer to each group showed that
primarily both communities were identified by their ethnic identity; however, the
second most popular identity for each group was different. Participants referred to
themselves then as Cypriots, to Turkish Cypriots as Turks, and, last, to themselves as
Greeks and to Turkish Cypriots as Cypriots. The Cypriot identity was therefore more
prevalent for their own group than for Turkish Cypriots, who were perceived as closer
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to their Motherland identity than they considered themselves to be. While these
results could be considered to reveal young Greek Cypriot perception of the
relationship each group has with each identity, the literature has emphasised that
"there is no sharp dichotomy" between the use of these identifications (Loizides,
2007, p.174); it is argued that they are all used interchangeably. However, the present
study, even with such a small sample, has given us an idea of how young Greek
Cypriots perceive the identifications of each group, which appears to be confirmed by
the existing literature, at least concerning Greek Cypriot perception of their in-group,
(Loizides, 2007); Greek identity has been on a decline since 1974 while Cypriot
identity emerged in the meantime and Greek Cypriot identity is currently the most-
prevalent.
Further conclusions could be made, however, about the ways Greek identity was used
in relation to trust based on the manifest link participants themselves made between
their Greek identity and Turkish Cypriot Turkish identity with the different trust
targets. It appeared that they mainly included themselves in the "Greek group" and
Turkish Cypriots in the "Turkish group" when they wanted to explain their trust in
these targets and legitimise the right of Greece and Turkey to participate in the
resolution of the Cyprus issue.
While the Greek identity was not used in any other context, the Turkish identity of
Turkish Cypriots was made salient in reference to trust in different contexts, personal
or public ones. Participants referred to it repeatedly to explain their distrust and their
negativity towards Turkish Cypriot participation in national institutions or in intimate
relationships with Turkish and Turkish Cypriot people. The Turkish element of the
Turkish Cypriot identity, either considered an element, or a super-ordinate identity for
Turkish Cypriots, was an important differentiating point between the two
communities; it made salient the boundaries of each group having as a consequence
the reinforcement of distrust.
On the other hand, the Cypriot identity's boundaries and content were not as clear;
they were not the same for all participants. Some participants attributed the Cypriot
identity to both Turkish and Greek Cypriots while others considered this only a Greek
Cypriot "privilege". What were stable were the respective associated privileges and
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disadvantages of in-group and out-group membership. In-group membership was
related to the perception of increased similarities amongst in-group members, and
differences with out-group members, according to Social Identity Theory and
Common Ingroup Theory (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hewstone & Cairns, 2001),
and, especially, with expression of trust and empathy (based on common
victimisation) towards the in-group members; on the other hand, out-group
membership was related with distrust, cautiousness, and disinterest (both in terms of
attitudes and behaviour). For people who attributed the Cypriot identity also to
Turkish Cypriots, this identity appeared to exist above the ethnic identities of each
group; it did not eliminate the ethnic identities, it just made them less salient, as
supported by cross-categorisation theory (Hewstone & Cairns, 2001).
In contrast to Cypriot identity, European identity was perceived as a newly acquired
privilege that only Greek Cypriots could/had the chance to benefit from; and the main
benefit for them was the interest and support Greek Cypriots thought they would have
to resolve the Cypriot conflict, if possible on their own terms. However, the European
identity was not only used as an "ace" against the Turkish Cypriots, it was also used
to legitimise the interference of different countries in the Cyprus issue and therefore
participants' trust in them. Distrust in countries outside the EU, such as the USA, was
also based on the fact that they were perceived as not having the right to interfere in
the Cyprus issue, due to their European out-group status. However, European
membership was not the only criterion for legitimising countries' right to interfere;
there was also what was perceived as genuine concern about Cyprus and an existing
relationship with Cypriot people.
Finally, the analysis on the frequency of times and the contexts in reference to which
participants decided to position themselves either within their in-group by using "we"
or to talk as individuals, by using "I", or outside of their group, by using "they", also
gave us an idea of the use of group membership by young Greek Cypriots.
Participants' choice to speak either within their ethnic in-group or individually most
of the time showed that these are the two main contexts participants consider
themselves in. Participants chose to speak about the majority of issues on an
individual basis, since the questions were targeted at them personally. However, their
choice of speaking on behalf of their in-group in issues related to the country, as a
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whole, and in relation to a companson with the Turkish Cypriots, showed this
tendency for members to seek cohesion and unity in their in-group when "threatened"
or just compared with out-groups. This unity and this cohesion however was not
permanent across all contexts and issues; participants also referred to their in-group as
an out-group in issues they considered their group to suffer, such as its negative
attributes (arrogance and dividing of the in-group), or issues they themselves did not
have any participation in (such as the referendum). In-group membership was
therefore not a permanent situation which entrapped young people; they appeared to
use it depending on the context and always trying to maintain their self-esteem. When
the group's characteristics would diminish their self-esteem, they rejected the group
and positioned themselves temporarily outside it (Social Identity Theory, Tajfel &
Turner, 1979).
In total it could be said that identifications were used differentially towards trust in
different targets; however, the main point which should be emphasised is that the
existence of a common, or super-ordinate identity, like the Cypriot one, appeared to
increase trust levels in the out-group. This emphasises the crucial role of a group
categorisation/identification which would go beyond the two conflicting identities and
facilitate inter-group social trust and therefore the prospect of a harmonious
unification of the two communities.
7.4.3.6 Institutional trust
All of the above factors appeared to influence trust levels both in institutions and in
people; however, three factors were linked only to trust in institutions. These were
procedural trust, general distrust and power. Procedural trust is a type of trust, whose
importance has been emphasised in the literature, as a dimension of political trust
(Luhman, 1979; Levi & Stoker, 2001), but it has not been studied in relation to
contlict resolution. The results of the present study highlighted its importance,
showing that trust in an institution's system of operation and structure facilitates the
acceptance of the integration in it of members of an adversarial out-group. People are
more willing to trust a member of the out-group in terms of attribution of fairness,
justice and genuine concern, when they trust the system within which this person is
going to be integrated (Sunshine & Tyler, 2003). As Luhman (1979) has argued, it is
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easier to trust a system than trust a new person every time, even though it is harder to
control it. In the case, however, of institutions which do not have a tight structure
which could control and give directions to the out-group member, people should trust
the motives of the individual's exercise of power; they should trust that they are in
accordance with the "official" regulations of his profession.
7.4.3. 7 General distrust
The other factor which appeared to be related only to institutional trust was
generalised distrust, both in politics and in different institutions. Disappointment and
hopelessness appeared to lead to this attitude based on the perceived lack of fairness
and the corruption both of representatives and the system within which they worked.
The difference between this concept and political cynicism is that distrust is related to
an expectancy concerning the target's future behaviour, which cynicism and
scepticism do not have (Meijerink, Dekker, Post, 2007). This is, however, what
constitutes the existence of general distrust so important in conflict resolution. The
parties should be making an effort to renegotiate their relationship in different
contexts, and contextual factors should not be inhibiting this effort, but facilitating it.
It could therefore be considered more difficult for Turkish Cypriots to integrate
harmoniously in a future federal state if Greek Cypriots have a pre-existing negativity
towards the institutions into which Turkish Cypriots will be integrated; distrust will be
generalised to them as well, without allowing them to prove their trustworthiness.
7.4.3.8 Power
Finally, the third factor found to influence only institutional trust was power. Power
has been studied extensively in conflict resolution literature in the context of the
power relationship of the groups involved in a contlict (Rouhana, 2004; Maney et al,
2006). However, in the present study, power emerged mainly in reference not vis-a-
vis the Turkish Cypriots but vis-a-vis the international institutions involved in the
Cyprus issue, and in reference to the legitimisation of their right of involvement.
Concerning the perceived power status of Cyprus in the international arena, it was
presented as a very low one. Young participants perceived Cyprus as a powerless
country which needed the help of more powerful counterparts. This disempowerment
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of their in-group could be designed to reinforce the victimisation of Cyprus at an
international level, along with the national level. Cyprus is realistically a very small
country, with a very small population, which till 1974 did not even have an army. It is
therefore understandable that Greek Cypriots feel especially "small" and "powerless"
in comparison with all other international agents. However, on the other hand, the
power of Cyprus could be considered much more important than that of the Turkish
Cypriots who live in international economic isolation, in a country unrecognised by
the international institutions. However, Greek Cypriots did not appear to recognise
that; the main reason why they did not appear to feel more powerful than Turkish
Cypriots must be because they have already been invaded by a Turkish Cypriot ally,
a very powerful and big ally, which is Turkey, without any of Cyprus' allies having
the courage to intervene. They feel isolated both from Greece, which is its traditional
ally, and from the rest of the international institutions. They therefore might feel they
have to emphasise this powerlessness so that the international community finally
protects their interests. However, this perceived self-powerlessness could lead to
passivity, to decreased responsibility taking and therefore possibly less willingness to
compromise. Further research would be necessary to examine the consequences of
this feeling of powerlessness.
On the other hand, power was used to legitimise the right of involvement of certain
institutions, such as the EU and the UN. It was another criterion which offered this
legitimisation along with European membership. Participants expressed more trust in
targets which they considered powerful enough to offer effective help and influence
the progress of the Cyprus issue. Trust was therefore attributed to agents, who were
perceived as able to have a real effect on the conflict; this shows the disappointment
felt by Greek Cypriots with the processes and the efforts made by different agents to
find a solution up to now.
7.4.4 General conclusion
The present study has shown that young Greek Cypriot trust attitudes towards the out-
group are not homogeneous or independent of the characteristics of the individual
targets and contexts. Furthermore, it was shown that young people's attitudes to the
resolution prospects are the result of complex processes which involve not only
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cognitive evaluations but also emotional ones. It was very interesting to find that the
factors which were related to these processes were in many parts similar to those of
adults, despite the young age of the participants and their personal lack of conflict
experience. Different factors were related to trust in different targets via different
processes. All of these factors should be further examined in a quantitative way to test
their external validity and the existence of a structured system which could connect
them in a meaningful, causal way in order to understand the process of reconciliation
attitudes.
270
Chapter 8: Theoretical and applied predictors of attitudes to specific forms
of conflict resolution
The present study tested an explanatory theoretical model of conflict resolution,
integrating the factors found in the previous two studies to affect attitudes and
perceptions of applied solutions to the Cyprus conflict. Different dimensions of
peaceful conflict resolution were considered in the present study such as attitudes
towards reconciliation, attitudes towards a specific reconciliation plan, and people's
preferred solutions and solutions considered feasible. The gap in the literature
concerning the empirical testing of widely acknowledged theoretical constructs and
assumptions was addressed in the present study, as well as the lack of focus in
people's perceptions of conflict resolution at grassroots level. The first aim was to
explore the ways inter-group social and political trust, emotions and different. .
cognitive factors, as well as the practical prerequisites of trust and acceptance, as'
formulated by Kelman (1978, 2005) could lead to different attitudes towards
reconciliation in general and towards a specific reconciliation plan within an existing
model of conflict resolution. The second aim was to look at the relationship between
all of these aforementioned factors and people's preferred and perceived as feasible
solutions to the Cyprus problem. Both theoretical concepts and applied steps for
conflict de-escalation were examined in reference to perceptions of specific conflict
attitudes and solutions in the context of the Cyprus issue.
8.t Introduction
8.1.1 The "Eclectic" model, reconciliation and accepting a reconciliation plan
In the present study, Fisher's (1990, 2000) model of reconciliation was chosen, being
the most comprehensive, in order to test the relationship between different forms of
reconciliation and different types of trust, emotions and cognitive factors already
identified and measured in the present thesis (see chapters 6 and 7). The model was
already very inclusive and very carefully structured, integrating factors at different
levels and at different temporal sequences (see chapter 3 for a review).
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Diagram 8.1: Part of the original model (Fisher, 1990)
OrientationsAntecedents Processes Outcomes
Cognitive
bias
Identity Mistrust
~
+ Reduced
Ethno- productivity
centrism
t Contentious
tactics ... Escalation
Cultural differences Perceived
Hist. of antagonism threat Inadequate
Conflict of values t coordination____.
Confl. of interests. Competitive
Confl. of needs orientation Ineffective
Conti. of power Communication
Although the definition in this model of conflict was endorsed by the present study, it
was considered necessary to be enriched with the mention of "lack of trust between
adversaries and the existence of mutual negative emotions". Based on these additions,
the original model was expanded to the aims of the present study integrating the
concepts of inter-group social/political trust and emotions (see Diagram 8.2).
The model already included trust within the factors it examined, however, it argued
that there were only two paths which could link it with its antecedents and outcomes
(see diagram 8.1). Therefore, the present study which was interested in the role of
trust within conflict resolution focused only on these paths and expanded them based
on the existing literature and the results of previous studies within this thesis. This
decision was taken also based on practical considerations, since it would not have
been easy to test the whole model in one study. The present study looked at the direct
link of trust with factors that were not originally linked directly with it, such as threat,
cultural differences, religious and national identification, conflict of interests, power
and values, as its antecedents, based on the existing literature (see chapter 4 for an
extensive review). Furthermore, trust was also differentiated in social and political
trust, following the results of the first study (see chapter 6), and was also linked to
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emotions, as its antecedents and attitudes to reconciliation and to a specific
reconciliation plan as its outcomes (see diagram 8.2).
Diagram 8.2:Modeltested
Lack of Antagonism
Inter-group
Anger
Cypriot identity
Lack of Threat
Conflict of interests
Confl. Of needs
Confl. Of power
Similarities
In-group anger
Trust in the
Turk.Cyp. -- ........
~ leaders
Inter-group
Fear
Out-group anger
In-group fear
Out-group fear
The addition of emotions in the antecedents of trust was based, on the one hand, on
the fact that their importance was later on recognised by Fisher (2000) and added to
the original model, even though the paths linking them with their antecedents or
outcomes were not specified; they were only described to contribute to the escalation
of the conflict in a climate of increasing mistrust (Fisher, 2000, p.174). On the other
hand, their addition was based on the results of the previous qualitative study (see
chapter 7) which emphasised their importance and their link with trust. In this respect,
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Reconciliation
Reconciliatio
plan
there is a gap in the existing literature on the emotional sources or factors affecting
trust/distrust within the context of intergroup conflict, since it has focused mostly on
the cognitive factors affecting trust. The present study attempted to fill this identified
gap in the literature, by exploring empirically both the cognitive and the emotional
sources of trust/distrust in the out-group people and leaders (inter-group social and
political trust), in an attempt to understand deeper the concepts of inter-group trust
and emotions in the context of interethnic conflict resolution.
Inter-group emotions were conceptualised in the present study in reference to
Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie et al., 2000). Research, within this theory, has
provided empirical evidence both for the prevalence of anger and fear in the context
of intergroup conflict (Mackie et al., 2000; Retzinger & Scheff, 2006; Giner-Sorolla,
Mackie, Smith, 2007), as well as of the importance of social identification in emotions
and of emotions' importance in the regulation of inter-group behaviour (Mackie,
Silver & Smith, 2004). However, emotions have not been researched in reference to
trust or attitudes to inter-ethnic group reconciliation. Mackie et al. (2000) have shown
that anger and fear are two distinct negative emotions, created after different
appraisals of the relationship with the out-group and which elicit different set of
behaviours towards the out-group. Anger has been related to more violent reactional
tendencies, while fear to more avoidant reactional tendencies. Similarly, when the
effects of fear and anger were examined in reference to public policy preferences
(Lerner, Gonzalez, Small & Fischoff, 2003) it was shown that anger was related to
more "punitive preferences" while fear to more "conciliatory preferences". However,
while these findings have emerged from experimental studies in reference to
terrorism, there has not been much research on these issues in reference to solution
preferences in inter-group conflict resolution with naturally occurring emotions (and
not experimentally triggered). The present study addressed these gaps and looked at
the relationship between different levels of emotions, inter-group social and political
trust, attitudes to reconciliation and to specific solutions to the Cyprus conflict; three
levels of emotions were identified and considered in the present study, personal
emotions, perceived in-group emotions and perceived emotions of the out-group
towards the in-group (Iyer & Leach, 2008). Perceived out-group's emotions were
considered following the importance of the norm of reciprocity as it was previously
described in Fisher's (1990, 2000) model of conflict resolution.
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8.1.2 Reconciliation
As the focus of the present study was not only on the factors leading to a certain
outcome, but also on the outcome itself, different types of conflict solutions, amongst
which reconciliation, were examined in the present study. In particular in Fisher's
model (1990, 2000), reconciliation was the solution which was considered as the
outcome; both attitudes towards reconciliation and attitudes towards a specific
reconciliation plan were explored. Reconciliation has been differentiated from other
forms of resolution, such as conflict resolution and conflict settlement (Burton, 1990),
based on its different qualitative focus and goal (see chapter 3). In reconciliation,
important constituents are forgiveness, empathy and apology and an important factor
of these concepts is trust (Darby & Schlenker, 1989). Therefore, in the
aforementioned model of conflict resolution (Fisher, 2000) which integrates trust and
emotions, reconciliation, was considered as an outcome which could be efficiently
integrated. The second outcome attitude to be considered by the present study was
attitudes to a specific reconciliation plan. This choice was made due to the recent
events of the 2004 referendum. The two attitudes while already considered as separate
in the literature (Shamir & Shikaki, 2002), they have not been measured or explored
in depth. The present study, integrating at first both of these attitudes as the outcomes
of Fisher's (1990, 2000) conflict resolution model, examined the processes that lead
to differential attitudes towards these two dimensions of reconciliation and shed light
to the reasons why "well-planned" and costly official reconciliation attempts, such as
the Annan plan, can be unsuccessful and ineffective.
8.1.3 Preferred and Feasible solutions
The focus of the present study, however, also extends to the perceived range of
solutions to the Cyprus conflict by the people, and their relation with social
psychological factors. Research on the solutions to international and intra-national
conflicts has been mainly conducted, within the context of political sciences, where
the available solutions are analysed, in terms of their advantages and disadvantages
mainly from a legal/political point of view and more rarely from a social point of
view; research taking into consideration the relationship and the attitudes between the
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previously conflicting communities has not been as extensive (Nordquist, 1985;
Adamolekun & Kincaid, 1991; Barzilai, Goldberg, Inbar, 1991; Hadjipavlou-
Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993).
In the Cyprus conflict, both the Cypriot government and the Turkish Cypriot leaders
have moved positions in their official proposed solutions as the political and social
situation has been changing and different powers and needs have become salient at
different historical times (Hadjipavlou- Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993). However,
while these official positions have been analysed and evaluated by political
researchers, there has not been any research looking at people's preferences or
opinions on the solution to the conflict, even though public opinion is very important
in conflict situations because it constitutes an important force that "mediates and
accommodates social integration and social change" (Shamir & Shikaki, 2002, p.187),
and therefore, can determine the outcome of a conflict. It has to be taken, therefore,
seriously into consideration and always consulted for issues of such importance, as in
the Cyprus issue, the solution that will be implemented. For this reason, the present
study considered the current period as prior to the next unlofficial attempt to achieve
reconciliation, and examined the solutions Greek Cypriot young people, who
constitute the future active citizens of the Cyprus state, prefer and those which they
consider feasible (Inbar & Yuchtman- Yaar, 1989).
As it has been argued and recognized in the conflict resolution literature (Kelman,
1978; Hadjipavlou- Trigeorgis & Trigeorgis, 1993) one of the prerequisites of
acceptance of the other is that people understand the difference between their desires
and what they can do or acquire under the constraints of reality. Inbar and Yuchtman-
Yaar (1989), who conducted one of the few pieces of research on this topic, looked at
the public's opinion concerning their goals in reference to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, and found that people do distinguish between what they would ideally wish
to happen and what could happen in reality. However, while if adults can distinguish
between these two, can young people, who are more passionate and more radical
(Conger, 1991), be expected to make the same differentiation? The second question to
be raised in reference to the present study, after Inbar and Yuchtman-Yaar's (1989)
research, concerns the factors that could predict/influence people's choices in terms of
their preferred and accepted as feasible solutions. Socio-demographic factors
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appeared to have low power especially for the Arab participants in their study (lnbar
& Yuchtman-Yaar, 1989), therefore, which are the factors influencing and predicting
significantly the choice of a solution?
8.1.4 Prerequisites for acceptance and trust in the opponent out-group
. Apart from the different types of solutions, another area which was explored in the
present study concerned the applied/practical steps (emerging from the
operationalisation of theoretical factors) which lead to reconciliatory solutions. Two
sets of prerequisites, one for acceptance and one for trust (Kelman, 1978, 2005) (see
chapter 3 and 4 for a review) were considered and explored in the present study due to
their relevance with conflict resolution and the aims of the present study and thesis.
The lack of any previous empirical quantitative testing of these prerequisites could not
allow any inference on the level each one is present in our sample, but they could
show the relevance of these items to reconciliation. It has to be specified that young
people's perceptions of the presence and the level of presence of these prerequisites
were explored, not the "actual" existence of these prerequisites. This would allow
making a link between the different types of solutions available to the Cypriot
citizens, and Greek Cypriots' perception of the inter-group facilitative action which
has or will be taken.
8.1.5 Research Questions
The present study explored the following questions:
a. How does inter-group/personal fear and anger relate to all the possible
antecedents according to Fisher's model (1990); the antecedents being history
of antagonism, threat, Cypriot identity, conflict of interests, conflict of needs,
conflict of power, similarities, in-group anger, out-group anger, in-group fear,
out-group fear?
b. How does social and political trust relate to these inter-group emotions and the
same antecedents?
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c. How do attitudes to reconciliation and attitudes to a specific reconciliation
plan relate to social, political trust, emotions, their antecedents, and the
prerequisites of acceptance and trust (Kelman, 1978, 2005)?
d. 1. What are participants' preferred solutions and solutions perceived as
feasible 2. How do participants' preferred solutions and solutions perceived as
feasible relate to social, political trust, emotions, the antecedents in Fisher's
model (1990) and the prerequisites of acceptance and trust (Kelman, 1978,
2005)?
8.2 Method
8.2.1 Participants and Procedure
The study was carried out in private schools and higher education colleges in Nicosia
and Limassol, the two largest cities of Cyprus. In total, 354 young people, between 15
and 28 years of age, completed the questionnaires. All of the 15-17 years old
completed the questionnaires under the supervision of their teacher and the researcher.
The mean age is 16.75. Fifty seven percent of the participants were below 17 years of
age, while only 6.5% was above 19 years of age. There were 188 male participants
and 165 female participants. It was important for the present study, based on the
results of the qualitative study that parents' origins appeared to affect participants'
conflict attitudes and emotions, to ask about participants' parents' origin; 49% of
participants have had at least one of their parents coming originally from the occupied
part of Cyprus.
8.2.2 Measures
The present study consists of a self-completed questionnaire (see Appendix I) with
168 close-ended questions measuring: demographics (age, gender, place of living,
school, class, parents' origin), national and religious identification, Greek, Greek
Cypriot and European identification, political and social trust, differences and
commonalities between the two groups, history of antagonism between the Greek and
the Turkish Cypriot communities, preferred solution, emotions, material and symbolic
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threat, acceptance and trust prerequisites and attitudes to reconciliation and to a
reconciliation plan.
Concerning parents' origin, participants were asked if their mother's or father's
origin was from the occupied part of Cyprus and if they still had relatives living in the
occupied part of Cyprus. These were asked with 2 single item questions on a "yes or
no" answer scale.
National identification was measured with 3 items from the national identification
scale of Cinnirella (1997). A selection was made of 3 items for practical reasons, to
reduce the length of the questionnaire. These were measured on a 7-point likert scale,
ranging from 1, to an extremely small extent, to 7, to an extremely great extent. These
items were: "To what extent do you feel Cypriot?", "How important is it to you being
Cypriot" and "To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Cypriot people?".
Cronbach alpha was 0.75, which allowed us to create a new variable measuring
national identification, using the Mean of these three items.
Religious identification was also measured using the same format with two of the
above three items (Cinnirella, 1997) for practical reasons, to reduce the length of the
questionnaire. These items were: "To what extent do you feel Christian Orthodox?",
"How important is it to you being Christian Orthodox?". The correlation coefficient
was very high r=0.8S and they were combined into one new variable measunng
religious identification, using the mean of these two items.
Political and social trust were measured using four or five (depending on the target)
statements, on a 7-point likert scale, that were found to be significant predictors of
trust during the first study, In the first study (see chapter 6), it was found that trust had
a different phenomenological meaning according to the target; different concepts were
found to predict the trustworthiness of each target. In the third study it was therefore
decided to use only the items that were significant predictors of each target of trust.
The format of the items that were used to measure political and social trust was: i.e. in
the Turkish Cypriot leaders: "The Turkish Cypriot leaders are effective", and
"effective" was then replaced by "legitimate", "worthy of support" and "worthy of
pride" (see Appendix I with the questionnaire of the study).
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An exploratory factor analysis was carried out, and all the items grouped according to
the target of the different concepts. The method of factor extraction was Principal
Axis Factoring with the number of factors extracted determined by the Kaiser-
Guttman minimum eigen value of one criterion and the method of rotation was Direct
Oblimin, because we did not know if the factors were correlated or not. Items grouped
according to the target of trust into 10 factors, which accounted for 79% of total
variance. All the items concerning the Greek government grouped together under
factor 1, all the items concerning the Turkish Cypriots grouped together under factor
2, all the items concerning the United Nations grouped together, under factor 3, all the
items concerning the Turkish Cypriot leaders grouped together, under factor 4, all the
items concerning the Cypriot government grouped together under factor 5, all the
items concerning the Turkish government grouped together under factor 6, all the
items concerning the Greek Cypriots grouped together under factor 7, all the items
concerning the European Union grouped together under factor 8, all the items
concerning the Turkish people grouped together under factor 9 and finally all the
items concerning the Greek people, grouped together under factor 10.
Table 8.1: Correlation matrix of the factors extracted by the factor analysis on trust targets
Factors
Factors 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1
2 -.03
3 -.24 -.10
4 .03 .24 -.18
5 -.50 -.05 .29 -.00
6 -.02 -.23 .12 -.43 .11
7 .35 -.19 -.11 -.12 -.27 .14
8 .27 .13 -.46 .11 -.37 -.10 .09
9 -.04 .49 -.07 .21 .09 -.36 -.18 .10
10 -.53 .13 .12 .02 .23 -.05 -.54 -.11 .04
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Table 8.2: Pattern matrix of the targets of political and social trust
Factor
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
The Greek government is trustful .90
The Greek government is fair .87
The Greek government is legitimate .80
The Greek government has integrity .79
The Turkish Cypriots are fair .94
The Turkish Cypriots are worthy of pride .86
The Turkish Cypriots are compassionate .83
The Turkish Cypriots are worthy of support .75
The United Nations are worthy of pride -.93
The United Nations are trustful -.93
The United Nations are fair -.90
The United Nations are responsive -.81
The Turkish Cypriot leaders r worthy of support .84
The Turkish Cypriot leaders are legitimate .82
The Turkish Cypriot leaders are worthy of pride .75
The Turkish Cypriot leaders are effective .74
The Cypriot government is effective -.90
The Cypriot government is worthy of support -.86
The Cypriot government is fair -.82
The Cypriot government has integrity -.82
The Turkish government is efficient -.88
The Turkish government is effective -.81
The Turkish government is worthy of pride -.71
The Turkish government is legitimate .38 -.38
The Greek Cypriots are fair .89
The Greek Cypriots are legitimate .85
The Greek Cypriots are trustful .74
The Greek Cypriots are compassionate .54
The European Union is fair .81
The European Union is worthy of support .79
The European Union is responsive .78
The European Union is compassionate .75
The Turkish people is responsive .86
The Turkish people is fair .82
The Turkish people is compassionate .75
The Turkish people is legitimate .61
The Greek people is worthy of support -.89
The Greek people is legitimate -.86
The Greek people is responsive -.80
The Greek people is fair -.69
Reliability analyses yielded very high alphas, which followed our initial expectations
(based on the results of our first study). A new variable was then computed for each
factor, using the mean of the items comprising it.
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Table8.3: Cronbach's alpha of social and political trust targets
Political Trust
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders
Trust in the Turkish government
Trust in the Cypriot government
Trust in the Greek government
Trust in the European Union
Trust in the United Nations
Cronbach's Alpha
0.86
0.86
0.93
0.94
0.88
0.95
Social Trust
Trust in the Greek Cypriot people
Trust in the Turkish Cypriots
Trust in the Greek people
Trust in the Turkish people
0.88
0.93
0.92
0.88
In order to measure perceived differences and similarities between the two
communities, five items were used expressing differences and four items expressing
similarities, based on the results of the second-qualitative- study. The differences
were on the beliefs, the traditions and customs, economic progress, the way they
viewed history, and the way of life of the two communities. On the other hand, the
similarities were on the right of owning and using the land of Cyprus, the right to be
called Cypriots, the meaning of Cypriot identity, and their past victimisation. One
item was also used showing cultural differences between the Turkish Cypriot and the
Turkish people. The exploratory factor analyses, whose method was Principal Axis
Factoring and the Rotation Method Direct Oblimin, grouped all the items with the
differences together (Factor 2) and all the items with the similarities together (Factor
1). The two factors extracted accounted for the 52.81% of the total variance. The
correlation between the two factors was r=.20.
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Table 8.4: Patternmatrixof the factoranalysisof the itemsfor the perceiveddifferencesand
similaritiesbetweenthe 2 groups
The Turkish Cypriots have the same right to be called Cypriots as the Greek Cypriots
The Turkish Cypriots have the same right to own and use the land of Cyprus as the Greek
Cypriots
The Cypriot identity has the same meaning for the Turkish Cypriots as it has for the Greek
Cypriots
The Turkish Cypriots are victims of the past history as the Greek Cypriots
There are differences in the economical progress of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
There are differences in the customs and traditions of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
Cypriots
There are differences in the way the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots view history
There are differences in the way of life of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
There are differences in the beliefs of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
There are cultural differences between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish people
Factors
2
-.89
-.70
-.70
-.60
.70
.63
.62
.58
.51
.35
Despite the fact that the item on the cultural differences between the Turkish Cypriots
and the Turkish people was grouped with the items showing the differences between
the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, we chose not to include it when creating
a new variable expressing differences, due to the semantic difference and the low
loading of the item on the factor. Cronbach's alpha was 0.75 for the items expressing
the differences and 0.80 for the items expressing the similarities. A new variable was
then computed for each factor, on the mean of the items comprising it.
In order to measure the perceived extent of history of antagonism between the Greek
Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot community, we used six questions on a seven-point
likert scale, ranging from 1, "to an extremely small extent", to 7, "10 an extremely
great extent" that were repeated for both communities. These six items were "Turkish
Cypriots have been treated violently by the Greek Cypriots", "Turkish Cypriots have
been treated unfairly by the Greek Cypriots", "Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek
Cypriots that they are peaceful", "Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots
that they are compromising people", "Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots
that they are trustful", "Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are
stronger than them". The same items were repeated with Greek Cypriots as the agent
of each statement.
An exploratory factor analyses was conducted, using Principal Axis Factoring as the
method of factor extraction and Direct Oblimin as the method of rotation, because we
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did not know if the factors were correlated or not. The items that measured Turkish
Cypriots' trustful, compromising and peaceful attitude towards Greek Cypriots
grouped under factor 1. The items that measured Turkish Cypriots' unfair and violent
treatment of the Greek Cypriots grouped under factor 2; the items that measured
Greek Cypriots' trustful and compromising attitude towards the Turkish Cypriots
grouped under factor 3, and finally Greek Cypriots' unfair and violent treatment of the
Turkish Cypriots grouped under factor 4. The two items on power did not load on any
factor. These four factors accounted for 66.43% of the total variance. The correlation
between the four factors was very low (see Table 8.6), except for the correlation
between factors 4 and 1.
Table 8.S: Pattern matrix of the factor analysis of the items measuring history of antagonism
Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are compromising
people
Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are peaceful people
Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are trustful people
Greek Cypriots have been treated violently by Turkish Cypriots
Greek Cypriots have been treated unfairly by Turkish Cypriots
Greek Cypriots have shown to Turkish Cypriots that they are trustful people
Greek Cypriots have shown to Turkish Cypriots that they are compromising
people
Greek Cypriots have shown to Turkish Cypriots that they are stronger than
them
Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are stronger than
them
Turkish Cypriots have been treated violently by the Greek Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots have been treated unfairly by the Greek Cypriots
Greek Cypriots have shown to Turkish Cypriots that they are peaceful people
Factors
2 3 4
.92
.76
.75
.81
.70
.83
.68
-.96
-.58
.48
Table 8.6: Correlation matrix of the factors extracted from the factor analysis on history of
antagonism
Factor 1 2 3 4
1 1.00
2 -.11 1.00
3 -.15 .17 1.00
4 -.57 -.15 .16 1.00
Conflict of interests, values, needs and power prospects between the two
communities were measured with four items on a seven-point likert scale, ranging
from 1, "to an extremely small extent, to 7 "to an extremely great extent". These items
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were "Turkish Cypriots' and Greek Cypriots' interests are conflicting", "Turkish
Cypriots' and Greek Cypriots' values are similar", "Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriots' needs are similar" and "Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots' prospects of
power are conflicting". These items were used as single-item measures of conflict of
interests, values, needs and power.
Concerning emotions, first, participants' personal anger, fear, frustration, and hate
towards the Turkish Cypriots were measured, second, participants' perceptions of
their national in-group's anger, fear, frustration, and hate towards the Turkish
Cypriots were measured, and third, participants' perceptions of Turkish Cypriots'
fear, anger, frustration and hate towards Greek Cypriots were measured.
Material and Symbolic threat were measured using the scales developed by
Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman (1999) .on symbolic and material threat. The items
were translated back and forth to the Greek language and changed to fit in the Cypriot
reality. The changes concerned the tense of the verbs which was used, since in the
Cyprus case these statements would concern a future society, and the names of the
groups. Then, an exploratory factor analysis was carried out, using Principal Axis
Factoring as the method. of factor extraction and Direct Oblimin as the method of
rotation, because we did not know if the factors were correlated or not. Four factors
were extracted which accounted for 56.98% of total variance, and not two factors (on
symbolic and material threat). The items concerning the beliefs and values about
family issues, social relations, morality and religion, and work grouped under factor 1
(which explained 25.91% of total variance); Items on jobs, social services, taxes,
contributing to society, and culture issues grouped under factor 2 (which explained
12.78% of total variance); Health care, subsidizing housing, schools and quality of
social services grouped under factor 3 (which explained 10.75% of total variance),
and the two items about total conformity grouped under factor 4 (which explained
7.54% of total variance). The correlations between the 4 factors were low (see Table
8.8).
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Table 8.7: Pattern matrix of the factor analysis of material and symbolic threat
The values and beliefs of Turkish Cypriots regarding family issues and
socializing children are basically quite similar to those of Greek Cypriots
The values and beliefs of Turkish Cypriots regarding social relations are
compatible with the beliefs and values of Greek Cypriots
The values and beliefs of Turkish Cypriots regarding moral and religious issues
are compatible with the beliefs and values of Greek Cypriots
The values and beliefs of Turkish Cypriots regarding work are basically quite
similar to those of Greek Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots will displace Greek Cypriots from their jobs
The arrival of Turkish Cypriots will increase the tax burden on Greek Cypriots
Social services will become less available to Greek Cypriots because of the
arrival of Turkish Cypriots
The Turkish Cypriots will be getting more from this country than they will
contribute
The arrival of Turkish Cypriots will undermine Greek Cypriot culture
Turkish Cypriots should be eligible for the same health-care benefits received
by Greek Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots will have to be entitled to subsidized housing and utilities as
poor Greek Cypriots are
The children of Turkish Cypriots should have the same right to attend public
schools in Cyprus, as Greek Cypriots do
The quality of social services available to Greek Cypriots will remain the same
despite the arrival ofTurkish Cypriots
Turkish Cypriots should leam to conform to the rules and norms of Cypriot
society immediately after the reunification of the two communities
Turkish Cypriots should have to accept Greek Cypriot ways
Factors
1 2 3 4
.85
.71
.65
.44
.71
.64
.59
.41
.39
.83
.64
.62
.39
.69
.53
Table 8.8: Correlation matrix of the 4 factors extracted from the scale on symbolic and
material threat
Factor 1 2 3 4
1 1.00
2 -.27 1.00
3 .33 -.21 1.00
4 -.30 .38 -.22 1.00
Cronbach's alpha for items loading on factor 1 was 0.76, for factor 2 it was 0.74, and
for factor 3 it was 0.74. Since the fourth factor was comprised of two items, their
inter-item correlation was measured and it was 0.41. One new variable was computed
for each of the three first factors using the means of the items comprising them, while
the two items comprising the fourth factor were considered separately from each
other.
Prerequisites for Compromise and Trust were measured using items inspired by
the prerequisites proposed by Kelman (1978, 2005) on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
All these items were measured on a seven-point likert scale, ranging from 1 "to an
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extremely small extent", to 7 "to an extremely great extent". Concerning the
prerequisites for trust (Kelman, 2005), the items were: "Greek Cypriots are willing
to reassure Turkish Cypriots with symbolic gestures and recognitions of the other
side", "Greek Cypriots have made efforts to approach Turkish Cypriot side", "Greek
Cypriots have committed to the Turkish Cypriot side to bring the two communities
closer", "The Greek Cypriots have reassured the Turkish Cypriots for their
willingness to bring the two communities closer", "There should be a third party as a
repository of trust to manage the conflict and the resolution of the Cyprus issue",
"Turkish Cypriots have made serious efforts to achieve peace", "Both sides have
made reassuring gestures for the resolution of the Cyprus issue", "The negotiators of
the Greek Cypriot side are close enough to the opposite side".
Concerning the prerequisites for acceptance (Kelman, 1978), the items used to
measure them were: "Do Greek Cypriots know the beliefs/point of view of Turkish
Cypriots on the situation?", "Are Greek Cypriots responsive to the concerns and the
needs of Turkish Cypriots?", "do you personally understand the concerns and the
needs of Turkish Cypriots?", "Is there someone for Greek Cypriots to negotiate with
in the Turkish Cypriot side?", "Is there something to negotiate about in the Turkish
Cypriot side?", "is your preferred solution for the Cyprus issue feasible?", "Are you
willing to make concessions on your demands for the resolution of the Cyprus
issue?", "Are Greek Cypriots willing to make concessions on their demands for the
resolution of the Cyprus issue?", "Have there been changes in the Turkish Cypriot
side?", "Could there be more changes in the Turkish Cypriot side?".
In order to measure attitudes to a reconciliation plan, seven items were used with a
7-point likert scale ranging from 1, "I totally disagree", to 7 "I totally agree", These
seven items were based on the reconciliation scale developed by Shamir & Shikaki
(2002). The initial items developed and tested by Shamir & Shikaki (2002) were
changed to fit in the reconciliation measures proposed by the Annan plan which was
proposed to the two communities in 2004. The items were: "Open borders to free
movement of people and goods", "The return of one third of the value of the
properties in the Occupied part of Cyprus, to the Greek Cypriot immigrants, after the
reunification", "Equal right of veto by the two communities in economical, political
and social issues", "Gradual Greek and Turkish demilitarization, which will exceed
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2018", "The return of a certain number of Turkish settlers back to Turkey after the
reunification", "Would you under the above conditions of peace invite a Turkish
Cypriot person to visit you in your house?", "Would you under the above conditions
of peace visit a Turkish Cypriot person in hislher home?". The exploratory factor
analysis of the above items revealed two factors, which accounted for 57.41% of total
variance. Principal Axis Factoring was used as the method of factor extraction and
Direct Oblimin as the method of rotation, because we did not know if the factors were
correlated or not. The two last items on visiting or inviting a Turkish Cypriot
acquaintance to one's house grouped under the first factor (which explained 38.66%
of total variance) and the first five items under the second factor (which explained
18.75% of total variance). The correlation between the two factors was low (r=.39).
Table 8.9:Patternmatrixof the scaleon a reconciliationplan
-Would you under the above conditions of peace invite
a Turkish Cypriot person to visit you in your house?
-Would you under the above conditions
of peace visit a Turkish Cypriot person in his/her home?
-Gradual Greek and Turkish demilitarization, which will exceed 2018
-The return of a certain number of Turkish settlers
back to Turkey after the reunification
-The return of one third of the value of the properties in
the Occupied part of Cyprus, to the Greek Cypriot immigrants, after the reunification
-Open borders to free movement of people and goods
-Equal right of veto by the two communities in economical, political and social issues
Factor
1 2
.95
.94
.65
.50
.42
.40
.40
The reliability analysis of the items of the two factors revealed that it would be better
to consider all seven items when measuring reconciliation; Cronbach's alpha was
0.71.
Attitudes to reconciliation were measured using 8 items, inspired by the scales on
compromise by Devine-Wright (1999), on a 7 point likert scale, ranging from 1, "1
totally disagree", to 7, "1 totally agree". These items were: l.Public apologies for the
past by both communities would be beneficial for both the Greek Cypriots and the
Turkish Cypriots 2. Apologising for the past will benefit both communities 3. Both
communities should apologise for the past wrongs that they have committed 4. The
Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities need to forgive each other for the
past 5. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should never apologise for their past
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atrocities 6. The Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities need to
compromise with each other 7. Turkish Cypriots would show strength by
compromising with Greek Cypriots 8. Both communities should never forgive each
other for what happened in the past. This scale, after recoding the two negative items,
had an internal reliability of (1=0.85;
Preferred solution was measured with a multiple choice single question. The
possible answers to this question were "Maintaining the present situation", "Creation
of a confederate state where the two communities would be totally equal in terms of
social, political and economical decision making", "Creation of a state where Greek
Cypriots would do the decision making in social, political and economical issues",
"Creation of two different states" and finally an option where participants could write
their own preferred solution. The majority of participants' responses in this fifth
question were that Cyprus should return to the situation before 1974.
Feasible solution was measured with the same multiple choice single question as in
the preferred solution. The possible answers to this question were "Maintaining the
present situation", "Creation of a confederate state where the two communities would
be totally equal in terms of social, political and economical decision making",
"Creation of a state where Greek Cypriots would do the decision making in social,
political and economical issues" and "Creation of two different states". There was no
option at .the end to write their own perceived acceptable solution, as we wanted
participants to choose one of the already existing and discussed possible solutions by
either of the conflicting sides.
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8.3 Results
8.3.1 Analytic Strategy
In order to answer the first three research questions, first, the descriptive statitstics of
the variables which would be used in the model were examined, then, the correlations
among these variables and finally the explanatory power of these variables for inter-
group fear, inter-group anger, social trust, political trust, attitude to reconciliation and
attitude to a reconciliation plan through hierarchical multiple regressions. In order to
answer the fourth research question, first the descriptive statistics of the preferred and
the feasible solutions were examined and then discriminant function analyses in order
to see how participants' preferred solutions and perceived as feasible solutions related
to social, political trust, emotions, the antecedents in Fisher's model (1990) and the
prerequisites of acceptance and trust (Kelman, 1978, 2005).
8.3.2 Prediction of inter-gro upfear, inter-group anger, social trust, political trust,
attitude to reconciliation and attitude to a reconciliation plan
8.3.2.1 Descriptive Statistics
All the variables were measured on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1, I strongly
disagree, to 7, I strongly agree. The means and standard deviations of the variables
used in the model of conflict resolution are in Table 8.10. Due to
compartmentalisation of symbolic and material threat, in a non-theoretically driven
way, the factor that we finally chose to use in this analysis was the factor 3, which
included most of the items of material threat that had a social and humanitarian
aspect. It was found that Cypriot identification was high while the measurements of
similarities, lack of antagonism and lack of threat were below the average. Intergroup,
perceived in-group and out-group anger were above the average, while intergroup,
perceived in-group and out-group fear were much lower than the average of the scale,
which was 4. These two emotions were respectively significantly different at all
levels.
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Trust in both Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkish Cypriot people was very low, while
the t-test showed that trust in Turkish Cypriot people was significantly higher than
trust in Turkish Cypriot leaders, t(353)=33.14, p<O.OOl. The mean of attitude to a
reconciliation plan was also below the average score of 4, while the mean of attitude
to reconciliation was significantly higher than the mean of attitude to a reconciliation
plan, t(353)=57.63 p<O.OOI.
Table 8.10: Means and standard deviations of variables in the model
M SD
Cognitive appraisals
Cypriot identity 5.21 1.20
Similarities 3.16 1.48
Lack of antagonism 2.63 1.36
Lack of threat 3.93 1.39
conflict of interests 4.51 1.68
conflict of needs 3.56 1.76
conflict of power prospects 4.16 1.55
Emotional appraisals
Inter-group/personal anger 4.55 2.06
Perceived in-group anger 5.15 1.58
Perceived out-group anger 4.27 1.69
Inter-group/personal fear 2.70 1.83
Perceived in-group fear 2.87 1.69
Perceived out-group fear 3.47 1.77
Trust
Trust in the TurkCyp leaders 1.41 .68
Trust in the TurkCyp people 2.46 1.40
Conflict outcome
Attitude to reconciliation 4.13 1.35
Attitude to a reconciliation plan 3.87 1.26
8.3.2.2 Correlational Analyses
Then we looked at the correlations amongst the variables that would be included in
the model (see Table 8.11), to see which ones were significantly correlated with inter-
group anger, inter-group fear, social trust, political trust, attitudes to reconciliation
and to a reconciliation plan, before their explanatory power was examined with the
following regressions.
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It was found that inter-group/personal anger was correlated to a moderate to high
degree with certain only cognitive appraisals, such as threat, lack of antagonism,
similarities, conflict of needs, but also with perceived emotions felt by the in-group or
the out-group, such as in-group and out-group anger and fear. It was also however
related significantly and at a moderate to a high level with both social and political
trust and attitude to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan. On the contrary we
saw that intergroup/personal fear 'was significantly correlated with threat, lack of
antagonism, conflict of needs, out-group fear, political trust and compromise but at a
very low level. It was only highly correlated with in-group fear. Inter-group/personal
anger and fear were both correlated highly with their respective perceived in-group
emotions (r=O.SI and r=O.61 respectively) and only weakly with their respective
perceived out-group emotions (r=O.28 and r=O.18 respectively).
Social trust (trust in the Turkish Cypriot people) was highly correlated with cognitive
appraisals, such as threat, lack of antagonism, similarities, and with emotions such as
inter-group anger, attitudes to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan. It was
moderately correlated with conflict of needs, in-group anger and political trust (trust
in the Turkish Cypriot leaders). It was only correlated at a low level with in-group
fear and out-group anger. Political trust (trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders) was
moderately correlated with threat, lack of antagonism, similarities, conflict of needs,
social trust and attitudes to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan and with inter-
group/personal anger. It was correlated very weakly with in-group anger, personal
fear and in-group fear.
Attitudes to reconciliation was highly correlated with threat, similarities, social trust
and attitudes to a reconciliation plan, while moderately correlated with lack of
antagonism, conflict of needs, in-group anger, out-group anger, personal fear, in-
group fear and out-group fear. It was weakly correlated only with personal fear and
in-group fear. Attitudes to a reconciliation plan was also highly correlated with threat,
similarities, social trust and attitudes to reconciliation, while moderately correlated
with lack of antagonism, conflict of needs, personal anger and political trust. It was
also weakly correlated with Cypriot identity, in-group anger, out-group anger and out-
group fear.
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8.3.2.3 Hierarchical multiple regressions
Six hierarchical multiple regression analyses were then conducted with the variables
that were found in the literature to lead to inter-group anger, inter-group fear, social
trust, political trust, attitudes to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan. The first
one analysed the predictive power of lack of antagonism, perceived threat, Cypriot
identity, conflict of interests, conflict of needs, conflict of power, similarities, in-
group anger, out-group anger, in-group fear, out-group fear and inter-group/personal
fear on inter-group/personal anger. Both regression equations were significant (For
the first step: F (7,341)=27.86, p<.OI and for the overall regression equation: F
(12,336)=28.73, p<.OI). The first equation explained 35% and the second 49% of the
total variance. First the cognitive appraisals were entered and then the emotional ones.
The reason this order was chosen was based on the results of the previous qualitative
study (chapter 7). Since participants did not have any direct experience of the events
which caused the Cyprus conflict, then the emotions they feel are all based on the
cognitive analysis of the events they have heard of or read about. In the first step all
the variables were significant except for conflict of interests and conflict of needs. In
the second step, lack of antagonism, threat, Cypriot identity, similarities, in-group
anger and out-group fear were significant predictors (see Table 8.12).
The second hierarchical regression analysed the predictive power of the same
variables for inter-group fear. Only the second regression equation was significant,
F(12,336)=20.l6, p<O.Ol,explaining 38% of the total variance, while the first one had
explained 4% of the total variance (see Table 8.12).
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Table 8.12: Summary of hierarchical regressions: Analysis for variables predicting intergroup
anger and intergroup fear
Inter-sroue An~er Inter-~roue Fear
Variables B SEB ~ B SEB ~
Step 1
Cognitive appraisals
Cypriot identity .15 .08 .09* -.10 .08 -.07
Similarities -.35 .08 -.25** -.17 .09 -.14*
Lack of antagonism -.21 .08 -.14** .II .08 .08
Lack of threat -.46 .08 -.31** .12 .09 .09
Conflict of interests .01 .08 .00 .07 .06 .07
Conflict of needs -.04 .06 -.03 .13 .06 .13*
Conflict of power .13 .07 .10* -.06 .07 -.05
Step2
Cognitive and Emotional appraisals
Cypriot identity .18 .07 .11** -.03 .07 -.02
Similarities -.28 .07 -.20** -.15 .07 -.12*
Lack of antagonism -.14 .07 -.09* .05 .07 .03
Lack of threat -.42 .07 -.28** .13 .07 .10
Conflict of interests .00 .05 .00 .05 .05 .04
Conflict of needs -.07 .05 -.06 .06 .05 .05
Conflict of power .08 .06 .06 -.08 .06 -.07
In-group anger .42 .06 .32** .05 .05 .06
Out-group anger .09 .05 .07 -.07 .06 -.06
Inter-group fearlInter-group .06 .06 .05 .03 .05 .03
anger
In-group fear .00 .06 .00 .66 .05 .61**
Out-grouE fear .10 .05 .08* .07 .05 .06
Note. Rl:35% for Step 1 of Intergroup anger. AR' =14% for Step 2. R'=4% for Step 1 of Intergroup fear. AR' =34%
for Step 2. *significant at 0.05 **signifircant at 0.01.
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Diagram 8.3: Multiple regressions for inter-group anger and fear
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-.12 Inter-group
fear
In-group fear
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Out-group fear
The third hierarchical regression analysed all the previous variables plus intergroup
anger and intergroup fear in reference to social trust (trust in the Turkish Cypriot
people). It was conducted again in two steps. First, all the cognitive appraisals were
included and then all the emotional ones. The reason this order was chosen was again
due to participants' lack of personal experience or contact with Turkish people and
the events of the conflict. All the information participants would have to develop their
trust evaluations and attitudes to reconciliation would have to be based on the
cognitive and emotional information transmitted to them by their society (parents,
friends, media etc.). Both equation regressions were significant. F (7,341)=37.06,
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p<.OI for the first step and F (13,335)=21.73, p<.OI for the second. The first equation
accounted for 43% of the total variance and the second for an additional 3%.
Similarities, lack of antagonism, threat and conflict of power were significant
predictors in the first step, while in the second similarities, lack of antagonism and
threat remained and intergroup anger was added (see Table 8.13).
In the fourth hierarchical regression for political trust (trust in the Turkish Cypriot
leaders) we entered the same predicting variables as for social trust. Again, both
regression equations were significant. F (7,341)=9.55, p<.OI for the first step and F
(13,335)=6.18, p<.OI for the second. The first equation explained 15% of the total
variance, and the second equation explained 16%. In the first step lack of antagonism
and threat were significant predictors of political trust, and in the second these two
plus inter-group anger and inter-group fear (see Table 8.13).
Table 8.13: Summary of hierarchical regressions: Analysis for variables predicting social
trust and political trust
Social Trust Political Trust
Variables B SEB ~ B SEB ~
Step 1
Cognitive appraisals
Cypriot identity -.06 .05 -.05 -.01 .03 -.02
Similarities .29 .05 .31** .02 .03 .04
Lack of antagonism .21 .05 .20** .13 .03 .26**
Lack of threat .28 .05 .27** .08 .03 .16**
Conflict of interests .02 .04 .03 -.02 .02 -.04
Conflict of needs .03 .04 .04 .02 .02 .05
Conflict of power -.08 .04 -.09* -.01 .02 -.03
Step2
Cognitive and Emotional
appraisals
Cypriot identity -.03 .05 -.02 .00 .03 .01
Similarities .25 .05 .26** .01 .03 .03
Lack of antagonism .18 .05 .17** .11 .03 .23**
Lack of threat .22 .05 .22** .06 .03 .12*
Conflict of interests .02 .04 .03 -.02 .02 -.04
Conflict of needs .02 .04 .03 .01 .02 .03
Conflict of power -.07 .04 -.08 -.01 .02 -.01
Inter-group anger -.12 .04 -.18** -.05 .02 -.15*
In-group anger .02 .04 .02 .01 .03 .03
Out-group anger -.05 .04 -.06 .00 .02 .01
Inter-group fear -.01 .04 -.01 .05 .02 .13*
In-group fear .05 .04 .06 -.01 .03 -.02
Out-groU2fear .03 .03 .03 .03 .02 .08
Note. R'=43% for Step 1 of Social trust. IlR' =3% for Step 2. R2:=16%for Step 1 of Political trust. IlR2 =3% for Step 2.
*significant at 0.05 **signifircant at 0.01.
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Diagram 8.4: Second step of the hierarchical regressions of inter-group social and political trust
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In the fifth hierarchical regression, all the previous variables were entered, including
social trust and political trust as predictors of reconciliation. The regression was
conducted in four steps. First all the cognitive appraisals were entered, then the
emotional ones, then social and political trust and finally attitudes to a reconciliation
plan. All four regression equations were significant: F (7,341)=29.92, p<.OI for the
first step, F (13,335)=16.76, p<.Ol for the second step, F (15,333)=17.37, p<.Ol for
the third one and F(16,332)=17.65, p<.Ol for the fourth one. The first equation
explained 34%, the second 37%, the third 41% and the fourth 43% of the total
variance. In the first step all the predicting variables were significant except for
Cypriot identity and conflict of power. In the second, similarities, lack of antagonism,
threat, conflict of interests, intergroup anger and in-group fear were significant
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predictors. In the third step, threat, conflict of interests and social trust were
significant predictors, while intergroup anger and in-group fear were nearly
significant. In the fourth step, threat, conflict of interests, social trust and attitudes to a
reconciliation plan were significant (see Table 8.14).
In the sixth hierarchical regression, all the previous variables (including
reconciliation) were entered as predictors of attitudes to a reconciliation plan. The
regression was conducted in four steps. First all the cognitive appraisals were entered,
then the emotional ones, then social and political trust and then compromise. All four
regression equations were significant: F (7,341)=28.02, p<.OI for the first step, F
(13,335)=15.85, p<.OI for the second step F (15,333)=15.12, p<.OI for the third one
and F (16,332)=15.47, p<.OI for the fourth one. The first equation explained 35%, the
second 36%, the third 38% and the fourth one 40% of the total variance. In the first
step Cypriot identity, lack of antagonism, threat and similarities were significant
predictors. In the second, similarities, lack of antagonism and threat were significant
predictors. In the third step, similarities, lack of antagonism, threat, and social trust
were significant predictors, and in the fourth step the same predictors as in the third
step plus attitudes to reconciliation (see Table 8.14 and 8.15).
Because the present study was interested in the relationship between emotions, trust
and reconciliation, when certain emotions (inter-group anger and in-group fear)
appeared to disappear from the significant predictors of attitudes toward reconciliation
when social and political trust were entered in the regression, we checked to see
whether social trust mediated the relationship between these emotions and attitudes to
reconciliation. It was found that the relationship of both emotions with attitudes to
reconciliation was mediated by social trust (Sobel z = 13.65, p<O.OOl and Aroian z=
13.64, p<O.OOI for inter-group anger, while Sobel z=8.83, p<O.OOI and Aroian z=
8.81, p<O.OOI for in-group fear). For inter-group anger, mediation was partial as the
effect of the inter-group anger was reduced but it was not close to 0 (B=-.16), when
social trust was entered in the regression model. On the other hand, for in-group fear
there was full mediation, as the effect of in-group fear fell close to 0 (B=O.07) when
social trust was added in the regression model.
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Table 8.14: Summary of hierarchical regressions: Analysis for variables predicting attitudes
to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan.
Reconciliation Reconciliation Plan
Variables E SEE P E SEE P
Step 1 Cognitive appraisals
Cypriot identity -.02 .05 -.02 -.09 .05 -.09
Similarities .15 .05 .16** .20 .05 .24**
Lack of antagonism .17 .05 .17** .15 .05 .17**
Threat .33 .05 .34** .26 .05 .29**
Conflict of interests .09 .04 .11* .03 .04 .04
Conflict of needs .OS .04 .10* .04 .04 .06
Conflict of power -.07 .04 -.OS .00 .04 .00
Step 2 Cognitive and Emotional
appraisals
Cypriot identity .00 .05 .00 -.09 .05 -.OS
Similarities .10 .05 .11 * .19 .05 .22**
Lack of antagonism .13 .05 .13** .15 .05 .16**
Lack of Threat .27 .05 .2S** .24 .05 .26**
Conflict of interests .09 .04 .11 * .03 .04 .04
Conflict of needs .07 .04 .09 .04 .04 .06
Conflict of power -.05 .04 -.06 .00 .04 .00
Inter-group anger -.10 .04 -.15* -.03 .04 -.06
In-group anger -.03 .04 -.04 .05 .04 .07
Out-group anger -.04 .04 -.05 -.06 .04 -.OS
Inter-group fear -.01 .04 -.01 -.04 .04 -.06
In-group fear .09 .04 .11 * .05 .04 .07
Out-group fear -.04 .03 -.05 -.05 .03 -.06
Step 3 Cognitive. Emotional appraisals
and Social/Political Trust
Cypriot identity .00 .05 .00 -.08 .05 -.OS
Similarities .04 .05 .04 .14 .05 .17**
Lack of antagonism .OS .05 .09 .12 .05 .13*
Lack of Threat .21 .05 .21 ** .20 .05 .22**
Conflict of interests .OS .04 .10* .02 .03 .03
Conflict of needs .06 .04 .08 .04 .04 .05
Conflict of power -.03 .04 -.04 .02 .04 .02
Inter-group anger -.07 .04 -.II(p=0.7) -.01 .04 -.02
In-group anger -.04 .04 -.04 .05 .04 .06
Out-group anger -.02 .04 -.03 -.05 .04 -.07
Inter-group fear .00 .04 .00 -.04 .04 -.06
In-group fear .OS .04 .10(p=O.7) .04 .04 .05
Out-group fear -.05 .03 -.06 -.05 .03 -.07
Social Trust .2S .05 .29** .19 .05 .21**
Political Trust -.03 .09 -.02 -.01 .09 -.01
·significant at 0.05 ··signifircant at 0.01.
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Table 8.15: Fourth step of hierarchical regression on reconciliation and reconciliation plan
Reconciliation Reconciliation plan
Variables B SEB ~ B SEB P
Step 4 Cognitive, Emotional
Appraisals, Social/Political
Trust and Reconciliation
Cypriot identity .02 .05 .02 -.08 .05 -.08
Similarities .01 .05 .01 .13 .05 .16**
Lack of antagonism .06 .05 .06 .10 .05 .11*
Lack of threat .17 .05 .17* .16 .05 .17**
Conflict of interests .08 .04 .10* .01 .03 .01
Conflict of needs .05 .03 .07 .02 .04 .03
Conflict of power -.04 .04 -.04 .02 .04 .03
Inter-group anger -.07 .04 -.10 .00 .04 .00
In-group anger -.05 .04 -.06 .06 .04 .07
Out-group anger -.01 .04 -.02 -.05 .03 -.06
Inter-group fear .01 .04 .01 -.04 .04 -.06
In-group fear .07 .04 .09 .02 .04 .03
Out-group fear -.04 .03 -.05 -.04 .03 -.06
Social Trust .24 .05 .25** .14 .05 .16**
Political Trust -.03 .09 -.01 -.01 .09 .00
Reconciliation .19 .05 .20**
Reconciliation plan .20 .06 .19**
Note. R2-36% for Step 1. AR2 =4% for Step 2, AR2 =5% for Step 3 AR2 =2% for Step 4 of Reconciliation. R2::37% for
Step 1. AR2 =2% for Step 2, AR2 =2% for Step 3 and AR2 =2% for Step" of Reconciliation plan.
·significant at 0.05 "significant at 0.01.
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Diagram 8.5: Fourth step ofthe hierarchical regression on reconciliation and reconciliation plan
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8.3.3 How do the prerequisites of acceptance and trust relate to attitudes to
reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan?
Apart from Fisher's (1991) model, the predictive power of the prerequisites proposed
by Kelman (1978, 2005) were also examined on attitudes to reconciliation and to a
reconciliation plan. We first looked the correlations between the prerequisites and
attitudes to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan (see Table 3 in Appendix II).
All prerequisites had a significant relationship with reconciliation except for: how
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r2=.40
much do you think Turkish Cypriots want change (931), how much do you think
Greek Cypriots know Turkish Cypriots' point of view (98), how much do you think
Greek Cypriots are responsive to Turkish Cypriots' needs and worries (99), how
much do you think your preferred solution for the Cyprus issue is feasible (103), there
have been changes in the Turkish Cypriot side (106) and how much do you think
Greek Cypriots have tried to get closer to the Turkish Cypriots (109). Similarly, all
prerequisites had a significant relationship with attitudes to a reconciliation plan
except for no 98, 99, 103, 109, (see previously) and, how much do you believe
Turkish Cypriots are afraid of Greek Cypriots' dominance (92), Greek Cypriots are
willing to reassure the Turkish Cypriots with symbolic gestures and some
recognitions (108), and Greek Cypriots' negotiators are too close to the Turkish
Cypriots (115).
Then, one multiple regression was conducted to examine the predictive power of the
prerequisites for acceptance and trust (Kelman, 1978, 2005), that had a significant
correlation with reconciliation and a reconciliation plan. Both regression equations
were significant; F (18,316)=9.19, p<.OI for attitudes toward reconciliation and F
(17,317)=9.37, p<.OI for attitudes toward a reconciliation plan. The former regression
equation accounted for 31% of total variance in attitudes to reconciliation and the
latter accounted for 30% of total variance in attitudes to a reconciliation plan. The
prerequisites that were significant for attitudes to reconciliation were on how much
participants thought: Turkish Cypriots were afraid of Greek Cypriots' dominance,
Turkish Cypriots were also victims of the history, they understood Turkish Cypriots'
worries and needs, they were personally willing to make concessions in their demands
for the resolution of the Cyprus issue and how much they thought Greek Cypriots
have given reassurances to the Turkish Cypriots to bring the two communities
together. The prerequisites that were significant for attitudes to a reconciliation plan
were: how much participants thought Turkish Cypriots were also victims of the
history, they understood Turkish Cypriots' worries and needs, they were personally
willing to make concessions in their demands for the resolution of the Cyprus issue
and how much they thought Greek Cypriots were willing to make concessions in their
demands for the resolution of the Cyprus issue.
IEach item was allocated one number, which was then used as an abbreviation in the Correlation
Matrix. See Key for the presentation of all item numbers.
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Table 8.16: Unstandardised coefficients (Beta), standardised error of beta and standardised
coefficients (~) for prerequisites of acceptance and trust
Variables
Reconciliation Reconciliation plan
B SEB ~ B SEB P
How much do you believe that:
Turkish Cypriots are afraid of Greek Cypriots'
dominance (92)
Turkish Cypriots want change (93)
Turkish Cypriots feel a bond with Cypriot land (94)
Turkish Cypriots are also victims of the history (95)
Turkish Cypriots make efforts of reconciliation (96)
Turkish Cypriots really want peace (97)
You personally understand Turkish Cypriots' needs
and worries (100)
There is someone in the Turkish Cypriot side that
Greek Cypriots can negotiate with (101)
There is something in the Turkish Cypriot side that
Greek Cypriots can negotiate about (102)
You are personally willing to make concessions in
your demands for the resolution of the Cyprus issue
(104)
Greek Cypriots are willing to make concessions in
their demands for the resolution of the Cyprus issue
(lOS)
There have been changes in the Turkish Cypriot side
(106)
There could be more changes in the Turkish Cypriot
politics and economy (107)
Greek Cypriots are willing to reassure the Turkish
Cypriots with symbolic gestures and some
recognitions (108)
Greek Cypriots have committed to Turkish Cypriots to
bring the two communities together (110)
Greek Cypriot have reassured the Turkish Cypriots to
bring the two communities together (Ill)
There should be someone else managing the
resolution of the Cyprus issue (112)
Turkish Cypriots make serious efforts to achieve
peace (113)
There have been mutual reassurances (114)
Greek Cypriots' negotiators are too close to the
Turkish Cypriots (115)
-.12
.02
.17
-.05
.06
.11
-.09
-.04
-.01
-.01
.04
-.06
.07
.05
.05
.13
.07
.13
.04 -.16**
-.03
.03
.12
.03
.07
.09
-.11
-.03
.05
-.03
.00
.07
.20
.07
.02
.00
.00
.04
.04
.05
.06
.05
.04
-.05
.04
.18*
.04
.10
.04
.05
.06
.06
.04
.02
.24**
-.05
.08
.14* 1'"'*. .)
.04 .00.05 .06
.04 .09.04 .06
.04 .28**.05 .18**
.05 -.14*.05 -.10
.04 -.04
.04 .09 .04 .10
.05 -.04
.06 .02.07 -.01
.15
(p=.06)
-.01
.06 -.01.07
.03
.06
.06
.05
.05
-.06
.07
.03 .00
.05
.05
.06
-.03
significant at *0.05 ·*signifircant at 0.01
8.3.4 How do trust, emotions and cognitive appraisals relate to preferred and
feasible solutions?
8.3.4.1 Descriptive statistics
One of the prerequisites for a solution to a conflict is that both sides are able to
distinguish between what they want and what they think can be actually achieved. We
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· examined the existence of this prerequisite in our sample by looking at the
relationship between the number of participants who chose each solution in terms of
preference and in terms of feasibility. A chi-square test showed a significant
relationship x2(12)=140.39, p<O.OOI, which means that the distinction between
preference and feasibility had an effect on the choice of solution.
The valid percentages for each solution showed that in terms of preference, the most
popular solution (35.6% of participants chose it) was the creation of a federal state
where Greek Cypriots would be the ruling majority. The second most popular solution
was the return to the situation before 1974, then it was the maintenance of the status
quo/the current situation and then the creation of two separate states. The least
popular solution was the creation of a federal state where both communities would
live with equal political, social and economic rights (13.7% or participants chose it).
On the other hand, in terms of feasibility, the most popular solution was maintaining
the status quo/the current situation (34.3% of participants chose it), followed by the
creation of a federal state where Greek Cypriots would be the ruling majority, then by
the creation of two separate states and finally by the creation of a federal state where
both communities would live with equal political, social and economical rights
(17.2% or participants chose it). There is no percentage for the fifth solution, as it was
not included in the possible answers to the question of a feasible solution.
Table 8.17: Validpercentageof participants'choiceof a preferredanda feasiblesolution
Solutions Preferred solution Feasible solution
% sample %sample
1st Maintaining the status quo
2nd Federal State with two equal communities
3rd Federal State dominated by the Greek Cypriots
4th Two separate states
5th To return to the situation before 1974
Total
15.7
13.7
35.6
15.2
19.8
100.0
34.3
17.2
27.9
20.6
o
100.0
The results of the crosstabulation of the solutions in terms of preference and in terms
of feasibility suggest that the majority of participants who chose the maintenance of
the status quo and the creation of two separate states also chose these solutions as the
most feasible ones. On the other hand, half of the participants who chose the creation
of a federal state with two equal communities as their preferred one, also chose it as a
feasible one. The majority of people who chose the creation of a federal state
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dominated by the Greek Cypriots as their preferred one, did not think it was also a
feasible one. The return in the situation before 1974 in terms of preference, was not
represented in the feasible solutions, as it was a category which emerged after the
completion of the questionnaires, it was not one that we had provided participants
with. However, we could say that the majority of people who chose it as their
preferred solution, then chose the maintenance of the status quo as the feasible one,
followed by the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state, then by the two separate
states, and finally by the creation of a federal state with two equal communities (see
Table 8.18).
Table 8.18: Crosstabulationcountsof the preferredandfeasiblesolutions
Feasible Maintain. Federal Federal Two %of
the status State - State-Greek separate total
quo two equal Cypr domino states
Preferred communit
Solution
Maintaining the 38 (11.3%) 2 (.6%) 5 (1.5%) 9 (2.7%) 16.1%
status quo
Federal State with 9 (2.7%) 23 (6.8%) 7 (2.1%) 8 (2.4%) 14.0%
two equal
communities
Federal State 34 (10.l%) 21 (6.3%) 57(17.0%) 10(3.0%) 36.3%
dominated by the
Greek Cypriots
Two separate 11 (3.3%) 3 (.9%) 8 (2.4%) 30 (8.9%) 15.5%
states
To return to the 24 (7.1%) 6 (1.8%) 17 (5.1%) 14 (4.2%) 18.2%
situation before
1974
% of tot a) 34.5% 16.4% 28.0% 21.1% 100.0%
Results were then considered separately for participants whose parents came from the
occupied part of Cyprus and those whose parents came from the free part of Cyprus.
The former participants would have been exposed to more vivid and direct
reminiscence of the life in the currently Occupied part of Cyprus before the invasion,
and of the events during and after the invasion, while the latter, would have only
heard of these events and personal narratives from friends and the media. The chi-
square test was significant for both groups; however, in the first group more than 20%
of the cells had a count below 5, which makes the chi-square score un-interpretable.
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8.3.4.2 Discriminant function analyses
A direct discriminant function analysis was performed usmg different aspects of
threat, of history of antagonism, conflict of needs, values, interests and power
prospects, strength of Cypriot and religious identification, attitude to reconciliation
and to a reconciliation plan, and emotions and trust as predictors of membership in the
five possible preferred solutions. The preferred solutions to the Cyprus issue were
the maintenance of the status quo (1), a federal state with two equal communities (2),
a federal state dominated by the Greek Cypriots (3), two separate states (4) and the
return to the situation before 1974 (5). Four discriminant functions were calculated
with only the first one discriminating significantly between the five solutions
(p<0.001). The first discriminant function accounted for 54.7% of the between-group
variability.
Table 8.19: Summary of the discriminant function analysis
Function Percentage of variance explained Wilk's lambda Significance
1
2
3
4
53.7
24.5
12.4
9.4
.44
.67
.82
.92
.00
.24
.87
.88
Table 8.20: Results of the first discriminant function analysis of cognitive, emotional and
trust factors
Predictors Correlations of predictors
discriminant function
with the Univariate F (4,316)
Inter-group anger
Reconciliation plan
Turkish Cypriots badly treated
Social services, poor people,
children·
Inter-group hate
General conformity with Gr Cyps
practices
Trust in the Greek people -.35*
Inter-group frustration -.34*
Greek Cypriots' positive attitude -.33*
Trust in the Greek Cypriots -.31 *
Values and beliefs .30*
.37*
18.62
9.38
10.86
8.48
8.58
8.26
5.98
Similarities
Trust in the Turkish Cypriots
Reconciliation
.67*
.47*
.46*
-.45*
.45*
.44*
-.36*
-.36*
5.91
5.50
5.38
5.53
5.30
5.38
4.79
* Largest correlation between each variable and the discriminant function
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Table 8.21: Descriptive statistics of the significant predictors in terms of preference
Predictors Maintenance of Federal state Greek Cypriot Two Return to the
the status quo with 2 equal dominated separate prior-1974
communities Federal state states situation
M(SO) M (SD) M(SO) M (SD) M (SO)
Similarities 3.34(1.37). 4.66(1.38) 2.74(1.30). 2.99(1.32). 2.72(1.38).
Trust in the Turkish 2.29(1.29). 3.57(1.44) 2.20(1.28). 2.59( 1.50). 2.19( 1.37).
Cypriots
Reconciliation 3.86(1.45). 5.20(1.13) 4.16(1.26). 3.91(1.25). 3.62(1.37).
Inter-group anger 4.76(2.12). 3.05(2.07) 4.87(1.81). 4.52(2.00). 5.08(1.99).
Reconciliation plan . 3.80(1.06). 4.85(1.44) 3.68(1.20) • 3 .67( 1.28). 3.64(1.24).
Turkish Cypriots 2.85(1.09) • 3.67(1.31) 2.61(1.26). 2.63( 1.28). 2.35(1.22) a
badly treated
Social services, poor 3.91(1.30). 4.77(1.21) 3.62(1.36) • 3 .84( 1.29). 3.83(1.43).
people, children
Inter-group hate 4.36(2.11) • 2.50(1.89) 4.07(2.27) • 3.94(2.18). 4.38(2.37) •
General conformity 4.69(1.22) 3.95(1.62) 5.04(1.26) • 4.60(1.47) 4.98(1.44).
with Gr Cyps practices
Trust in the Greek 4.42(1.58) 3.79(1.54) 4.91(1.61). 4.70(1.36) 5.00(1.51).
people
Inter-group frustration 4.34(2.13). 2.93(1.96) 4.15(2.06) • 4.20(1.95), 4.78(2.12),
Greek Cypriots' 4.16(1.57) 3.65(1.33) 4.64(1.28) • 4.10(1.20) 4.62( 1.58).
positive attitude
Trust in the Greek 4.96(1.25) 4.49(1.30) 5.33(1.18). 4.80(1.36) 5.35(1.46).
Cypriots
Values and beliefs 2.93(1.07) • 3.70(1.00) 3.13(1.06) • 2.93(0.96). 2.90(1.16).
a: Significantly different with federal state with 2 equal communities
Table 8.22: Correlation matrix of significant predictors in terms of preference
Pooled within-group correlations among predictors
Simi! Trust ReconInter Recon TurkCyp Soci Inter Gen Trust Int GreCyp Trust
Turk anger plan Badtreat Serv hate conf Greek frustr Pos att GreCyp
C
Similarities
Trust in the
-.54Turkish Cypriots
Reconciliation .43 -.52
Inter-group anger -.44 -.46 -.43
Reconcil. plan .45 .46 .46 -.35
Turkish Cypriots
.60 .36 .29 -.20 .29badly treated
Social services,
poor people, .50 .51 .51 -.49 .46 .31
children
Inter-group hate -.45 -.50 -.49 .77 -.35 -.22 -.44
General
conformity with -.20 -.23 -.20 .22 -.07 -.15 -.17 .20
Gr Cyps practices
Trust in the
-.06 -.10 -.12Greek people .21 -.02 .03 -.08 .12 .28
Intergroup
-.36 -.40 -.42 .61 -.23 -.24 -.38 .62 .38 .14frustration
Greek Cypriots'
.50 -.11 -.10 .21 -.05 -.10 -.05 .16 .23 .29 .19positive attitude
Trust in the
-.11 -.14 .20 .37Greek Cypriots -.16 .18 .01 -.07 -.02 .18 .29 .54
Values-beliefs .22 -20 .24 -.22 .20 .II .30 -.21 -.20 -.08 -.23 -.08 -.07
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Table 8.23: Unstandardized canonical discriminant functions evaluated at group means
Solutions
Group means 2 3 4 5
Function 1 at
Group .05 1.71 -.39 -.04 -.50
Centroids
The loading matrix of correlations between predictors and discriminant functions, as
seen in Table 8.20, suggests that the best predictor for distinguishing between the
solutions was perceived similarities between the two communities. This was the most
important factor determining participants' choice. Then, trust in the Turkish Cypriot
people, attitudes to reconciliation, inter-group anger, attitudes to a reconciliation plan
and how badly Greek Cypriots think Turkish Cypriots have been treated, were the
next more influential factors, the levels of influence of which were not very different.
Finally, the least influential factors appeared to be how threatened participants
thought they will be if they live with the Turkish Cypriots, inter-group hate, how
willing Greek Cypriots thought Turkish Cypriots will be in conforming with the
Greek Cypriots' practices, trust in the Greek people, inter-group frustration, how
positive Greek Cypriots' opinion is on the compromise behaviour of the Turkish
Cypriots, trust in the Greek Cypriot people and how threatened in terms of their
values and beliefs they thought they will be if Turkish Cypriots live with them
(loadings less than .3 were not interpreted and therefore not displayed).
Participants who preferred as a solution the federal state with two equal communities,
believed there were more similarities between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
Cypriots, they trusted the Turkish Cypriots more, they were more favourable to
reconciliation and the reconciliation plan, thought that the Turkish Cypriots were
badly treated in the past by the Greek Cypriots and felt less threat in terms of their
values, beliefs but also in their social services if they were to live with the Turkish
Cypriots, than those that chose any other solution. They also felt less inter-group
anger, hate and frustration towards the Turkish Cypriots than those who chose any
other solution. On the other hand, they trusted less the Greek Cypriots and the Greek
people, while they also had a less positive opinion on Greek Cypriots' attitude
towards the Turkish Cypriots in the past, and thought that Turkish Cypriots would
conform more with Greek Cypriot's practices, if they were to live together only than
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those who chose either the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state or the return to the
prior-1974 situation (see Table 8.21 for the Means and Standard Deviations). Their
scores on these factors did not differ from those who chose the maintenance of the
status quo or the creation of two separate states. It is also worth noticing that it was
found that on the one hand, inter-group emotions are amongst the factors which
differentiate between the most favourable and the least favourable solutions for the
Turkish Cypriots, as well as that inter-group trust in the "enemy", and not political
trust in the in-group or the Greek Cypriots are also amongst those factors.
Pooled within-group correlations among the significant predictors of the first
function, showed high correlations between the three inter-group emotions, inter-
group anger and inter-group hate, as well as between inter-group hate and inter-group
frustration (see Table 8.22). There was also a high correlation between perceived
similarities and how badly participants perceived Turkish Cypriots to have been
treated. There were average correlations between similarities and trust in the Turkish
Cypriots, reconciliation and a reconciliation plan, inter-group anger and hate and
threat in the social services. Trust in the Turkish Cypriots was also correlated
averagely with attitudes to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan, inter-group
anger, hate and frustration, and social services. The correlations were also average
amongst attitudes to reconciliation, the three emotions, attitude to a reconciliation
plan and threat in social services. All the other correlations were either very low or
non significant.
Concerning the classification procedure for the total usable sample of 321 young
people, 52% were classified correctly, compared to the 20% who would be correctly
classified by chance. People who chose the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state
(75% correct classification) and those who chose the Federal state with two equal
communities (63.6% correct classification) were the most likely to be classified
correctly amongst all participants, than either those who chose the maintenance of the
status quo (30% correct classification), 'or the creation of two separate states (38%) or
the return to the pre-1974 solution (32.3 % correct classification).
Concerning the feasible solution to the Cyprus issue, three discriminant functions
were calculated with the first one allowing to discriminate significantly between the
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five solutions (p<0.00 1). The first discriminant function accounted for 40.8% of the
between-group variability.
Table 8.24: Summary of the discriminant function analysis
Function Percentage of variance explained Wilk's lambda Significance
1
2
3
40.8
38.5
20.7
.59
.73
.89
.01
.07
.59
Table 8.25: Results of the first discriminant function analysis of cognitive, emotional and
trust factors in terms of feasibility
Correlations
of
predictors
Pooled within-group correlations among predictorswith
discriminant
function
Predictors Univariate lnt. Soc. lnt. Trust Out Trust Reco
F(3,315) an~er Servic. hate TurC fear Gree neil,
Similarities .57* 11.09 -.47* .53* -.45* .56* -.05 -.17 .47*
Inter-group -.52* 8.73 -.51 * .77* -.48* .26 .25 -.45*
anger
Social .51 * 6.63 -.46* 5"* -.15 -.11 .52*. "
services,
poor people,
children
Inter-group -.47* 7.79 -.51 * .33 .15 -.51 *
hate **
Trust in the .44* 6.61 -.13 .55*
Turkish
Cypriots
Out-group -.42* 5.19 -.14
fear
Trust in the -.36* 4.25 -.16
Greek
people
Reconciliat. .33* 3.72
* Largest absolute correlation between each variable and any discriminant function
311
Table 8.26:Descriptivestatisticsof the significantpredictorsin termsof feasibility
Maintenance of Federal state Greek Cypriot Two
the status quo with 2 equal dominated separate
communities Federal state states
Predictors M(SD) M(SD) M (SD) M(SD)
Similarities 3.04(1.45) a 4.13(1.55) 2.73(1.32). 3.12(1.37).
Inter-group anger 4.66(2.10) • 3.33(2.02) 5.07(1.90). 4.65(1.88).
Social services, poor 4.00(1.43) 4.54(1.49) 3.52(1.27) • 3.76(1.21 ).
people, children
Inter-group hate 4.08(2.34) a 2.65(2.11) 4.4 7(2.12) a 3.91(2.11).
Trust in the Turkish 2.47(1.51) 3.10(1.49) 2.04(1.15). 2.60(1.37)
Cypriots
Out-group fear 3.08(1.77) 3.06(1.56) 3.89(1.88)b 3.78(1.65)
Trust in the Greek 4.36(1.65) 4.39(1.56) 5.11(1.59h 4.68(1.34)
people
Reconciliation 4.07(1.44) 4.69(1.26) 3.96(1.24) a 3.98(1.42).
a: significantly different from federal state with 2 equal communities
b: significantly different from maintenance of the status quo
Table 8.27:Unstandardizedcanonicaldiscriminantfunctionsevaluatedat groupmeans
Solutions
Function 1 at Maintenance Federal state Greek Cypriot Two separate
Group Centroids of the status with 2 equal dominated states
guo communities Federal state
Group means .24 .81 -.57 -.27
The loading matrix of correlations between predictors and discriminant functions, as
seen in Table 8.25, suggested that the factors that best distinguished between the
solutions were: similarities, inter-group anger and perceptions of threat, followed by
inter-group hate, trust in the Turkish Cypriot people, perceived fear of the out-group
towards them, trust in the Greek people and compromise (loadings less than .3 were
not interpreted and therefore not displayed).
Participants who chose as feasible the solution of the federal state with two equal
communities believed there were more similarities between the Greek Cypriots and
the Turkish Cypriots and felt less inter-group anger and hate towards the Turkish
Cypriots, than those who chose any other solution. However, they were more
favourable to reconciliation and saw less threat in their social services if they were to
live together with the Turkish Cypriots, only in comparison to those who chose the
Greek Cypriot dominated state and the creation of 2 separate states. Their scores did
not differ from those who chose the maintenance of the status quo on these factors.
Furthermore, they trusted more the Turkish Cypriots, less the Greek people and
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thought less that Turkish Cypriots were afraid of them only than those who chose the
Greek Cypriot dominated federal state. Their trust scores in the Turkish Cypriots did
not differ from those who chose any other solution. Concerning the last two factors,
however, also the scores of those who chose the maintenance of the status quo also
differed from those who chose the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state (see Table
8.26 for the means and standard deviations). These results do not only show the
difference between the results in terms of preference but also confirm the closeness of
beliefs of those who chose the maintenance of the status quo with those who chose the
creation of a federal state with 2 equal communities in terms of feasibility.
Concerning the pooled within-group correlations, there was only one high correlation,
between inter-group anger and inter-group hate. The rest of the correlations were
moderate, low, or non significant. Similarities; inter-group anger and reconciliation
seemed to be the variables which were correlated with almost everything at a
moderate level. People who perceived more similarities between the two groups also
tended to feel less anger towards the Turkish Cypriots, to see less threat in their social
services by the Turkish Cypriots, to trust them more, and to be more favourable to
reconciliation. People also who felt more anger towards the Turkish Cypriots tended
to see more threat in the social services, to hate more the Turkish Cypriots and trust
them less and to be less favourable to reconciliation. People who were more
favourable to reconciliation also tended to feel less threat in social services by the
arrival of the Turkish Cypriots, to feel less hate towards them and to trust the Turkish
Cypriots more (see Table 8.25 for the correlation coefficients).
Concerning the classification procedure, 52% of participants were correctly classified
compared to the 25% who would be correctly classified by chance. People who chose
the maintenance of the status quo (64% correct classification) were the most likely to
be classified correctly amongst all participants, either those who chose the federal
state with two equal communities (44.2% correct classification), or the Greek Cypriot
dominated federal state (46.6%) or the creation of two separate states (44.9% correct
classification).
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8.3.5 How do the prerequisites of acceptance and trust relate to the
preferred/feasible solutions?
A discriminant function analysis was performed in order to identify the predictors
among the different prerequisites which best distinguished among the different
choices of a preferred and a feasible solution to the Cyprus issue. Concerning the
preferred solution to the Cyprus issue, four discriminant functions were calculated
with the first and the second one allowing to discriminate significantly between the
five solutions (p<O.OOl). The first discriminant function accounted for 49.6% of the
between-group variability and the second one for 27.9%.
Table 8.28: Summaryof the discriminant function analysis based on the prerequisites of
acceptance and trust in terms of preference
Function Percentage of variance explained Wilk's lambda Significance
'"
1
2
3
4
49.6
27.9
14.5
8.0
.58
.75
.88
.95
.00
.05
.60
.83
Table 8.29: Results of the first and second discriminant function analyses of the prerequisites
of acceptance and trust in terms of preference
Predictors
. Correlations of predictors with
the discriminant function
Function 1 Function 2 Univariate F(4,323)
Turkish Cypriots make serious
efforts to achieve peace (l13)
Turkish Cypriots make efforts
of reconciliation (96)
You are personally willing to
make concessions in your
demands for the resolution of
the Cyprus issue (104)
Turkish Cypriots really want
peace (97)
Turkish Cypriots are afraid of
Greek Cypriots' dominance
(92)
Turkish Cypriots are also
victims of the history (95)
Greek Cypriots' negotiators are
close enough to the Turkish
Cypriots (lIS)
Greek Cypriots have reassured
the Turkish Cypriots that they
will bring the two communities
together (Ill)
-.45 6.18*
-.43 4.71**
-.40 6.27*
-.39 4.03**
.38 4.05**
-.34 2.94**
.43
.30 1.52(NS)
* p<O.OOI .. p<0.05 NS- non-significant
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Table 8.30: Descriptivestatistics of the significantprerequisitesof acceptanceand trust in
termsof preference
Maintenance Federal state
of the status with 2 equal
quo communities
Greek
Cypriot
dominated
Federal
Two
separate
states
Return to
the prior-
1974
situation
state
Predictors
2.75(1.40). 3.31 (1.40) 2.39(1.42).Turkish Cypriots make serious
efforts to achieve piece (113)
Turkish Cypriots make efforts of 3.47(1.63)
reconciliation (96)
You are personally willing to
make concessions in your
demands for the resolution of the
Cyprus issue (104)
Turkish Cypriots really want
peace (97)
Turkish Cypriots are afraid of
Greek Cypriots' dominance (92)
Turkish Cypriots are also
victims of the history (95)
Greek Cypriots' negotiators are
close enough to the Turkish
Cypriots (115)
Greek Cypriots have reassured
the Turkish Cypriots that they
will bring the two communities
to ether ( III )
M(SD) M(SD) M (SO) M (SO) M (SO)
2.98(1.48) 3.57(1.24)
3.l2(1.63). 3.60(1.41) 2.97( 1.68)ab4.13(1.49)
2.61 (1.83). 4.26(1.69) 3.22(1. 72). 3.10(1.75). 2.91 (1.72).
3 .46( 1.77). 3.92(1.27) 3.26(1.92) 8
3.52(1.69) 4.00(1.97)
4.10(1.77) 3.45(2.05) a
3.42(1.32) 3.48(1.55)
2.98(1.42) 3.20(1.60)
3.76(1.64) 4.41(1.39)
4.20(1.58).
3.75(1.92)
3 .85( 1.24)0
3.44(1.45)
4.33(2.55) 3.11(1.61)0
a: significantly different from federal state with 2 equal communities
b: singinficantIy different from two separate states
c: significantly different from maintenance of the status quo
3.84(1.91 ) 4.65(1.96)
The loading matrix of correlations between predictors and discriminant functions, as
seen in Table 8.29, suggested that the best predictors for distinguishing between
preferred solutions were two prerequisites of trust and one of acceptance; in
particular, these were how much participants thought: Turkish Cypriots made serious
efforts to achieve peace, how much they thought Greek Cypriots' negotiators were
close enough to the Turkish Cypriots and how much they thought Turkish Cypriots
made efforts of reconciliation. However, other prerequisites of acceptance were also
significant; these were: how much they were personally willing to make concessions
in their demands for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, how much they thought
Turkish Cypriots really wanted peace, how much they thought Turkish Cypriots were
afraid of Greek Cypriots' dominance and how much they thought Turkish Cypriots
were also victims of the history helped also distinguish between the solutions
(loadings less than .3 were not interpreted and therefore not displayed).
3.140.15) 3.43(l.l7)
2.92(1.43) 3.13(1.60)
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Different prerequisites differentiated between different solutions. However, the
majority of differentiations were between those who preferred the federal state with
two equal communities and those who preferred other solutions. Participants, who
chose as their preferred solution the federal state with two equal communities did not
appear to differentiate from those who chose the maintenance of the status quo or
those who chose the creation of 2 separate states in any of the prerequisites apart from
one prerequisite of acceptance, personal willingness to make concessions for the
resolution of the conflict. On the other hand, they differentiated themselves from
those who chose the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state and the return to the prior-
1974 situation on more prerequisites of acceptance, the aforementioned one and their
belief that Turkish Cypriots really wanted peace and made serious efforts both to
achieve peace and reconciliation. Concerning the belief that Turkish Cypriots were
also victims of the history, it differentiated between only those who chose the federal
state with two equal communities and those that chose the return to the prior-1974
situation, while the belief that Turkish Cypriots were afraid of Greek Cypriots'
dominance differentiated only those who chose the federal state with two equal
communities from those who chose the Greek Cypriot dominated Federal state (see
Table 8.30 for the means and standard deviations).
Those who chose the creation of 2 separate states only differentiated themselves from
those who chose the return to the prior-1974 situation on one prerequisite of
acceptance. Similarly those who chose the maintenance of the status quo
differentiated themselves from those who chose the federal state with 2 equal
communities only on one prerequisite of acceptance, and from those who chose the
Greek Cypriot dominated federal state on one prerequisite of trust. There were no
other differentiations between solutions (see Table 8.30 for the means and standard
deviations).
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Table 8.31: Correlation matrix of significant predictors in terms of preference
Predictors
Pooled within-group correlations among predictors
113 96 104 97 92 95 115
Turkish Cypriots make serious
efforts to achieve piece (ll3)
Turkish Cypriots make efforts of .51
reconciliation (96)
You are personally willing to .26 .21
make concessions in your
demands for the resolution of the
Cyprus issue (104)
Turkish Cypriots really want
peace (97)
Turkish Cypriots are afraid of
Greek Cypriots' dominance (92)
Turkish Cypriots are also victims
of the history (95)
Greek Cypriots' negotiators are
close enough to the Turkish
Cypriots (115)
Greek Cypriots have reassured
the Turkish Cypriots that they
will bring the two communities
together (111 )
.50 .67 .24
.04 -.02 .04 -.03
.42 .62 .30 .66 -.06
.29 .10 .14 .17 -.06 .10
.14 .13 .22 .13 .03 .12 .24
Pooled within-group correlations among the significant predictors are shown in Table
8.31. Among them, there were three high positive correlations and three moderate
positive ones. The rest were either low or non significant. Whether participants
thought Turkish Cypriots made efforts of reconciliation correlated strongly and
positively with evaluations of Turkish Cypriots desire for peace and evaluation of
Turkish Cypriots' victimisation in history, as well as did evaluations of Turkish
Cypriots' victimisation with Turkish Cypriots' desire for peace. Whether participants
thought Turkish Cypriots made serious efforts to achieve peace correlated positively
and moderately with evaluation of Turkish Cypriots efforts of reconciliation,
evaluation of Turkish Cypriots desire for peace and evaluation of Turkish Cypriots
victimisation in history.
Concerning the classification procedure, 48.5% of participants were correctly
classified compared to the 20% who would be correctly classified by chance. People
who chose the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state (74.4% correct classification)
were the most likely to be classified correctly amongst all participants, than either
those who chose the maintenance of the status quo (25.5% correct classification) or
those who chose the federal state with two equal communities (56.5% correct
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classification), or the creation of two separate states (25%) or the return to the pre-
1974 situation (31.8% correct classification).
Figure 8.1: Scatter plot 1- Group centroids of the preferred solutions for the two significant
functions
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Function 1
A discriminant function analysis was then performed in order to identify the
predictors among the different prerequisites which best distinguished among the
different choices of a feasible solution to the Cyprus issue. Concerning the preferred
solution to the Cyprus issue, three discriminant functions were calculated with the
first one allowing to discriminate significantly between the five solutions (p<O.001).
The first discriminant function accounted for 45.4% of the between-group variability.
Table 8.32: Summary of the discriminant function analysis based on the prerequisites of
acceptance and trust in terms of feasibility
Function Percentage of variance explained Wilk's lambda Significance
1 45.2 .71 .00
2 35.2 .82 .08
3 19.6 .93 .46
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Table 8.33: Results of the first discriminant function analysis of the prerequisites of
acceptance and trust in terms of feasibility
Predictors
Turkish Cypriots
really want peace
(97)
Turkish Cypriots
make efforts of
reconciliation (96)
Turkish Cypriots
feel a bond with
Cypriot land (94)
Turkish Cypriots are
also victims of the
history (95)
You are personally
willing to make
concessions in your
demands for the
resolution of the
Cyprus issue (104)
There could be more
changes in the
Turkish Cypriot
politics and
economy (107)
Greek Cypriots are
willing to make
concessions in their
demands for the
resolution of the
Cyprus issue (105)
Correlations
of predictor
variables
with the
discriminant Pooled within-group correlations among predictors
function
r Univariate 96 94 95 104 107 105
F(3,323)
.54 5.36** .68 .30 .68 .21 .26 .10
.53 5.69** .28 .63 .18 .16 .04
.48 4.64** .39 .06 .08 -.05
.46 4.53** .29 .29 -.01
.45 4.70** .29 .52
.38 .192.87**
.37 2.77**
** p<0.05
319
Table 8.34: Descriptivestatistics of the prerequisitesof acceptance and trust in terms of
feasibility ,
Predictors Maintenance Federal state Greek Two
of the status with 2 equal Cypriot separate
quo communities dominated states
~- Federal state
M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M (SD)
Turkish Cypriots really want peace (97) 3.46(1.92) a 4.42(1.52) 3.41(1.65) • 3.85(1.38)
Turkish Cypriots make efforts of 3.16(1.80) • 3.93(1.52) 3.02(1.57) a 3.76(1.35)
reconciliation (96)
Turkish Cypriots feel a bond with 4.38(1.94) • 5.16(1.22) 4.08(1.73). 4.52(1.76)
Cypriot land (94)
Turkish Cypriots are also victims of the 3.88(2.11) 4.60(1.65) 3.42(1.81) • 4.03(1.93)
history (95)
You are personally willing to make 2.81(1. 77). 3.86(1.71) 3.18(1. 79) 3.42(1.85)
concessions in your demands for the
resolution of the Cyprus issue (104)
There could be more changes in the 4.07(1.94) 4.67(1.59) 3.80( 1.74) 4.21(1.67)
Turkish Cypriot politics and economy
(107)
Greek Cypriots are willing to make 2.94(1.58) 3.61(1.54) 3.09(1.60) 3.37(1.56)
concessions in their demands for the
resolution of the Cyprus issue (l05)
a: Significantly different from federal state with two equal communities
Table 8.35: Un standardizedcanonicaldiscriminantfunctionsevaluatedat groupmeans
Solutions
Function 1 at 2 3 4
Group Centroids
Group means -.25 .80 -.32 .17
The loading matrix of correlations between predictors and discriminant functions, as
seen in Table 8.33, suggested that the factors that best distinguished between the
solutions were only prerequisites of acceptance: how much participants thought
Turkish Cypriots really wanted peace and how much Turkish Cypriots made efforts of
reconciliation. These were the two most important factors. However, participants'
perceptions on how much Turkish Cypriots felt a bond with Cypriot land, how much
Turkish Cypriots were also victims of the history, how much they were personally
willing to make concessions in their demands for the resolution of the Cyprus issue, if
there could be more changes in the Turkish Cypriot politics and economy and how
much Greek Cypriots were willing to make concessions in their demands for the
resolution of the Cyprus issue were also significant in distinguishing between the
solutions considered feasible (loadings less than .3 were not interpreted and therefore
not displayed).
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Participants who chose the creation of the federal state with two equal communities as
a feasible one did not differentiate themselves from those who chose the creation of
two separate states on any of the prerequisites measured. On the other hand, they
differentiated themselves from those who chose the maintenance of the status quo
and/or the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state on the beliefs that Turkish Cypriots
really wanted peace, really made efforts of reconciliation, that they felt a bond with
Cypriot land, that they were also victims of the history and that they personally would
be willing to make concessions in their demands for the resolution of the Cyprus issue
(see Table 8.35 for the means and standard deviations). There were no other
differentiations between solutions, which shows that in terms of feasibility and in
terms of the prerequisites of acceptance and trust, which were examined in this study,
those who chose the maintenance of the status quo, those who chose the creation of
two separate states and those who chose the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state
held similar beliefs.
Pooled within-group correlations among all the significant predictors showed that
there were only three strong positive correlations and one moderate positive amongst
certain predictors, while the rest were all either low or non-significant. The more
people thought that the Turkish Cypriots. really wanted peace, the more they tended to
believe as well that the Turkish Cypriots also made effort for reconciliation and they
were also victims of history, while the more people thought that the Turkish Cypriots
made efforts for reconciliation, the more they also tended to believe that they were
also victims of history. Furthermore, the more people tended to believe that Greek
Cypriots were willing to make concessions in their demands the more they tended to
believe that they would personally make concessions in their demands.
Concerning the classification procedure, 45.3% of participants were correctly
classified compared to the 25% who would be correctly classified by chance. People
who chose the maintenance of the status quo (62.5% correct classification) were the
most likely to be classified correctly amongst all participants, than either those who
chose the federal state with two equal communities (29.8% correct classification), or
those who chose the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state (47.3% correct
classification), or the creation of two separate states (26.9%).
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8.4 Discussion
8.4.1 Attitudes to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan in relation to trust.
emotions and cognitive appraisals
Further analysis of the factors that were chosen to be included in the present study
based on the existing literature on conflict resolution and our previous research,
yielded important findings for the role of emotions and trust. They were both
integrated in the model of conflict resolution (Fisher, 1990, 2000) and they both
proved important predicting factors for attitudes towards reconciliation and
acceptance of a reconciliation plan. Concerning emotions, we looked at inter-
group/personally expressed emotions, perceived emotions of the in-group towards the
out-group, and perceived emotions of the out-group towards the in-group. Although
questions on the inter-group emotions were phrased at an individual/personal level,
we assumed that their function was at an inter-group level instead of at a personal
level, based on the importance of the identity of the participants (Mackie et al., 2000).
This assumption was based on the expectation that these emotions would not exist, if
our participants were not Greek Cypriots; because, none of our participants had
experienced or been involved directly in any historical event or personal incident with
the Turkish Cypriots. Most of our participants had never even seen or met a Turkish
Cypriot or a Turkish person in person.
The findings of our analyses also confirmed the evidence of the literature on the
distinctiveness of anger and fear (Mackie et al., 2000; Huddy, Feldman, Taber &
Lahav, 2005). These two emotions when examined at either an inter-group or
(perceived) in-group level, they were not significantly correlated. Similarly, the
hierarchical regressions also revealed that they were predicted by different factors.
While inter-group anger was predicted significantly by Cypriot identification, threat,
similarities and two other levels of emotions, in-group anger and out-group fear, inter-
group fear was only predicted significantly by (perceived) in-group fear and
similarities. In contrast to the Intergroup Emotions Theory (lET) which suggests that
group identification is an important predictor of intergroup emotions, the results have
shown that Cypriot identification was significant only for anger, not for fear. This
raises questions about the role of the strength of identification for certain emotions,
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which could point to the direction of the significance of other factors, such as domain
relevance (Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel & Fischer, 2007). It could be that fear becomes
more prevalent in more specific settings and in potentially different settings, than the
current one where the two communities do not have any contact and are physically
separated (Ahmed, 2004). The results of the qualitative study (see chapter 7) have
also pointed to this direction, with the emergence of fear when a potential future
coexistence of the two communities was made salient. However, alternatively it
should be considered that the use of a different identification, Le. ethnic identification,
which has been emphasised by the qualitative study, could have lead to different
results. Different identifications should also be examined, before conclusions should
be drawn on the role of group identification.
However, these two emotions did not only have different antecedents, but they
themselves predicted different attitudinal and behavioral tendencies (Mackie, Devos.
& Smith, 2000). Inter~groupfear only predicted inter-group political trust (trust in the
Turkish Cypriot leaders- and not trust in the Turkish Cypriot people) positively. The
more participants expressed fear towards the leaders of the opponent group, the more
they would trust them. This could be related to findings of the study of Mackie et al.
(2000) where fear was not related to a violent behavioural tendency towards the out-
group in a conflicting situation. In the present study it was shown that not only did it
not predict a violent behavioural reaction but on the contrary it predicted a positive
one. Fear, based probably on insecurity (according to the results of the qualitative
study), lead people to trust the authorities that control the reconciliation and
controlling process. These results, however, offered little support for theories of
emotions and conflict resolution which have indicated that fear leads to an interminent
cycle of violence through the collective memory of past inter-group violent behaviour
(via the fixation of the society to react to the perception of present and future threat
through the already known path of violence) (Bar-Tal, 2001).
However, this relationship could also be due to other reasons; it could also be, that
because fear is a feeling that conflicting parties do not easily admit (very low mean of
inter-group fear in our sample), because it hides a sense of lack of pride coming from
perceived lack of power against the enemy, it is only admitted by people that have
admitted the impossibility of the conflicting situation and are more willing to
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communicate and reach reconciliation with the opponent. Considering this alternative
explanation, it has to be emphasised that further research would be essential, as one
important factor affecting fear is culture (Paez & Vergara, 1995) and fear has not been
researched in the Cypriot context -neither concerning the way situations are being
appraised, nor the level and the form of its expression (Cole, Bruschi, Tamang, 2002).
The reason why culture should be further considered is also due to the inconsistency
which was found between the qualitative study (see chapter 7) and the present
quantitative study; in the qualitative study fear emerged repeatedly creating an
impression that it existed and it was very influential on young people's attitudes to
reconciliation, while in the present study levels of reported fear were very low and it
was not found to affect either attitudes to reconciliation or attitudes to a reconciliation
plan. Only, the relationship between in-group fear and attitudes to reconciliation was
mediated by inter-group social trust, which shows that fear can be admitted at a group
level and affect attitudes to reconciliation, but not directly and not at a personal level.
Concerning, admitting one's personal fear, it could be that fear is an emotion easily
admitted in the intimate context of an interview, but not in a questionnaire in the
context of a classroom, along with questions on anger and frustration, which
emphasise more feelings of pride, dominance and self-esteem (Cole et aI., 2002).
On the other hand, inter-group anger was a significant negative predictor of both
political and social trust; the more participants expressed anger the less they would
trust both the members and the authority of the opponent out-group. Anger also
predicted attitudes toward reconciliation negatively indirectly, as it was mediated by
inter-group social trust. The more anger someone felt towards the out-group, the less
they would trust this out-group people and the less they would want to reconcile with
them. These two relationships with negative attitudinal and behavioural tendencies
confirmed and extended the results of the study of Mackie et al. (2000) on the
function of anger in conflicting situations, however, they offered little support for
Pennekamp et al's (2007) study, which suggested that anger could be a way to signal
one's willingness to "seek reparation for the injustice (by) restoring the relations
between groups" (p.52-53). Anger's effects both concerning trust and reconciliation
were negative in the present context. Nevertheless, the long-term outcome of anger
cannot be known and therefore assumptions could not be made for the eventual effect
of anger on reconciliation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007).
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Concerning trust, the differentiation between social and political trust, provided a
clearer understanding of the relationship of trust with its correlates (cognitive,
emotional appraisals and attitudes toward reconciliation). On the one hand, both
social and political trust were predicted by both cognitive and emotional appraisals,
which confirmed the relationship of trust with cognitive and emotional factors
(Barber, 1983; Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Metlay, 1999; Macek & Markova, 2001).
Perceived similarities, perceived threat (Davidson et al, 2004; Maney et al., 2006), the
perceived history of antagonism between the two groups (Mack, 1983; Hadjipavlou,
2002; Nadler & Saguy, 2004), as well as inter-group anger and fear (Giner-Sorolla et
al., 2007; Bar-Tal, 2001) were found to predict social and political trust. However,
first, social trust was not affected by inter-group fear, and political trust was not
affected by the perceived similarities, and second, the common predictors of the trust
in these two targets accounted for a different amount of variance in each type of trust.
These differences show that inter-group social and political trust are not related to the
same factors in the same way. It is worth also noticing that the cognitive factors were
much more predictive of social trust than political trust (almost 3 times more), and
also that the significant factors for political trust did not explain a big part of its
variance. More research should be conducted to find the factors which would have
higher predictive power for political trust. Furthermore, the results showed that the
cognitive factors were much more important than emotions in the prediction of either
social or political trust. Therefore, both social and political trust, based on the specific
emotional and cognitive factors that the present study considered, appeared to be
cognitively based and not emotionally based.
To sum up, these results have shown first, that there is a direct relationship of both
social and political trust with more factors than the ones indicated by Fisher's model
(1990, 2000); consisting of both emotions and the inter-group antecedents. Second,
they have shown that inter-group social and political trust are two different concepts
which should not be equated or considered as one. This was also apparent from the
consequences that each concept had. Social trust proved to be the more influential of
the two on reconciliation and acceptance of a reconciliation plan. It had a direct effect
on both of them. The more participants expressed trust towards the out-group people,
the more they were willing to reconcile with them and accept this specific
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reconciliation plan. On the other hand, inter-group political trust did not have any
effect on either of these two outcomes and its correlation with social trust was not
very strong either. This could be explained by the extremely low mean score of
political trust. Trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders was very low for the totality of the
sample. It was obvious that young Greek Cypriots differentiated between the Turkish
Cypriot people and their leaders, showing a clear preference for the people instead of
the political leaders.
Attitudes toward reconciliation and attitudes toward a reconciliation plan were also
found to be two distinctive types of attitudes (Rothstein, 1999; Shamir & Shikaki,
2002). Although they had some common correlates and the one predicted the other,
they were not predicted by the same factors. It was interesting that there was no direct
significant emotional predictor of attitudes toward the reconciliation plan and that
trust mediated the effect both of inter-group anger and in-group fear for attitudes
toward reconciliation.
The results showed that the factors affecting the decision for reconciliation between
two conflicting parties are very different to those affecting the decision to accept
particular propositions that affect the life of the parties' members in every day
domains. When it comes to a specific reconciliation plan, people decide based on
cognitive factors and not on how they feel about their opponents. However, the
indirect effect of emotions through trust should not be disregarded and should be
further examined.
Overall, Fisher's model appeared to be very important in providing a structure of the
factors affecting conflict resolution; however, the complexity of the original model
and the particularities of each conflict allow and probably demand the simplification
and the adaptation of the model to the specific context of each conflict. Furthermore,
the incorporation of emotions and of the differentiation of social and political trust is
considered as enriching to the model, as well as the differentiation in the outcomes of
the model. When we refer to the solution of a conflict and to people's attitudes
towards a solution, it has to be seriously taken into consideration that general attitudes
differ to attitudes towards specific plans. Therefore, the targets/outcomes of a model
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of conflict resolution should also be specified (whether they refer to general attitudes
or specific plans).
The results from the initial analysis of the data which aimed to derive the measures
used in subsequent analyses to test the model of conflict resolution revealed that it
was not possible to use the concepts of material and symbolic threat in our analyses.
The items that were proposed by Stephan, Ybarra and Bachman (1999) did not group
together as expected, showing the further compartmentalisation of these two concepts
for young Greek Cypriots. There was a further distinction between the general and the
more specific targets of symbolic threat, as well as between socially oriented material
threat and economy oriented material threat. The reason for this compartmentalisation
could be on the one hand that there are more concepts embedded in the two concepts
that the scale is supposed to measure or on the other hand, that there was a lot of
measurement error that did not allow for the emergence of the two factors
theoretically hypothesised.
8.4.2 Attitudes to reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan in relation to the
prerequisites of acceptance and trust
The analysis of the prerequisites of acceptance and trust (Kelman, 1978, 2005)
showed that certain of these practical steps predicted attitudes both towards
reconciliation and towards a reconciliation plan, while certain ones predicted attitudes
. only to one of the two. The level of Turkish Cypriots' victimisation in history, the
level of perceived knowledge of Turkish Cypriots' worries and needs and the level of
personal willingness to make concessions on one's demands were the factors found to
influence attitudes to both targets. On the other hand, the perceived level of Greek
Cypriots' willingness (in-group willingness) to make concessions in their demands
vis-a-vis the Turkish Cypriots was found to influence only attitudes to a reconciliation
plan, and the perception of Turkish Cypriots' fear of Greek Cypriots' dominance
predicted only attitudes towards reconciliation.
Within the common factors, it was surprising to see that personal willingness to make
concessions had an opposite effect from perceived in-group willingness on attitudes to
a reconciliation plan. While increased personal willingness predicted increased
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favourability to a reconciliation plan, perceived increased in-group willingness
predicted decreased favourability toward a reconciliation plan. This shows that
willingness to make personal concessions, to take personal action, has a different
effect from perceiving the in-group as willing to make concessions, to take action.
This incompatibility could be the result of a perceived inequality between the
concessions each side had to make according to the plan; while the in-group was seen
as willing to make concessions, the out-group, the Turkish Cypriots were perceived as
not having made or be willing to make enough concessions. The validity of this
explanation is supported by the fact that the "no camp" and the Greek Cypriot
president, Mr. T. Papadopoulos, in his personal declaration to the Cypriot people
regarding the referendum of 2004, had used the argument that although the Greek
Cypriot side had agreed to make various concessions, the Turkish and the Turkish
Cypriot side had not agreed to make enough (Papadopoulos, 07/04/2004).
Another interesting result was that favourability toward reconciliation was negatively
predicted by the perceived knowledge of Turkish Cypriots' fear of being dominated.
The more participants perceived Turkish Cypriots as being afraid of Greek Cypriots'
dominance, the more they were unfavourable toward reconciliation. Finding the
"enemy" less powerful than the in-group, increased the in-group' s power position,
leading to decreased willingness to reconcile. These results confirm previous theories
and research on. the conflict escalating results of power imbalance between
adversaries (Maney et al., 2006; Davidson et al., 2004), and expand them by showing
precisely the effect of the perception of belonging to a high power group with
willingness to reconcile.
These results, first, supported our previous findings that reconciliation in general and
a reconciliation plan should be treated differently since they are two different
phenomena. People who support one of them will not categorically support the other
one as well, since different factors lead to each of these attitudes.
Second, the results showed that the perceived knowledge of one's needs and worries
has the same positive affect on willingness to reconcile, as the actual knowledge of
them as hypothesised by Kelman (1978). The results however, also suggested that the
effect of knowledge of the opponent side's needs and worries becomes different when
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the power issue is raised. Admitting the other's fears not only does not make oneself
more compromising, but has the opposite effect. It seems as people, when they have
the chance to have the "upper hand", they try to take advantage of it and take as much
as they can out of it. Fourth, the role of history was also confirmed (Kelman, 2004,
see also chapter 7 and chapter 3), as well as the role of personal and perceived in-
group willingness to make concessions, which is a behavioural attitude inherent in the
concept of reconciliation.
Fifth, it is also important to emphasise that none of the other factors/prerequisites,
neither the cognitive ones nor the behavioural/attitudinal ones, predicted favourability
toward reconciliation or toward a reconciliation plan. Perceived in-group and out-
group efforts of reassurance, of commitment or of peace appeared not to play any
role. This could be methodologically due to the simple reference of these concepts-
without any specific example- which could have entailed an intellectual difficulty for
the majority of participants, who were under 17 years old. However, it could also be
that these issues have not been part of the family, school or media agenda and
therefore participants are not familiar with these concepts. It is common in conflict
situations that only the in-group's actions are discussed, while the out-group's efforts
of reassurance or commitment to peace are either not discussed or viewed with
suspicion (Kelman, 2005; Maney et al., 2006).
8.4.3 Which are the preferred solutions and the solutions considered feasible?
The results revealed that young people distinguished between what they preferred and
what they considered feasible for a solution to the Cyprus conflict, following the
results on adults (Inbar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1989). The choices young people made in
each case were not the same and these choices did not depend on the same factors.
Despite many commonalities between the factors that predicted their choice of a
preferred or a feasible solution, there were still differences in these factors that should
be taken into consideration, both in terms of relevance and strength.
Looking initially at the popularity of the different solutions in terms of preference, it
is observed that the solutions which allocated and secured the most of privileges only
to the Greek Cypriots were the most popular ones, followed by those which would
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ensure the maintenance of the current social, political and economical situation,
followed in the end by the solution where the "other" community would share the
same benefits and rights. These results, although in contrast with the content analysis
results of the qualitative study (see chapter 7), they followed partly the results of
research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Inbar & Yuchtman- Yaar, 1989); in the
present study, the difference between the perceived as most favourable to the in-group
solutions and the other solutions was very similar to the Palestinians' and Israeli
Arabs' responses in Inbar "and Yuchtman-Yaar (1989) study. On the other hand, the
spread of Greek Cypriots' responses amongst the rest of the solutions and the
popularity of the maintenance of the status quo over a federal state with two equal
communities was similar to the Israeli Jews' responses. The complexity of these
results, lie in that Greek Cypriots' results are a combination of Palestinians' and
Israeli Jews' results. In particular, on the one hand the majority of the Greek Cypriots
(who are the majority and the economically advantaged population in the country) felt
so strongly about its lost rights, very much like the Palestinians, who are on the
contrary the economically and politically disadvantaged group in the country; but, on
the other hand, in terms of willingness to change the current situation, Greek Cypriots
did not seem ready to abandon their present economic, political and social status, in
order to reunite the country, similarly to the Iraeli Jews. This combination of factors
shows not only the difficulty of the situation but also the particularity of the situation
in Cyprus, in comparison to other conflicts.
This is also apparent from the results on feasibility, which also did not correspond to
the results of the Israeli and Palestinian study (Inbar & Yuchtman- Yaar, 1989). "The
most popular solution in terms of feasibility was the maintenance of the status quo,
followed by the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state, followed by the creation of
two separate states and finally followed by the creation of two federal states with two
equal communities. Even in terms of feasibility, the Greek Cypriots appeared to hold
very tight to their current situation, perceiving it impossible to share what they now
unilaterally benefit from (strong economy, EU membership), with the Turkish
Cypriots. However, they appeared less polarised than in terms of their preferences,
which is both encouraging and discouraging; on the one hand, wider variety of
opinions shows a more open-minded group and therefore more prone to change, but
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on the other hand, wider variety makes it even harder to reach intra-group agreement
on one only solution.
8.4.4 The relationship between preferred solutions and feasible solutions with trust.
emotions, cognitive appraisals and the prerequisites of acceptance and trust
Due to the lack of an existing literature on the association of possible solutions with
psychological factors, the results could not be discussed in reference to previous
studies. References could only be made to general attitudes towards reconciliation and
public policy preferences, which have emerged in the literature in reference to
situations of national security threat (i.e. terrorism). The present study explored two
types of factors leading to the choice of a solution to the Cyprus issue; the theoretical
factors and the perception of the practical steps to be taken to achieve certain of these
theoretical factors and reconciliation. Both types of factors lead to the same
conclusions on young Greek Cypriots' evaluation of the solutions.
Looking first at the prediction of the preferred and the feasible solutions based on the
theoretical factors, the significant factors for both types of solutions were not only
either cognitive or emotional; there was a combination of cognitive and emotional
factors. Perceived similarities, perceived threat, trust in different in-group and out-
group targets, history of antagonism, attitudes to reconciliation and to a specific
reconciliation plan, as well as personal/inter-group and also out-group emotions were
significant (Mack, 1983; Rothstein, 1999; Hadjipavlou, 2002; Nadler & Saguy, 2004;
Mackie et al., 2004; Huddy et al., 2005).
Both in terms of feasibility and preference, the solutions perceived as most and least
favourable to the in-group (in terms of feasibility the Greek Cypriot dominated federal
state and the federal state with two equal communities respectively, and in terms of
preference the return to the pre-1974 situation and the federal state with two equal
communities respectively) were associated with the least/most perceived similarities
between the two groups, least/most trust in the out-group, most/least trust in the in-
group, most/least perceived threat and most/least negative emotions towards the out-
group. These results are consistent with experimental results of the existing literature
on the effect of threat, fear and anger on public policies preferences, which show that
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the angrier, the less scared and the more threatened people feel, the more they are
going to be supportive of more punitive, aggressive and isolationist policies (Huddy et
aI., 2005; Lerner et aI., 2003).
However, in terms of preference, only people who chose the federal state with two
equal communities were different from those who chose the other solutions on certain
factors; people who chose any other solution did not differ on any of the factors
considered. It appears therefore, that young people who prefer the four other solutions
are not distinguishable either in terms of trust, or emotions or cognitive evaluations of
inter-group relationships.
Furthermore, there were certain factors, such as trust in the in-group and Greek
people, and certain aspects of perceptions of threat and history of antagonism, in
reference to which, people who chose the federal state with two equal communities
did not differ either from those who chose the maintenance of the status quo and those
who chose the two separate states. The similarity between the first two cannot be
easily explained, however, the similarity between those who chose the federal state
with two equal communities and those who chose the two separate states could be
related to the fact that the separation of Cyprus in two equal states has been the
official position of Turkish Cypriots in the resolution of the Cyprus conflict;
therefore, those Greek Cypriots who support it, are those more favourable to Turkish
Cypriots (Anatolia Agency, 23.5.00, http://wwvv.hri.orglnews/cvprus/tcpr/2000/00-
05-24.tcpr.html).
Only in terms of feasibility, the maintenance of the status quo was distinguished from
the Greek Cypriot dominated federal state in terms of perception of out-group fear
and trust in the Greek people; those who chose the Greek Cypriot dominated federal
state trusted more the Greek people and believed that Turkish Cypriots were more
afraid of the Greek Cypriots, than did those who chose the maintenance of the status
quo. It appears therefore that perception of inter-group emotions and trust in a
favourable to the in-group out-group, also help differentiate between the other
solutions.
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However, it is worth noticing that in terms of feasibility, similarly to what was found
in terms of preference, people who chose the federal state with two equal
communities did not differ from those who chose the maintenance of the status quo in
terms of perceived social threat, inter-group social trust, perception of out-group fear,
trust in the Greek people and attitudes to reconciliation. These results show that even
though these factors were differentiating between the solutions that were preferred,
these factors were not important when considering what could realistically happen.
When the constraints of reality were considered, young people who chose the
maintenance of the status quo did not hold very different views from those who chose
the most favourable to the Turkish Cypriots solution. This shows on the one hand, that
young people differentiate between feasible and preferred solutions and also that
generalisation should not be made on what supporters of different solutions believe or
would be expected to support. Solutions might be related to different inter-gorup
attitudes for people, not only from different groups, but also within the same group,
depending on the consideration of the constraints of reality.
When the practical steps for acceptance and trust were considered, the results were
also different in terms of feasibility and preference. While in terms of feasibility all
significant predictors created one significant function, in terms of preference two
prerequisites which belonged to the prerequisites for trust (Kelman, 2005) created a
different pattern of solutions. The solution of a federal state with two equal
communities and the solution of a federal state dominated by the Greek Cypriots were
positioned together, separately from the solution of two separate states, of the
maintenance of the status quo and the return to the pre-1974 situation. The difference
of the two clusters showed the difference between federalism and the other three
solutions. Any type of federalism- seemed to be promoted by the existence of trust,
vis-a-vis the creation of any type of separate entities. However, due to the difficulty
associated with the item used for trust, this claim cannot be further explained; further
research would be necessary on the role of the prerequisites of trust in relation to the
choice of preferred solutions.
Another important finding in the results of the preferred solutions concerned the role
of perceived fear of the enemy towards the in-group in conflict. While people more
favourable to the Turkish Cypriots (and therefore who would choose the creation of a
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federal state with two equal communities or two separate states) would be expected to
be those who would mostly recognise Turkish Cypriots' fear of Greek Cypriot
dominance, they were those to recognise it the least, while those"that recognised it the
most were those who preferred the more unfavourable to the Turkish Cypriots
solutions. Fear was therefore not considered a disadvantage of the adversarial out-
group, but an extra factor that would justify the separation of the two communities or
at least the control over the Turkish Cypriots. This confirms the results on the role of
out-group fear in attitudes towards reconciliation, also shown by Fisher's model tested
in the present study, and the existing literature on the role of power (Maney et al.,
2006; Davidson et al., 2004). This conception of the out-group showed the effects of
the lack of communication between these two communities (as Turkish Cypriots
consider their own fear as a sign of their powerlessness and need of support from
Greek Cypriots) and the necessity of knowledge of each others beliefs and emotions if
things are to move forward (Retzinger & Scheff, 2006).
8.4.4.1 Preferred versus feasible solutions"
Greek Cypriot young people did distinguish between what they would ideally want
and what could realistically happen to resolve the Cyprus issue. Different factors were
found to predict the preferred versus the feasible solutions. In particular, more
cognitive factors, more trust evaluations and more prerequisites significantly
predicted the preferred solutions in comparison to the feasible ones. Looking at the
relationship between the two types of solutions and the theoretical factors, it appears
that first concerning threat (Stephan et al., 1999), more dimensions (including threat
to the group's values and beliefs, threat by the benefits that should be given to the
outgroup in the case of a federal state and threat by the lack of willingness of the out-
gr?up to conform with the Greek Cypriots' practices) were predictive of the preferred
solutions in comparison to the feasible solutions. This shows that even when young
people think about what they prefer, they still consider very realistic and practical
issues involved in their coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand,
when evaluating and choosing a feasible solution, these practicalities are not taken
into consideration at the same level, and other factors seem to influence more their
decision.
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Apart from threat, trust also appeared to play an important role both in predicting the
choice of a solution, and also at differentiating between different choices in terms of
preference and feasibility. There were more targets of trust predicting significantly the
preferred solutions. Trust in the Turkish Cypriots, the main "opponent" group in the
Cyprus conflict for the Greek Cypriots, and trust in the Greek people, both an in-
group and an out-group for the Greek Cypriots at different historical times, were
important when choosing both a preferred and a feasible solution. On the other hand,
trust in the in-group, the Greek Cypriots, was only significant for the preferred
solutions. When considering which solution could be realistically implemented,
participants did not seem to be influenced by their trust in their in-group. They were
more "objective" when considering what could happen in reality. On the other hand,
trust in the international external parties involved in the Cyprus issue, the European
Union and the United Nations, did not prove to be important for either type of
solutions; this showed that even though they are important in the Cyprus issue, when
it comes to a permanent decision for the conflict, young Greek Cypriots do not
consider or challenge the opinions and the roles of the international institutions, they
evaluate only the relationship of the immediate parties involved.
In terms of emotions, only inter-group/personal emotions were significant predictors
of the preferred solutions, and they were all related to anger (inter-group anger, hate
and frustration). Only out-group fear was a significant predictor, which on the other
hand, showed the importance of the dialectic nature of emotions in inter-group
conflict. While the dynamic and the reciprocal character of conflicts has already been
emphasised in terms of the cognitive factors involved (Fisher, 1990, 2000; Rothstein,
1999), the reciprocal nature of emotions should also be considered and further
explored in future research.
In terms of the differences between the preferred and the feasible solutions based on
the prerequisites of acceptance and trust, the only differentiation between them is that
the differentiation of the feasible solutions is based mainly on prerequisites of
acceptance, while in terms of preference there is a mixture of prerequisites of trust
and acceptance. This difference highlights the significance of trust especially in the
choice of an ideal solution and not in the choice of a feasible solution. Feasible
solutions, as expected, appeared to be more based on practical factors. However, for
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both types of solutions there was a mixture of evaluations of perceptions and of real
actions of both the in-group and the out-group, which shows that they are both
evaluated by young people when considering both what they want and what they
believe can realistically happen.
The results on the explanatory power of different social psychological factors for the
preferred and feasible solutions have confirmed first, the distinction of the concepts of
preference and feasibility amongst young people, similarly to that of adults (Inbar &
Yuchtman-Yaar, 1989); second, the importance not only of trust, but also of the
differentiation of trust in different targets, in-group/out-group social arid political
targets in the choice of a solution; third, the importance of a distinction amongst inter-
group negative emotions (Lerner et al., 2003; Huddy et al., 2005) as different
emotions lead to the choice of different solutions, both in terms of preference and
feasibility, and fourth, the importance of other factors such as perceived similarities,
perceived history of antagonism and perceptions of in-group's and out-group's actions
and motives in the choice of feasible and preferred solutions.
8.4.5 General Conclusion
The present quantitative study explored the role of emotions and trust in attitudes to
reconciliation and attitudes to specific reconciliation plans, as well as to specific
solutions to the conflict. The first point that the results of the present study made is
the importance of the distinction of trust in different targets as well as of negative
inter-group emotions, both in distinct emotions, and subjects of emotions in the
understanding of attitudes towards reconciliation and towards specific solutions to a
conflict. The second point was that the role of emotions does not appear to be as
important as the role of cognitive factors in the explanation of attitudes to conflict
. resolution; however, further analyses and research would be necessary to establish the
potential mediation/moderation of emotions also by other factors, apart from trust.
The third point was the importance of the examination of both practical steps as well
as of theoretical factors in the analysis of conflict resolution and in the differentiation
between solutions in terms of preference and feasibility, as they give a different
insight on people's understanding of the conflict. Finally, the fifth point was that
young people appear able to distinguish between what they want and what they
336
consider realistically feasible and this distinction is mainly based on specific cognitive
evaluations. Their lack of life experience, in comparison to adults, appears not to
hinder either their distinction of reality from fantasy, or their use of cognitive factors
in the evaluation of issues of national importance.
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Chapter 9: General discussion
The present thesis had two broad aims. First it was designed to explore the role of
trust and emotions in processes of conflict resolution and second to assess the
usefulness of specific models of conflict escalation/de-escalation for furthering our
understanding of the psychological processes which may act as barriers to conflict
resolution. In order to achieve these research aims, the present thesis examined:
1. young people's levels of trust in varying in-group/out-group social and political
targets
2. young people's understanding of the concept of trust in these targets
3. the factors affecting inter-group social and political trust, including that of emotions
4. the usefulness of Fisher's model (1990, 2000) in creating a framework for
examining the relationship between social psychological factors (such as inter-group
trust, patterns of identification, inter-group negative emotions, unilateral victimisation,
cultural differences, conflict of interests, needs, power) and willingness to reconcile
5. the usefulness of Kelman's (1978, 2005) trust and acceptance prerequisites for
understanding willingness to reconcile and acceptance of different solutions to the
conflict
6. the explanatory power of different social psychological factors and practical
prerequisites for young people's choice of solutions to conflict in terms of feasibility
and in terms of preference (Inbar & Yuchtman-Yaar, 1989).
The findings of the present thesis further previous theoretical and empirical
understanding of trust by showing that young people differentiate between different
targets of trust, not only based on the in-group/out-group status of the target but also
on its social/political character and its relationship with the trustee. Trust in social
targets appears to have a distinct role in conflict resolution attitudes to trust in
political targets, as it is related to different cognitive and emotional factors and also
leads to different attitudes towards both reconciliation and other solutions to the
conflict. The thesis also empirically tested for the first time and theoretically
expanded Fisher's model and Kelman's prerequisites (1978, 2005) of conflict
escalation/de-escalation, as well as Inbar and Yuchtman- Yaar' s (1989) dichotomy
between realistic and idealistic solutions, showing that between inter-group social and
political trust, particularly inter-group social trust is important in explaining young
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people's choices and attitudes towards conflict resolution, along with inter-group
emotional evaluations and other social psychological factors such as similarities,
history of antagonism and perceived threat. It is indeed worth noting that our findings
emphasise the significance of emotions in conflict resolution and extend our
understanding of their role by showing that they affect differentially willingness to
reconcile and choice of solution in terms of feasibility and preference.
9.1 (a) Do young people trust in-group and out-group social and political targets
involved in inter-ethnic conflict at varying levels?
(b) What is the phenomenological understanding of the concept of trust in
different in-group and out-group social and political targets in the context
of conflict resolution?
The first issues addressed were the levels of inter-group social and political trust
amongst young Greek Cypriots and the phenomenological understanding of trust in
different social and political targets. Within the context of protracted inter-ethnic
conflict both the levels and the phenomenological use/understanding of the concept of
trust were found to be target and context specific, confirming theories of political and
general trust (Gamson, 1968; Easton, 1975; Weatherford, 1987; Mishler & Rose,
1997; Citrin & Muste, 1999; Citrin, 1974; Luhman, 1979; Citrin & Green, 1986; Levi
& Stroker, 2000; Waitier & Markova, 2004). Levels of trust in various in-group and
out-group social and political targets varied and also the concept of trust was
associated with different concepts, based not only on the in-group/out-group
membership of the target but also on the political versus social character of the target.
The role of trust in the people and the political institutions of the countries involved
(Cyprus, the self-named T.R.N.C, Greece, Turkey) as well as in the international
political players and institutions (USA, UK, the UN and the EU) should therefore be
considered separately in theories of trust in conflict resolution. On the one hand, equal
levels of trust in Greek and Greek Cypriot (both social and political) targets showed
that, despite the decrease in the Greek Cypriot strength of Greek identification
(Loizides, 2007; Hadjipavlou, 2003), in young people's perception the two nations
remain very close in the international arena and they form an international alliance
which appears to be trusted independently of either the social or political status of the
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target. On the other hand, low trust levels and the double differentiation between
Turkish Cypriot and Turkish political and social targets showed that there is not one,
but three non-homogeneous "adversarial out-groups"; Turkish Cypriot people are
considered differently from Turkish people and Turkish Cypriot leaders, and from the
Turkish government. The differentiation between these targets revealed not only the
differentiation between the two Turkish ethnic groups that live on "the other side"
(Hadjipavlou, 2003), but also the differentiation between the social and the political
target of each ethnic out-group, the social target being trusted more than the
respective (ethnically) political target. This differentiation between social and political
trust confirms the existing literature (Watier & Markova, 2004) and extends it in the
context of conflict resolution suggesting that it exists also in relation to trust in
"adversarial out-groups".
Despite the non-differentiation between social and political targets in relation to trust
levels in the Greek and the Greek Cypriot targets, trust in each target appeared to be
related to different concepts/elements. There was no clear differentiation between the
concepts on which social trust was based and those on which political trust was based
as the literature had suggested, or that trust would be based upon the performance
or/and the ethical characteristics of the target (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000; Nadler &
Saguy,2004). There was a different combination of factors each time related either to
the performance, the ethical characteristics and/or the emotional characteristics of the
target. Despite the differences, pride appeared to be the concept on which trust in
institutions (independently of their ethnic belonging) was based (confirming the
literature on the importance of the ethical characteristics of the target, Larson, 1997;
Metlay, 1999; Tyler & Huo, 2002), and fairness was the concept on which trust in
people was based. Fairness has been mainly reported in the literature as a criterion for
political trust (Citrin & Muste, 1999); however, the present thesis suggests that it is
crucial for inter-group social trust (Metlay, 1999) as well, probably due to the specific
context in which trust is assessed.
Concerning trust in the third party international players, on the one hand, they were all
trusted at different levels but, on the other hand, there were more commonalities
(support, fairness, responsiveness and pride) between the concepts/elements on which
their trust assessment was based than there were for the other targets discussed earlier.
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Effectiveness was found to be the basis only for trust in the US government, while it
was not relevant for trust in any of the other three international players. This
difference could be due to the fact that the current relationship of the former three
international targets 'Withthe Greek Cypriot people as well as the role these targets are
expected to have in the resolution of the Cyprus issue are more homogeneous than
those of the previously discussed targets or the American government.
The differentiation of young Greek Cypriot trust levels in the US government, the UK
government, the UN and the EU could be linked to different levels of acceptance of
their involvement in the resolution of the conflict (as the qualitative study revealed).
On the one hand the new and untested accession of Cyprus to the EU and, on the other
hand, the already tested and ineffective relationship of Cyprus with the UN and the
UK appear to have directed young Greek Cypriot preferences towards the EU and not
the old and traditional third parties in the Cyprus conflict. Trust in the US government
was lower than trust in the UN and the UK government, probably due either to the
general feeling of anti-Americanism (Berman, 2004) or the perceived collaboration of
the US with Turkey (see chapter 7).
Theoretically, these differences emphasise the need to integrate theories of general
and political trust in the literature of inter-group conflict for the conceptualisation of
trust and the need to expand these theories so as to be able to address the dynamics of
inter-group relationships (between different national/international players) in inter-
ethnic conflict resolution.
9.2 Correlates and outcomes of trust in different targets
Trust is not a concept which exists in isolation; the results of the different studies
revealed that trust levels in different targets are affected by different factors and also
affect different factors (or the same factors at varying levels). These factors were
examined initially through the relationships that emerged during the first quantitative
study (see chapter 6) and the qualitative study (see chapter 7), then through Fisher's
(1990) "Eclectic Model" (see chapter 8) and finally through the use of Kelman's
(2005) prerequisites of trust. In order to explore the outcomes of trust, compromise,
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reconciliation and different preferred and perceived as feasible solutions were
considered.
Amongst the factors found to be related to trust in the literature, the results of the
present thesis showed that the demographics of age and gender affected trust levels in
different targets differentially. Little evidence was offered in support of the existing
literature (Rotter, 1971), which suggested that women and older children were in
general more trustful than men and younger children respectively. In study 1 (see
chapter 6) women were found to trust only certain targets more than men did while
there was a general tendency for older young people to be less trustful than younger
ones. The context of inter-group conflict appears therefore to be a context very
different to the ones within which trust has been studied until now.
Feminine/masculine roles and experiences as well as the different age groups'
experience or knowledge of or attitudes towards the conflict do not appear to have the
same effect on trust.
Concerning factors which were identified specifically in the literature on young
people, political interest and political knowledge were also found to be related to trust
but only in certain targets; they were not found to be related to trust in any of the
"enemy" out-groups (either the Turkish or the Turkish Cypriots targets). Trust levels
were therefore independent of how much young people knew or how much they were
interested in political issues. This could be explained by the strength and the prejudice
of the rhetoric about the Turkish and Turkish Cypriots in Cypriot society; both in the
media and the school curriculum, only one type of information is presented. Therefore
whether a young person was more or less interested in politics, or more or less
knowledgeable about the Cyprus issue, he/she would still receive the same type of
information. On the other hand, political interest and perceived political knowledge
were related positively with trust in Greek and Greek Cypriot targets, trust in the EU
and the UN and negatively with trust in the US. The results in relation to Greek and
Greek Cypriot targets could be explained by the small right-wing bias of the sample
while the results in relation to the EU and the UN could be explained possibly by the
official support of these two institutions expressed in the media (in contrast to the
disapproval and disbelief of the General Secretary of the UN Kofi Annan, see
Eleutherotupia, 11/02/05). On the other hand, the negative relationship with trust in
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the US could be explained either by the general feelings of anti-Americanism in
current times (Berman, 2004; Eleutherotupia, 10/02/05) or by the perceived as
sometimes passive and sometimes anti-Greek Cypriot role the US has played in the
Cyprus issue (Brands, 1987).
Similarly, political ideology was not related to trust in the out-groups either; only in
the Greek and Greek Cypriot social targets. Political ideology appeared to be more
related to internal social issues than to political affairs. This lack of differentiation in
trust levels attributable to ideology shows that political ideology is not a determinant
factor in young Greek Cypriot trust either in the government or the "enemy" out-
groups or the international third parties. Greek Cypriot young people appear to trust
these targets, which are directly involved in the Cyprus issue, whatever their political
ideology. This could be related on the one hand to the reported emotional apathy and
general distrust in politics and politicians as well as to the perceived inefficacy of
political parties due to their constant fighting (see chapter 7). On the other hand, the
homogeneity about these out-groups could be related to the fact that political party
positions are not perceived significantly different concerning these targets.
Likewise, ethnic, national, Greek, European and religious identifications were also
found to be related to trust in different targets differentially. National (Cypriot), Greek
and religious (Christian Orthodox in the majority) strength of identification was not
found to be related to trust in the "enemy" out-group targets (Turkish and Turkish
Cypriot targets); only in the Greek and Greek Cypriot targets, and the EU for national
and Greek identification. These relationships are only partly in line with the role of
national identity, Greek (homeland) identity and religious identity in conflict found in
the literature (Fisher, 1990; Kelman, 2004; Kraus, 2006; La Porta, et al., 1997; Welch
et al., 2004). The explanation for the lack of relationship with trust in the out-group
targets could be either that inter-group trust is related to different identifications or to
different aspects of the identifications from those considered in the present thesis
(Chrysanthaki, 2007) or that the relationship of these identities with trust in the out-
group targets is indirect; since these identifications are related to trust in the Greek
and the Greek Cypriot targets, it could be the positions of the Greek and the Greek
Cypriot targets on these out-groups which affect young Greek Cypriots' trust levels in
these out-groups.
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In contrast to the above identifications, ethnic (Greek Cypriot) identification had an
effect on trust in all of the targets except the Turkish Cypriot ones. Even this newly
constructed identification for Greek Cypriots (Polis, 1996; Loizides, 2007), who until
recently used to define themselves either as Greeks or Cypriots depending on their
political ideology (Trimiklinioti, 2006; Loizides, 2007), appeared to have a direct
effect only on trust in one of the "enemy" out-groups, the Turkish targets. In contrast
to its positive effect on all of the other targets of trust, its effect on the social and
political Turkish targets was negative. However, the lack of significant relationship
with the Turkish Cypriot targets reveals that, at particular times, only specific group
identifications affect trust levels in specific "enemy" out-groups. The effect of these
identifications appears to change through time as different identifications become
more salient and influential in different historical (socio-political) contexts. In the
case of Cyprus, it appears that Greek (also called "homeland") identification, national
identification and religious identification are no longer salient for young Greek
Cypriots, who appear to be more influenced by their ethnic identification, although
not in reference to their relationship with the Turkish Cypriots.
The cognitive factors which were found to affect (to predict) trust in Turkish Cypriot
social and political targets were the perceived power status of each group (Davidson
et aI, 2004; Maney et al., 2006), the history of antagonism between the two groups
(Mack, 1983; Hadjipavlou, 2002; Nadler & Saguy, 2004), the perceived threat from
the out-group (Fisher, 1990) and the perceived similarities between the two groups
(Maney et al., 2006). Even though some of these factors were common to trust in both
social and political targets, there were still differences 'both in the number of
predictors of each type of target and in the predictive power of each factor. These
results confirmed the literature which argues for the importance of these factors but
they also emphasised the importance of the distinction between social and political
trust when considering the factors which affect' trust; potential factors should be
examined in reference to the social or political type of target of trust and its in-
group/out-group status.
Even though young Greek Cypriots do not have any personal experience of the events
which preceded and followed the 1974 invasion, cognitive evaluative factors of the
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inter-group relationship appear to be still relevant and influence their trust levels
through the effect of social memory, as the qualitative study revealed (Lyons, 1996;
Hadjipavlou, 2002). Exposure to all official national practices (such as national
holidays which celebrate Greek and Greek Cypriot victories over the Turkish people
or the school curriculum which presents a certain historical view of the events and the
relationship between the two peoples) as well as exposure to all the unofficial cultural
myths and practices (such as story telling) about the relationship of the two groups has
helped to preserve and transmit the historical antagonism and the perceived threat and
differences between the two peoples.
Apart from the cognitive factors, another set of factors found to be important for trust
in different targets was emotions. The results (see chapter 7 and 8) showed that, when
considered in inter-group conflict, negative emotions (fear, hate, anger, emotional
apathy) should be differentiated (Iyer & Leach, 2008) as they appear to be related to
different factors and also to lead to different trust levels in political/social targets and
different attitudes toward reconciliation (Tam, Hewstone, Cairns, Tausch, Maio &
Kenwrothy, 2007). Negative emotions, therefore, cannot and should not be considered
as a homogeneous phenomenon since people who feel these different emotions would
have to be targeted differentially based on the particularities of each emotion (their
particular correlates and consequences for conflict resolution).
Furthermore, the present thesis argues for the importance of the differentiation
between different "subjects" of emotions (who is feeling the emotion); the group or
the individual (Parkinson, Fischer & Manstead, 2005; Iyer & Leach, 2008). The
Intergroup Emotions Theory (Mackie et al., 2004) has put forward the term "group
emotions" for emotions rooted in the group membership of the individual; however,
the present study expanded this theory and showed that this term was not sufficient to
describe the roots of all emotions in an inter-group context. On the one hand, national
identification was found not to affect all emotions (it did not predict fear) although
maybe a different kind of identification would have had different results (i.e. ethnic
differentiation, based on what was previously argued), and, on the other hand, it was
shown that young people use emotions rooted in their group memberships, either at an
individual or at a group level (personal emotions vs. in-group emotions) differentially.
This means that they do not always agree with or endorse the emotions of their in-
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group and many times they position themselves outside the group in order to
distinguish their personal emotions towards certain targets (Iyer & Leach, 2008). An
explanation for this result could be that both in the interviews and in the questionnaire,
when participants were asked about their emotions towards the out-group, it was not
made explicit whether they should respond as members of their national/ethnic group
(Iyer & Leach, 2008). Even though the whole interview/questionnaire was making
salient ethnic group identifications, the questions on emotions (although they made
salient the inter-group conflict context) did not make salient participants' ethnic or
national identification; this allowed participants to decide whether and when to
position themselves within their in-g~oupor outside of it.
In particular the results of both studies revealed the importance of anger for inter-
group trust and reconciliation attitudes as well as the fact that anger is not rooted in
"shame" and "guilt", as suggested in the literature (Retzinger & Scheff, 2006), but in
the history of the relationship of the adversaries, and more precisely in selected events
of the inter-group history, such as in the case of Greek Cypriots, the 1974 "unfair"
Turkish invasion and the events which followed the invasion (Weiner, Graham &
Chandler, 1982; Bizman & Hoffman, 1993). These results highlight the importance of
the perception of the causes of the Cyprus issue by young Greek Cypriots for the
emergence of inter-group anger and also that Greek Cypriots do not feel shame about
something their in-group has done, even though they acknowledge their share of
responsibility in the Cyprus issue. Those who acknowledged Greek Cypriot violent
and unfair behaviour towards the Turkish Cypriots before the 1974 invasion, on the
one hand, did not try to provide any reason for Greek Cypriot actions towards the
Turkish Cypriots but, on the other hand, could not see this behaviour as the cause or
the beginning of the conflict, or even the cause of the Turkish invasion. The reason
for this perception must be related to the fact that young Greek Cypriots do not have
any direct experience of that historical period and, therefore, all the information they
have is that transmitted to them by older generations; which appears not to include
this information or perception of events.
While the results on anger were consistent across the qualitative and the quantitative
study, a certain inconsistency was revealed between the results of the two studies
concerning fear. Fear was presented as very prominent in the qualitative study in
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relation to inter-group social trust and attitudes towards reconciliation but had limited
predictive power in the quantitative study (offering little evidence in support of
research on inter-group emotions, see Mackie et aI., 2004). This inconsistency could
be either due to an artefact of statistical analysis (since trust in the Turkish Cypriot
leaders was highly correlated with trust in the Turkish Cypriot people) or an artefact
of the interview schedule since the majority of questions focused on inter-people
attitudes. Furthermore, in both methodologies it should also be considered that, since
fear is an emotion that shows powerlessness (Cole et al., 2002), it could not be easily
expressed or acknowledged in a conflict context (Cole, Bruschi & Tamang, 2002).
The context (both the methodological and the socio-political one) within which
emotions are studied appears to playa decisive role in the salience and the strength of
emotions.
Apart from these two emotions, hate and emotional apathy were also made salient in
the qualitative study. While emotional apathy was associated, as expected, with
attitudinal passiveness, blocking positive evaluation of the politicians and the
institutions (Southwell & Everest, 1998) which could bring a solution to the Cyprus
issue, hate was revealed to be a more complex concept.
On the one hand, hate was at no point expressed as a personal emotion (Ahmed, 2004);
it was always presented as the in-group's or the out-group's emotion. This failure or
unwillingness to express it on a personal level could be explained by the existing
literature arguing that it is a "group emotion" (Ahmed, 2004), or by the fact that
strong emotions like hatred cannot be easily acknowledged, maybe due to their strong
social undesirability even in a conflict context, or else by the actual lack of strong
inter-group negative emotions amongst young Greek Cypriots. In methodological
terms, different ways should be found to address these emotions and study their
causes and their consequences; a more individual and private environment for
questionnaire completion, the separation of questions on different emotions'within the
questionnaire, or even the use of alternative scenarios to elicit or to describe these
emotions could facilitate their expression and therefore their examination. On the
other hand, young Greek Cypriots might not feel strong inter-group negative emotions
due to the lack of any personal experience with Turkish Cypriot or Turkish people;
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the effect of social memory might not be strong enough to create strong emotions like
hatred.
In reference to all the emotions discussed in the present thesis, the results revealed
that different methodologies make salient a different level of influence of emotions on
trust levels and reconciliation attitudes. On the one hand, the qualitative study showed
that different emotions influence the reconciliation process through their effect on
(dis)trust in Turkish Cypriots within national institutions, and through their effect on
trust in the international institutions for the resolution of the conflict, based on
perceptions of the causes, the consequences and the solution of the Cyprus issue while,
on the other hand, the quantitative study showed that the emotions were not as
influential as the qualitative study suggested. They still int1uenced trust and the
reconciliatory attitudes but much less than the cognitive factors did. This discrepancy
highlighted the difficulty of the study of emotions which lies in an array of possible
issues: the difficulty of personal acknowledgement of certain emotions and the
difficulty of expression of certain emotions (e.g. fear) probably due to cultural or
contextual norms. Based on the effect of these issues, the use of different
methodologies proved to be necessary to capture the whole extent of the role of
emotions in trust/distrust and also acceptance of different types of solutions.
Another finding in reference to emotions, which should be highlighted, is the effect of
the perception of the out-group's emotions towards the in-group on the in-group's
emotions and attitudes towards the out-group. This interdependence was apparent in
both the qualitative and the quantitative study; in the former, hate was perceived as a
mutual emotion between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots leading to participant's
distrust in Turkish Cypriots while, in the latter study, the perceived out-group's fear
of the in-group predicted positively inter-group anger. This interdependence should be
further researched since the relationship between emotions of the in-group and the
out-group has not yet been addressed in the literature.
After having discussed the correlates of trust in different targets, as they emerged both
from the use of Fisher's (1990) "Eclectic Model" and also from the qualitative and
first quantitative study, the outcomes of social and political trust should also be
discussed. The results of the first study revealed that only trust in the out-group
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people (inter-group social trust), and not in the out-group leaders (inter-group political
trust), was influential in compromise attitudes. However, because the compromise
measure which was used in the first study (see Appendix I) involved statements about
apology and forgiveness which are more emotionally loaded, it could be considered
that it facilitated or elicited the salience of social trust versus political trust. In order to
avoid this, in the following quantitative study which was based on Fisher's model
(1990, 2000), apart from the compromise/reconciliation scale, another scale was also
introduced testing the acceptance of some of the main statements of the Annan plan
which were not emotionally loaded (see Appendix I). The results concerning the
relationship of trust with reconciliation and a reconciliation plan showed again the
importance of inter-people trust, at grass roots level, in attitudes toward reconciliation,
and not of people's inter-group political trust. It appears to be the inter-people
relationship and not the relationship with the political leadership which affects
willingness to make concessions, accept the "other's" point of view and build
harmonious relationships with them.
Apart from Fisher's model, trust was also examined in reference to the preferred
solutions to the conflict and the solutions considered feasible in the conflict. The lack
of previous research on the relationship between different solutions and psychological
factors did not allow for any comparison with existing research results and theories;
however, these results, in their own right, reveal factors' which affect people's
assessment of solutions to the conflict. In terms of preference, inter-group social trust,
inter-group perceived similarities and perception of out-group's efforts to achieve
peace and reconciliation (which is also part of accepting the "other") appeared to be
the most important differentiating factors while, in terms of feasibility, perceived
inter-group similarities, inter-group anger, perceived social threat, perception of out-
group's willingness for peace and efforts for reconciliation (which are part of
accepting the "other") appeared to be the most important differentiating factors. These
results have revealed first, that trust levels in different targets affect the assessment of
different solutions differentially, depending on the consideration or not of the realistic
limitations that "feasibility" assumes, and second, that there are other factors apart
from trust which affect very strongly young people's choices of solutions which
should be studied further such as perceived inter-group similarities, inter-group
acceptance and inter-group emotions. The higher importance of trust for the preferred
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solutions in contrast to those considered feasible could be due to the emotional
constituent/aspect of trust (Lewis & Weigert, 1985; Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000;
Nadler & Saguy, 2004); when the constraints of reality of inter-group conflict were
considered, trust appeared to become less relevant or less of an appropriate criterion
of assessment of the possible solutions and cognitive criteria became the main point
of reference.
Finally, the prerequisites of trust (Kelman, 2005) were considered in relation to
reconciliation and a specific reconciliation plan. The lack of significance of any of
these prerequisites for either of the target variables showed that the statements on
commitment to peace and the use of symbolic gestures (such as mutual recognitions)
as they are explained by Kelman are not relevant to young Greek Cypriots' attitudes
towards reconciliation or a specific reconciliation plan. A reason for this result could
be either that these concepts have not been addressed enough within Cypriot society
(they have not been discussed or analysed either in the school curriculum or by
politicians through the media) or that, in cases where they have been addressed, they
have been treated with suspicion (Maney et al., 2006).Another reason, however,
could also be that these social expressions of improvement in inter-group
relationships were not relevant, because the relationship between the two
communities has not improved and important steps, such as mutual recognitions and
actions which show commitment to peace, are yet to be taken.
9.3 Do models of conflict resolution help advance our understanding of the
psychological processes taking place in conflict environments?
As described in the literature review of conflict resolution (see chapter 3), many
models of conflict resolution exist which emphasise different end-goals (e.g.
forgiveness, acceptance, trust or reconciliation) and different steps to be taken to
achieve these end goals (Long & Brecke, 2004; Kelman, 1978, 2005; Fisher, 1990,
2000; Rouhanna, 2004). Amongst those found in the literature the most integrative
ones and those most relevant to the central concepts explored in the present thesis
were used to understand the conflict situation and processes in Cyprus.
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The main model used as a framework to explore the relationship of trust in different
targets with different factors, which were found to either influence/predict trust or to
be predicted by trust in the first two studies of the thesis, was Fisher's (1990, 2000)
"Eclectic Model". This model was chosen based on its comprehensiveness (it
included most of the concepts the present thesis was interested in), its relevance (it
was built upon the researcher's experience of the Cyprus conflict) and its detailed
definition of the relationships of the factors considered.
While the previous section described the role of trust and emotions in the model,
many other factors were involved and were found to predict favourability to
reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan. These direct relationships were not
foreseen by the original model and therefore should be discussed further.
Reconciliation (apart from inter-group social trust and perceived threat) was also
dependent on perceived conflict of interests, while favourability toward the
reconciliation plan was also dependent on the perceived similarities and antagonism
between the adversaries. The differentiation of attitudes which emerges towards these
two "outcomes" confirms the existing literature (Shamir & Shikaki, 2002) but also
shows that these two attitudes still affect each other, and that they are both influenced
by perceived threat and inter-group social trust while they are not influenced directly
by any emotional factor. This lack of emotional predictors shows that attitudes both
towards reconciliation as a general approach to the solution of the conflict and
towards a specific reconciliation plan are mainly cognitively based, even amongst
young Greek Cypriots, who might not have the knowledge or the experience of the
conflict that adults have. However, the role of emotions should not be disregarded
since, especially in relation to willingness to reconcile, emotions were mediated by
inter-group social trust probably due to the emotional dimension of trust (Lewis &
Weigert, 1985; Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000; Nadler & Saguy, 2004).
The findings of use of this model suggests that it provides an integrative framework to
examine inter-ethnic conflict (especially in populations with no personal experience
of the conflict events) and therefore should be further considered by cont1ict
researchers, but certain adjustments/changes should be made to it both to facilitate its
application and also to explain contlict processes more accurately.
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Diagram 9.1: Theoretical framework based on Fisher's model (1990, 2000)
Cognitive
factors Inter-group
social and
political trust
Willingness
to reconcile
Inter-group
emotionsOut-group
In-group
emotions
First, as shown in the previous section, trust has a more direct relationship both with
the inter-group antecedents/orientations considered in the model (cultural differences,
history of antagonism, threat etc.) and also with the outcome of the conflict,
(reconciliation in the present thesis). It should therefore be considered that the original
model by Fisher (1990) could be simplified, with fewer factors both in the
"orientations" and "processes" levels of the model (see chapter 8). This would allow
an easier application of the model in different conflict contexts since the factors
originally included in the model, apart from being too numerous, were also very
difficult to operationalise. Second, the results suggest that the concept of trust should
be more finely defined and used; it should take into consideration the exact target of
trust since trust in different targets was found to have different predictors and
different outcomes. Between inter-group political and social trust, social trust
appeared to be the more influential of the two and should feature in the definition of
trust in this model. Nevertheless, inter-group political trust should not be ignored;
further research would be necessary to explain the relationship of inter-group political
trust with reconciliation, via alternative indirect means.
Third, the results suggest that emotions, which were added by Fisher a decade after
the original model (Fisher, 2000), should be incorporated in the model; however, the
present thesis suggests that there should be a differentiation between negative
emotions (such as anger and fear) and also between the "objects" (targets) and
"subjects" of emotional responses (Iyer & Leach, 2008), because each emotion has
different antecedents and also different outcomes. Furthermore, the results suggest
that the concept of "interactivity" that Fisher (1990) has highlighted about group's
attitudes applies also to inter-group emotions and should be added to the model.
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Fourth, concerning Fisher's statement (Fisher, 1990) that there are not many models
looking at "de-escalation", the results of the present study suggest that since his model
on "escalation" helped also to understand reconciliation between conflicting groups,
which assumes de-escalation of the conflict and also the rebuilding of the relationship
between former "enemies", it could also be used for "de-escalation".
Diagram 9.2: Results of the model tested
Confl. Of needs
Lack of Antagonism
Out-group anger
Cypriot identity
Lack of Threat
Reconciliatio
Confl. Of power
In-group anger
In-group fear
[nter-group~
Fear
Trust in the
Turk.Cyp.
Leaders
Reconciliatio
plan
Out-group fear
Concerning the prerequisites of acceptance (Kelman, 1978), different statements
amongst them were found to predict significantly favourability either to reconciliation
or to a reconciliation plan, or to both. The results confirmed the importance of the
level of inter-group victimisation, of the perceived knowledge of the out-group's
needs, worries and fears, and, finally, of the personal and in-group's perceived
willingness to make concessions. In these results, it was surprising to see that the
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personal versus the in-group's perceived willingness to make concessions had an
opposite effect on attitudes towards a reconciliation plan. While personal willingness
had a positive effect on favourability toward a specific reconciliation plan, perceived
in-group's willingness had a negative effect. This finding offered little support for the
Realistic Group Conflict theory (Sherif, 1966) which suggested that group members'
attitudes reflect the objective interests of their groups, since we saw that individual
action tendencies and attitudes do not necessarily have the same effect as perceived
in-group attitudes and tendencies. Furthermore, the effect of the perceived out-group's
fear of the in-group's domination confirmed the importance of the perceived power
imbalance (Kelman, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Davidson et aI., 2004; Maney et al.,
2006). When the out-group is perceived as being afraid of the in-group, this triggers
more negative attitudes towards reconciliation. This reaction could be related to the
perceived empowerment of the in-group, which allows in-group members to consider
their position as privileged and therefore not forced to make concessions (Devos et aI.,
2003).
Finally, it has been found that solutions to a conflict are being assessed differentially
depending on the consideration or not of the realistic limitations to one's preferences
(Inbar & Yarr, 1989). In the assessment of the factors which differentiated between
the solutions, along with trust, perceptions of similarities, of inter-group threat, of
history of antagonism, inter-group emotions, attitudes towards reconciliation and
attitudes towards a reconciliation plan were the factors which affected the assessment
of different solutions, in terms of preference versus feasibility. The emergence of
these factors deepened our understanding of the assessment and choice of solutions by
young Greek Cypriots and highlighted the issues which should therefore be addressed
when a specific solution is to be promoted. Further research would be necessary
however, to explore both the meaning of each solution for people in conflicting
environments (as this could be different from the official meaning of each solution)
and the association of these solutions (which could be either conceptual or related to
the representation of each solution) to their identified correlates.
Similarly to the factors aforementioned, certain prerequisites of acceptance and trust
(Kelman, 1978, 2005) also helped to explain the assessment of different solutions.
The results suggested that, in terms of preference and feasibility, young people who
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chose federalism (any type, either with two equal communities or dominated by
Greek Cypriots) were the most willing to make personal concessions or thought that
their in-group would be willing to make concessions. While this could be expected of
people who chose the creation of a federal state with two equal communities, this was
not expected of people who chose the creation of a Greek Cypriot-dominated federal
state. These results show that federalism could be the way forward since even though
the latter form of it is not originally favourable to Turkish Cypriots, this could change
and its terms could improve for Turkish Cypriots since people who support this
solution are willing to make further concessions.
The use of these prerequisites also revealed the same effect offear on the choice of a
solution as on attitudes towards reconciliation and a specific reconciliation plan.
People who chose a federal solution (either type) were those that least acknowledged
Turkish Cypriot fear of being dominated. Fear when acknowledged was once more
found to lead to more negative attitudes towards the out-group, both in terms of
attitudes and solutions to the conflict. The out-group's fear is therefore a factor which
should be seriously addressed both in terms of helping the out-group not feel it any
more and in terms of what it means for the in-group.
9.4 Limitations and future directions
One point which should be acknowledged in reference both to the analyses and the
interpretation of the findings in the present thesis is that alternative interpretations to
some of the findings could not be ruled out. In particular it has to be acknowledged
that the empirical testing of Fisher's model (1990, 2000) did not establish either a
causal relationship between the correlates of trust and inter-group social and political
trust, or between trust and willingness to reconcile. The present thesis argues for a
circular dynamic relationship between factors; however, this particular direction of
influence was chosen, due to the lack of inter-group and conflict experience of the
population in the present thesis, which could not have allowed initially either for trust
evaluations, or emotional reactions or reconciliatory attitudes. Young people first
acquire any information they have through either their parents/friends or the media.
Furthermore, both for the benefit of clarity and focus, it was not considered
appropriate to conduct further analyses in order to rule out alternative interpretations.
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Another limitation which has been acknowledged concerns the representativeness of
the sample of the two quantitative studies in the present thesis. The representativeness
of the sample is an important element for the external validity of the findings.
However, the two quantitative studies of this thesis were not conducted on a
representative sample of Greek Cypriot youth. Due to the denial of access to state
schools by the Cypriot Ministry of Education, the two quantitative studies, which
required big sample sizes, were conducted in private educational institutions.
However, due to the requirement of fees (estimated at 4,500-5,000 Euros/per year)
and other financial contributions from parents (school uniforms, payable textbooks
etc.), private educational institutions do not· have students from all the economic,
social and political backgrounds of Cypriot society. Some schools, such as the English
School, are even considered to have students who constitute the future elite of Cypriot
society (http://www.apopsi.com.cy/2008/04/198). Nevertheless, while traditionally,
private educational institutions have had only economically and socially privileged
students, nowadays, with the increasing number of private schools, a growing number
of middle class families also chooses private schools for their children's education
(Neofytou, 2008). However, still, only 16.7% of Cypriot students attend private
educational institutions (Politis, 26/04/2009). Despite existing research which claims
that Greek Cypriot students have the same social behaviour whether they attend a
private or a state educational institution (Skouros, 2003), young people's attitudes
towards political and social issues could not be considered the same across private
and state institutions, without research findings to show it. As a consequence, the
results of the two quantitative studies of this thesis could not be considered as having
taken into consideration students across the range of the socio-economic and political
spectrum of Cypriot society. Nevertheless, due to the constraints imposed by the
Ministry of Education, conducting the empirical studies in private institutions was
considered the second best solution. It would be therefore strongly recommended to
replicate these studies in future research in state schools in order to establish whether
there are differences and, if so, identify whether these differences are related to the
socio-economic status or political ideology of participants.
Another methodological limitation of the quantitative studies concerns the measures
that were used; many of the measures (the national and religious identification scales,
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the compromise scale, the reconciliation scale etc.) had different constituent elements
(different dimensions), which were not further examined. Further analyses would be
necessary to explore the relationship of these different elements with the correlates
and the outcomes of the central concepts in order to have a more precise
understanding of the role of these concepts (Chrysanthaki, 2007).
Furthermore, since all of these scales were originally created for and used with an
adult population, many of the concepts they measured might not have been very
relevant especially to the younger participants in the present studies, since in terms of
life experience and knowledge, they might have been new to them. Examples should
have been used to explain some of the concepts, which could have increased the
reliability of participants' answers. However, due to lack of previous research
examining these issues, there was no prior knowledge of the concepts which would be
new or difficult for participants of different ages; furthermore, due to time and
resources constraints (since the empirical studies were conducted in a different
country from that where the studies were designed and analysed), it was not possible
to conduct pilot studies for different age groups. This limitation was addressed
through the exploratory nature of the first two studies, which identified both the
difficulties and participants' understanding of many concepts; these were then taken
into consideration in the third study so that internal validity was achieved. Future
research should acknowledge the complexity of the concepts of trust, power relations,
reconciliation etc., and explore the phenomenological understanding/use of these
concepts for the population under investigation before they are further used or
analysed.
However, not only could the understanding/use of certain concepts be particular to the
population explored but also there could be certain macro-factors which hinder the
expression or the acknowledgement of certain concepts by the participants themselves,
such as social desirability and cultural norms. In order to address these factors,
researchers should be aware of them and not challenge participants more than it
would be culturally acceptable, since this could not only lead to false responses, but
could also cause distress. Researchers should try to make participants feel comfortable
to talk about their beliefs/emotions by reassuring them both about the anonymity and
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the confidentiality of the data and also by giving them time to talk when they feel
comfortable about it.
Two methodological issues which should also be considered is the deficiency of all
questionnaire measures to fully capture the extent of participants' experience
(questionnaire items are never perfect) and also the difficulty to access participants'
"true" psychological state in a limited interview-time with a stranger. Both issues,
along with the aforementioned cultural issues, might have affected the results of the
present study and should be both addressed in future research, especially concerning
emotions.
In particular concerning emotions, further research should address the difficulty of
expressing emotions, both in questionnaires and in interviews; this could be done by
including more than one-item measures (or one question in interviews) on
participants' emotions which would address emotions not only towards the out-group
in general but also towards specific sub-groups (e.g. the leaders) of the out-group and
towards specific actions of the out-group (Iyer & Leach, 2008). This variation of the
"object" of the emotions would help both the participant to target hislher emotions
more easily and avoid getting frustrated trying to explain his/her emotions and also
the researcher to capture in more detail the participant's experience of emotions
towards the out-group. However, these could be achieved only when there are no
restraints of focus or of length of the questionnaire/interview time that existed in the
quantitative study of the present thesis.
358
9.5 Concluding implications
The present thesis explored the role of trust and emotions in relation to peaceful and
reconciliatory conflict resolution with reference to young Greek Cypriots. It showed
the importance of inter-group social trust and inter-group emotions as well as of other
socio-psychological factors not only in terms of trust in an adversarial group but also
in terms of specific conflict solutions.
Based on the findings of the present thesis, attempts of conflict resolution should
focus more extensively on inter-group relations at a social/societal level; people's
inter-group emotions and levels of inter-group trust should be addressed via the
emphasis on inter-group similarities, the alleviation of perceptions of inter-group
threat and antagonism and the acknowledgement of the adversary's emotions towards
the in-group. However, when it comes to the choice of a realistic solution, people
appear to differentiate between their ideal choices and the feasible ones and they base
their choices primarily on cognitive inter-group evaluations. For solutions therefore,
to be accepted by people (in a future referendum) they should come from the people
themselves and also address the issues of primary concern to them.
359
Reference List
Abrams, D. & Emler, N. (1992). Self-denial as a paradox of political and regional
social identity: Findings from a study of 16- and 18- year olds. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 22, 279-295.
Abrams, D., & Hogg, M.A. (1990). Social Identity Theory: Constructive and
Critical Advances. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Abramson, P.R. (1983). Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change.
San Francisco: Freeman.
Adamolekun, L. and Kincaid, J. (1991). The Federal Solution: Assessment and
Prognosis for Nigeria and Africa. Publius: Thejournal of Federalism, 21, 173-188.
Adelson, J. (1971). The political imagination of the young adolescents. Daedalus,
100, 1013-1050.
Ahmed, S. (2004). The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
Allport, G.W. (1979). The Nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley
Pub. Co.
Alvik, T. (1968). The development of views on conflict, war, and peace among
school children:a Norwegian case study. Journal of Peace Research, 5, 171-195.
Anderson, B. (l991).Imagined Communities:Reflections on the origin and spread
of nationalism (revised edition). London: Verso.
Ash, T.G. (1993). In Europe's name: Germany and the divided continent. New
York: Random House.
Azar, E.E. (1990). The Management of Protracted Social Conflict. Hampshire:
Dartmouth.
360
Baker, W.O. & O'Neal, J.R. (2001) Patriotism or Opinion Leadership? : The
Nature and Origins of the "Rally' Round-the-Flag" effect. The Journal of Conflict
Resolution. 45 (5), p.661-687.
Bar-Tal, D. (2000). From Intractable Conflict Through Conflict Resolution to
Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis. Political Psychology, 21, 351-365.
Bar-Tal, D. (2001) Why Does Fear Override Hope in Societies Engulfed by
Intractable Conflict, as It Does in the Israeli Society? Political Psychology, 22 (3), p.601-
627.
Barber, B. (1983). The Logic and Limits of Trust. New Bruswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers University Press.
Barzilai, G., Goldberg, G., and Inbar, E. (1991). Israeli Leadership and Public
Attitudes Towards Federal Solutions for the Arab-Israeli Conflict Before and After
Desert Storm. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 21,21,191-209.
Berman, R.A (2004). Anti-Americanism in Europe, a cultural problem. Stanford
California: Hoover Institution Press.
Berti, A. E. (1998). The Development of Political Understanding in Children
between 6-15 years old. Human Relations, 41, 437-446.
Beschloss, M.R. & Talbot, S. (1993). At the highest levels: The inside story of the
end of the Cold War.Boston: Little, Brown.
Bizman, A. and Hoffman, M. (1993). Expectations, Emotions and Preferred
Responses regarding the Arab-Israeli Conflict:An Attributional Analysis. The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, J7, 139-159.
Blesdoe, J. C. (1979). Personality Characteristics Differentiating Internal and
External College Women. The Journal of Psychology, 10J, 81-86.
361
Boehnke, K. and Boehnke, M. (2005). Once a Peacenik--Always a Peacenik?
Results From a German Six-Wave, Twenty-Year Longitudinal Study. Peace and
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 11, 337-354.
Boyatzis, R. E. (1998). Transforming qualitative information, Thematic analysis
and code development. London: Sage Publications.
Brands Jr, H.W. (1987). America Enters the Cyprus Tangle, 1964. Middle Eastern
Studiess, 23 (3), p.348-362.
Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using Thematic Analysis in Psychology.
Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3, 77-101.
Breakwell, G. (1986). Coping with Threatened Identities. London: Methuen.
Brewer, M.B. (1997). The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations: Can
research inform practice? Journal of Social Issues, 53, p. 197-211.
Broome, B. J. (2005, in press). Building Bridges Across the Green Line: A Guide
to Intercultural Communication in Cyprus. Prepared for the United Nations Office of
Project Services (UNOPS).
Broome, B. 1. (1998). Designing Citizen-Based Peace-Building Efforts in Cyprus:
Interactive Management Workshops with Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. In
A.E.R. Woodcock (Ed.), Cornwallis III: Analysisfor Peace Operations, Cornwallis Park,
pp. 33-58. Nova Scotia, Canadian Peacekeeping Press.
Bryant, R. (1998). An education in honor: Patriotism and the schools of Cyprus.
In V. Calotychos (Eds.), Cyprus and Its People (pp. 53-68). Oxford: Westview Press.
Bryant, R. (2002). The purity of spirit and the power of blood: A comparative
perspective on nation, gender and kinship in Cyprus. The Journal of the Royal
Anthropological Institute, 8 (3ing ), 509-530.
Bryman, A. (1988). Quality and Quantity in Social Research. London: Unwin
Hyman.
362
Burman, E., & Parker, I. (1993) Discourse analytic research, London: Routledge.
Burton, J.W. (1987). Resolving deep-rooted conflict: A handbook. Lanham,
Md.:University Press of America.
Burton, J. W. (1988). Resolving Deep-Rooted Conflict. Lanham, MD: University
Press of America.
Burton, J. W. (1990). Conflict: Resolution and prevention. New York: St. Martin's
Press.
Cairns, E. (1987). Caught in Crossfire, Children and the Northern Ireland
Conflict. New York: Appletree Press, Syracuse University Press.
Calotychos, V. (1998). Cyprus and its People: Nation, Identity, and Experience in
an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1977. USA: Westview Press.
Camp, G. D. (1980). Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus. Political Science
Quarterly, 95, 43-70.
Carnevale, PJ. & Pruitt, D.G. (1992). Negotiation and Mediation. Annual Review
of Psychology, 43,531-582.
Chadjipadelis, Th. & Andreadis 1. (2007). Analysis of the Cyprus referendum on
the Annan plan. 57th Political Studies Association Annual Conference 'Europe and
Global Politics' (Bath, UK 2007).
http://www.psa.ac.ukljoumals/pdfI5/2007/Chadjipadelis.pdf
Chrysanthaki, T. (2007). When the relationship between Nationality and Religion
Matters: An Investigation into Changes in the Identity and Inter-group Relations as a
Response to Threat. PhD Thesis, University of Surrey.
363
Chun, K.T. & Campbell, lB. (1974). Dimensionality of the Rotter Interpersonal
Trust Scale. Psychological Reports, 35, 1059-1070.
Cinnirella, M. (1997). Towards a European identity? Interactions between the
national and European social identities manifested by university students in Britain and
Italy. British Journal of Social Psychology, 36, 19-31.
Citrin, J. (1974, September). Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in
Goverment. The American Political Science Review, 68, 973-988.
Citrin, J. & Green, D. P. (1986, October). Presidential Leadership and the
Resurgence of Trust in Goverment. British Journal of Political Science, 16,431-453.
Citrin J. & Muste, C. (1999). Trust In Government. In Robinson J.P., Shaver,
P.R., Wrightsman, L. (eds). Measures of Political Attitudes. New York: Academic
Cole, P.M., Bruschi, C.J., Tamang, B.L. (2002) Cultural Differences in Children's
Emotional Reactions to Difficult Situations. Child Development. May/june, 73 (3), p.983-
996.
Conger, J. J. (1991). Adolescence and Youth, Psychological Development in a
Changing World. (4th ed.) New York: HarperColIins.
Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In
D.E.Apter (Ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York, London: The Free Press, Collier-
MacMillan Limited.
Cooper, P. (1965). The development of the concept of war. Journal of Peace
Research, 2, p.I-I7.
Cooper;R. & Berdal, M.(J993). Outside intervention in ethnic conflicts. Survival:
Global Politics and Strategy, 1468-2699, Volume 35, Issue 1, Pages 118 - 142.
Coyle, A. (2007). Introduction to qualitative psychological research. In E.Lyons
& A. Coyle (Eds.), Analysing Qualitative Data in Psychology. London: Sage.
364
Craig, S.C. (1993). The Malevolent Leaders: Popular Discontent in America,
Boulder, CO: Westview.
Crawford, N. C. (2000). The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion
and Emotional Relationships. International Security, 24, 116-156.
Cuhadar Gurkaynak, Esra. "Exploring the Civil Society Functions in
Peacebuilding: The Cases of Israeli-Palestinian and Cyprus Conflicts" Paper presented at
the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention,
Hilton Chicago, CHICAGO, IL, USA, Feb 28,2007
Cypriot Bureau of Press and Information (2000) Cyprus Republic
Danielidou, L. & Horvath, P. (2006). Greek Cypriot Attitudes Toward Turkish
Cypriots and Turkish Immigrants. Journal of Social Psychology, 146, 405-421.
Darby, B.W. & Schlenker, B.R. (1989). Children's reactions to trangressions:
Effects of the actor's apology, reputation and remorse. British Journal of Social
Psychology, 28, 353-364.
Dasgupta, P. (1988). Trust as a Commodity. In D. Gambetta (ed). Trust, Making
and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Davidson,1. A., McElwee, G., & Hannan, G. (2004). Trust and Power as
Determinants of Conflict Resolution Strategy and Outcome Satisfaction. Peace and
Conflict: Journal 0/Peace Psychology, 10, 275-292.
Deutsch, M (1958). Trust and suspicion, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2(4), p.
265-279.
Deutsch, M (1973). The resolution of Conflict, New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
Deutsch, M. (2006). Cooperation and Competition. In P. T. Coleman, M. Deutsch,
& E.C. Marcus (eds),The Handbook ofContlict Resolution: Theory and Practice. Jossey
Bass.
365
Devine-Wright, P. (1999). Tracing the hand a/history: the role a/social
memories in the Northern Ireland conflict. University of Surrey.
Devos, T., Silver, L.A., Mackie, D.M. & Smith, E.R. (2003). Experiencing
Intergroup Emotions. In Mackie. D.M. & Smith, E.R. (Eds), From Prejudice to Inter-
group Emotions, Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups. Taylor & Francis, Inc.
Devos, T., Spini, D., and Schwartz, S. H. (2002). Conflicts among human values
and trust in institutions. British Journal 0/ Social Psychology, 41, 481-494.
Doob, L. W. (1986, June). Cypriot Patriotism and Nationalism. The Journal of
Conflict Resolution, 30, 383-396.
Drory, A. & Ritov, I. (1997). Effects of Work Experiece and Opponents' Power
on Conflict Management Styles. International Journal of Conflict Management, 8, 148-
161.
Dyregrov, A., Gupta, L., Gjestad, R. & Mukanoheli, E. (2000). Trauma Exposure
and Psychological Reactions to Genocide Among Rwandan Children. Journal of
'';
Traumatic Stress, 13 (I), p. 3-21.
Eagly, A. H. & Steffen, V. 1. (2000). Gender Stereotypes Stem From the
Distribution of Women and Men Into Social Roles. In C.Stangor (Ed.), Stereotypes and
Prejudice. Hove: Psychology Press.
Easton, D. (1965). A Systems Analysis of Political Life, New York, Wiley.
Easton, D. (1975, October). A re-assessment of the concept of political support.
British Journal of Political Science, 5, 435-457.
Edwards, D., Potter, J. (1992). Discursive Psychology, London: Sage.
Emler, N. (2002). Morality and political orientations: An analysis of their
relationship. European Review of Social Psychology. 13. 259-291.
366
Enright, R, Santos, M. & Al-Mabuk, R. (1989). The adolescent as forgiver.
Journal of Adolescence, 12, 95-110.
Enright, R., & The Human Development Study Group. (1991). The moral
development of forgiveness. In W. Kurtines J. Gerwitz (Eds.),Handbook of moral
behavior and development (Vol. 1,pp. 123-151). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Feshbach , N.D. (1991). Attachment Process in Adult Political Ideology:
Patriotism and Nationalism. In J.L. Gewirtz and W.M. Kurtines (eds), Intersections with
Attachment. Hillside, NJ: Erlbaum.
Field, A. (2005). Discovering Statistics Using SPSs. London: Sage Publications.
Fischer, A. H., Rodriguez, P. M., van Vianen, E.A.M., & Manstead, A. S. R.
(2004). Gender and culture differences in emotion. Emotion, 4,87-94.
Fischer A.H. & Roseman, 1.1. (2007) Beat them or Ban them: The Characteristics
and Social Functions of Anger and Contempt. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 93(1), p.l03-115.
Fisher, R. J. (1990). The Social Psychology of Intergroup and International
Conflict Resolution. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Fisher, RJ. (1991). Peacebuilding for Cyprus: Report on a conflict analysis
workshop. Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Ottawa, Ontario,
Canada.
Fisher, RJ. (1992). Peacebuilding for Cyprus: Report on a Conflict Analysis
Group, June 1991. Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security.
Fisher, RJ. (1994). Education and Peacebutlding in Cyprus: A Report on Two
Conflict Analysis Workshops. Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan.
367
Fisher, R. J. (2000). Intergroup Conflict. In The Handbook of Conflict Resolution,
Theory and Practice (pp. 166-184). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Fisher, R. J. (200Ia). Social Psychological Processes in Interactive Conflict
Analysis and Reconciliation. In M.Abu-Nimer (Ed.), Reconciliation, Justice and
Coexistence, Theory and Practice. Oxford: Lexington Books.
Fisher, R. J. (2001b). Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of and
Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse. Journal of Peace Research, 38, 307-
326.
Fisher, R. J., Ury, W., & Patton, B. (1991). Getting to Yes. New York: Penguin.
Gaertner, S. L. & Dovidio, J. F. (2000). Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common
Ingroup Identity Model. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.
Gallagher, A.M. (1994). Political discourse in a divided society. In A.Guelke (Ed)
New perspectives on the Northern Ireland conflict (p.28-45). Aldershot UK: Avebury.
Gallagher, A.M. (2004). After the War Comes Peace? An Examination of the
Impact of the Northern Ireland Conflict on Young People, Journal of Social Issues, 60(3),
629-642.
Gambetta, D. (1988). Trust, Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations. Basil
Blackwell.
Gamson, W. A. (1968). Power and Discontent. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey
Press.
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory. and Women's
Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
368
Giner-Sorolla, R, Mackie, D.E., Smith, E.R. (2007). Special Issue on Intergroup
Emotions: Introduction Group processes and intergroup relations, 10 (1), p.5-8.
Glaser B.G. & Strauss A.L. (1967). The Discovery of Grounded Theory. New
York, Aldine.
Gould, D.B. (2004). Passionate Political Processes: Bringing Emotions Back into
the Study of Social Movements. In J. Goodwin, & lM. Jasper, Rethinking Social
Movements: Structure Meaning and Emotion. USA, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers
Inc.
Grafeio Typou kai Plhroforiwn Lefkwsia (2000). Kypros.
Greene, lC., Caracelli, V.J., & Graham, W.F. (1989). Toward a Conceptual
Framework for Mixed Method Evaluation Designs. Educational Evaluation and Policy
Analysis, 11,255-274.
Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, M. and Trigeorgis, L. (1993, June). Cyprus: An
evolutionary Approach to Conflict Resolution. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37,
340-360.
Hadjipavlou, M. (2002). Cyrpus: A Partnership Between Conflict Resolution and
Peace Education. In G.Salomon (Ed.), Peace Education: The Concept, Principles, and
Practices Around the World (pp. 193-208).Mahwah, NJ, USA: Laurence Erlbaum
Associates.
Hadjipavlou, M. (2003). Inter-ethnic stereotypes, neighbourliness, separation:
paradoxes and challenges in Cyprus. Journal of Mediterranean Studies, 13 (2), 281-318.
Hadjipavlou, M. (2007). The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for
Peacebuilding. Journal of Peace Research, 44(3), 349-365.
369
Hakvoort, I. & Oppenheimer, L. (1993). Children and Adolescents' Conceptions
of Peace, War and Strategies to Attain peace: A Dutch case study. Journal of Peace
Research, 30,.p.65-77.
Halperin, E. (2006). Collective hatred and its political consequences: A
nationwide panel study of the 2006 Israeli elections. In 29th Annual Scientific Meeting of
International Society of Political Psychology, The political psychology of liberation, the
political psychology of Oppression.
Henwood, K. and Pidgeon, N. (1994). Beyond the Qualitative Paradigm: A
Framework for Introducing Diversity within Qualitatitve Psychology. Journal of
Community & Applied Social Psychology, 4, 225-238.
Heraclides, A. (2008) Cyprus and Divided Societies. Multi-Disciplinary
workshop. Queen University of Belfast, 20-2 l" May 2008.
Hetherington, M. 1. (1998, December). The Political Relevance of Political Trust.
The American Political Science Review, 92, 791-808.
Hewstone, M. & Brown, R. (1986). Contact and Conflict in Intergroup
Encounters. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Hewstone, M. (1988). Attributional Bases oflntergroup Conflict. In W.Stroebe,
A. Kruglanski, D. Bar-Tal, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup
Conflict, Theory, Research and Applications. London: Springer-Verlag.
Hewstone, M. & Cairns, E., (200 I). Social Psychology and Inter-group Conflict.
In D. Chirot, M.E. P. Seligman (2001) Ethnopolitical Warfare, Causes, Consequences
and Possible Solutions. Washington DC: American Psychological Association.
Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Voci, A, McLernon, F., Niens, U., & Noor, M. (2004).
Intergroup Forgiveness and Guilt in Northern Ireland: Social Psychological Dimensions
370
of "The Troubles". In N.R.Branscombe & B. Doosje (Eds.), Collective Guilt:
International Perspectives ( New York: Cambridge University Press.
Huddy, L., Feldman, S., Taber, C. & Lahav, G. (2005). Threat, Anxiety, and
Support of Antiterrorism Policies. American Journal of Political Science, 49 (3), p.593-
608.
Hupcey, J. E., Penrod, J., Morse, J. M., and Mitcham, C. (2004). An exploration
and advancement of the concept of trust. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 36, 282-293.
Hutchinson, J. & Smith, AD. (1996). Ethnicity. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Inbar, M. & Yuchtman- Yaar, E. (1989). The People's Image of Conflict
Resolution Israelis and Palestinians. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33, 3.1-66.
International Crisis Group (2006). The Cyprus stalemate: What next? (Rep. No.
171).
Iyer, A & Leach, C.W. (2008). Emotion in inter-group relations. European
review of social psychology, 19, p.86-125.
Jackobsson Hatay, A (2004b). Popular referenda and peace processes: The
twin referenda on the Annan Plan for a Reunited Cyprus put in perspective. The
Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University available from
[http-z/www.pcr.uu.se/publications].
Jansz, J. (2000). Masculine identity and restrictive emotionality In: AH. Fischer
(Ed.). Gender and Emotion. Social Psychological Perspectives, pp. 166-187. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Joffe, H. & Yardley, L. (2004). Content and Thematic Analysis. In D.F.Marks &
L. Yardley (Eds.), Research Methods for Clinical and Health Psychologists. London:
Sage.
371
Johnson-George, C. & Swap, W. C. (1982). Measurement of Specific
Interpersonal Trust: Construction and Validation ofa scale to assess Trust in a specific
other. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 1306-1307.
Joseph, J. S. (1985). Cyprus, Ethnic Conflict and International Concern. New
York: Peter Lang.
Kanter D.L., & Mirvis, P.H. (1989). The Cynical Americans: Living and Working
in an Age of Discontent and Disillusion. San Francisco: Josey-Bass.
Kelman, H. C. (1978). Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for
Mutual Acceptance. International Security, 3, 162-186.
Kelman, H.C. (1979). An Interactional approach to conflict resolution and its
application to Israeli-Palestinian relations. International Interactions, 6 (2), 99-122.
Kelman, H. C. (1986). Overcoming the barriers to negotiation of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. Journal of Palestine Studies, 16, 13-28.
Kelman, H.C; (1987). The Political psychology of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict:
how can we overcome the barriers to a negotiated solution? Political Psychology, 8 (2),
p.347-363.
Kelman, H. C. (1997).Social Psychological Dimension oflnternational Conflict.
In I.W. Zartman & lL. Rasmussen (Eds) Peacemaking in International Conflict:
Methods and Technique, p.191-236. Washington, DC: Institute of Peace Press.
Kelman, H. C. (1997). Nationalism, Patriotism, and National Identity: Social
Psychological Dimensions. In D.Bar-Tal & E. Staub (Eds.), Patriotism, In the lives of
individuals and nations. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
Kelman, H. C. (1997, October). Negotiating National Identity and Self-
Determination in Ethnic Conflicts: The Choice Between Pluralism and Ethnic Cleansing.
Negotiation Journal, 327-340.
372
Kelman, H. C. (1997, March). Group Processes in the Resolution oflnternational
Conflicts, Experiences From the Israeli-Palestinian Case. American Psychologist, 32,
212-220.
Kelman, H. C. (1998). Social-psychological Contributions to Peacemaking and
Peacebuilding in the Middle-East. Applied Psychology: An International Review, 47, 5-
28.
Kelman, H. C. (2001). The Role of National Identity in Conflict Resolution,
Experiences from Israeli-Palestinian Problem-Solving Workshops. In R.D.Ashmore,
LJussin, & D.Wilder (Eds.), Social Identity, Intergroup conflict, and Conflict Reduction
(pp. 187-212). Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Kelman, H. C. (2004). Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological
Perspective. In Y.Bar-Siman-Tov (Ed.), From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation (pp.
111-124). Oxford University Press.
Kelman, H. C. (2005). Building trust among enemies: The central challenge for
international conflict resolution. International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 29, 639-
650.
Kim, U, Helgesen, G., and Ahn, B. M. (2002). Democracy, Trust and Political
Efficacy: Comparative Analysis of Danish and Korean Political Culture. Applied
Psychology: An International Review, 51, 318-353.
Kirkpatrick, L. A. (1992). An Attachment-Theory Approach to the Psychology of
Religion. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion,2, 3-28.
Kirkpatrick, L. A. (1993). Fundamentalism, Christian Orthodoxy, and Intrinsic
Religious Orientation as Predictors of Discriminatory Attitudes. Journal for the Scientific
study of Religion, 32, 256-268.
Kitromilides, P. M. (1977). From coexistence to confrontation: The
dynamics of ethnic conflict in Cyprus. In M. Attalides, ed. Cyprus Reviewed, (pp. 35-70).
Nicosia, New Cyprus Association
373
Kohlberg, L. (1984). The psychology of moral development: vol. 2. Essays on
moral development. New York: Harper & Row.
Krampen, G. (1998). Prediction of Political Participation and Development of
Political Action-orientations in the Transition from Adolescence to Early Adulthood-
Results of a follow-up after seven years. ZeitschriJt fur Entwucklungspsychologie und
Pedagogische Psychologie, 30, 80-88.
Kraus, S. (2006). The Use of National Identity in Conflict Resolution. Paper'
presented at the 29th Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political
Psychology.
Kunovich, R. M. & Hodson, R. (1999, December). Conflict, Religious identity
and Ethnic Intolerance in Croatia. Social Forces, 78, 643-668.
Kyrris, C. (1976). Symbiotic elements in the history of the two communities of
Cyprus. Kypriakos Logos,8, 245-256.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997, May).
Trust in Large Organisations. The American Economic Review, 87, 333-338.
Lalljee, M. & Evans, G. (1998). Political talk and the stability and consistency of
political orientation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 37, 203-212.
Lambrou, J.K. (2004). Istoria tou Kypriakou, ta chronia meta tin aneksartisia,
1960 -1974, Nicosia: Thekona.
Landau, M. 1., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszcynski, T., Arndt, 1., et
al. (2004). Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminders of9/11
on support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin,
30,1136-1150.
Larrabee, F.S. (1981). Dateline Athens: Greece for the Greeks, Foreign Policy,
45, 158-174.
374
Larson, D. W. (1997). Trust and Missed Opportunities. Political Psychology, 18,
701-734.
Leach, C. W. and Williams, W. R. (1999, December). Group Identity and
Conflicting Expectations of the Future in Northern Ireland. Political Psychology, 20, 875-
896.
Leak, G. K. and Randall, B. A. (1995). Clarification of the link between right-
wing authoritarianism and religiousness: the role of religious maturity. Journal/or the
Scientific study 0/Religion, 34, 242-252.
Lerner, J.S., Gonzalez, R.M., Small, D.A. & Fischoff, B.(2003). Effects of fear
and anger on perceived risks of terrorism: An National Field Experiment. Psychological
Science, 14 (2), p.144-150.
Levi, M. & Stoker, L. (2000). Political Trust and Trustworthiness. Annual
Reviews of Political Sciences 3, 475-505.
Lewicki, R. J. & Wiethoff, C. (2000). Trust, Trust Development, and Trust
Repair. In M.Deutsch & P. T. Coleman (Eds.), The Handbook of Conflict Resolution,
Theory and Practice (pp. 86-107). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Lewis, J. D. & Weigert, A. (1985, June). Trust as a social reality. Social Forces,
63, 967-985.
Lincoln, Y.S., & Guba, E.G. (1985). Naturalistic Enquiry. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage.
Loizos, P. (1988). Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus ..Man, 23, 639-653.
Loizides, N. G. (2007). Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus.
International Studies Perspectives, 8, 189.
375
Loizos, P. (1998). How might Turkish and Greek Cypriots see each other more
clearly? In VcCalotychos (Eds.), Cyprus and Its People (pp. 35-52). Oxford: Westview
Press.
Long, W. J. & Brecke, P. (2003). War and reconciliation, Reason and emotion in
Conflict resolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England.
Luhman, N. (1979). Trust and Power. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Lyons, E. (2006). Coping with Social Change: Processes of Social Memory in the
Reconstruction of Identities. In G.M. Breakwell & E. Lyons, Changing European
Identities, social psychological analyses of social change. Oxford: Butterworth-
Heinemann.
Lyons, E. (2007). Analysing qualitative data: Comparative reflections. In E.Lyons
& A. Coyle (Eds.), Analysing Qualitative Data in Psychology. London: Sage.
Macek, P. &Markova, I. (2001). The meaning of trust in several European
countries. Paper presented at British Academy and Maison des Sciences de I'Homme
International Symposium, Trust as a Pre-condition to Communication, Social
Thinking and Social Practices During Democratic Transition in Post Communistic
Europe. London, September, 13-15,2001.
Mack, 1.E. (1979). Foreword to V.D. Volkan, Cyprus -War and Adaptation: A
Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict, ix-xxi. Charlottesville, Va:
University Press of Virginia.
Mack, J. (1983). Nationalism and the Self. Psychohistory Review, 2.
Mack, J. E. (1990). The Psychodynamics of Victimisation among National
Groups in Conflict. In V.D.Volkan, D. A. Julius, & J. V. Montville (Eds.), The
Psychodynamics of International Relationships, Volume I: Concepts and Theories (pp.
119-129). Toronto: Lexington Books.
376
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., and Smith, E. R. (2000). Integroup Emotions:
Explaining Offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 79, 602-616.
Mackie, D. M., Silver, L. A., & Smith, E. R. (2004). Intgergroup Emotions:
Emotion as an Intergroup Phenomenon. In L.Z.Tiedens & C. W. Leach (Eds.), The Social
Life of Emotions (pp. 227-245). Cambridge University Press.
Madill, A., Jordan, A., & Shirley, C. (2000). Objectivity and reliability in
qualitative analysis: Realist, contextualist, and radical constructionist epistemologies.
British Journal of Psychology, 91, 1-20.
Maney, G. M., Ibrahim, I., Higgins, G.I., & Herzog, H. (2006, March). The Past's
Promise: Lessons from Peace Processes in Northern Ireland and the Middle East. Journal
of Peace Research, 43, 181-200.
Maoz, Z. & Felsenthal, D.S (1987). Self-biding commitments, the nducement of
trust, social choice and the theory of international cooperation. International Studies
Quarterly, 31, p.177-200.
Markova, I. (2004). Trust and Democratic Transition in Post-Communist Europe.
Oxford University Press.
Marty, M.E. (1997). Introduction: The Role of Religion in Cultural Foundations
ofEthnonationalism. In M.E. Marty & R.S. Appleby (Eds) Religion, Ethnicity and Self-
Identity, nations in turmoil. Hanover and London: University Press of New England.
McLernon, F., Cairns, E. & & Hewstone, M. (1999). 'Northern Ireland: A Time
To Forgive?' British Psychological Society Annual Conference, London, December.
McLernon, F., Cairns, E., Lewis, C. A., & Hewstone, M. (2003). Memories of
Recent Conflict and Forgiveness in Northern Ireland. In The role of memory in ethnic
conflict (pp. 125-143). London: Palgrave Macmillan.
377
McLernon, F., Ferguson, N. & Cairns, E. (1997) Comparison of North em Irish
Children's Attitudes to War and Peace Before and After the Paramilitary Ceasefires.
International Journal of Behavioral Development, 20 (4), p.715-730.
Meijerink, F., Dekker, H., Post, V. (2001). Political Cynicism, origins and effects.
Paper presentation at the 4thECPR Conference, Pisa, 6-8 September.
Metlay, D. (1999). Institutional Trust and Confidence: A Journey into a
Conceptual Quagmire. In G.Cvetkovich & R. E. Lofstedt (Eds.), Social Trust and the
Management of Risk (pp. 100-116). London: Earthscan Publications.
Mishler, W & Rose, R. (1997, May). Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular
Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies. The Journal
of Politics, 59.
Muldoon, O. (2004). Children of the Troubles: The impact of Political Violence
in Northern Ireland. Journal of Social Issues, 60 (3), p.453-468.
Muldoon, 0.,McLaughlin, K. & Trew, K. (2007a). Adolescents' Perceptions of
National Identification and socialisation: A Grounded Analysis. British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 25, p.579-594.
Muldoon, 0., Trew, K., Todd, J., Rougier, N. & McLaughlin, K. (2007).
Religious and National identity after the Belfast Good Friday Agreement. Political
Psychology, 28 (1), p.89-103.
Mullet, E. & Girard, M. (1999). Forgiveness: Developmental and Cognitive
Points of View, in M. McCullough, K. Pargament & C. Thorensen (Eds) Frontiers of
Forgiveness. New York: Guildford.
378
Nadler, A. & Saguy, T. (2004). Reconciliation between Nations: Overcoming
Emotional Deterrents to Ending Conflicts between Groups. In H.1.Langholtz & C. E.
Stout (Eds.), The Psychology of Diplomacy (pp. 29-46). London: Praeger.
Nadler, A. & Liviatan, I. (2006). Intergroup Reconciliation: Effects of
Adversary's Expressions of Empathy, Responsibility, and Recipients' Trust. Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 32, 459-470.
Niemi, R. & Jennings, M. K. (1991, November). Issues and inheritance in the
formation of party identification. American Journal of Political Science, 35, 970-988.
Nordquist, K. (1985). Contradicting Peace Proposals in the Palestine Conflict.
Journal of Peace Research, 22, 159-173.
Olekalns, M. (1997). Conflict At Work: Defining and Resolving Organisational
Conflicts. Australian Psychologist, 32, 56-61.
Olzan, S. & West, E. (1991). Ethnic conflict and the Rise and Fall of Ethnic
Newspapers. American Sociological Review, 56, 458-474.
Paez, D. & Vergara, A.1. (1995). Culture Differences in emotional knowledge. In
J. A. Russell, 1M. Fernandez-Dols, A.S.R. Manstead & J.C. Wellenkamp (Eds) Everyday
conceptions of emotion: An introduction to the psychology, anthropology and linguistics
of emotion (p.415-434). Boston: Kluwer.
Paluck, E.L. (2009). Reducing Intergroup Prejudice and Conflict Using the
Media: A Field Experiment in Rwanda. Interpersonal Relations and Group Processes,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(3),574-587.
Panteli, S. (1990). The Making of Modern Cyprus, from Obscurity to Statehood,
England: Interworld Publ ications.
Papadakis, Y. (1998, May). Greek Cypriot narratives of history and collective
identity: nationalism as a contested process. American Ethnologist, 25, 149-165.
379
Papadopoulos, T. (2004). Declaration by the President of the Republic Mr Tassos
Papadopoulos regarding the referendum of 24th April2004.
Papadopoulos, T. (2004). Statement by the President of the Republic Mr Tassos
Papadopoulos.
Parkinson, B., Fischer, A.H. & Manstead, A.S.R. (2005). Emotion in Social
Relations.Cultural Group and Interpersonal Processes. New York: Psychology Press.
Pennekarnp, S.F., Doosje, B., Zebel, S. & Fischer, A.H. (2007). The Past and the
Pending: The Antecedents and Consequences of Group-Based Anger in Historically and
Currently Disadvantaged Groups. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 1O( 1), p.41-
55.
Pettigrew, T.F. (1998). Intergroup Contact Theory. Annual Review of Psychology,
49,65-85.
Polis, A. (1996). The social construction of ethnicity and nationality. The case of
Cyprus. Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 2 (1), p.67-90.
Potter,1. & Wetherell, M. (1987): "Discourse and Social Psychology," London:
Sage.
Quillian L. (1995). Prejudice as a response to perceived group threat: population
composition and anti-immigrant and racial prejudice in Europe. American Sociological
Review, 60, 586-611.
Rahim, M.A. (1986). Referent Role and Styles of Handling Interpersonal
Conflict. Journal of Social Psychology, 126, 78-96.
Retzinger, S. & Scheff, T. (2006). Emotions, Alienation and Narratives in
Protracted Conflict. In M.Fidzduff & C. E. Stout (Eds.), The Psychology of Resolving
Global Conflicts, From War to Peace, volume 1:Nature vs Nurture (pp. 239-255).
London: Praeger Security International.
380
Rosenberg, M. (1957). Faith-in-People And Occupational Attitudes. In
Occupations And Values. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
Rosenberg, S. W. and Wolfsfeld, G. (1977). International Conflict and the
Problem of Attribution. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21, 75-103.
Ross, M. H. (1993). The Culture of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in
Comparative Perspectives. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
Rothbart, M. & Hallmark, W. (1988). Ingroup-outgroup differences in the
perceived efficacy of coercion and conciliation in resolving social conflict. Journal 0/
Personality and Social Psychology, 55, p.248-257.
Rothman, J. (1997). Revolving Identity-Based Conflict in Nations, Organisations
and Communities. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Rothman, J. and Olson, M. L. (2001, May). From Interests to Identities:Towards a
New Emphasis in Interactive Conflict Resolution. Journal of Peace Research, Special
Issue on Conflict Resolution in Identity-Based Disputes, 38, 298-30S.
Rothstein, B. (2000). Social Capital in the Social Democratic State:The Swedish
model and Civil Society. In R.Putnam (Ed.), The Decline of Social Capital? Political
Culture as a Condition/or Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rothstein, R. L. (1999). After the Peace, Resistance and Reconciliation. Boulder,
London: Lynne Rienner.
Rouhana, N. N. (2004). Group Identity and Power Asymmetry in Reconciliation
Processes: The Israeli-Palestinian Case. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace
Psychology, J 0, 33-52.
Rouhana, N.N. & Kelman, H. (1994). Promotingjoint thinking in international
conflicts: An Israeli-Palestinian continuing workshop. Journal of Social issues, SO (I),
157-178.
381
Rousseau, D.L. & Garcia-Retamero, R. (2007). Identity, Power and Threat
Perception, A Cross-National Experimental Study. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(5),
p.744-771.
Rubin, J.Z. & Brown, B.R. (1975). The Social Psychology of Bargaining and
Negotiation. Academic Press.
Ryan, G. W. & Bernard, R. (2005). Data Management and Analysis methods. In
N.K.Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (2 ed., pp. 769-
802). London: Sage publications Inc.
Saylor, C. F. (1993). Children and Disasters. New York, London: Plenum.
Sherif, M. (1966). In common predicament: Social psychology of intergroup
conflict and cooperation, Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
Sherif, M. (1966). Group Conflict and Cooperation. London: Routlege & Kegan
Paul.
Schwartz, S. H. & Huismans, S. (1995, June). Value Priorities and Religiosity in
Four Western Religions. Social Psychology Quarterly, 58, 88-107.
Schwebel, M. (1982). Effects of the Nuclear War Threat On Children and
Teenagers: Implications For Professionals. Presented at a Symposium of Physicians for
Social Responsibility, NYC, New York.
Saylor, C. F. (1993). Children and Disasters. New York, London: Plenum.
Shamir, J. & Shikaki, K. (2002, March). Determinants of Reconciliation and
Compromise among Israelis and Palestinians. Journal of Peace Research, 39, 185-202.
382
Sjoberg, L. (1999). Perceived Competence and Motivation in Industry and
Government as Factors in Risk Perception. In G.Cvetkovich & R. E. Lofstedt (Eds.),
Social Trust and the Management of Risk (pp. 89-99). London: Earthscan Publications.
Skinner, N. F., Giokas, 1. A., & Hornstein, H. A. (1976). Personality Correlates of
Machiavellianism: 1. Consensual Validation. Social Behavior and Personality, 4, 273-
276.
Skouros, T. (2003). Antisocial Behaviour of Greek Cypriot students attending the
3rd year of secondary school in the school environment. Pedagogikh epitheorisi, 35,
p.219-235.
Slovic, P. (1993). Perceived Risk, Trust, and Democracy. Risk Analysis, 13, 675-
682.
Smidt C. (1999, September). Religion and Civic Engagement: A Comparative
Analysis. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 565, 176-192.
Southwell, P.L. & Everest, MJ. (1998). The electoral consequences of alienation:
Nonvoting and protest voting in the 1992 presidential race. The Social Science Journal,
35 (1), p.43-51.
Stein, H.F. & Niederland, W.O. (1989). The Development of the Self: A
Psychoanalytic Perspective. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, p. 85-106. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Stephan, W.G. & Stephan, C.W. (1991). Intermarriage: Effects on Personality,
Adjustment, and Intergroup Relations in Two Samples of Students, Journal of Marriage
and the Family, 53(1),241-250.
Stephan, W.O. & Stephan, C.W. (2000). An Integrated Threat Theory of
Prejudice. In O.S. Oskamp (Ed). Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination (p.23-45).
London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
383
Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, 0., and Bachman, G. (1999). Prejudice Toward
Immigrants. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29, 2221-2237.
Stokes, D. E. (1962). Popular evaluations of government: an empirical
assessment. In H Cleveland. & HD Lasswell (Eds.), Ethics and Bigness: Scientific,
Academic, Religious, Political and Military (pp. 61-72). New York: Harper.
Strauss, A. & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of qualitative research: Grounded theory
procedures and techniques. London: Sage.
Sunshine, 1., & Tyler, T. (2003). Moral Solidarity, Identification with the
Communnity, and the Importance of Procedural Justice: The Police as Prototypical
Representatives ofa Group's Moral Values, Social Psychology Quarterly, 66(2), 153-
165.
Tai, C.S., Peterson, E.J., & Gurr, T.R. (1973). Internal Versus External Sources of
Anti-Americanism: Two Comparative Studies. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 17(3),
455-488.
Tajfel, H. (1978). Differentiation between social groups. London: Academic
Press.
Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. (1979). An Integrative Theory ofIntergroup Conflict. In
W.O.Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations (
Monterey: Brooks/Cole Publishing.
Tam, T., Hewstone, M., Cairns, E., Tausch, N., Maio, O. & Kenwrothy, J. (2007).
The impact of intergroup emotions on forgiveness in Northern Ireland. Group Processes
& Intergroup Relations, 10, p.II9-135.
Tank, P. (2002). Re-solving the Cyprus problem: Changing perceptions of state
and societal security. European Security, 11(3), p.I46-164.
384
Teddlie, C. & Tashakkori, A. (2003). Major issues and controversies in the use of
mixed methods in the social and behavioral sciences. In A.Tashakkori & C. Teddie
(Eds.), Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social and Behavioural Research ( Thousand
Oaks: Sage.
Thabet, A.A.M., Abed, Y. & P. Vostanis, (2002). Emotional Problems in
Palestinian Children living in a War Zone; a cross-sectional study. The Lancet, 359,
p.180 1-1804.
Thompson, M.M., Zanna, M.P. & Griffin, D.W. (1995) Lets not be indifferent
about (attitudinal) ambivalence (p.361-386). In R.E. Petty & J.A. Krosnick (Eds) Attitude
Strength: Antecedents and Consequences. Malwah, NJ. Lawrence Erlebaum.
Todd, Z., Nerlich, B., & McKeown, S. (2004). Introduction. In Z.Todd, B.
Nerlich, S. McKeown, & D. C. Clarke (Eds.), Mixing Methods in Psychology, The
Integration of Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Theory and Practice ( Hove and
New York: Psychology Press.
Tompazos, S. (2006). To sxedio Annan kai h Ellhnokypriakh Amhxania.
Ref Type: Unpublished Work.
Tompazos, S. (2006, February 24). H perirreousa atmosfaira. Augh.
Torney-Purta, J. (1983). The development of views about the role of social
institutions in redressing inequality and promoting human rights. In R.L.Leahy (Ed.),
child's construction of social inequality (London, New York: Academic Press.
Trew, K. (2004). Children in Socio-Cultural Divisions in Northern Ireland.
Journal of Social Issues, 60 (3), p.507-522.
385
Trimiklinioti, N. (2006). Oi diachoristikes grammes kai Kypriaka kommata.
2006.
Tsakona, AE. (2003). Anti-Americanism and Opinion Makers in Greece During
the War on Iraq. ELIAMEP, PN06.07.
Turner, i.c., Hogg, M.A., Oakes, PJ., Reicher, S.D. & Wetherell, M.S. (1987).
Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Oxford, England:
Blackwell
Turner R.N., Hewstone, M., Voci, A, Paolini, S., & Christ, O. (2007). Reducing
Prejudice Via Direct and Extended Cross-Group Friendship. European Review of Social
Psychology, 18,212-255.
Tyler, T. R. & Degoey, P. (1996). Trust in Organisational Authorities, The
Influence of Motive Attributions of Willingness to Accept Decisons. In R.M.Kramer &
T. R. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in Organisations: Frontiers of theory and research (pp. 331-
356). Sage Publications.
Tyler, T. R. & Huo, Y. J. (2002). Trust in the law, Encouraging Public
Cooperation with the Police and Courts. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Volkan, V. D. (1988). The need to have enemies and allies: From clinical
practice to international relations. Northvale, New Jersey: Jason Aronson, Inc.
Volkan, V.D. (2002). September 11 and Societal Regression. Group Analysis, 35
(4), p.456-483.
Volkan, V.D. (2003). Blind Trust: Large groups and their leaders in times of crisis
and terror. Charlottesville, VA: Pitchstone Publishing.
Walliman, N. S. R. (2004). Your Undergraduate Dissertation: The Essential
Guide for Success, London, Sage Publications.
Watier, P. & Markova, I. (2004). Trust as a psychosocial feeling: Socialization
and totalitarianism. In I.Markova (Ed.), Trust and Democratic Transition in Post-
communist Europe (pp. 25-46). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
386
Weatherford, M. S. (1987). How does government performance influence
political support. Political Behavior, 9, 5-28.
Weatherford, M. S. (1992, March). Measuring political legitimacy. The American
Political Science Review, 86, 149-166.
Webster, C. (2005). Division or unification in Cyprus? The role of
demographics, attitudes and party inclination on Greek Cypriot preferences for a
solution to the Cyprus problem. Ethnopolitics, 4(3), 299-309.
Webster, C. and Lordos, A. (2006). Who supported the Annan Plan? An
Exploratory Statistical Analysis of the Demographic, Political, and Attitudinal Correlates.
Cyprus Review, 18, 13-35.
Weiner, B., Graham, S., Chandler, C. (1982). Pity, Anger, and Guilt: An
Attributional Analysis. Personality And Social Psychology Bulletin, 8(2), p.226-232.
Welch, M. R., Sikkink, D., Sartain, E., and Bond, C. (2004). Trust in God and
Trust in Man: The Ambivalent Role of Religion in Shaping Dimensions of Social Trust.
Journal for the Scientific study of Religion, 43, 317-343.
Whyte, J. (1990). Interpreting Northern Ireland. Oxford, England: Oxford
University Press.
Willig, C. (2001).Introducing Qualitative Research in Psychology, Adventures in
theory and method. Norfolk: Open University Press.
Wink, W. (1998). When the Powers Fall: Reconciliation in the healing of nations.
Minneapolis: Fortress.
Wrightsman, L.S. (1964). Measurement of Philosophies of Human Nature.
Psychological Reports, 14, 743-751.
387
Yanay, N. (1996). National Hatred, Female Subjectivity, and the Boundaries of
Cultural Discourse. Symbolic Interaction, 19(1), 21-36.
Yardley, L. & Bishop, F. (2008). Mixing Qualitative and Quantitative Methods: A
Pragmatic-Approach. In C.Willig & W. Stainton Rogers (Eds.), Handbook a/Qualitative
Research. Sage.
Zand, D.E. (1972). Trust and Managerial Problem Solving, Administrative
Science Quarterly, 17,229-239.
Zubenko, W. N. & Capozzoli, 1. (2002). Children and disasters: a practical guide
to healing and recovery. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Websites
www.askoxford.com accessed on 05/06/2009.
Stavrinides, http://website.lineone.netl-acgtaILong%20Joumey.doc accessed on
12/05/2009.
Eleutheri ora (newspaper), 28-02-
2008.http://www.elora.gr/portal/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=570&It
emid=2 accessed on 28/02/2009.
http://www.ecclesia.gr/greek/holysynod/deltia typoU/2002-11-20.html; accessed
on 21/04/2008.
http://www.aegean.gr/agios-therapontas/magazine/speciaIlCypruslEcclesia.html;
accessed on 21104/2008.
http://wvvw.wrmea.com!archives/June 2004/0406040.html accessed on
16/07/2007.
388
Anatolia Agency, 23.5.00, http://www.hrLorginews/cyprus/tcpr/2000/00-05-
24.tcpr.html.
http://www.apopsLcom.cy/2008/04/198 accessed on 22/0512009.
Neofytou, T. (2008). http://www.apopsi.com.cy/2008/04/197 accessed on
22/05/2009.
Politis, 26/04/2009 http://www.politis-news.com/cgibinlhweb?-A=86803 7&-
V=archivearticles accessed on 26/04/2009 ..
http://www.prio.no/Cyprus/ accessed on 22/12/09
http://www.peace-cyprus.orglyouthl accessed on 22/12/09
389
Appendix I
1. Questionnaire Study 1 English version
2. Questionnaire Study 1 Greek version
3. Interview, participant 7, Study 2
4. Questionnaire Study 3 English version
5. Questionnaire Study 3 Greek version
390
1. Questionnaire STUDY 1 ENGLISH VERSION
Your views on the political issues in Cyprus
Cyprus' political situation has been the issue for many politicians, diplomats and
researchers all around the world, due to the complexity and the severity of the subject.
No matter what the solution to the Cyprus issue is, it will have to be acceptable from all
Cypriots.
This research is a part of an effort to approach and understand young people's views on
the political issues.
I would deeply appreciate if you could read and complete the following questionnaire,
answering to all the questions after following the relevant instructions every time.
There are no right or wrong answers.
Your participation to this research will be anonymous and confidential.
If you have any queries or if you want to know more about this research, do not hesitate
to contact me using the following email address:
d.pahis@surrey.ac.uk
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WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE .....
Information about yourself:
.:. Please, circle the most appropriate responsefor you in thefollowing questions
1. Age: 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 years old
2. Sex: Male / Female
3. Do you have relatives that live in the occupied part of Cyprus? Yes / No
4. Is the origin of your mother or father
from the occupied part of Cyprus? Yes / No
.:. As you know, people identify at different levels with their nationality or religion.
For some people, they constitute an important part of themselves, whilefor others
not. Please complete, in the line after each question, the number which
represents the level at whick you identify with the following statements. Please
choosefrom thefollowing scale:
To a small To a neither To a great extent
extent great nor small
extent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. To what extent do you feel Cypriot?
6. To what extent do you feel Greek Cypriot?
7. To what extent do you feel Greek?
8. To what extent do you feel European?
9. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Cypriot people
10. To what extent do you feel pleased to be Cypriot?
11. How similar do you think you are to the average Cypriot person?
12. How important to you is being Cypriot?
13. How much are your views about Cyprus shared by other Cypriot people? __
14. When you hear someone who is not Cypriot criticize the Cypriot people, to what
extent do you feel personally criticized?
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.:. Please, answer the following questions, by completing in the line after each
question, the number that represents your level identification with the following
statements:
To a small To a neither To a great extent
extent great nor small
extent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
15. To what extent do you feel Christian Orthodox?
16. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Christian
Orthodox people?
17. To what extent do you feel pleased to be Christian Orthodox?
18. How similar do you think you are to the average Christian
Orthodox person?
19. How important to you is being Christian Orthodox?
20. How much are your views about Orthodoxy shared by other
Christian Orthodox people?
21. When you hear someone who is not Christian Orthodox criticize the
Christian Orthodox people,
to what extent do you feel personally criticized?
Your views about politics:
.:. Some people are very interested in politics whereas others are not at all. Please
answer the following questions by circling the number that expresses your view,
using the following scales:
Very Little Not much Very Much
not little
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
22. How much are you interested in
politics in Cyprus?
1234567
Very Little Not much Very much
not little
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. How much do you think you know
about politics in Cyprus?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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.:. Some people read newspapers and watch political discussions, while others
demonstrate no interest at all at these things. Please answer the following questions
by completing in the line after each question the number that expresses
your view, choosingfrom the following scale:
Never Very rarely
1 2
Rarely
3
Sometimes
4
Often
5
Very often Every day
6 7
24. How often do you watch the news or political discussions on the television? __
25. How often do you read the political sections in newspapers?
26. Do you discuss about politics with your parents at home?
27. In politics, people are often talking about "left" and "right" wing ideology. Where
do you place yourself in the following scale? Please circle the most appropriate
number for you.
Left wing Right wing
ideology ideology
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
.:. Many people and governments are involved in the resolution of the Cyprus issue.
You may trust some of them more than others. Please complete in the lines after each
statement the most appropriate number for you, from number 1 to 7, according to how
much you agree or disagree to the following statements in terms of the resolution of the
Cyprus issue.
Your views on the Turkish Cypriot government:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue
To what extent do you agree/disagree that:
disagree agree
1234567
28. the Turkish Cypriot government is trustful
29. the Turkish Cypriot government is worthy of support
30. the Turkish Cypriot government is legitimate
31. the Turkish Cypriot government is trustworthy
32. the Turkish Cypriot government is fair
33. the Turkish Cypriot government is effective
34. the Turkish Cypriot government is efficient
35. the Turkish Cypriot government is responsive
36. the Turkish Cypriot government is compassionate
37. the Turkish Cypriot government has integrity
38. the Turkish Cypriot government is worthy of pride
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Your views on the Turkish K;overnment:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: I 2 3 4 S 6 7
39. the Turkish government is trustful -
40. the Turkish government is worthy of support
41. the Turkish government is legitimate --
42. the Turkish government is trustworthy
43. the Turkish government is fair
44. the Turkish government is effective
45. the Turkish government is efficient
46. the Turkish government is responsive
47. the Turkish government is compassionate
48. the Turkish government has integrity
49. the Turkish government is worthy of pride
Your views on the CV)2riot government:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
50. the Cypriot government is trustful --
51. the Cypriot government is worthy of support --
52. the Cypriot government is legitimate --
53. the Cypriot government is trustworthy --
54. the Cypriot government is fair --
55. the Cypriot government is effective --
56. the Cypriot government is efficient --
57. the Cypriot government is responsive --
58. the Cypriot government is compassionate
59. the Cypriot government has integrity
60. the Cypriot government is worthy of pride
Your views on the Greek government:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 S 6 7
61. the Greek government is trustful
62. the Greek government is worthy of support
63. the Greek government is legitimate --
64. the Greek government is trustworthy --
65. the Greek government is fair --
66. the Greek government is effective
67. the Greek government is efficient --
68. the Greek government is responsive
69. the Greek government is compassionate -
70. the Greek government has integrity
71. the Greek government is worthy of pride
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.:. The British and American government, as well as the European Union and the
United Nations are also involved in the resolution of the Cyprus issue. Please
circle the most appropriate number for you, from 1 to 5, according to how much
you agree or disagree with the following statements, in terms of the resolution of
the Cypriot issue.
Strongly Somewhat Neither Somewhat Strongly
disagree disagree disagree agree agree
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue: nor
a2ree
Your views on the British Government
72. The British government is trustful 1 2 3 4 5
73. The British government is worthy of support 1 2 3 4 5
74. The British government is legitimate 1 2 3 4 5
75. The British government is effective 1 2 3 4 5
76. The British government is fair 1 2 3 4 5
77. The British government is efficient 1 2 3 4 5
78. The British government is responsive 1 2 3 4 5
79. The British government is compassionate 1 2 • 3 4 5
80. The British government has integrity 1 2 3 4 5
81. The British government is worthy of pride 1 2 3 4 5
82. The British government is trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Somewhat Neither Somewhat Strongly
disagree disagree disagree agree agree
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue: nor
agree
Your views on the American Government
83. The American government is trustful 1 2 3 4 5
84. The American government is worthy of support 1 2 3 4 5
85. The American government is legitimate 1 2 3 4 5
86. The American government is effective 1 2 3 4 5
87. The American government is fair 1 2 3 4 5
88. The American government is efficient 1 2 3 4 5
89. The American government is responsive 1 2 3 4 5
90. The American government is compassionate 1 2 3 4 5
91. The American government has integrity 1 2 3 4 5
92. The American government is worthy of pride 1 2 3 4 5
93. The American government is trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5
,I,
?•o
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Strongly Somewhat Neither Somewhat Strongly
disagree disagree disagree agree agree
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue: nor
agree
Your views on the European Union
94. The European Union is trustful 1 2 3 4 5
95. The European Union is worthy ofs~port 1 2 3 4 5
96. The European Union is legitimate 1 2 3 4 5
97. The European Union is effective 1 2 3 4 5
98. The European Union is fair 1 2 3 4 5
99. The European Union is efficient 1 2 3 4 5
100. The European Union is responsive 1 2 3 4 5
101. The European Union is compassionate 1 2 3 4 5
102. The European Union has inte_&ti!y 1 2 3 4 5
103.The European Union is worthL of pride 1 2 3 4 5
104.The European Union is trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5
Strongly Somewhat Neither Somewhat Strongly
disagree disagree disagree agree agree
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue: nor
agree
Your views on the United Nations
105.The United Nations are trustful 1 2 3 4 5
106. The United Nations are worthy of support 1 2 3 4 5
I07.The United Nations are legitimate 1 2 3 4 5
108.The United Nations are effective 1 2 3 4 5
109. The United Nations are fair 1 2 3 4 5
110. The United Nations are efficient 1 2 3 4 5
111. The United Nations are responsive 1 2 3 4 5
112.The United Nations are compassionate 1 2 3 4 5
113.The United Nations have integrity 1 2 3 4 5
114.The United Nations are worthy of pride 1 2 3 4 5
I IS. The United Nations are trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5
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.:. Please circle the number the represents you most, from 1 to 7, according to how
much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
1 means that you strongly disagree, whereas 7 means that you strongly agree.
2
Neither agree
or disagree
3 4
StronglyStrongly
disagree
1
agree
5 6 7
116. I trust the government for the resolution of the Cyprus issue
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
117. I trust the United Nations for the resolution of the present conflict with Turkey
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
118. I trust the European Union for the creation of a united Cypriot Nation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
119. I trust Cypriot politicians for the final dominance and maintenance of peace
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
120. I support the government for the resolution of the Cyprus issue
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
121. I support the United Nations for the resolution of the present conflict with
Turkey
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
122. I support the European Union for the creation ofa united Cypriot Nation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
123. I support Cypriot politicians for the final dominance and maintenance of peace
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
124. I am confident that the government is working for the resolution of the Cyprus
issue
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
125. I am confident that the United Nations will help in the resolution of the present
conflict with Turkey
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
126. I am confident that the European Union will help in the creation of a united
Cypriot Nation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Strongly
Disagree
1 3 5
Strongly
agree
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Neither agree,
or disagree
4 6
127. I am confident that the politicians are working for the final dominance and
maintenance of peace
1 2 3 4 '5 6 7
128. I find the government's actions, for the resolution of the Cyprus issue,
legitimate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
129. I find the United Nations' actions, for the resolution of the present conflict with
Turkey, legitimate
1 2 3 4 5 6
130. I find the European Union's actions, for the creation of a united Cypriot Nation,
legitimate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
131. I find the actions of the Cypriot politicians, for the resolution of the Cyprus
issue, legitimate
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
132. Greek Cypriot people would be surrendering to the Turkish Cypriot people by
compromising over a United Cyprus, according to the Annan plan
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
133. The Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities need to compromise
with each other
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
134. Turkish Cypriot people would show strength by compromising with the Greek
Cypriot people.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
135. There is no need for compromise between the Greek Cypriot people and the
Turkish Cypriot people.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
136. The Turkish Cypriot people would be surrendering to the Greek Cypriot people
by compromising with the Annan plan.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
137. The Greek Cypriot people would show strength by compromising with the
Turkish Cypriot people
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Circle the number which Strongly Neither Strongly
represents how much you agree or Disagree agree or agree
disagree with the following disagree
statements
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
138. The Greek Cypriot community
should never forgive the Turkish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cypriot people for their past
actions
139. The Greek Cypriot people would
look weak by forgiving the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Turkish Cypriot community for
the past atrocities
140. The Turkish Cypriot and Greek
Cypriot communities need to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
forgive each other for what
happened in the past.
141. Both communities should never
forgive each other for what 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
happened in the past
142. The Turkish Cypriot community
should never forgive the Greek 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cypriot people for their past
actions
143. The Turkish Cypriot people
would show strength by 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
forgiving the Greek Cypriot
l'_eo_ptefor their past actions
144. Apologising for the past will
benefit both communities in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Cyprus
145. Public apologies for the past by
both communities would be 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
beneficial for everybody in
Cyprus
146. The Turkish Cypriot people
should not apologise to the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Greek Cypriot people for their
past
147. If the Greek Cypriot people
apologise to the Turkish Cypriot 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
people for the past it would be a
betrayal of previous _generations
148. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish
Cypriot people should never 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
apologise for their l'_ast atrocities
149. Both communities should
apologise for the past wrongs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
that they have committed
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.:. Apart from the different governments and organisations which are involved in the
resolution of the Cyprus issue, the opinion of the public for other peoples is also
important. Please complete the lines following each question with the number
from 1 to 7, according to how much you agree or disagree with the following
statements, in terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue.
Your views on the Greek Cypriot people:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
150. The Greek Cypriot people are trustful
151. The Greek Cypriot people are worthy of support
152. The Greek Cypriot people are legitimate
153. The Greek Cypriot people are trustworthy --
154. The Greek Cypriot people are fair
155. The Greek Cypriot people are effective --
156. The Greek Cypriot people are efficient
157. The Greek Cypriot people are responsive --
158. The Greek Cypriot people are compassionate --
159. The Greek Cypriot people have integrity
160. The Greek Cypriot people are worthy of pride --
Your views on the Turkish Cypriot people:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
161. The Turkish Cypriot people are trustful
162. The Turkish Cypriot people are worthy of support
163. The Turkish Cypriot people are legitimate
164. The Turkish Cypriot people are trustworthy
165. The Turkish Cypriot people are fair
166. The Turkish Cypriot people are effective
167. The Turkish Cypriot people are efficient
168. The Turkish Cypriot people are responsive
169. The Turkish Cypriot people are compassionate
170. The Turkish Cypriot people have integrity
171. The Turkish Cypriot people are worthy of pride
~ ~••
• ... ,
\ I
,.,~.....
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Your views on the Greek people:
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue
To what extent do you agree/disagree that:
Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
1234567
172. The Greek people are trustful
173. The Greek people are worthy of support
174. The Greek people are legitimate
175. The Greek people are trustworthy
176. The Greek people are fair
177. The Greek people are effective
178. The Greek people are efficient
179. The Greek people are responsive
180. The Greek people are compassionate
181. The Greek people have integrity
182. The Greek people are worthy of pride
Your views on the Turkish people:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue
To what extent do you agree/disagree that:
disagree agree
1234567
183. The Turkish people are trustful
184. The Turkish people are worthy of support
185. The Turkish people are legitimate
186. The Turkish people are trustworthy
187. The Turkish people are fair
188. The Turkish people are effective
189. The Turkish people are efficient
190. The Turkish people are responsive
191. The Turkish people are compassionate
192. The Turkish people have integrity
193. The Turkish people are worthy of pride
.:. Approaching the end of this' questionnaire, please answer the following questions,
using the space after each question
194. In which city are you living;
195. 'Whichis your school
196. In what grade are you studying?
2. Questionnaire STUDY 1
GREEK VERSION
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TI TIIl:TEYEIl: .....
nJ..:l1pO<pOpU:~ 110. TOVEa\)TO GO\) :
.:. Ilapaxasd: pQJ.s us h"15I().Otu; sm).oye, 7COVas avr17r:po(Jm7CSVOVVatu; napoxau»
spmr~(Jsu;.
197. HA.udu: 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 xpovcOv
198. <1>UA.o: Ay6pt / Koptrot
199. 'Exet~ croyyevsi~ 1tOU~ouvs ()1;U1(u'tSX6J.levu; Nm / '0Xt
200. H 1(u'tuyrorfl tT]<;J.lll'tepu<;cou it rou
1t<l'tepu cou €iVUtU1t6'tU1(u'tSX6J.leYu; Nut / '0Xt
.:. D7Cmq ,iPS1" 01 av(}pm7COl alu(}avovral Tr/V dJvl1(~ ~ tnv (}p'l(J](svrlK~ rov, taototnta ue
f5zarpoperlKo rpo7Co. Tta PSPIKOV, &v eivai onuavttxo uepo; rov eaotob rOD" evd: yza
illOD, eivai. llapaKaAW 7CS, pOD us ti fJa(}po aZ(J(}avs(Jw StJV rOD, napoxato:
xapaKrf{plapovq UV/-l1C).l1Pwvovro.C; (JTI1V "IPo.}lJui rov h'o.rQJ.).l1).O "1'0. aeva o.P10}lO.
IIapaKaAW i5z6.J..e,sa7COtnv xapaxatco xiiuoxa :
1:£ 1:£ noJ..\) 1:£ JUKpO Oeee OE ,UKpO, 1:£ 1:£ no).\} 1:£ \)n£ppoJ..lKU
\)n£p~oJ..lKU J'lKPO pa9J'o O\}T£ 0& J'£'"fU).o J'£'"fUJ..o J'£'"fU).o J'&"faAOpaOJ,lO
»lKP6 6a9»0 ilaO»O paOJ,lO 6aO»o paOpo
1 2 3 4 S 6 7
20I, I:s 1tot6 ~u9J.l6 atcr9avecrm Ku1tptoqa; __
202. I:s 1tot6 ~u9J.l6 mcr9avsaat EUllVOKU1tptoqa;
204. I:s 1t01.6~u9J.l6 ata9avEaut Eupro1tutoqa;
207. Ilooo 6J.lotoqu 1ttan:ust<; 6n siam us eva/J.lia J.leao/ll KunptO/a;
208. Iloco 0'TlJ.lavn1(6stvci Y1.a osvc 'to ysyov6<; 6n stern KunptOqu;
209. Iloco 1tta'tsuet<; 6n Ot an6\j1et<; aou yta tT]XcOpa aou O"UI.l<Provouv
J.lS'troYO"UJ.l1ta'tptCO'tcOvaou;
210. 'Orav a1(ou~ KanOtov nou 8ev eivm Kunpto<; va KptnKap€1. 'tou<;
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.:. Ilapa1(alw atuivtnoe UTZ, xapoxoica eponnaeu; G'V}mll1PWVovTar; atnv 'Ypappl/ TOV
aplOpO 1COVe1(rppa(el ae tt paellO azoBaVefJal too; xopoxaio: xapaKT1'fPlfJIlOV, :
1:& 1:& noM 1:& 111KpO OU1'& es 111Kp6, 1:& 1:& nOAU 1:& Vn&pfJoAlKll
Vn&pfJOA1Ka JllKPO fJa9Jlo 0U1'& ee Jl£,,(aAO Jl£,,(aAO Jl£,,(aAO Jl£"(tlAO fJa9f.1o
U1KoO 6a9uo 6a9uo lla9~16 fJa9uo Da9uo
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
211. LE 1tOtO~aeJ.lO atO'euvEcrat XptO'nav091l Op9000~0911;
212. LE 1tOtO~a9J.lo at0'9uvEO'at on Exet~ ouvatOu~ OEO'f..I.OU~
f..I.stOU~Xpioncvou; opeooo~ou~;
213. LE 1t0t,0~a9J.lo atO'euvsO'at cuxaptO'tllf..l.ev0911
1tOUstoui XptO'navo91l Op9000~0911;
214. Ilooo of..l.Ot09amO'tsus~ on staat
J.lEeva./J.lta J.leO'o/l1Xp1.O'navo/ll opeooo~o/l1;
215. Ilooo O'l1J.laVnKOetvct yta O'eva to yeyovo~ on stom
XptO'nav091l opeoOO~0911;
216. Iloco mcrteUet~ on Ot a1to'l'st~ cou yta tllv Op90oo~ia
euuqxovoev J.lStrov UMroV;
217. Oruv aKou~ KU1tOlOV1tOUOSVstvct Xptonavoq Op90oo~0~ vc
xpmxrips; rou opeooo~ou~, crt: 1tOtO~a9J.lo at0'9uvEO'at on
KptnKUpouv sO'eva 1tpoO'romKu;
.:. Kdxotoi aVepW1COlew5zarpepovral 1COAVyta tnv 1COAm1(~evd: tV10l &v aarosoovto:
1(aeOAOV.Ilapoxaub axavtnae atu; nopaxau» epormoeu; pa(ovTar; ae "'-VKlo TOVaplOpo
1COVavtmpoaomeiei T1'f 611(r,fJOVYVWIl1'fXP1'falIlO1COIWvra, tu; napoxatos xlluoxec:
napa no)..u no)..u Afyo OU1'& )"fyo, ApK&1'a nOAU napa no)..u
)..tyo )..lyO OU1'& no)..u
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
218. noO'o svotaq>epeO'at Y1.a tl1V1tOA1.nKll 1
O'tllv Ku1tpo;
2 3 4 5 6 7
napa no)..u no)..u Afya 0\)1'& )..{ya, APK&1'a nolla napa nolltl
)..iYa )..{ya 0i>T& nolltl
I 2 3 4 5 6 7
219. noaa vOJ.lisst~ on ~8pSt~ yta tl1v 1
1toA,lnKllO'tllv KU1tpo;
2 3 4 5 6 7
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.:. Meptxol av()p(JJ1r:Ol&o.fJa(ovv Erpy/pepi&~ KW 1r:o.pW(Olov()ovv xositudc (JV(y/rr,(JEl~, evd:
iliOl &V &ixvovv Ko.VeVo.cvbzo.rptpov. Ilopcxauo ataivtnae atu; nopoxaxca eponnaeu;
UV}l1r:l't/pwvovrae; t1T1/V'Ypapptj TOVaplOpo 1r:OVavtmpoaomsiet tn 6lK~ (JOVyvdJ/-lY/o.1r:O
TY/vxapoxoito xsiuaxa:
OOTt OOA.t>mtaVla
I 2
I:navla .M£P1Kt~ q>opt~ I:tlXVa
3 4 5
001.6 c:roXVa Ka6£ J1tpa
6 7
220. Iloco OUXVu1tapaKoA.ou6d; n<; EtO~O'et<;~ 1tOA.tnKs<;OUs11nlO'Et<;
cmv T11A.eOpaO'1l;
222. MtA.u1'€ "(ta 1toA.tn~ 0'1'0 O'mn J,.l€rou; 'Y0vel<;O'OU;
223. £ry/v 1r:OA.I7:lKr,01 av()pOJ1r:OIpIA.aVEPEPIKt~ rpopt~ yta «aptarepd» tau «dE~lfi.». nov
r01r:08Biei, cuD rov Bo.ViO UOVatnv KA.if,l.o.Ko.o.vr17; Ilapaxaui: POlE ae KVKlo TOVaplOpo 1r:OV
UBo.Vfl1r:PO(JOJ1r:BVB1.
AputT&pa
4 7I 2 3 5 6
.:. Ilossoi av()pOJ1r:Olxai KVfJBpV~(Jel~e/-l1r:A.tKOvraloinv etdsuan rov KV1r:pzaKOV
1r:pofJA.r,f,l.o.iO,.Ka1r:OlOV~uxopei va TOV~BP1r:laTBVEUal1r:cPl(J(JOiBPOcVW iliov~ l,yorBpo.
Ilapoxau» uvp;rltjpwtIe erne; ;rapaKtl.TW 'Ypappee; TOVaplOpo 1r:OVoe
ovttnpooomeiet neptaaotepo a1r:Oto 1 tOJ~ to 7 o.vaA.oya ue TO zoao 1r:laTB6El~~ &v
mateieu; tu; xopoxctca npotaaeu; UTO ;rlalUlo 11Je;e1CllvU't/e; TOVKV1CplaKo6.
224. 11TOUPKOKU1tptariJ l1'YEO'iaeivat a~tomO'tTl
225. 11TOUPKOKU1tplariJ l1'YEcria a~i~Et tTlv U1toO'nlPt~l1 O'ou
226. Ot 1tpU~Et<;tTl<;TOUPKOKU1tptariJ<; 11YEcria<;EiVat ~UO'tJ,.lE<;
227. 11TOUPKOKU1tptariJ 11YEO'iaO'ou EJ,.l1tVSEtEJ,.lmO'1'ocrUVll
228. 11TO'UPKOKU1tptariJ l1'YEcriaeivat oiKat11
229. 11TOUPKOKU1tptariJ l1'YEO'iadvat a1to1'EA.eO'J,.lanriJ
230. 11TOUPKOKU1tptariJ ll'YEO'ia eivat a1tooonriJ
231. IITOUPKOKU1tptariJ ll'YEcria oEiXVEt av1'a1toKptO'll
crn<; a1tatnlO'Et~ 1'rov EUllVOKU1tpirov .
232. IITo'UpKoKU1tptarilll'YEO'ia Eivat ouJ,.l1tovenril
233. IITOUPKOKU1tptariJ ll'YEO'ia eivat 116tKUaKspatll
234. a~il;Bt va B10'at 1tEp~<pav0911 'Yta tTlv TOUPKOKU1tplarilllYBO'ia __
0\ a1CowslS 0'01) YUl mv T01)pKOI,tmplaK1} nysO'ia:
L1'O 7tA.aiO'to T1)~ &1Cil..1)O'1l~1'01) K1)1CplaKO~,
O'S1tOlO ~a6J,.l0 mO'tS~St<; on:
.1£v TOnl(JT£t>ro
Ka9oA.otl
1 2
To nlGT£llro
anOA.tlTa
3 4 5 6 7
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Ot anO\llEtS GO'\)Ita 'tUV TOVPKtKU Kt>6tpymm:
~tO 1tAaicrto TTJ~ EniA'\)<r11~TO'\)K'\)nptaKOV,
os 1t0\0 ~a9llo mcrtc:i)e1~ on:
Atv TO TnGTtllO>
Ka96AOl)
1 2 3 4 5
235. 11TOVP1GlCllKu~tpV1l<JT1 sivrn a~lomcrTIl
236. 11Toupxucr] Ku~tpv11cr11 et~i~et t11VU1tocrnlPt~l1 coo
237. Ot 1tpa~C:t~ TIl~ TouP1GlCll~ KU~€PV1l<JT1~eiVU1.~amlle~
238. 11TouP1GlCll KU~8PV1lcr11cou ell1tV8et ellmcr'tocrUV1l
239. 11TouP1GlCll KU~8pv11cr11etvci oiKU1.11
240. 11TouP1GlCll KU~€PV1lcr11eiVU1.a1tOteAecrllanKit
241. 11Toupxncr; KU~8pv11cr11sivm a1tooonKit
242. 11TouP1GlCll KU~8PV1lcr11Oc:iXVC:1aVta1tOKp1<JT1
crn~ etnet1nlcre1t; 'tow EU11VOKU1tp{IDV
243. 11TouP1GlCll KU~€PV11<JT1stvcr <JU1l1tOVenKit
244. 11TouP1GlCll Ku~tpV1lcr11 stvct 1191K<1aKepat11
245. et~i~C:1vc siotn 1tePTlq>avo<;/11Y1a TIlVToupxucn Ku~epV1lcr11
01 anO\llE1C GO'\)IUI!1)V K'\)nplaKU K'\)6tpvnGu:
Atv TO nlGTWO>
k'tO Metimo TTJ~ EniA'\)<r11>;'TO'\) Kt>nplaKOV,
os notO ~et91lO mcr'tc:uC:1~on:
To TnGTtllO>
an6Al)Ta
6 7
To nlGTwo>
Ka66AOl) an6AuTa
1234567
246. 11KU1tp1aKit Ku~tpV11cr11 etvot a~lomcrTIl
247. 11KU1tptaKit Ku~tpV1l<JT1 a~il;et TIlv U1tocrnlPt~11 cou
248. ot 1tp<1~e1.<;TIl<;Ku1tp1.aKit<; Ku~tpV1lcr11<; stvoi ~acrtlle~
249. 11KU1tptetKit Ku~tpV1lcr11 cou ell1tVtet ellmcrTocrUV1l
250. 11KU1tp1aKit Ku~tpV1l<JT1 sivai oilca.t11
251. 11KU1tptaKit Ku~tpV1l<JT1 stvct et1to'tc:A.ecrllanKit
252. 11Ku1tptaKit Ku~epV1l<JT1etvci a1tooonKit
253. 11Ku1tptaKit Ku~epV1l<JT1oc:tXVe1avta1tOKptcr11
crn<; a1tmnlcret<; nov EU11VOKU1tpiIDV
254. 11Ku1tp1.aKit Ku~epv11<JT1etvui <JU1l1tOvc:nKit
255. 11Ku1tptaKit Ku~tpv11cr11 sivct 119tK<1aKepm11
256. a~il;et vo siom 1tePTlq>avo<;/11yta TIlv Ku1tptaKit Ku~tpV1lcr11
01 anO\llE1C GO'\)yta 'TUVEUnvlKU Kt>6tpvUGu:
k'tO 1tAeticrtOTll~ E1t(A'\)<r11~'to'\) KU1tptaKOv,
cre 1tOtO~et91l0 1ttcrTeUet~ on:
Ka96AOU An6AuTa
1234567
257. 11EU11VtKit Ku~tpV1lcr11 c:ivm et~t01ttcrTIl;
258. "EU"vtKit Ku~tpV1lcr" a~i~Et TIlVU1tocrnlPt~l1 crou
259. Ot 1tpa~et<; TIlt; EU"v1Kit~ Ku~epV1l<JT1<;c:ivm ~acrtlle<;
260. 11EM11v1Kit Ku~tpV1l<JT1 crou C:1l1tVee1 ellmcrtocrUV1l
261. 11EM11VtKit Ku~tpV1l<JT1 sivat oiKatll
262. 11EM11VtKit Ku~tpv11crll eivat a1tOteAc:crllanKit
263. 11EAA11V1.ldjKu~epvllcr~ c:ivat a1tooonldj
264. 11EM11Vtldj Ku~epVll<JT1 oc:tXVC:taVta1tOKpt<JT1
crn<; a1tatnlcre1.<; tIDV EAAllVOKU1tpicov
265. 11EM11vtri) KuPtPV1lO"l1 sivm crDJ.l1tOVenKi]
266. 11EM11vtKi] KuPtpV11O"ll stvm 11etJC<lwctPat11
267. a~i~et vc etO"at 1tep~q>avoq11 yta TIlV EM11VtKi] KuPtpV11O"ll
.:. AMs,; SP1f:ASKOPSVS';KVjJSpV~O'sz.;xat glsBvei.; opyavtauoi eivat 1]AYYAIK~ xai 1]
ApSpIKo.VZK1]KVjJipv1]O'1], Ka8dJ.; xai 1] Evpw1f:ai·K~ EvwO'1] xai Ta Hvcoueva E8v1].
Ilapaxaai, ptile ae KVh-).O TOVaplOpo xoo O'SaVTl1f:p0O'wJrSVSltteptaootepo aJro to 1io»;
to 7 avruoya tu: to JrOGOO'Vprpwvei.; ~ gzarpwvei.; ue tu; xapoxaio: rppaO'eZ';GTOJrlaiG10
nt.; E1Cilv01/'; TOVKV1CPlaK0l5.
A1a<p<ov<i> A1(l<p<ov<i> Oil't's I:1)J1<P<Ovro I: 1)J1<p<ov<i>
1tOI.-O I.lyO o l(l<p<OV ro, J.iyo nol.u
l:'TO 1ClaiG'lo 't'11>;£1Cil\)(J1}>;'TO\)K\)1CplaKo'6: ou't's
O1)t.UI)<OV<i>
01 a1C6\11El~ (JO'UYla 't'11VAyyyluoi Kl)f:}iPV11O'11
268.H AyyA.tKi]lCUPtpV1lO"l1 eivci a~to1ttO"TIl 1 2 3 4 5
269.H AyyA.tKi]lCUPtPV1l(j11 a~~st TIlv U1tO(jn1Pt~l1 1 2 3 4 5
J.lOU
270.0t 1CP<l~St~TIl~ AyyA.tri)~ lCUPtpVTJO"ll~sivut 1 2 3 4 5
BacrtJ.ls~
271.H AyyA.l_1Q1lCUPtpV11O"lleiVat a1to'tsA.e(jJ.lanKi] 1 2 3 4 5
272.H A.Y'YA.tKi]lCUpepV_TI211eivct OiKatll 1 2 3 4 5
273.H AYYAtKi]lCUBtPV1l(j11 stvci a1tooonKi] 1 2 3 4 5
274.H AYYAtKi]lCUpepVTJO"ll OetXVSt avta1tOKpt(j11 ore; 1 2 3 4 5
a1tatn1O"st~ tOW EM11VOKU1tpirov
275.H AYYAtKi]lCUPepV1l(j11 etvoi crDJ.l1tOVsnKi] 1 2 3 4 5
276.H AYYAt~ lCUPepVTJO"lletvor lletKU aKepat11 1 2 3 4 5
277.a~i~st vu stem 1tsp~q>avoq11 yta 'to ep"(o TIl~ 1 2 3 4 5
AYYAtri)~ lCUPtpV11O"ll~
278.H AYYAtri) lCUPtPV11O"llJ.lOUSJ.l1tV€St 1 2 3 4 5
SJ.l1tt(j'tocrUV1l
01 a1C6\j1El~ (JO'UYla 'TllV AJ.leplKflV1K11 I(\)Pip""V',
279.H AJ.leptK<lVtKTJKUptpVTJ(jll etvm a~to1tt(j'tTl 1 2 3 4 5
280.H AJ.lSPtK<lVtKll KUptpv11(j11 a~isst mv 1 2 3 4 5
U1tO(jn1Pt~l1 J.lou
281. Ot 1tP<l~S~ TIl~ AJ.lSPtKaVtKTJ~KUPepV1la11~stvcr 1 2 3 4 5
BuatJ.te~
282.H AJ.lSptKUVIKll KUpepv11a11stvm 1 2 3 4 5
a1to'tEAs(jJ.lan1Cl)_
283. H AJ.tSPtKUVtKTJlCUBe~<IT} sivat oiKatll 1 2 3 4 5
284.H AJ.leptKuvtKTJlCUpepv11(j11 stvct a1tooonKi] 1 2 3 4 5
285.H AJ!SptKUVIKlllCUpepVTJO"ll OeiXV6t aV'ta1tOKptO"ll 1 2 3 4 5
an~ a1tatn1(jet~ trov EM11VOKU1tpirov
286.H AJ!SptKuVIKlllCUpepV11O"ll eivat crDll1tovsnri) 1 2 3 4 5
287.H AJ.lepucuvtKlllCUpepVTJ(j11 sivat 11etKu aKepat11 1 2 3 4 5
288.a~iset va ciaat 1tep~q>avoq11 "(ta to ep"(o TIl~ 1 2 3 4 5
AlleptKuVtKll~ lCUPepV1l(j11~
289.H AIlSptKUvtKll KUpepVTJO"llIlOu 61l1tVeSt 1 2 3 4 5
eJ!1tt(jtocrUVll
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A1U(j)COVro A1UCPCOVro 06T& I: 1>fl(j)covro I:1>flcpcovro
no)." Uyo ()lUCPCOVro, ).'10 no)."
I:'t'o 1tl..uicno 1'11~E1ril..1>(J1}~'t'01) K1)1tplaKo-u: oVT&au Il<PCOVro
01 a1t6\11E1~(101) 11U 1'11vE1)pW1ta1Kll 'EvwO'1}
290. H EupO>1tatKi! 'Eveon stvoi a~t6ma't'Tl 1 2 3 4 5
291. H Eupro1t(lUcTl 'EvcoO'11 a~i~st rnv 1 2 3 4 5
U7tocr'ti}Pt~T1 uou
292. Oi 1tpa~s1.<; 't'Tl<;Eupco1tutKi!<; 'EvcoO'11<;stvoi 1 2 3 4 5
pamf,.l&<;
293. H Eupco7ta.t1cit 'Evcoon eivrn <l1to'tsAeaJ,1Ctn1cit 1 2 3 4 5
294.H Eupco1tut1cit 'Evoxrn stvci OiKatl1 1 2 3 4 5
295.H Eupco1tal.Ki} 'Evcocrll eivci u1tooon~ 1 2 3 4 5
296.H EupO>1tatKi} 'Evoxrn oeiXVet UVa1t6Kpt<Jll 1 2 3 4 5
an<;u1tut'ti}cret<;tCOVEAATlvoKU1tpicov
297.H EUPID7tUtKi} 'Evoion etvoi cr'UJ,17tovsnKi! 1 2 3 4 5
298.H Eupco1tut1cit 'Evoicn etvm Tl9tKa UKBPal.Tl 1 2 3 4 5
299. Ct~i~et vu eiom 1tSPi]<PUV0911 ytU to BPYO 't'Tl<; 1 2 3 4 5
Eupco1tat1cit<; 'EvO><Jll<;
300.H EupO>1tutKi} 'Evoicn uou Sf,.l1tVSSt 1 2 3 4 5
Sf..l1ttatomJVT1
01 a1t6\VS1C; (101) Yla ruHvrof.lEVa E9V11
301. Tu Hvrousvu 'EOvTl stvm a~tomato<; 1 2 3 4 5
opyavtcrf,.l6<;
302. To Hvcousvc 'EOvll a~i~ouv 'tT}Vu1toa'ti}pt~ll 1 2 3 4 5
J,10U
303.0t 1tpa~e1.';; tCOVHveusvev EOvrov stvm 1 2 3 4 5
pamf,.ls<;
304. Tc Hvouevc 'E9vll eivm a1totsAeaf,.lanK6,;; 1 2 3 4 5
opyavtaJ,1oe;
305. Tu HVCOJ,1Bva'EOvll stvm OiKatOe; opyavtcrf,.lo<; 1 2 3 4 5
306. Tc HVIDf,.lSva 'EOvll stvm a1tooottK6<; 1 2 3 4 5
opyavtcrf,.l6c;
307. Tu Hvcousvu 'EOvll OetXVOUVaVta1t6Kpt<Jll 1 2 3 4 5
or«; a1tat'ti}as1.<; 'tIDVEMTlVOKU1tpicov
308. Tc HVCOf,.lBvCt'EOvTl oeixvouv ouuaovoic 1 2 3 4 5
309. Tu HVIDf,.lBvCt'EOvll stvm 1191.KauKBpato<; 1 2 3 4 5
opyavtaf,.l6<;
31 O.a~i~et va siaat 1tSPi]<PUV0911 yta to epyo tCOV 1 2 3 4 5
HVCOf,.lBvCOVEOvrov
311. Ta HVIDf,.lBva'EOvll f,.lOUsf,.l1tVeouv 1 2 3 4 5
sJ,1ma'tocrUVT}
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.:. Ilaoaxauo pti.le ae Ii.-DK).O TOV aplO)lO 7COVae aVTI7CpOU{J)7CeVel7CepZUUOrepO a7COTO 1 tOJ~ to
7 awUoya ue TO 7COUOUV/-lfP{J)vei~ ~ bzarpOJvei~ ue tu; xapoxatca 7CpoTaUeU;.
To 1 anuaivet OTZt5ev uV)ltp(J)vei~ KaOo).ov KaI TO 7 orz uV)ltp{J)vei~ napa lCO).';.
AEV (JU)1qu:ov6l
Ka90AoU
1 2
OVrE OUJ1<PC:.OV6l,
OVrE 51a<pc:.ov6l
3 4 5 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
313. E~mO''tC:uo~a1. ru Hvcousvc 'EOvT} '(la 'tT}Ve1tO..UO'T}'tT}~1tapouO'a~ 01.a~aXTl~ ~e 'tT}V
Toupxic
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
315. E~mO''teuo~at rou; KU1tpl.Ou~ 1tOA1.nKOU~'(la rnv 'teA1.K1lemKpa'tT}O'T}Ka1. Ota<puAa~T}'tT}e;
etpT}V11e;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
317. Y1toO''tT}pil;core Hvouevo 'ESvT} '(la 'tT}Ve1tiAuO'T}'tT}~1tapouO'a~ Ota~aXT}~ us TIlV
Toopxtc
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
318. Y1toO'TIlpil;co rrtv Eupro1tat:K1l 'Evoxrn Y1.a'tT}011~tOupyia sviciou KU1tp1.aKOUKpa'tou~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
319. Y1toO'TIlPil;co rou; KU1tptou<; 1tOAtnKou<; Y1.a'tT}V'teAtK1l emKpa'tl1O'T} Kat Ota<pUAa~T}TIle;
etpT}vl1e;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
320. Eiprn atcrtoOO~09T} on 11K'U~EPV11O'T}epyai;e'ta1.l'ta 'tT}VemAuO'T}ron Kuzptcxou
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
321. Eiprn atO'toOo~09T} on re Hvcouevu 'EOvT}Sa ~Ol1S"O'oUV ornv emAuO'T}'tT}~1tapouO'a<;
Ota~aXT}<;ue rnv T oupxto
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
322. Etum atcrtoOO~0911 on 11EupOlrca'lK1l 'EvOlO'l1 ea pOl1eilO'et O'TII011)ltoupyia evtciou
KUrcptCLKOUKpa'tou~
2 3 4 5 6 7
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M:v O'u,.up<ovro
Ka9oA.Oll
1 2
OV'Tt O'llIlCP<Ovro,
Oure olacp<ovro
4 5 63
323. EiJ.tat at01ooo~0911 on ot 1tOAtnKOi sp"(a~ovtat "(to.TIlV'tEAtld) E1ttKpaTIl<JT)xrn
otaq>UA.a~l1TIl~ Etpi)Yl1~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
324. Bpicxro vOJ.ttJ.tE90iKatE~ n~ EVep"(EtE~TIl~ 1CU~epYl1011~"(to.TIlVSmAU<JT)tOU KU1tptaKOU
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
325. Bptoxm vOJ.ttJ.tE9oiKCt.lE~n~ EV€PYEtE~nov Hvrouevrov E8vwv yta TIlVEmAU<JT)TIl~
1tapoucra~ otaJ.taXJ1~ JlE TIlVToupxic
1 2 3 4 5 6
326. BpiO'lCo)vOJ.ttJ.ts90iKatE~ n~ EV€p"(etS~TIl~ EupO)1tai:ld)~ 'Evroo11~ yta TIl 011J.ttoupyia
.EVtaiou Kunpuncou Kpa'tou~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
327. Bpicxoi vOJ.ttJ.ts90iKate~ n~ EVepyetS~ troy Ku1tpto)v 1tOAtnKWvyta TIlV'tSAtld)
e1ttKpaTIlcr11Ka.t ol.aq>uAa~l1TIl~ etpi)Yl1~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
328. Ot EM11VOJCU1tPtotSa 1tapaoioov'tav croix TOUPKOJCU1tPtoU~av cruJ.t~t~a~ov'tav us 'to
crXeoto Awav "(to. J.tia EVo)J.t~ Ku1tpo
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
329. H TOUPK01CU1tptald)Kat 11EM11V01CU1tptald)KOtVO't11'taxpeta~E'tat vu cruJ.t~t~acrtOUv
J.teta~u tOU~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
330. Ot TOUPKOJCU1tptOtSa SOetxvav 1tocro ouvatoi sivct av cruJ.t~t~a~ov'tav J.tEtOU~
EM11VOx:U1tPtoU~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
331. tJ.EVxpEta~E'tCt.lva u1tap~et cruJ.t~t~acrJ.to~ avaJ.tEoa croix; EM11VOx:U1tPtOU~Kat 'tOU~
TOUPKOJCU1tptoU~
2 3 4 5 6 7
332. Oi TOUPKOJCU1tptOtSa 1tapaoioovt'Ct.v croix EAAllVOx:U1tPtOu~av cruJ.t~l~a~OVtav J.tE'tO
crxeolo Awav
2 3 4 5 6 7
333. Oi EM11VOJCU1tptOtSa eOetxvav noco Suvcroi eiVCt.lav cruJ.t~t~asovtav us tOU~
TOUPKOJCU1tPtOU~"(tU J.tia evousvn Kunpo
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Bale ae KVld.o TOV apllJpo 7t:OV AUJ.<provro OU'tS I:up<provro
avtmpoacozeiei zoao fJzarpmveie;~ EV't'SAro~ (1) p<provo> &V'tSAro~
onuocovek; ue ne; itapoxato: OUTS
xpotaaeu; ~la<provro
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
334. H Ell'lvoKl>1tptaKt) xowornr«
~6V 1tp€1tet 1t0't€ vc O1lyxropi}cret 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TOU~TOUPKOKU1tPl.OU~')'ta 't~
1tpa.~ete tOU~ oro 1tapeAOOv
335. Oi Ell'lvoKi>np1.01 Oa ocwovrev
aouvaJ.lot av croyxropoucrav TIlV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TOUPK01(l)1tptaKi} xowomrc ytu
Ta aicrY.11rou 1tapEAOoV'tO<;
336. H TOUPKOKl>1tptaKt) Kat TJ
Ell'lvOKl>1tplaKt) KOtv0TllTCl 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1tpS1tet vu cruyxropi}crouv TJJ.lia
~VnUnytuT01tapeAMv
337. Kapia a1to 'tl~ ~uo KOlV6't'1\'t&~
om ea €1tp61te vu O1lyxropitcret 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TIlVnUTJ ytll o.n O1lVe~TJoro
1tIlPEAOOV
338. H TOUPKOKl>1tptaKt) KOtv0TllTIl
OeV1tpe1tEt 1to'te vc crUyxropitcrel 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TOU~EUTJVOKU1tP10U~Yla ~
1tPa.~ete: tOU<;oro 1tapeAeOV
339. 01 T01)PKOKU1tPWl ea eoelxvav
zoco Suvatot stvci av 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
O1lyxroPOUcrllVrou;
EUTJVOKU1tptOU~Yla n~1tpa.~e~
TOUeero 1tapeAOOv
340. Av Il1tOAoyouV'tav Kat Ot &60
KOtVo'trl'r&~ yta to napeAeOV ea 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
urcf}pxe llJ..lotl3aio o<PeAOC;
341. H oTJJ.locrta croyyvWJ.lTJytu to
1tapeAOOv Kilt ano T~ &60 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KOlVO't'1\'t&~Oa itTav rocpeA1J.lTJKat
ytu roue EMTJVOKUnptOu<;Kilt '(ta
roue Toupxoxunptot«;
342. Ot T01)PKOKU1tP10l Bev npe1tet
va a1tOAorTJ90uv orouq 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EAATJVOKU1tPtOU~'(ta to
napeAe6v tOU~
343. Av Ot Ell'lvOKU1tPl.Ol STJtitcrouv
O1lYYVWflTJano TOU~ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TOUPKOKU1tptOU<;'(til to
1tapeAe6v, ea eivat crav va
npooiOouv 't~ 1tpoTJ,(ouJ..lEve<;
ymtec Toue
344. Ot EllTtvoKU1tPl.Ot Kilt et
T01)PKOKU1tPlOt Bev 1tpe1tet nOte 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Vll ~TJtitcrouv a~LOt~aia croyYVWflTJ
yta 'ta aicrXTITOUnapeA06vTo<;
345. Kat Ot 000 KOlVOTTtT&~ea
1tpE1tet va a1toAo,(llOOUv '(ta Ta 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
An01'Jtau 1tapeAOoV'to~ 1tOU
€1tpa~av
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.:. Ilipa axo tu; bla({JOpe~ Kvf3epv~uel~ xat opyavtauoix; noo efi;c}.iKovral atnv emAVU1'/ too
KV7rplaKOV, uetpaei Km 11 yvciJfil1 rov 7rOAir1'/yza totx; (;')J.ov~ AaoV~. Ilapoxaab
UV}llr).qpw(J'e CTTl~lrapaKu:rw 'fpa}l}lt~ TOVapl8}lo 7rOVae avtmpooomeiei neptaaotepo
a7rD to 1 eo»; to 7 avaA.oya fie to 7rOUOmateieu; ~ bev tnateieu; tu; napoxoxca npotdaeu; O'TO
lr).aimo T1/~ elri).v(J1'J~TODKVlrplaKov.
o, ano,vets O'O'U1ta TO'US;EllnvOJrnnpl.O'US;:
AtV TO nt<fTturo To trl<fTtUro
1:tO MatatO TtJ~ £nu.'UO'11~ TO'U K'UnplaKOV, KUeOAOU UtrOAUTU
(JE noto ~(leJ.10 mcrt£Ue~ on: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
346. Oi EUT]V01CU1tptOt stvat (l~tomcrtOt
347. 01. EUT]V01CU1tP1.01. a~U;ouv tT]v U1tocrti}P1.~T] con
348. Oi 1tpa~et<; tOW EUT]vOK1)1tpirov stvai ~amJ.1e<;
349. Oi EllT)vo1CU1tpWt con EJ.11tVeOUVEJ.1mcrtocrUV11
350. Oi EUT)V01CU1tpt01.stvnt 8iKatot
351. 01EUT)V01CU1tpW1.eivat U1tOtcA.ecrJ.1unKoi --352. Ot EJJ,T)V01CU1tpt01.stvm u1tooonKoi
353. Ot EUT)V01CU1tP1.0t8eixvouv aVtU1tOKptO"T]
cr~ U1tUttitcrSt<; rev EMT]VOK1)1tpirov
354. Oi EUllV01CU1tPl.Ot eivct O"UJ.l.1tOVEnKOi
355. Oi EUT)V01CU1tpt01.stvct T]etK<1aKep<l1.Ot
356. a~i~Et vu stom 1tcpijCPav09T] ytU rou; EUllV01CU1tptOU<;
01anowtts O'O'U1ta TO'US To'UpKOK'UnptO'US:
Atv TO 1ft<fTturo To trt<fT&uro
1:tO 1tJ.lLtmo TtJ~ £no.'UO'11~ TO'U Kt>nptaKoV, Ka9oAou UtrOAUTU
ce 1tOtO ~aeJ.10 mcrt£U€l<; on: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
357. Ot TOUPK01CU1tptot €ivat (l~tomcrtot
358. Ot TOUPK01CU1tptot u~U;ouv tT]v U1tocrtitPt~T] crou
359. Ot 1tP<1~€~ trov TOUPKOK1)1tpirov eivat ~<1mJ.1e<;
360. Ot TOUPK01CU1tptot aou eJ.11tVeouv eJ.1mcrtocrUVT]
361. Ot T OUpK01CU1tptot eivat OiKatOt
362. Ot T OUPK01CU1tptOt eivat a1tOt€AecrJ.1UnKoi
363. Ot TOUPK01CU1tptOt €ivat u1tooonKoi
364. Ot TOUPK01CU1tptot l)Eixvouv avta1toKptcrll
cr~ a1tuttitcrs~ trov EMT]VOK1)1tpirov
365. Ot TOUPK01CU1tp1.ot €iva1. (1)J.11tov€nKoi
366. Ot TOUPK01CU1tptot €ivUtlletl(<1 uKepmOt
367. a~i~et va €iom 1tSpijCPav0911 yta 'tou<; TOUPK01CU1tptOU<;
sP?, "'"""JIl
•
• - I
\ I
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0\ a1to\lls\s (Sal) 1U1 'TOVEllnv\KO lao:
Atv TO nlGTturo To nlGTturo
~to MatmO 'T1l~ E1tU.l)Cf11~'Tal) Kl)1tptaK01>, Ka(6).ou anOAU1'a
cs 1tOtOpa8J.l0 mO'tevet~ on: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
368. 0 EMT}vtKO~ Aao~ etvci a~tomO'to~
369. 0 EMT}vtKO~ Aao~ a~il;et tT}vl)1toO'nlPt~T} oou
370. Ot 1tpa~e~ tOU EMT}VtKOVAaov sivm ·~amJ.lC:~
371. 0 EMT}VtKO~A.a0~ cou EJ.l1tVSetEJ.lmO'tocrVVT}
372. 0 EllT}vtKO~ Aao~ c:ivat OiKatO~
373. 0 EllT}vtKO~ Aao~ etvat a1totc:A.cO'J.lanKO~
374. 0 EllT}vtKO~ Aao~ etvct a1tOOOnKO~
375. 0 EllT}vtKO~ Aao~ oeixvet aVta1tOKptO"T}
O'n~ a1ta1.nlO'et~ rcov EllT}vOKU1tpirov
376. 0 EllT}vtKO~ Aao~ etvut ouuzovenxoc
377. 0 EllT}vtKO~ Aao~ eivm T}8tKUaKepal.O~
378. a~il;et vc etom 1tC:Ptlq>av09T}yta tOY EllT}vtKO Aao
Ot a1to\lls\s (Sal) 1ta 'TOVTOt>PKtKO lao:
Atv TO nlGTturo To nlGTturo
~tO MatmO 'T1l~ E1tU.\)Cf11~TOl) K1)1tptaK01>, Ka96Aou anOAU1'a
cs 1tOtOpa8J.l0 mO'tEvc:t~ on: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
379. 0 TOVplCtKO~Aao~ stvci a~tomO'to~
380. 0 TOVp1CtKO~Aa6~ a~isEt tT}vl)1tOO'nlP1.~T}0'01)
381. Oi 1tpa~E~ rou TOVplCtK01)Aaov eivci pamJ.le~
382. 0 TOVplCtKO~Aao~ 0'01) EJ.l1tVSeteJ.lmO'tocrVVT}
383. 0 TOVplCtKO~Aao~ eivct OiKatO~
384. 0 TOVplCtKO~Aao~ eivci a1tOteA.cO'J.lanKO~
385. 0 TOVplCtKO~Aao~ sivci a1tOOOnKO~
386. 0 TOVplCtKO~Aao~ oEiXVEtaV'taltOKptO"T}
ern; a1tatnlO'et~ rrov EllT}vOKUltpirov
387. 0 TOVplCtKO~Aao~ Eivat cruJ.l1tOVEnKO~
388. 0 TOVplCtKO~Aao~ eivat T}81.Ka Kepa1.0~
389. a~iI;E1.va EiO'at 1tePtlq>av09T} yta tOY TOVplCtKOAao
.:. ll)"r/<1ui(ovra<; (ITO ft).O<; rov epmf'7paro)"oyiov, 7rapalwJ..cfJ a7rC1.vr'7(Je(ITZ<;7rapaKa.rm
epmf~(Jel<; ypa.rpovra<; (ITOV Kt:VV XdJpo T1JV a;ro'vT1JG'1J G'ov.
391. ~E 1t01.0O'xoAc:io1tT}yaiVe1.~;
f,a, £UXaPIOTOUp£ "oAuVIa TIJ OUPJI£TOxr} oaf OTI]v fp£uva J.Ja.r
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3. Interview, participant 8 STUDY 3
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Ll. Tsur (JOU,f:i~aa'tf: ano 'to navf:IDa'tijlltO rou l:upcu 'tT}~Ayy".ia~, Kat KUVOUW:Ilia
epf:uva
D. Hi, we are from the University of Surrey in England, and we conduct a study
yta 'to n IDa'tcUOUV01 vsot yta 'tT}VnOAtnKi}, yta re SE~a'ta zou cvOta<pEpouv rn xwpa
tOU~,
on what young people believe about politics, for the affairs that concern their
country.
A. Nat', cv'tu~f:t
A. Yes, ok
Ll. On ~a~ 1tCt~Sa sivrn tf:A.ctc.o~eumorsunxo uvrovuuo, ocv Aelle: 'to ovouo cou Kat
KaVf:~ Ssv Sa ~uSf:t
D. Everything you say is totally confidential, we don't mention your name, and
nobody will know
n Ila~ ei1tc~, ours oi yOVSt~oou, oors oi <piAOtcou, OUtS ot Ka911Yll'tE~,Kavf:i<;,
what you've told us, neither your parents, or your friends or the teachers,
nobody.
A.Opaia
A. Good
Ll. Ozors 0, n Ss~ to A.c~ ... ceo IDOetA.tKp1.VUrooo KaAUtepa ..
D. So you can say whatever you want, the more honest the better
A. Ev'tu~St,
A.OK
Ll. APXtKUSa ~a~ net~ zooo xpovwv siorn
D. First of all tell us how old you are
A. 15, 16 ce 3 ll~€PS~ nspinou
A. 15,16 years old in about 3 days
Ll. E, cv'tu~f:t, sfvut Kat ot 0'00 oou yovei~ EMllvoKUnptot?
D. OK, are both your parents Greek-Cypriots?
A. E, vat, anAa. 11lll1tEpa uou yevvf]SllKE oro Aovotvo, aAAu stvm Kunpta
A. Yes, just my mother was born in London, but she is Cypriot.
Ll. Etvct Kunpur, Ollc.o<;, Kunpta rou Aovotvou, 'tT}~AYYAia<;
D. But she is Cypriot ... , Cypriot of London in England
A. NataMu .
A. Yes, but .
Ll. 'H nrcv AYYAtOa?
D. Or is she English?
A. UXt, Kunpta anAu YCVVTJST}KSsxst
A. No, Cypriot she was just born there
Ll. Kat ~e'tU TJPSeEOc.oOT}AaOTJ.
D. And then she moved here .
A. Nat, Vat
A. Yes, yes
Ll. MUAla'ta, Exst<;Kun010 YOVI0TJKun010 (j1)yycvTJano 'ta Ka'tExollcva?
D. OK, is any of your parents or relatives from the occupied part?
A. E, 0Xt an'o,n eulla.~at, 0Xt..
A. Eh, no, from what I remember, no
Ll. 'EXE1<;KunolOu<; <piAou<;ano 'ta Ka'tf:xo~cva?'EXcl<; aKouacl 'Yta ra Karf:XOllcva?.
D. Do you have friends from the occupied part? Have you heard about the
Occupied part?
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A. Net, vm, ...apKS'tS<;...
A. Yes, yes, a lot
11. I:av n sioou<; OTjAaoij?
D. Like what, so to speak?
A. Ej.I., OT)Aaoij a<; 1tOUj.l.Sq)1Yyav€a1to re crmna 'tOu<;, 1tro<;Ssv ea tu 1t<lPOUVmaro ij
srcn 1tpuYlla'ta ...
A. Like, let's say they left their homes, that they will not get them back, things
like that
6.. MUAta'ta, oxors s1tacpij ullSaTj BcrUo£v EX€t<;j.l.E'ta Ka't€XOIl£Va, EXBt<;1tUBt?
EmO'KBcp'tT)Ka'tB?
D. So you have no direct relation to the occupied part, have you been there?
Have you ever visited?
A. 'all, OX!
A. No no
6.. 'all Ssv EX€'tS 1tUBt, B!l, av os porrncco, EXSt<;yvropiast KU1tOta TOUPKOKU1tptaKi]
OtKOYEvSta, exat<;
D. No, you haven't been there, em, if I asked you, have you ever met any
Turkish Cypriot family,
KU1tOtOU<;CPtAou<;T OUPKOKU1tPWU<;1tO'tE?
have you ever had any Turkish-Cypriot friends?
A. 'EXro yvropiast !lia cpopu ..aAAu a1tAU ij'tav a<;1tOUJ.l.E...xaipE'tat nKUVB'tS... 'tEtOta
A.l've met one (family) once, but it was just let's say, 'hi, how are you', things
like that.
6.. (YEAta) a, KU1tOtOU<;TOUPKOU<;?
D. (laughs) ah, any Turks?
A. Kaeapu?
A. Only? (Not Turkish Cypriots)
6.. Nat
D. Yes
A. Ea ...oX!
A. Eh, no
6.. Kceroiou; 'EUTjVB<;?
D. Any Greeks,
A. Nat, Vat ...
A. Yes, Yes
6.. E~ EUuoo<; EVVOO>.•.
D. From Greece I mean
A. Nat, vat
A. Yes, yes
11. I:u'YY£vai<;?
D. Relatives?
A. Nat, EXOU!lS CPtAou<;,O'U'Y'Y£vai<;....
A. Yes, we have friends, relatives ..•
11. MUAtata, Bj.I.,txv as porrouou n aXEO'T]£XBt<;EcrU us rn epTjaKE:ia rt ea 1l0U EAeYB<;?
ITtatEuBt<; OTjAaoij
D. OK, eh, if I asked you what is your relation with religion, what would you
say? Do you believe
EcrUoro eEO?
in God?
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A. <I>UO'tKo.... 1t1.(HeUO)aA.A.o...... 1t1.O'1:euO)O'tyo. O'tyo. a1tOJ!aKpuvoJ!aO'te 11veoAaia
critJ!epa ..eJ!, evto.~et
A. Of course ..• I believe ••. but I believe that we, young people, are getting away
from it these days, ok,
1t1lyaivO) sKKAllcria, oX).Kat roco taKnKo., aUo. evto.~et ...
I go to church, not so frequently, but ok ....
A. <I>UO'tOAOytKo.(ytAta)
D. Normal stuff (laughs)
A. Nat (yEAta)
A. Yes (laughs)
A. EJ!, vnorsoere KtOAa~?
D. Do you also fast?
A. Nat, vat
A. Yes, yes
A. Av aKouO'e~ crnv t1lAeOpaO'11Ko.1tOtOV,1t.X. tOV XptO'tOOOUAOit Ko.1tOtO~a1to rnv
aPXtS1t1.O'Komlvc
D. Ifyou hear someone on TV, say Christodoulos or someone from the church
J!tA.6.etea Ko.tO'et~ 1tOtt vu tOU~ aKouO'et~?
talking, would you sit and listen to them?
A. Av rpdxo eyro ea rnv a.CPitO'O)avOtxti} ..a~ 1touJ!e vc a.KOUO'O)Ko.n, vc eillat Afyo
8V1lllepO)J!tvo~ ... aM6.
A. If I am having dinner, I will leave it on, let's say to listen a bit, to be a bit up
to date, but
Ssv ea ....
I will not ...
A. Aev ea Ko.tO'e~ em rourou ..
D. You will not sit down especially to listen
A. Nat, Vat, vat oev ea 1t0) tropa eivat Ko.1tOtO~tePo.pXTl~vo tOV aKouo,O)....
A. Yes, yes, I won't say ..• 'here is a priest talking, I will listen to him'
A. Mo.AtO'ta, o» O'SpO)ti}O'O)a1to to 1 to)~ to 7,1 to Al'yotepo, 7 to 1tSP10'0'OtSPO,
D. OK, if I asked you, from 1 to 7,1 being the least, 7 the most •..
A. Nat, Vat
A. Yes, yes
A. ~e n ~aeJ!o a.tO'eo.veO'at Ku1tptO~, rt ea J!OUtA.eye~?
D. To what extend do you feel Cypriot, what would you say?
A .
A .
A. 1 to AtYOtepo, 7 to nspiooorepo ...
D. 1 the least, 7 the most
A.6 ..
A.6 ..
A. 6, cv con tA.eya os n ~a.eJ!o a.tO'eo.veO'at EU11VOKU1tPtO~?
D. 6, if I told you to what extend do you feel Greek Cypriot?
A 6
A 6
A. 6, cv con {Aeya. 0'8 n Paello atO'eo.V80'at 'EU11Va.~?
D. 6, if I told you to what extend do you feel Greek?
A 4
A 4
A. Kat 0'8 n Pa.ello atO'eo.V80'at EupO)1taio~?
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D. And to what extend do you feel European?
A. E, (yeAta),
A. Eh, (laughs)
A. Trope 1tOUeytve ~eAO~Kat 11Ku1tpo~ 'TIl~Eupco1t(l1.Ki]~'EvCOO'l1~?
D. Now that Cyprus is also a member of the European Union?
A. (yeAta) 3 vc O'a~ 1tCO't11VaA"eSta ....
A. (laughs) 3 to tell you the truth
!1. 3, (yeAta) ...
D. 3, (laughs)
A. !1evVotroeco ota<popa us .... 'to 1tCO~,,~aO''tav nprv , Kat ropo, Sev ~M1tco 'toO'l1
ota,<popa 1tOUel~aO''te
A. 1 don't feel a difference with ... how we were before, and now, I don't see that
much difference
O''TIlvEupro1t11 .••
that we are in Europe.
!1. a, ~aAtO''ta, ~epet~ on 1tepm eYWe eva 011~0'l'''<ptcr~a ..
D. OK; you know that last year there was a referendum ...
A. Nat, Vat
A. Yes, Yes
!1. ~epet~ nO'UVE~l1Kcnnsi1ts 11EM11VOKU1tptaKi]1tASupa?
D. Do you know what happened and what the Greek Cypriot side said?
A. E, Ssv elJlat aKpt~ro~ O'iyoupo~ ..
A. Eh, I am not totally sure ...
fl.. Nat
D. Yes
A. 2epco on ,,'tav 'to Vat 'to ~Xt, Stxav Ka1tota O'Uveopta ornv 'tllAeopaO'1l Kat
ota<p11JliO"e~srot ....
A. 1 know it was yes ... no, they had some conferences in the TV and
commercials ..•
fl.. JlaAtO"'ta,l1 EAA11VOKU1tptaKi]1tAeUpa ems oxt 0''t0 O'xEOtOAwav ..
D. OK, the Greek Cypriot side said no to the Annan plan
A. (ue OtaK01t'tet) Nat, vat <puatKa
A. (interrupts) Yes, yes of course
!1. su, o» epeEt Ka1totO 1tato! a1to 't11VAYYAia Kat con 1tet aKouco O'UvEXEtayta 'to
KU1tptaKO, rt etvm 'to
D. If some kid comes from England and tells you 'I always hear about the
Cyprus issue, what is it?'.
Konpunco? Tt ea rou f;A.eyS~Stat ~s OUOAoyta?
What would you reply shortly?
A. E~, ea rou e~l1youO'a 1tCO~..s ...ot TOUpKot 1ti)pave rnv Ku1tpo to 74 Kat ea rou
E~l1youO'a 1tro~'t11V
A. Eh, I would explain that ... eh ... the Turks took Cyprus in 74 and I would
explain that they keep it
KpataVS, aAAa ...Sev etvoi xropa roue, srot mO"'teUOUV....
but •.. it is not their country, that's what they believe
s. MaAtO"ta
D.OK
A. Aura ... (yeAla aJl11xaviac;)
A. That's all •.. (laughs feeling akward)
fl.. e, ...orov ecrU aKouc; yta to KU1tptaKO, atO'eaveO"at Kun?
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D. Eh ..• when you hear about the Cyprus issue do you feel anything?
A. (us ota,K61ttet) Nat, vet ...
A. (interrupts) Yes, yes
D.. SullO, aOta<popia ....
D. Anger, indifference .
A. Nat, Vat, SullO 'Ytan f:Xw (j\)'Y'Yevei~IlOU1tOUijtaV O'tOV1t6A.sIlOKat ioropte;
....Kat coro, J(Ut
A. Yes, yes, anger because ... I have relatives that were in the war and stories ...
and this, and
<pUO'l.Kaeillat Sullwlltvo~, evta~et Ssv eillat a1t6 to ~6peto IlSPO~ tll~ Kuzpou, roO'te
Sev 'to V01.roew roco
of course I am angry, ok I am not from the northern part of Cyprus, so I don't
feel it that
ouva'ta, aMa .... Ka'tU KU1tOtO'tp61to VOtroew eU1l6.
strongly, but in a way I feel anger
D.. IlUAtO''ta, Ell, 1ttO''tI';uete;on <ptaiet KU1tOtOC;'Ytaut6 1tOU(j\)ve~TJ? Iloie; sivci 01.anise;
yt au't6 1tOU
D ok, eh, do you believe what happened it's someone's fault? What are the
causes for what
(j\)ve~TJ?
happened?
A. Ell, <p'taiet Ka1totoc;, Ssv ~epw o» etvui O'wO't6C;ij AaveaO'lltvoc;, aMa eixalle 'tOY
EIl<puAtO1t6A.s1l0Kat
A. Eh, it is someone's fault, I don't know if it's right or wrong but we had the
Civil War and
Ile'ta ijpeav Ot TOUpKOt..o» Sev eixalle 1tOA.sj.10j.1e'ta~u j.1a~oev ea eixav tllv eUKutpia
va speouv 01.
then the Turks came .•. ifwe didn't have the war between us the Turks wouldn't
have the chance
TOUPKOt..
to come ...
D.. j.1UAtO''ta,ej.1,1ttO''teUetC;on Ot EMTJVOKU1tptOtei1tav 6XLO''tOO'Xeoto Awav 1tOU
zporswcv 'tu Hvrousvc
D. ok, eh, do you believe that the fact that the Greek Cypriots said no to the
Annan plan that the
'ESvTj, ea exet Ka1tOtec;e1tt1t'troO'etC;'YtUtll xropa?
United Nations proposed will have any consequences for the country?
A. E1taVaAall~ave'tat Ai'YO... tllV eprotllO'T}?
A. Can you repeat the question?
D.. vat, Vat, AeW OTJAaoij 'to on Ot EMTJVOKU1tptotei1tav OXt 0''t0 O'Xeoto Awav Kat oev
'to OtXtllKaV
D. Yes, yes, I say that the fact that the Greek Cypriots said no to the Annan plan
and did not accept it
A.Nat
A. Yes
D.. 1ttO''teuetc;on ea u1tapxouv tropa Ka1tote~ O'Uve1tete~?Un ea O'Uj.1~eiKan O'tll xropa
O'tO IlSMOV ij ...
D. Do you believe that there will be consequences now? That something will
happen to the country in the future or ...
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A. Ilurreixo 1troc;ij'tav KUA6 Kat Sev ea eXet roco ouva'tec; em1t't(oaet~ oco av MyaJ-l.e
Vat, moreixo etvm
A. I believe that it was good and it will not have that strong consequences as if
we had said yes, I believe it
yta 'to KaAu'tepo
is for the best
11. J-l.aA1.a'ta,copcic, 1tOtOC;mO''teuet<; ea uxopoocs va owaet Ilia Aua11? ~'to KU1tp1aKo ...
D. Ok, good, who do you believe could give a solution? To the Cypriot issue ..•
Ase .
A. eh .•.•
11. Kat Sevcou J-l.tAaroY1U€va a'toJ-l.o, yevucwc; sroi?
D. and I am not talking about a person in particular, but generally, ok?
A. Nat, vat
A. Yes, yes
11. 01. EU11V01CU1tptOt, oi TOUPK01CU1tptOt,11Eupro1tatKij 'Evoion, 11AyyAia, 11Auspucr],
11EUaou ...
D. The Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, the European Union, England,
America, Greece ...
A ... Sev, Ssv eiurn 1tOAUcriyoupo<; ...
A•••I, I am not so sure ..•
11. e'tmKa'ta TT) yvwJ-l.11cou...1tOto<;ma'teUet<; ea J-l.1tOpOUO'evu owaet J-l.iaAUO'11
D. In your opinion who do you believe could give a solution
A. EJ-l.,ell ...
A. eh, eh ..•
11. oev ~EpOUJ-l.eav ea J-l.1tOpOUO'e1tpuYJ-l.an" aMu ... ea 1tpoO'1taeouae ...
D even if we don't know if they could indeed, those that would try
A. H Eupro1ta1.Kij 'Evcocn, co» ..
A. the European Union, as .••.
11. ouv oPYUV1.O'J-l.oC;
D. as an institution •.• ?
A. Nat, vat ouv oPyuv1.0'J-l.6<;
A. Yes, yes as an institution
11. ell, 1tOta mO''teue\<; ea Il1tOpOUO'evu eivm J-l.iaAUO'T),11KaAu'teP11 yta osvc, 1tOta
mO''teUet<; Sa
D. eh, what do you believe could be a solution, the best for you, what do you
believe that would
ij'tuv .... va eivct Ila~i ot 0'00 xowornre; ...
be .•. the two communities to be together •.•
A. (us otaK61t'tet) <pumKa va Ila<; oWO'ouv mO'ro 'tT)VKuzpo, au'til Sa sivm 11tSavtKij,
aUa ... Sev yive'tat
A (interrupts) of course to give us Cyprus back, that would be ideal, but this
cannot
au't6 ..
happen
11, ozors Ile'ta ce rt 1taJ-l.e?
D. Then what is next?
A. E .... va uetvooue E'tm morsuco ... Sev ~EPro oev ~EPro
A. Eh, to stay like this f believe •.. I don't know, I don't know
~. va JleiVE'te Elm,
D. To stay like this,
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A. t::,.ev~epm, iam~ stvm 11e7toJlevT)AUcrT)
A. I don't know, maybe this is the next solution
t::,..,.ulA1.a'ta,e, o» mlpOl>Jle eva osvcpto, on 7tX.HAUO'11xou yive'ta1. sfvct vc yivet Jlta
ouvo Jloa7tov~Ha,
D. Ok, eh, let's think of a scenario, that for example the solution is to have a
confederation like we say,
o7tm~MJle, vc ~ouve et ouo xowornre; Jla~i aM<i vc eX0l>v Jlia 1(l)~epVTJcrT),
evtatc ..erot, yta OAO'to
the two communities to live together but have one government, a unique one, for
all the
VTJm...srot os eva 'ts'tOto osvcpio, ecrUeO.atO'eaVOaOl>Vaacpo.Aeta us rrtv ccrovoutc?
t::,.11l..ao~o» ~~epe~
island ... in such a scenario, would you feel security with the police? Ifyou knew
that
on 11ccrovoutc exet Kat TOl>PKOKU7tPtOl>~aO''tUvOIl1.KOU~,7tW~eO.alO'eaVOO'Ol>v?
The police employ Turkish Cypriot policemen too, how would you feel?
A·Il, KaeOAOl>aO'cpaA~~,ytati Sev roix; ~epco yta vu rouq ell7ttO''teuOllat, Kat ...curoi ea
V01.WeOl>VKo.7t01.0
A. Hm, not secure at all, because I don't know them to trust them and they will
have
Iliao~ 7tpO~ella~, Kat Il7tOpeia~ 7tOUllevc ~pouve Kan IltKPO yta vc Ila~ (jl)AAa~Ol>V ~
erot ....va Ila~ .
some hatred towards us, and they might find something small to arrest us or just
like that to give us .
oroaol>v KA~O'11curoxrvnrou (1.(;; 7tOUJle,Kan a7tAO ...
parking tickets let's say, something simple ...
t::,..MaAtata
D.OK
A. AUa al>'ta 'to. JltKpo. re 7tpo.Yllata ea 'to. Ko.vave Kaee Ilepa Kat ea ~'tav OUO'1(OAO
vc ~oulle Ila~i
A. But these things they would do them every day and it would be difficult for us
to live with
tOl>~ ..
them .
t::,..JlaAtata, o» Stat nou 0'0l> Aero O'e eva evtaio Kpo.'tO~,o.v01.yav ta crUvopa, Kat
07t01.0~~eeAemlyatve
D. ok, in a united state as I described, if the borders were open and anyone could
go anywhere,
01t0l>0~1tote, ea mlyatve<; 7tOte va lleiv8t<; 0''tT)~OPeta Ku1tpo?
would you ever live in northern Cyprus?
A.OX!
A.No
t::,..OXt, n ea 0'8 1t8ipa~8 Kat oev ea 7t~yatVe<;?
D. no, what would affect you and you wouldn't go?
A. To ....va oivro Aecpta ae KetVOl><;,Kat va lleyaAWVet 11xwpa tOl>~....n ea 1l0l> ~yet
elleva (jl)IlCPepov,
A. To give money to them and their country to grow ... what is my benefit,
evto.~et oev etJlat (jl)llcpepOVtOA6yo~, aUu 0.<;1tOUlle,evvow ....Oev eO.fl'apeaet va tOl>~
~o11eroxmpi<; va
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ok I am not a mercenary, but let's say, I mean ..•I wouldn't like to help them,
without them
~OT}enVf:Kat vc vOlasOVtat "(ta EJ.La~
helping and caring about us
6. J.LaAtata, EJ.L,ooov aq>opa tOV KOaJ.LOOEYea cs 1teipaSs T}epT}O"1CsiatOU~, to on
oopcvs oi K01ttA.e~
D. ok, eh, in regards to the people, would you mind their religion, the fact that
the girls wear
re J.LaVnlAla, TOon VTjatEUOUV, 'ro on ot avtpf:~ 1tpoaf:Uxovtat. Kat aKOU~to X6tSa
...va ",aUsl ...
scarves, they fact that they fast, that men pray and you hear Hotza ... chanting
A. E, EY'ta~s1...Ka1tro<;ea J.LC 1tf:ipaSf: aUa stvm 11epTjaKeia tOU~, OEYJ.t1tOpei~vc rrtv
aUa~El<; ...
A. eh, ok, I would mind somehow, but it's their religion, you can't change it...
6. aUa saU DEYea ml'Yatvs~ ...
D. but you wouldn't go...
A. Dll.... .
A. No .....
6. J.LaAtata, o» tropa "(tatt ~tPSt~ as tva evioto KpaTo~, 'Ytan ea souaaTs JlaSi, Ka1tOlOl
a1to autou~ ea
D. ok, if, because in a single state you would live together, some of them came
epxovTav vu ustvouv Kat atT} vonc Koxpo, saU cv eixs<; tva amn soro atT} AEJ.LeaOea
tOU<;'to
to stay in Southern Cyprus, if you had a house here in Lemessos would you
voilCtass<;? ea voilCtass~ to amn cou as J.LtaTOUPKOKU1tptaKi}oncoreveto 1tOUijpes
va s'YlCataataOsi
let it to them? Would you let your house to a Turkish Cypriot family that came
to stay
atT} AEJ.Lf:ao?
In Lemessos
A. MJ.LJ.L,OEYvOJli~ro, oll
A. Hmm, I don't think so, no
6. q>iA.ou<;Oa eKave<;? 6T}Aaoij ea sPx6vtouaav Kat TOUPKOKU1tptOt.Kat ctu OT}J.Loata
Kat ere tOtronKa,
D. Would you make friends? There would be Turkish Cypriots too, in both
private and public schools
A.Nat
A. Yes
6. ea eixs<; 1tp6~ATjJ.Lava KaVS1.<;Ka1totOu<;q>iA.ou<;TOUPKOKU1tptOU<;?
D. Would you mind having Turkish Cypriot friends?
A. ea sixa Ka1tOta OuaKoAla ma'teuro vc Oroq>tAla J.LaSiroo; ....
A. I believe I would have some difficulties in envisaging friendship with them ...
6. '(ta'ti , rt Oa as q>o~1.Se?
D. why, what would scare you?
A. E. EYta~et. q>UatKUOEYsivut sxetvot 1tOUq>taivE. aUn eivat ...xapT} af: Keivou~ ....av
KataAa~alVEtf: n evvoro
A. Eh, ok, of course it's not their fault, but it's .... due to them ... if you
understand what I am saying
tl. e~ij'Y11ae to J.Lou...
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D. Explain it to me ...
A. Ell, 01lAaoij ~epco, 1t1.0"tEUCOKat on au'tu re 1tatOtU stvct Ka!"Ot UVepC01tat,Ssv
cp'taiVe eKeiV01yta 'to
A. Eh, I know, I believe that these kids are good people, it is not their fault for
the
KU1tp1aKO, aMu ea OUO'1(O/..eUOIlOUVvc yivC!)cpi/..o~Ilal;t rouq ytari V01cOeC!)IlEaa uou,
Ila stvm TOUPKat
Cyprus issue, but I would find it difficult to become friends with them because
inside I feel, they are Turks
..Ila~ EKavav KU1t01a1tpO~A.ijlla'ta ...E'tat stvct ...
... they've caused us some problems ... that's how it Is, .•
6. IlUA.1O"'ta,1t1.a'tcie~ on Ot yovei~ cou ea eiXav 1tpo~!..lllla cv 'te!..lKUE~ptaKE~
KU1tOlOVKat 'ta
D. Ok, do you think your parents would have an issue if you found someone
(Turkish Cypriot) and
1t1lyaiva'te KaA.a? ea eixavE cvrtppnor]? ea eumorsuovrcv 01 yoveis oou 1t1.ateUe1~
roix yoveis rou 1ta10lOU?
got along well together? Would they object? Do you believe that your parents
would trust the parents of the child?
A. su.Ssv, Vat VOllil;coea eixave KU1t01acvrlppncn
A. eh, I, yes, I think they would have an objection
6. ea eixave /..e~
D. you say they would ...
A. Nat, Il1tOpei OXlrooo ouvatTJ aUu Kun ea 'tOU~1tsipal;E
A. Yes, it could be not very strong, but they would mind
6. Ilu!..ta'ta, av EcrU'tcOpa YVcOptl;s~Ilia K01tEA.a,Ollopcpou!..a, E~U1tVll,
'.lOpcpCOIlEYll.... (yeA.ta) Kat EKaVE~
D. ok, if you met a girl, pretty, smart, educated ..• (laughs) and you had
Ilia axs011 aUa ij'tav TOUPKOKU1tpta, ea as 1tSipaSE?
a relationship, but she was Turkish Cypriot, would you mind that?
A. Nat (yEA.ta), Vat
A. Yes (laughs), yes
6, ea ce 1teipaSe ..Ot yovei~ cou 1t1.O''teuet~ea eiXav Kt curet avriPPllall?
D. You would mind ... do you think your parents would object?
A. ~iyoupa O'iyoupa
A. Sure, sure
6. criyoupa ... cv 'tcOpa 'te!..e1cOO'et~'to AUKElO, dllaa'te svicto KPU'tO~trope ouvruoou
that, a1tocpacriO'e1~
D. Sure .. when you finish school, imagine we have a united state, you decide,
ecrU, IlUMOV Oe1~on O''tllBopstc Ku1tpo eXEt eva 1to!..u KaA.O1taVE1t1.crtTJlltO,1tOUSXEt
autu 1tOUees va
or you find that in N.Cyprus there is a very good University, that has what you
want to
KUVet~EcrU.... Oll!..uoij O'tov tOIlS(l1tOU eet; va UKO!..OueijO'Elt;,uUa evtU~Et at
KaellYlltEt; dvut
do ... in the field you want to follow, but the teachers are
TOUPKOKU1tptOt,01 cpot'tllte~ Ot 1tEP10'0'0tEPOt TOUPKOKU1tptOt,ea 7tfJyatVEt;1tOte va
cr1tOUOUO'El~?
Turkish Cypriots and most of the students too, would you ever study there?
A. ea 1tpoO'1tUeouO'a vu rUpeU(l yt aUo 1tUVe1tlO'tTJlltOva O'a~ 1tc!)'tllv u!..ijeeta ...
425
A. I would try to find another University to tell you the truth ...
11. l..uIAtcrra, va ~pEte; Kun UMO ... EJ..l,tropa mcrtEUete; on Kat crov rousu TIle;80UAEtUe;,
Ot yoveie; cou av
D. Ok, find something else.. eh, do you believe that in the professional area, if
your parents found
e~ptcrKav J..lia80UAstU crTIl Bopstc Kunpo Kat mlyatvav, AeJ..lEtropn stm KU1tOta
crnYJ..li], i] eow crTIl
a job in Northern Cyprus and went there, for instance at some stage, or here in
Lemessos
AeJ..lEcro eoocov Sa epxov-rav Kat TOUPKOKU1tptot, 0 Epy08oTIle; rou; i]tav
TOUPKOKU1tptOe;,i] 0
Since Turkish Cypriots would come here as well, if their employer was Turkish
Cypriot, or
ePYOOOTIlC;0 OtKOC;cou i]'tav TOUPK01CU1tpWC;,mcr'teUstc; Sa i]'tav oiKatOe; J..la~icou?
AllAaoi] oi
your employer was Turkish Cypriot, do you believe they would be fair towards
you? Say,
a1tocpucretC; 1tOUSa e1tatpw: Sa tOU eixEe; eJ..lmcrtocrUVI1on Sa i]tav oiKau,e;? 1ISa etXeC;
'to cpo~o J..lecracou?
would you trust the decisions he would make would be fair? Or would you fear
inside you?
A. ea eixa 'to cpo~o .... av e~AS1ta 1tCOC;Ssv i]'tav OiKatOC;J..la~i J..lOUSa tOU eAsya Kun i]
cruveXt~s criyoupa
A. I would be afraid ... if I saw he was not fair towards me I would tell him
something about it or if he carried on I
Sa ecpsuya, aMU Sev Sa uou upecre Kat 1tOAUTJtOea ...
would surely leave, but I wouldn't like a lot even the idea to start with
11. J..lclAtcr'ta,n Sa 1t€piJ..lsvec; a1to curov yta vc rov eJ..lmcrteU'tete;? Ti cr'tOtXeia Sa
1tepiJ..lsvee;vu ode; yta vc
D. ok, what would you expect from him in order to trust him? What are the
elements you would expect
tOV eJ..lmcrteUteie; i] osv Sa 1tepiJ..lsvec;Kat 'to yeyovoe; on i]tav TOUPK01CU1tPtOC;Sa os
BKave vc vouocsu;
to trust him or would you not wait, and the fact that he was Turkish Cypriot
would make you
Kcln
feel something
A. Mxopet vu cxouoco Kun, vc uou 1tetKUtt yta to 1tapSASOv tOU, 1tCOC;ae; 1touJ..le
~oi]Sllcre Kcl1tOtOV
A. I may hear something, he may tell me something about his past, like he helped
some
Ku1tpaio, Kat KU1tCOC;va vOJ..li~coon autov va J..lTJvtOV 1tetPU~ouv Ot Ku1tpai01, elvat
qnAtKOe;J..la~i tOUc;,
Cypriot, and believe that he doesn't mind Cypiots, he is friendly with them,
Stat ...
like this ...
11. J..lUAtcrta, ocrov acpopu 1tUVCOcr't'TJOOUAstU, Sa S1tatSe yta creva Kcl1t010 POAOav Sa
crou SOtVe ta iota J..le
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D. Ok, with regards to work, would it be important if they would give the same
salary as with
rou; TOUPKOKU1tPtOU~,011Aao11 t(lvro ern OOUM:ui 1tpa:Yj.la'ta 1tOU9a EKave, 9a re
Mij.l~avee; U1tO'l''llv
the Turkish Cypriots, say things that he did at work, would you consider
aou?
them?
A. Eu, Vat vOj.li~ro aAAa ..aKEcp'tOj.lat ea uou re xdvst a1>'tay1.Uvu cpavEf1tros ...eivm
..eij.lat laOe; j.la~i us
A. Eh, yes I think so, but •.• I think that he will do these things to me (show
fairness) just to show that ... he is ... I am equal to Turkish Cypriots,
rou; TOUPKOKU1tptOUS,9a 'to EKavE f:1tf:t011etvai KaAoS os suevo il €1tf:101119sM: vc
cpaVf:l 1tross...elj.lat laos, Ka'taAa~alVf:tf:?
would he do that because he is good towards me or because he wants to show
that he treats me equally, do you understand?
6.. Ka'taAa~aivro, e, ooov acpopa 'tIDpa rou; OtKaatEe;, av mlyatves y1.UKan, j.lia
olacpop6. 1tOU9a eiXeC;j.le
D. I understand, eh with regards to the judges, if you went for something, a
dispute you had with
Ka1totOv oro otKaa't11Pto Kat E~M:1teson 0 OtKaat1ls sivci TOUPKOKU1tptOS,ornv
j.l1taive~ j.lEaa
someone in court and you saw that the judge is Turkish Cypriot, you go in,
ota~a~ete; 'to ovoua, Sev stvm EM'llVOKU1tptOe;,1tIDe;9a os sxove auto vc votoceic?
read the name, he is not Greek Cypriot, how would that make you feel?
A. Nat, oev ea tOY sumcrsuouoov ....
A. Yes, I wouldn't trust him ...
D.. e, Kat ouvrdoou on Kat ce j.lSplKa xpOV1.Uea mlyatVEe; Kat crpcro,
D. eh, imagine that in a few years you will do your military service,
A.Nat
A. Yes
D.. Kat 0 atpa'tos 9a 11'tav evurioc, 9a UmlPXav Kat EM'llVOKU1tptot Kat TOUPKOKU1tptot
j.lEaa oro orpuro,
D. and the army would be united, there would be Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots in the army,
1tC:oe;9a Evotro9f:s av mlyatVf:e; as j.lia atpanronKil j.lovaoa 1tOUot 1tEptaaOtEpOt iltav
TOVPKOKU1tP1.0t,11
how would you feel in a military unit that most of the people were Turkish
Cypriots, or
Ot aVIDtEp01.aou 11tav TOUpKOKU1tpt01....
your superiors were Turkish Cypriots ...
'H 1tOUiltav a'tll Bopsta KU1tpo 11atpanronKil j.lovaoa ...
Or that the military base was in Northern Cyprus
A. Ej.l, 9a Evotro9a Ka1tro~1ttEaj.lEvOe;,j.l111troe;j.lE '~aAovv va Kavro crdllPEs 00VAE1ES,
ev'ta~st oev j.lE
A. Eh, I would feel somehow stressed, I would fear that they will make me do
hard jobs, ok I don't
1tEtpa~Et va OOVAcUroaMa 9a j.lOU'ta ~a~avE ).lOVOGSsj.lEva
mind working, but they would make only me do the work.
D.. av epAe1tSe;on Kat GTOUe;aMove; Kavovv ta iota?
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D. I you saw that they said the same thing to everyone?
A. Ihcreixo Ka'to. Ko.nOtO 'tpono ea stvot OiKatOt....
A. I believe that somehow they will be fair ...
6. ea sivct oiKatot, ell, eaU ea 6vOtroee~ aacpw.sta yta 'tll xropa cou ~Epovra~ on
Koi'ta~e oro a'tpa'to J,la~uno.pxouv Kat Toupxoxozpiot,
D. They will be fair, eh, you would feel secure for your country knowing that
there are Turkish Cypriots in the Cypriot army?
A. <I>ucrtKo.OXt
A. Of course not
6. OXt,an6vavn ce noiov Oi]Ao.Oi],nmo~ 1tta'teuEt~ Ilnopei vc con E1tt'teeei Kat 0
a'tpa'to~ J,lnopei va J,l1l .
D. No, towards whom to say, who do you believe could attack and the army may
not
es npocpuMaas?
protect you?
A. 1I Ilnopei vc ...ev'to.~et, av ytvo'tav nOAello~...onOla xropa vc epX0'tav a'tllv Kuzpo
mcr'teUro Sev ea.
A. Or it may ... ok if there was a war ... whatever country attacked Cyprus, I
believe
~Olleouaav oi Toupxoxunptoi ....i]llnopei Ko.nOl.Ol vc ~OlleOUaav, et O:MOtea
anocpeuya.v .... 'tov
the Turkish Cypriots would not help ... or some of them might help, the others
would avoid ...• the
nOA.ello va....
war .• to .
6. ytan 'to 1tta'tsuEt~ nuto?
D. why do you believe that?
A. D.ev ea. roix; ..... nEipa.~E 11Kunpo~, ol1Aa.OT)oev eivm Kozpctoi vu 'tll vouceoov ...
A. They would not ..• care about Cyprus, because they are not Cypriots to feel
for it...
D..llo.Ata'ta, ~epEt~ tropa. on Kat crnv nOAtnKi) a~ noullE, o» T)tav evtnio 'to KPO:'tO~
a'auti} 'tll
D. You know now that in politics let's say, if it was a united nation in this
ouvouoczovdtc, ea uniJpxav xm Toupxoxoapto; uno'l'T]q>tOt,ea 'l'i]cpt~E~EaU Ko:nOtO
ToupKOKUnptO "{ta
. confederation, there would also be Turkish Cypriot candidates, would you vote
for some Turkish
va ~yet unouP'Yo~, ~ouA.euti}~.....
Cypriot to get elected as a minister, ~lember of the Parliament ....
A. 6ev vOJ,li~ro,oev 'tov ~epro ...oev ....
A. I don't think so, I don't know him ... I don't ...
6. av a~ nOUJ,lEB~yatVEan~ 'tllA.eOpO:aEt~Kat BAEYEto npoypaJ,llla J..louEiva.t auto
D. Let's say they would appear on TV and said 'my plan is this
A, ~, y. 0,
A, b, c, d,
A.Nat
A. yes
D..Kat aullcprovouaE~ EcrUw: a.u'to. 1tOUeAEyS,ea. tOV \jI"cpti;s~?
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D. and you agreed with what he said, would you vote for him?
A. AKOl-1a Olt, om vOJ.l.i~ro,vOl-1i~roea tlTaV Ka1tOtOTpono( Ka1tOtOKOA.no) vc maaet
'tou<;
A. Still no, I don't think so, I think it would be some trick to convince the
EMTJV01CUnptOu<;vc 'tOY 'l'TJ<piaouv, om, ea tu EKavE crnv npa~TJ? ...olt, yt auto om
ea tll-10UV c:riyoupo<;
Greek Cypriots to vote for him, he wouldn't keep his promises ... no, that's why I
wouldn't be sure
I:l. om ea tlaouv c:riyoupo<;, eu, ooov a<popa re OtKOVOl-1tKa,<pavta~caat cncto~ TJ
~opcta Kunpo<; om
D. you wouldn't be sure, eh, with regards to finance, do you imagine that
because Northern Cyprus is
stvm noA.u avsn'tUYI-1Evt" as eva svicdo Kpa'to<;, TJ1(U~EPVTJcrTJea tnpEnE vc pi~ct
nOMa A.e<pTa,
not very developed, in a united nation, the government would have to invest
much money,
e:mXstptl<Jet<;ea ntlyatvav aTO Boppc, E'tatpsi€<; ea aVOlyav KatvOUptE<;, Kat TJ
1(Uf3epVTJcrTJea
companies would go to the north, there would be new enterprises, and the
government would
EmXOpTJyouae rou; aypotE<;, tOD<;spyat€<;, yta vc avanruxeouvE? TIw<; to pA.tnEt<;
aUTO, on cs eva svtnio
fund the farmers, the workers in order to develop? What do you believe about
that, that in a united
Kpato<; ea Sivorev tl-1<pacrTJlCUpioo<;at11 popEta Kunpo?
Nation there would be emphasis mainly on Northern Cyprus?
A. EE, Twpa l-1tA.aJ.leott ea stvor Kat EMTJv01CUnptOl Kat TODpK01CUnptOt
A. Eh now we say that there will be both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
I:l. vat, Vat
D. Yes, yes
A .
A.....
I:l. J.la~i ea tlTaV, a1tA.a ea Stvotuv EI-1<paaTJoro Boppc
D. They would be together, they would just invest more in the North
A. EJ.l, vOl-1i~ooea ~J.louv m'ta~et av Kat J.l.ETaano A.iyo Kalpo, ea €A.eya pMnouv
zsprccorepo exetvoi»;
A. Eh, I think I would be ok, but after a while I would say 'they care more for
them
napa €l-1a<;,
than for us'
I:l. a, l-1aA.lO'ta,av O'UvElt~oTav oTJA.aotl au'to
D. I see, if this situation carried on
A. Nat, vat
Yes, yes
I:l. e, rt O'TJl-1aivetyta aeva av O'ODnoo, sumcreueom rnv lCUptpVTJaTJi] tOD<;
nOA.tttKoU<;? I:lTJAaOtl tt
D. Eh, what means to you if I said, do you trust the government or the
politicians? Meaning, what
mwaiVEt yta O'eva va E~lntO'tEueO'at lCanOl.Ov?Tt1tEP1.J.ltvet<;ano autov?
means to you to trust someone? What do you expect from them?
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A. Ne ....aKOU€t 'tT} <provij 'tOU KOa)..l.OU,Kat vc )..I.l1vAt€t 1toJ,J..U 1tpuY)..I.a'ta,aUn vc re
PAt1tOUJ,t€as
A. To ... listen to what people are saying, and not talk too much, 1want to see his
words turning
1tpU~Sl~,
into actions
f:1. )..I.UA!cr'ta,scrUzoiov eumoreosotn on sivct 0 mo Ka'tnUl1AO~ avepro1tO~ yta va PPE!
)..I.ia AU<Jl1?
D. OK, who do you trust is the best person to find a solution?
A. Au'to sivct ouaKoAo vu 1tro....ma'twro ea stvm opyaV1.aJ,to~ )..I.aSi , cuv rnv
Eupro1tal.lCll evro<Jl1,oev
A. This is hard to tell ... 1think it will be a body with ... like the European Union,
1don't
voJ,ti~ro 1tros ea it'tav KUAU it ea SPptcrKE eva<; UVepro1tOsAU<Jl1..
think that it would be good or a man would find a solution ...
f:1. see, ocov a<popu 'tT}v EUl1VOKU1tptaKi) Kat 'tT}VTOUPKOKU1tptaKi) l1ysaia, au'tous
'tous €)..I.ma'tsU€aat
D. eh, with regards to the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot government,
do you trust them
yta vo ppOUVe J,tia AU<Jl1?
To find a solution?
A. 'OXt, av OOUAeuav )..I.asi?
A. No, is this if they worked together?
f:1. OXt ~exrop!cr'tn
D. No, separately
A,'OXt
A.No
f:1. av oouAeuav )..I.a~i?
D. If they worked together?
A. Axou« 0Xt ..Ssv
A. Still no, ... 1 don't
f:1, mcr't'euet~ on oi 1tOAtnKOi 'tT}<;xropa<; cou KUVOUVon )..I.1tOPOUVyta va ppOUVe )..I.ia
AU<Jl1?
D. do you think that the politicians of your country do what they can to find a
solution?
A ..... vat, 'to mcr'tsuO) au'to, aUu ma'tsuro on KU1tot01.1tpoa1ta90uv va PPOUVEAU<Jl1
1tOUea (jl)J,t<pepe1.Kt
A.... yes 1 believe that, but 1 believe that some people try to find a solution that
will benefit
S)..l.U~,0l1Aaoit 0.<;1tOU)..I.S,eo» )..I.taAual11tOU it0l1 ppitKa)..l.€ pOl1eOUae OA01)~roo;
TOUPKOKU1tptOU<;Kat
us too, say like a solution that we have already found helped all the Turkish
Cypriots and
1tOAUAiyo rou; EMl1VOKU1tPl.OU~, Kat av KU1totOl.1tOAtnKOi 1tpoa1ta80uv va )..1.11 PPOUVE
Aual1 stvct yta 'to
only helped Greek Cypriots a little, and if some politicians try not to find a
solution, it is for our
KaAo J.la~ma'teuO) ...
own good 1 believe ...
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.1. l.uIAlcr'ta, £~, 01tro~ uou £i1t£~Kat zpw, mcr't£U£t~ Ot ~ev£~ 8uva~£t~ n POAOSa
E1tp£1t£va 1taisOUVE?H
D. OK, eh, as you said to me before, what do you believe should be the role of the
foreign countries?
Auspuo], 11AYYAia, 11EUa8a ...
America, England, Greece ...
A. $uO"tKa, Ka1tOtE~ea ~o11Soucrav tOU~ TOUPKOK61tPtOU~yta cru~<pepov tOU~, Kt
aMc~roue
A. Of course, some would help the Turkish Cypriots for their own benefit, and
some
EU11voK61tPtou~ ...
would help the Greek Cypriots .•.
.1. EcrUn mcrt£ust~ eO.E1tPE1tEva xovoov, ea E1tPE1tSvu avallEtxeOuv it ~Xt, it U1tO
opoix?
D. What do you believe they should do, should they interfere or not, or under
conditions?
A. E~ OXt,vo~iSro OXt,"(tan ea ~A£1taVS'to cru~<pepov roue Kat tTJ~ xropa~ 1tOU
sivat J.lasi,
A. Eh ... not, I believe not, because the would look after their interests and the
country's they support
.1. J.laAtcrta, 11EAAa8a a~ 1tOU~s .
D. OK. Let's talk about Greece .
A. EVta~Et, <pu()1xa 11EAAa8a, va ~a~~011eoucrE...aUa xropa xropa OXt,aUa av ittav
oo» op"(avtcr~o<;
A. OK, of course Greece would help us, but any other country would not, but if
it was an institution,
ea ittav mo avnKStJ.lSvtKa 11~OiteEta 1tOUea Stvorcv os KaeE xropa ....
the help to each country would be more objective ...
.1. J.laAtcrta, to. Hvoiusv« ESvTJa~ 1tOUJ.lE1tOUstvoi Kt auta eva~ opyavtcr~o~, a1to to.
ozoic 1tpOepXE'ta.t
D. OK, let's talk about the United Nations that is also an institution, from which
Kat 0 Koqn Awav, n POAOSa E1tPE1tEva1tai~ouv mcrt£u£t<; oro Kuzpunco?
Kofi Annan comes from, what should be their role in the Cyprus issue?
A. Kcrc Ka1tOtO'tP01tO ea ~o11Soucrav <pucrtKa,aMa 0 POAO<;rou; ea ij'tav aUo~ ...
A. In some way they would help, but their role would be different
.1. mcr'tEu£t~ Sa e1tpe1tevc exouv AO"(O?
D. Do you think they should have a say?
A. Nat, vo~isro Sa E1tpe1tE.... aUa ... ~1topei vc ijtav KaKo~, ~1top£i Kat KaAO~,aUa av
~o11eoucrav Ai,,(o
A. Yes I think they should ... but ... their say might be bad, might be good, but if
they helped a bit,
ea ijtav KaAo "(to.TTJVEupo)1tat'Kll evrocrTJyta 1tapa8etnla va ~o11eou(jav
it would be good for the European union for example to help
A. ropaia, cre euxaptcrtOullE 1tapa 1tOAU
D. Good, thank you very much
A. Euxaptcrtro 1tOAUKat KaAit Emtuxia crTTJl;roit cra" ...
A. Thank you very much and I wish you success in your life...
A. euxaptcrtOullS, Kt EcrU
D. Thank you, you too.
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4. Questionnaire, Study 3
ENGLISH VERSION
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Your views on the political issues in Cyprus
Cyprus' political situation has been the issue for many politicians, diplomats and
researchers all around the world, due to the complexity and the severity of the subject.
No matter what the solution to the Cyprus issue is, it will have to be acceptable from
all Cypriots.
This research is a part of an effort to approach and understand young people's views
on the political issues.
I would deeply appreciate if you could read and complete the following
questionnaire, answering to all the questions after following the relevant instructions
every time. There are no right or wrong answers.
Your participation to this research will be anonymous and confidential.
If you have any queries or if you want to know more about this research, do not
hesitate to contact me using the following email address:
d.pahis@surrey.ac.uk
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WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE .....
Information about yourself:
.:. Please, circle the most appropriate response for you in thefollowing questions
1. Age: 15 16 17 18 19 years old
2. Sex: Male / Female
3. Do you have relatives that live
in the occupied part of Cyprus Yes / No
4. Is the origin of your mother or father
from the occupied part of Cyprus? Yes / No
.:. As you know, people identify at different levels with their nationality or religion.
For some people, they constitute an important part of themselves, while for
others not. Please complete, in the line after each question, the number which
represents the level at which you identify with thefollowing statements. Please
choosefrom thefollowing scale:
To a small To a neither
extent great nor small To a great extent
extent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5. To what extent do you feel Cypriot?
6. To what extent do you feel Greek Cypriot?
7. To what extent do you feel Greek?
8. To what extent do you feel European?
9. To what extent do you feel strong ties with other Cypriot people?
10. How important to you is being Cypriot?
11. To what extent do you feel Christian Orthodox?
12. How important to you is being Christian Orthodox?
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Your views about politics:
.:. Many people and governments are involved in the resolution of the Cyprus
issue. You may trust some of them more than others. Please complete in the lines after
each statement the most appropriate number for you, from number 1 to 7, according
to how much you agree or disagree to the following statements in terms of the
resolution of the Cyprus issue.
Your views on the Turkish Cypriot leaders:
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue
To what extent do you agree/disagree that:
13. the Turkish Cypriot leaders are worthy of support
14. the Turkish Cypriot leaders are legitimate
15. the Turkish Cypriot leaders are effective
16. the Turkish Cypriot leaders are worthy of pride
disagree
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly
agree
6 7
Strongly
Your views on the Turkish government:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
17. the Turkish government is legitimate --
18. the Turkish government is effective --
19. the Turkish government is efficient
20. the Turkish government is worthy of pride --
Your views on the Cvpriot government:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
21. the Cypriot government is effective --
22. the Cypriot government is worthy of support --
23. the Cypriot government has integrity --
24. the Cypriot government is fair
Your views on the Greek government:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. the Greek government is legitimate --
26. the Greek government is trustful
27. the Greek government is fair --
28. the Greek government is has integrity --
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·:. The European Union and the United Nations are also involved in the resolution
of the Cyprus issue. Please circle the most appropriate number for you, from J
to 7, according to how much you agree or disagree with the following
statements, in terms of the resolution of the Cypriot issue.
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus Strongly Strongly
issue: disagree agree
Your views on the European Union
29. The European Union is worthy of
1 2 3 4 5 6 7support
30. The European Union is fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
31. The European Union is compassionate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
32. The European Union is responsive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Your views on the United Nations Strongly Strongly
disagree agree
33. The United Nations are responsive 1 2 ~ 4 5 6 7~
34. The United Nations are fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
35. The United Nations are worthy of pride 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
36. The United Nations are trustful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
\
• ,
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.:. Please circle the number the represents you most, from 1 to 7, according to how
much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
1 means that you strongly disagree, whereas 7 means that you strongly agree.
Strongly
disagree
1 2 3
Neither agree
or disagree
4 5 6
Strongly
agree
7
37. There are differences in the beliefs of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
38. There are differences in the customs and traditions of the Greek Cypriots and the
Turkish Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
39. There are differences in the economical progress of the Greek Cypriots and the
Turkish Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
40. There are differences in the way the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
view history
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
41. There are differences in the way of life of the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
42. There are cultural differences between the Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish
people
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
43. The Turkish Cypriots have the same right to own and use the land of Cyprus as
the Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
44. The Turkish Cypriots have the same right to be called Cypriots as the Greek
Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
45. The Cypriot identity has the same meaning for the Turkish Cypriots as it has for
the Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
46. The Turkish Cypriots are victims of the past history as the Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Please complete in the lines after each statement the most appropriate number for
you, from number 1 to 7, according to how much you agree or disagree to the
following statements in terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue.
To a small To a neither To a great
extent great nor small extentextent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Looking at the modern History of Cyprus (since 1960), to what extent do you
believe that:
. 47. Turkish Cypriots have been treated violently by the Greek Cypriots
48. Turkish Cypriots have been treated unfairly by the Greek Cypriots
49. Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are peaceful people __
50. Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are compromising
people
51. Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are trustful people __
52. Turkish Cypriots have shown to Greek Cypriots that they are stronger than them
Based on the above scale, to what extent do you believe, that:
53. Greek Cypriots have shown to Turkish Cypriots that they are violent people __
54. Greek Cypriots have shown to Turkish Cypriots that they are compromising
people
55. Greek Cypriots have shown to Turkish Cypriots that they are trustful people _
56. Greek Cypriots have shown to Turkish Cypriots that they are stronger than them
57. Greek Cypriots have been treated unfairly by Turkish Cypriots
58. Greek Cypriots have been treated violently by Turkish Cypriots
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.:. Please circle the choices that represent you to the following questions.
59. What is your preferred solution for the resolution of the Cyprus issue?
a. Maintaining the present situation
b. Creation of a confederate state where the two communities would be totally equal
in terms of social, political and economical decision making
c. Creation of a state where Greek Cypriots would do the decision making in social,
political and economical issues
d. Creation of two different states
e. Other (please write your own preferred
solution)
60. What solution do you consider is feasible for the resolution of the Cyprus issue?
a. Maintaining the present situation
b. Creation of a confederate state where the two communities would be totally equal
in terms of social, political and economical decision making
c. Creation of a state where Greek Cypriots would do the decision making in social,
political and economical issues
d. Creation of two different states
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.:. Please complete in the lines after each statement the most appropriate number for
you, from number 1 to 7, according to how much you agree or disagree to the
following statements in terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue.
To a small To a neither
extent great nor small To a great extentextent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Looking at the relationship of the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot
communities, to what extent do you believe that:
61. Turkish Cypriots' and Greek Cypriots' interests are conflicting?
62. Turkish Cypriots' and Greek Cypriots' values are similar?
63. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots' needs are similar?
64. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots' prospects of power are conflicting? __
.:. People develop emotions in their relationships. Based on the scale above, we
would like you to tell us to what extent:
65. you feel anger towards Turkish Cypriots
66. you believe that Greek Cypriots feel anger towards Turkish Cypriots
67. you believe that Turkish Cypriots feel anger towards Greek Cypriots
68. you are afraid of the Turkish Cypriots
69. you believe that Greek Cypriots are afraid of the Turkish Cypriots
70. you believe that Turkish Cypriots are afraid of the Greek Cypriots
71. you feel hate towards Turkish Cypriots
72. you believe that Greek Cypriots feel hate towards Turkish
73. you believe that Turkish Cypriots feel hate towards Greek Cypriots
74. you feel frustration towards Turkish Cypriots
75. you believe that Greek Cypriots feel frustration towards Turkish Cypriots __
76. you believe that Turkish Cypriots feel frustration towards Greek Cypriots __
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.:. Please complete in the lines after each statement the most appropriate number for
you, from number 1 to 7, according to how much you agree or disagree to the
following statements in terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue.
To a small To a neither
extent great nor small To a great extentextent
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
To what extent do you believe that:
77. Turkish Cypriots are afraid of the Greek Cypriots' domination
78. Turkish Cypriots want change
79. Turkish Cypriots feel connected to the Cypriot land
80. Turkish Cypriots are also victims of History
81. Turkish Cypriots really make reconciliatory moves
82. Turkish Cypriots really want peace __
83. Greek Cypriots know the beliefs/point of view of Turkish Cypriots on the
situation
84. Greek Cypriots are responsive to the concerns and the needs of Turkish Cypriots
85. you personally understand the concerns and the needs of Turkish Cypri~
86. there is someone for Greek Cypriots to negotiate with in the Turkish Cypriot side
87. there is something to negotiate about in the Turkish Cypriot side
88. your preferred solution for the Cyprus issue is feasible
To what extent do you believe, based on the above scale, from 1 to 7, that:
89. You are willing to make concessions on your demands for the resolution of the
Cyprus issue
90. Greek Cypriots are willing to make concessions on their demands for the
resolution of the Cyprus issue
91. There have been changes in the Turkish Cypriot side
92. There could be more changes in the Turkish Cypriot side regarding their political
and economic situation
93. Greek Cypriots are willing to reassure Turkish Cypriots with symbolic gestures
and recognitions of the other side
94. Greek Cypriots have made efforts to approach Turkish Cypriot side
95. Greek Cypriots have committed to the Turkish Cypriot side to bring the two
communities closer
96. The Greek Cypriots have reassured the Turkish Cypriots for their willingness to
bring the two communities closer
97. There should be a third party as a repository of trust to manage the conflict and
the resolution of the Cyprus issue
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.:. Please circle the number the represents you most, from 1 to 7, according to how
much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
1 means that you strongly disagree, whereas 7 means that you strongly agree.
2 3
Neither agree
or disagree
4
StronglyStrongly
disagree
1
agree
5 6 7
9S.Turkish Cypriots have made serious efforts to achieve peace
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
99. Both sides have made reassuring gestures for the resolution of the Cyprus issue
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
100. The negotiators of the Greek Cypriot side are close enough to the opposite
side
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
101. Turkish Cypriots should learn to conform to the rules and norms of Cypriot
society immediately after the reunification of the two communities
1 2 3 45 6 7
102. The arrival of Turkish Cypriots will undermine Greek Cypriot culture
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
103. The values and beliefs of Turkish Cypriots regarding work are basically quite
similar to those of Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
104. The values and beliefs of Turkish Cypriots regarding moral and religious
issues are compatible with the beliefs and values of Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
105. The values and beliefs of Turkish Cypriots regarding family issues and
socializing children are basically quite similar to those of Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
106. The values and beliefs of Turkish Cypriots regarding social relations are
compatible with the beliefs and values of Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
107. Turkish Cypriots should have to accept Greek Cypriot ways
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
lOS. The Turkish Cypriots will be getting more from this country than they will
contribute
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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109. The children of Turkish Cypriots should have the same right to attend public
schools in Cyprus, as Greek Cypriots do
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
.:. Please circle the number the represents you most, from 1 to 7, according to how
much you agree or disagree with the following statements.
1 means that you strongly disagree, whereas 7 means that you strongly agree.
Strongly
disagree
1 2 3
Neither agree
or disagree
4 5 6
Strongly
agree
7
110. The arrival of Turkish Cypriots will increase the tax burden on Greek
Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
111. Turkish Cypriots will displace Greek Cypriots from their jobs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
112. Turkish Cypriots should be eligible for the same health-care benefits
received by Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
113. Social services will become less available to Greek Cypriots because of the
arrival of Turkish Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
114. The quality of social services available to Greek Cypriots will remain the
same despite the arrival of Turkish Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
115. Turkish Cypriots will have to be entitled to subsidized housing and utilities
as poor Greek Cypriots are
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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.:. The Annan plan consists of the following clauses for the creation of afederal
state. Please complete in the lines after each statement the most appropriate
number for you, from number 1 to 7, according to how much you agree or
disagree to the following statements.
Strongly
disagree
1 2
Neither agree
or disagree
4 5 6
Strongly
agree
73
To what extend do you agree to the following clauses?
116. Open borders to free movement of people and goods
117. The return of one third of the value of the properties in the Occupied part of
Cyprus, to the Greek Cypriot immigrants, after the reunification
118. Equal right of veto by the two communities in economical, political and social
Issues
119. Gradual Greek and Turkish demilitarisation, which will exceed 2018
120. The return of a certain number of Turkish settlers back to Turkey after the
reunification
121. Would you under the above conditions of peace invite a Turkish Cypriot
person to visit you in your house?
122. Would you under the above conditions of peace visit a Turkish Cypriot person
in hislher home
.:. Apart from the different governments and organisations which are involved in
the resolution of the Cyprus issue, the opinion of the public for other peoples is
also important. Please complete the lines following each question with the
number from 1 to 7, according to how much you agree or disagree with the
following statements, in terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue.
Your views on the Greek Cvpriot people:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue
To what extent do you agree/disagree that:
disagree agree
1234567
138. The Greek Cypriot people are compassionate
139. The Greek Cypriot people are legitimate
140. The Greek Cypriot people are fair
141. The Greek Cypriot people are trustful
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Your views on the Turkish Cypriot people:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
142. The Turkish Cypriot people are worthy of support --
143. The Turkish Cypriot people are worthy of pride
144. The Turkish Cypriot people are fair --
145. The Turkish Cypriot people are compassionate
Your views on the Greek people:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
146. The Greek people are worthy of support
147. The Greek people are legitimate --
148. The Greek people are responsive
149. The Greek people are fair
Your views on the Turkish people:
Strongly Strongly
In terms of the resolution of the Cyprus issue disagree agree
To what extent do you agree/disagree that: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
150. The Turkish people are legitimate
151. The Turkish people are fair --
152. The Turkish people are responsive
153. The Turkish people are compassionate
.:. Please circle the number that represents how much you agree or disagree with
the following statements
Strongly
disagree
1 2 3
Neither agree
or disagree
4 5 6
Strongly
agree
7
154. The Greek Cypriot community should never forgive Turkish Cypriots
community for their past actions
2 3 4 5 6 7
155. The Greek Cypriots would look weak by forgiving the Turkish Cypriots for
their past atrocities
2 3 4 5 6 7
445
156. The Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot communities need to forgive each
other for the past
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
157. Both communities should never forgive each other for what happened in the
past
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
158. The Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities need to compromise
with each other
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
159. Turkish Cypriots would show strength by compromising with Greek Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
160. Apologising for the past will benefit both communities
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
161. Public apologies for the past by both communities would be beneficial for
both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
162. Greek Cypriots would be surrendering to Turkish Cypriots by compromising
with the Annan plan over a united Cyprus
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
163. If Greek Cypriots apologised to Turkish Cypriots for the past, they would
betray their ancestors
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
164. There is no need for compromise between Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
165. Both communities should apologise for the past wrongs that they have
committed
2 3 4 5 61
7
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.:. Approaching the end of this questionnaire, please answer the following questions
byfilling the lines provided with your answer.
166. In which city are you living?
167. Which is your school
168. In what grade are you studying?
Thank you vel}' much for your participation in our stud.J,
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5. QUESTIONNAIRE STUDY 3
GREEK VERSION
Ot an6'V€t<; 0'01> yta 'ta nOAt'ttKU8pwlJ€va O'mv Kunpo
H1tOAtnKij K<l'taa't'<l<J11aTIlv Ku1tpo 6XEt <l1t<laXOAT)aEt1tOMOU<; 1tOAtTIKOU<;,
6t1tACOJla'tS<;Km SpeuVll't8<; as OAO 'tOY KOaJlO, AOYCOTIl<; 1tSPt1tAOKOTIl'ta<;Kat TIl<;
ao~apo't11'ta<; rou 661l<l't0<;. '01tOt<l 1(1. ov sivct 'tSA1Ka 11AU<J11oro KU1tPt<lKO 1tPO~A11Jl<l,
6<l 1tpe1tSl va stvm a1toDSX'tT)KUpico<; a1to OAOU<;roue KU1tptou<;.
H epsuv<l au'tT) ano'tsAei Ilepo<; Ilia<; 1tPOa1ta6S1<l<;V<l1tA11crtaaOUIlS xm vo
.K<l'taA,a~OUIlS TI<;<l1tO\jlSl<;roiv verov yl<l 't<l1tOA1TIKa 6ell<l'ta.
e<l 'to SKTIJlOuaa ~<l6uta't'a av Ota~<l~S<;Kat crull1tAT)PCOVS<;'to 1t<lpaKa'tCO
epCOTIlJl<ltOA,oYto, a1tav't(ov'ta<; as OAe<;TI<;spCO'tT)aSt<;<lKOAou6rov't<l<; Ka6e <popa n<;
aVaAOYS<;oOl1yis<;. !lev U1taPXOUV (i(!)ate<; T)Aa60<; a1tav'tT)ast<;.
Edv unaPXSt Ka1t01.aanopia T)evOta<p6psaat m:ptO'ao'tspo yta au'tT)v TIlV speuvc, 1111
OtO'taO'et<;va SmKOtVcovf)O'st<; Ila~i 1l0U O'TIlV 1tapaKatCO 11AeKtpOV1Kij olsu6uv<J11:
d.pahis@surrey.ac.uk
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TI TIIl:TEYEIl: .....
nll1pO<pOPU:~ yta TOV Ea'OTO 0'0'0 :
.:. Ilopoxasd: pa;.e ae KVK).O tu; e7ClAoyeqnov ae avnnpoaomeboov otic xapaxatco
eporoiaet q.
123. ID.uda: 15 16 17 18 19 xpovcOv
124. <1>u",o: Ayopt / Kopirot
126. H Kataycoy" 't1l~ J.l.ll'tspa~cou " tOU
1tatspa oou stvm a1to re KatSxoJ.lZVa; Nat / '0;0
.:. VnOJq ~epelq, 01 avOpwnOl (J.lfJOaVOVCo.l tnv eeVIlC~ ~ tnv Op'7UKevrzlC~ toix;
toinotnta ue bl(J.(poperllCO tpoxo. Tta ueptxoix; <>Cv eivai fJ'7f,laVCZlCOf,ltpoq rov
eainoi: totx; evd: yza illovq eivai. IIapalCaJ.dJ tte; uo» ae tt fJaB,uo WfJOaW;fJaz
efJiJ totx; napaxaico Xo.palCT'7PlfJf,lOVq UV}/1Cll1PWvovro.q t1T1/v 'Fpo.}/)ltj 1'"OV
A'o.rilll1lo 'FlO.aeva o.plfJ)lo. Ilapoxasib bUx.J..e~eana tnv itopoxato: xsiuoxa :
:Es :Et 1rOAU :Es J.11KPO Out'S O'S J.11KPO, :Es ts 1rO).U ts U1rEpPOA1KU
unsPPo).lKU JUKpO pa9J.1o Oere O'S J.1E"(uw J.1E"(aAO J.1E"(UAo J.1E"(u).o pa9J.1o
,UKPO ~a9J16 ~a9J1o ~a9J1o ~aeJ16 6aeuo
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
127. rs 1tOtO~aOJ.loatcr06.vscrat Ku1tptOqa;
128. rs 1totO~aOJ.l.oatcr06.vsoat EUllV01CU1tptOqa;
130. re 1tOtO~aOJ.loato06.vecrat Eupco1taioqa;
132. Iloco crllJ.lavnKOstvoi yta osvc to ysyovo~ on eioat Ku1tptOqa;,__
133. Le 1tOtO~aOJ.l.oato06.vsoat Xptcrnavoq" opOoao~oqll;
134. nooo 0llJ.laVnKOsivat yta oeva to yeyovoC;on sioat Xptonavoq"
OpOooo~oqll; __
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135. Ol a1t6'1'El~ 0'0'0 "(la TllV 1tOAlTlKl] :
.:. IIoMof aV8pW1T:OZxoi 1CVPePV~Uel(;epreAe1COVro.zatnv emAVUf/ to» Kimptaxob
repop),~paroe;. KareOIOVe; unopei va rove; epTCl(7T:8VeUWnepiaaotepo eVW 6.Move;
AzyorepO. Ilapoxaab O'Vp7rl1jpwt7e atu; napaxano "Ipappt~ TOVaplOpo noo ae
avttxpooioxeiei neptaaoiepo areo TO 1 ewe; TO 7 aVaAoya ue TOnoaa taoteieu; ~
beV mateieu; TZe;napoxatco npotiiaeu; (7TO1rlait710 T1I~ e7rilvt7f/~ TOV
KV7rplaKOV.
Ot anO\llEtS 0'0l) Ita !!IV T01)pKOKllnptaKt) 1)YEGia:
~'t0 1tA.aiOl.oTI1~&1to..1)0'1)~TOl) Kl)1tlnaK01>,
O"S1totO ~aeJ.lO mO"rsust~ on:
Asv 1'0 nUTrsv<o
Kae6i..ou
1 2
1ttCfTEV<O
an6i..u1'a
3 4 5 6 7
136. TlTOUPKOlCt>1tptaKijrl'ysO"ia a~il;;st 'tTlv u1toatTJPt~Tl oon
137. ot 1tpa~S1~ tT]~ TOUplCOlCU1tp1aKi]~Tl'YsO"ia~etvci ~amJ.ls~
138. TlTOUPKOlCU1tp1aKijl1'Yscria stvci a1to'tsA.saJ.lanKi]
139. a~il;;st va stem 1tSPTJq>av09Tlyta rrtv TOUPKOlCU1tptaKi]11'Ysoia__
01 a1tO\llSl'; 0'01) Yla !!IV TOVPK1K1) Kl)6tpV1)01]:
~'t0 1tA.aimo TI1~E1ro..l)O'1)~TOl) Kl)1tPIClK01>,
os 1tOtO~aeJ.lO mate6£1~ on:
AEV TO nlCfTEU<O
Ka06i..0\l
1 2 3 4
To nlCfTsu<o
Un6AlJTU
567
140. O11tpa~S~ 'tTl~Toopxuoj; Ku~spVlla11~ etvct ~aml.!£(;
141. 11Toupxucq Ku~spVlla11 eivm a1to'tsA.caJ.lattKi]
142. 11Toupxucn Ku~epVllall etvrn a1tooonKi]
143. a~iSs1 vc eiom 1tSPTJq>av0911'Yta 'tTlv TouplC1.lCTjKu~epVlloll
01 a1tO\llSlS 0'0l) Yla !!IV Kl)1rptaKiJ Kl)6spV1)0'1):
~tO 1tA.aimo TI1~&1to..l)O'1)~TOl) Kl)1tplaK01>,
O"S1totO ~aeJ.lO mcrtsus1~ on:
AEV TO 1ttCfTsV<O
Ka96i..ou
1 2 3 4
To 1ttCfTSU<O
an6i..uTu
567
144. 11KU1tptalCfJ Ku~spvllall Eivat a1to'tsA.£aJ.lanKTJ
145. 11KU1tptalCfJ Ku~epVllC111a~il;;s1 'tTlv u1toatiJp1~11 aou
146. 11Ku1tptalCfJ Ku~epVlloll sivat 1191lC<1aKspat11
147. 11KU1tptalCfJ Ku~epVllC111dvat olKat11
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LTO 1tAuicno TT)~ E1Co..1.)(11l~TOt>KUnp1aKO-O,
O'S1totO ~ae)lO mcr!SUSt<; on:
Atv TO 1fUfTtUO> To 1fUfTf:uc.o
Ka9oJ...ou AlI'oJ...uTa
1234567
148. Ot 1tpa~st<; 'tTl<;EU11vtKi}<; Ku~sPV11cr11<;stvct OtKatOAoY11)lSvS<;__
149. 11EU11vtKi} Ku~spV11cr1111etKa aKSpatll __
ISO. 11EU11vtKi} KU~SPV11<il1etvct OiKat11
151. 11EU11vtKi} Ku~tpV11cr11 stvct a~tomcr'tTl
.:. A'uOl <51eevei~ opyavtauol 71:0Vep71:)£KOVTO.l (}TO Kiatptoxo t;~rI'Jpo. eivai I'J
EVPW71:o.i"K~ 'EVW(]'1'J xai TO.Hviouiva 'EBvI'J. Ilcpoxaab prile ae KVA1.0 TOV
apl8po 71:0Voe o.VTl71:pOO"W71:eiJelxeptaaotepo 0.71:0TO 1 to»; TO 7 o.vlUoyo. us TO
71:0(J0 (JVf.upwvei~ ~ <510.rp(j)vei~ ue tu; napoxeto: opaaeu; UTO niaimo T11~
l:TO nlaitllo TT)>;E1Co..\)O'11>;TOt> A1U<P{!)Vru l:UJ.l<P{!)Vc.O
Kt>1CP1UKO-O: u1ColuTU U1Col\)TU
01 anO"'E1~ (Jot> "(la T1)V E\)po>naiKll 'Evo>O'11
152. H Eupco1ta'lKi} 'Evocn u~i~st 'tTlv 1 2 3 4 5 6 7U1tocrnlP~l1 )lOU
153. H Eupco1tatKi} 'Evoicn sivca
1 2 3 4 5 6 7Q'U)l1tovsnKi}
154. H Eupco1ta'lKi} 'Evoxm osixvst
aVta1tOKptcrll cru; a1tatnlcrst<; tCOV 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
EM11VOK'U1tpicov
155. H Eupco1taiKi} 'Evco<il1 sivci oi1Ca11 1 2 3 4 5 6· 7
E1CilVfTfJC; TOV KV1CPWA·OV.
01 ano"'tl~ (JO\) "(la ru HVO>Jl£va E9V1l L11a<po>vro l:t>Jl<pO>vc(
anoJ..t>Ta a1CoJ..t>Ta
156. Tu Hveuevc 'E9vll osixvouv aVtanoKpt<il1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7oru; a1tatnlO'St<; tCOVEM11VOK'U1tpicov
157. Tu Hvrousvc 'E9vTJ stvm oiKatO~ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7opyavtO')lo<;
158. a~i~Et vu siom 1tEP1lCPavo<;/TJ"(ta to ep"(o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7TCOVHvoiuevcov EOVIDV
159. Tu Hvouevo 'E9vTJ stvoi a~tomO'to<; 1 2 3 4 5 6 7opYUvtcrJ.lo<;
~•
\
•
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.:. Ilapoxasd: pw..e oe IfVh"lO TOV o.PIOflO TWV ae avttxpoaomeiei 1CepZ(J(JOrepO a'lCo ro
1 tax; TO 7 awUoya J1.e TO 1CO(JO(JVWpOJvef~ ~ 6zaqJOJvef~ J1e tu; 1CapaKa.TOJ npotaaeu;
To 1 fJ11J1afVel on t5ev uV#ffJOJvei~ Ko.OO).,OV xat to 7orl UVflffJOJvei~ o.1ClJ).,vTa.
Asv O'u~<p(»v6>
Ka9oJ..ou
1 2 3
Oun O'\)~<P(»v6>,
OU1'& 3la<p(»v6>
4 5 6
1:.\)~<P(»v6>
A1toA.\)1'a
7
160. Y1tapxouy ota.<poP€~ O'n~ 1tE1tOte~O'ct~ rrov EAATJYOKU1tpiroyKat roiv
TOUPKOKU1tpiroy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
161. Y 1tapxouy Ota.<poP€~ ere tetJla Kat n~ 1tapao6crGt~ rrov EMTJYOKU1tpiroy Kat
rcov TOUPKOKU1tpicoy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
162. Y1tapxouy ota<popt~ O'TllYOtKOYOJ..Lt~1tPOOOOtrov EAATJYOK1.>1tpiroyKat nov
TOUPKOKU1tpiroy;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
163. Y 1tapxouy ota<popt~ O''tTJYicropucr] O'UYEioTJO'TJnov EMTJYOKU1tpiroy Kat rrov
TOUPKOKU1tpiroy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
164. Y1tapxouy ola<popt~ O''tOY'tP01tO sro~~ rrov EMTJYOKU1tpiroy Kat rrov
TOUPKOKU1tpiroy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
165. Ymxpxouy 1tOAtnO'J..LlKt~ota<popt~ ayaJlEcra oro»; Toupxouq.sm orou;
TOUPKOKU1tptoU~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
166. OtTOUPKOKU1tptot tXOUY otKaicoJla tOtOK't11cria~Kat XP~O'TJ~tTJ~YTJ~Tll~
KU1tpou 01tCO~ Kat ot EMTJYOKU1tptot
1 I 2 3 4 5 6 7
167. OlTOUPKOKU1tPlOt tXOUY 'to iOlO otKairoJla vc MYOY'tal KU1tPlOt 61tro~ Kat Ot
EMTJYOKU1tptOl
1 2 3 456
7
168. H KU1tpta~ 'tau't6'tTJ'ta tXet 'to ioto YOTJJlayta. rou; TOUPKOKU1tptoU~ 1tOUtXct
yta rou; EMTJYOKU1tPtOu~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
169. Ot TOUPKOKU1tptot stvot eUllata ron 1tap8Ae6y't0~ 01tro~ Kat ot EAAllYOKU1tptOt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
·:. Ilapaxasib aD)l7fXljpwaB atu; 1CapaKaTW "lpap,peq TOV aplOpO noo ae
avtmpooaatebet 7repIUUOTepO a7rO TO 1 iox; TO 7 aVlUoya ue TO 7rOUO mateieu; ~ Oev
mO"TeV8Ze; TIe; napoxdtco 7rpOTaU81e; (7TO1ClaialO T11C;E1CilV07Jq TODKV1CpWKOV.
1:& 1:& 1foJ..6 1:& J.ltKPO Oi>T& ee J.llKPO, 1:& 1:& 1foJ..6 1:& ll1f&pIlOAtKll
ll1f&pIJoJ..tKa J.ltKPO lla9J.lo 06T& ee J.l&"'faJ..o J.l&"'faJ..o J.l&"'faJ..o J.l&"'faJ..olla9J.lo
1l1KpO pa9f,1o 6a9j.lo .pa9j.lo 1a911_6 pa9f,16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
KOtta~ov1'a~ 't'l') vsorepn icropto (a1to 1'0 1960), ce n ~aeJlO mcrteuet~ on:
170. ot Toupxoxuaptot tX01)VavnJls't'romcr9si ~iata a1to 1'01)~EMTJVOKU1tpto1)~;__
171. ot T01)pKOKU1tptot tX01)VavnJls't'romcreei aDtKa a1to 1'01)~EMTjvOKU1tpto1)~;__
172. ot T01)pKOKU1tP10ttX01)VDsi~etcrouc EMTjvOKU1tpto1)~on stvct <ptAetpTJV1KOi
avepro1t01;_
173. ot T 01)PKOKU1tPtoteX01)v osi~et cr1'01)~EMTJVOKU1tpto1)~on etvoi
O'1.>Jl~t~acrnKOVOl.(lMaKnKOi avepro1tOt; __
174. Ot T01)PKOKU1tptOteX01)vOSi~Et 0''t'01)~EMTJVOKU1tPt01)~on etvci a~tot
eJlmcr1'o<r6vTj~;
175. 01 T01)pKOKU1tPtot tX01)Voei~et croix EMTjvOKU1tPt01)~on stvm mo Suvuroi a1to
(1)1'ou~;
I:& Tt paeJ.lO 1tloT&'6&1.~ Tropa, J.l&pO:OT) TTJV 1t(lP(l1tO:v(O K1iJ.l(lK(l OTt:
176. oi EMTJVOKU1tptOteX01)v OSi~Et orou; T01)PKOKU1tpt01)~on stvm eva~ ~imo~
Aao~;
177. Ot EMTJVOKU1tptot eX01)voei~et orou; TO'\)PKOKU1tPt01)~on etvoi eva~
0'1.>J.1~t~acrnK098taMaKnKO~ Aao~; .
178. 01 EMTjVOKU1tptOtexo'\)v oei~Et cr1'01)~TO'\)PKOKU1tpt01)<;on eivm a~tot
sJlmcrto<r6VTJ~;
179. oi EMTJVOKU1tptOteX01)v oEi~et orou; TO'\)PKOKU1tPt01)~on sivm mo (1)va1'oi a1to
t01)~ (1)tou~;
180. ot EMTjvOKU1tptOt tX01)VavnJle't'romcr1'ei aOtKa a1to 1'0,\)~To'\)pKOKU1tpto'\)~;
181. 01 EMTjvOKU1tPtOt tX01)Vav't'tJle't'romcr't'ei ~iata a1tO to'\)<;T01)pKOKU7tpt01)<;;
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.:. II'apoxau» P6J.B (TB /t";K).,O m; emA.oyer; 7COVae o.VTZ7Cp0(TOJ7CeVovvr1TZr;napaxatco
eponnoeu;
182. Ilour A;U011npoTI'_uI<;yta TI]Yeno.:ucrll roo Kt>nptU1COu;
a. Tn OtanlPllcrll 'tll<; napoucra<; Ka'tucr'tacrll<;
~. Tn Oll!..ltOt>pyia KOtVOUKpa.'tOt><;us TI] OtanlPl1011 ttov OUOxotvornrcov an6At>ta
Iorov otKOVO!..ltKU,nOAtTIKU Kat KOtVroVtKU
y. Tn Oll!..ltOt>Pyia Kpa.tOt><;61t0t> Ot EMllYOKU1tptot ea exot>Y tOY K'6ptO A6yo oru;
OtKOYO!..ll.Kec;,nOAtTIKec; Kat xorvorvucs; a1tOq>a.crEtc;
O. Tn Oll!..ltOt>pyia OUOOtaq>opEnKroy Kpa'tCOYan6A.t>'ta aVE~UpTI]'troy
e. AMll (1tapaKaAro ypU'I'te TI] otKil crac;
1tpOt(011)
183. Iloic Aucrll eEropeiC; cq>tKnl yta rnv e1t1At>011tot> Kunpuncou;
a. Tn otUnlPllall TI]<;1tapoucra<; Katucr'taall<;
~. Tn Oll!..ltot>pyia KOlVOUKpa.tOt><;us t1l OtanlPl1011 troy OUOxoivornrrev a1toAt>'ta
iorov otKOVO!..ltKU,1toAtTIKa. Kat xoworvtxu
y. Tn Oll!..ltot>pyia Kpa.tOU<; onou Ot EMllVOKU1tptot ea exouy tOY K'6ptO AOYo crt1lv
oucovouic, 1tOAtTIKilKat xowrovuce; a1tOq>a.aEt<;
O. Tn Oll!..ltOupyia OUOOta<pOpeTIKroy Kpatrov a1t6Au'ta aVE~upt11trov
454
.:. JIapwcoldJ uV}l1Cltjpwue atu; noposain» "Ipa}l}le; TOV apIO}lO lWD ae
avtmpoaomeiei 7r:€pIUUOTepo oxo TO 1 iox; TO 7 avaA.oya J1e 'CO7r:OUOmOT€V€I~ ~
&v mOT€V€U; tu; xa axatco 7C, ouiaeu; UTO 1ClaiulO ; e1Cilv q TOV KV1C uucot:
1:£ 1:£ nOAl> 1:£ ,UKPO OUT£ (1£J.llKPO, 1:£ nOAl> 1:£ l)n£p~OA1Ka
l)n£p~OA1Kcl J.llKPO ~at)J.l{) Oun (1£J.lgyaAo J.lgyaAo J.lgyaAo ~at)J.l6
uc 0 at) 6 at) 6 at) () at) 6
Kot"tu~oVtac; tcOpa TIl aXEcrll t11C;EMT]VOK"U1tptaKi]e;Km TOUP1COKU1tptaKi]e;
1COtVOtlltae;, as n paSJ.l.O ma"teUste; on:
184. to. O"UIl<PepOVtatroVTOUP1COKU1tpirovKat troy EMT]VOKU1tpirov elvat
cvnxpououevc;
185. Ot a.~iBe;troy EMllV01CU1tpirov Kat troy TOUP1C01CU1tpirovsivci 1ta.pOJ.l.OteC;;__
186. Ot avuYKsc; TrovTouPK01CU1tpirov Kat troy EMllV01CU1tpirov siva.t 1tapOIl0teC;; __
187. oi PA.e'l'Ste; yta u1tspoxil troVTOUP1COKU1tpirovKat troy EMllVOK"U1tpirov €ivat
avn 1CPOUOIlSVEe;;
.:. 0\ clv6pO>1rOt 6llO>~ ava7tn)oO'o1)V Kat alo61lllaTa cru; Ilsta.~u roo; axEaSte;. Ms
PUO"llTllv 1Capa1Cclvo> KAillaKa, Sa SEAalls tcOpa vc uc; 1tEte;GBTl paSJ16:
188. a.taSuvsaat SUllO yta. rou; TOUPK01CU1tptOUe;
189. matsUSte; on Ot EMllV01CU1tptOt ataSUVovtat SUllO yta rou; TOUPK01CU1tplOUe;
190. matSuete; on Ot TOUPK01CU1tplO1.atcrSuvovtat SUllO a1tEvaVn crouc
EMllV01CU1tptOUC;
191. a.tcrSuvscrat <popo a1tEvaVn croix TOUPK01CU1tptOUe;
192. matEUete; on Ot EMllV01CU1tptOt <popouV'tat rou; TOUP1C01CU1tptOUe;
193. mcrtEUet<; on Ot TOUPK01CU1tptOt<poPOUVtat roue EMT]V01CU1tpl.OUe;
194. a.tcrSuVEaat Iliaoe; yta '[ou<; TOUPK01CU1tptoUe;
195. matEUEte; on Ot EMllV01CU1tptOt atcrSuvovtat Ilicroe; yta. '[oue; TOUPK01CU1tptOue;
196. mateUete; on Ot TOUPK01CU1tptOtatcrSuvoVtat Ilicroe; yta tOUe; EMllV01CU1tptOUe;
197. vOtcOSS1.e;ayavU1Ct11all1tpOe; tOUe; TOUPK01CU1tptOue;
198. mcrteUete; On Ot EMllV01CU1tptOt V01.cOSOUVayavU1CtT]crll1tpOe; '[OUe;
TOUPK01CU1tptoue;
199. 1ttcrteUS1.<;on Ot TOUP1C01CU1tptOtVOtcOSouv ayavu1Ctllcrll1tpOe; tOUe;
EMllV01CU1tptOUe;
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.:. Ilapaxasd: (lVI/1rAl/pa)(le OTIC;napaxato: "Ipa)l)ltc; TOV aplfJ)lo 1rOVae
aV'rZ1rp0(J{J)1reVeZitepuraotepo oxo TO 1 e{J)C;TO 7 aVaAoya ue TOnoaa mateieu; ~
&v mateieu; TIt; 1rapW«J.T{J)npotaaeu; UTO 1rAail1lo T11C;rnilvulIC; TOV KV1rPlaKOD
l:t l:t 7to)':6 l:t J1lKpO 01>1'£ es J1lKPO, l:e l:e 7tOAU l:£ u7tepj30I..tKcl
1>7U:p!30AlKtl J1lKPO j3a9J1o OU1'£ O£ J1£YclAO J1&,,(clAO J1&,,(clAO J1&,,(clAOj3a9J1o
PlKPe) pa9pe) pa9pe) pa9pe) paape) fJa9pe)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
200. Ot TOVP1C01CU1tptOtq>o~OUVto.t rnv v1tspoxil rcov EA.A.T]vo1C'U1tpirov;
201. ot TOVP1C01C'U1tpiOtSeA.ovv va vno.p~st aMayi];
202. ot Toopxocesptot mcrSo.vov'tat DS!lSvOt JlS rnv KvnptalCij yij;
203. ot Toopxoxezpiot sivm snicrT]~ SUJla.ta. tll~ lcrtopia.~;
204. Ot Toupxoxozpto. lCo.VOVV1tpa.YJlan1Co. 1C1vijcrEt~cruJlq>tA.irocrT]~;
205. oi TOVP1C01CU1tptotSeA.OVV1tpa.YJla.nlCu va. vno.p~Et Etpi]VT];
206. oi EMT]V01CU1tptot yvropil;ovv n~ a.nO\jlEt9tOV rporto nov ~A.S1tOVVrqv
1Cato.crtacrT] Ot T ovp1Co1CUnptOt;
207. Ot EMT]vo1CUnptot cvrczoxpivovrm crn~ a.vT]cruXis~ xm cru; a.Vo.y1CS~tll~
T OVp1C01C'UnptalCij~nAsvpuc; ;
208. scrU 1tpocrromlCo. 1Ca.ta.A.a.~a.iv£t~ nc; a.vT]cruxisc; xm t1.~ a.vo.'{1Cec;tllC;
T ou p1C01C'Unpta.lCijc;nAsv po.~;
209. V1to.PXEt1Co.1tOtO~yta. va. Dta.npaYJla.t~meouv 01.EA.A.T]V01CU1tptoternv
TOVP1C01C'U1tpta.lCij1tA.Wpo.;
210. V1to.PXSt 1Co.n (1COtVOeoaq>o~) va. Ota.npaYJla.tw80uv 01 EMT]V01CU1tptot Jls toix
T OVp1CO~1tPtOV~;
211. T]A.ucrT]nov smevJlsi~ yta to KV1tpta.1COsival sq>t1C'tij;
1:8 T\ paSJiO 81t(01)~ ntG'tm)8t~, Ji8 pU01) 't1]V 1tapanuv(!) .u...iJiUKa, uno 'to 18ro~ 'to
7,o'tt:
212. sicrat Dta.tEStJlSvOC; va. 1CUVSt~vnoxropi]crSt~ crn~ U1tattijcrSt~ crov yta 'tT]v SmA.VcrT]
tOV KV1tpla1COU;
213. ot EMT]V01CU1tptOt sivat otateStJlevot va 1CUVOVV1tOxropi]cret~ crnc; a1ta.ttijcrEt~
tOVc; yta 'tT]v EmA.VcrT]tOV KVnpta1COu;
214. f:Xovv yivEt alliyec; crtllv T OVP1C01C'U1tptalCij1tAsVPo. ;
215. Jl1tOpei va yivovv nePtcrcrOtEPE~ a.Muyec; cr'tT]v TOVP1C01C'U1tptalCij1tAsVPU ocrov
aq>opu tllv 1tOAtnlCij 1CatOtlCOVOJltlCijtOV~ 1CatucrtacrT];
216. eiVat Ota.tEStJlevOt Ot EA.AT]V01CU1tPl0tva. 1Ca8T]cruxo.crovv tllv TOVp1C01C'Unpla.lCij
1tAWPU Jle cruJl~OAt1CBC;lCtvilcrEtC;1CatOPlcrJlevS~ ava.yvropicretC;;
217. Ot EMT]V01CU1tptOl BXOVV1Co.VEt1tpocrnuSetS~ va 1tAT]crtucrovv tllV
TOVp1C01C'Unp1alCij1tAWPU;
218. ot EMT]V01CU1tptot BXOVV8EcrJlEU'tsi crtllV TOVP1C01C'U1tptalCij1tMVPo. yta va.
q>BPOVVnc; ouo lCotV0tlltc:C; 1ttO 1COVto.;
219. ot EMT]V01CU1tptot f-XOVV1Ca8T]cruxo.cret tT]v TOVP1C01C'U1tptalCij1tAEVPo.Y1a.tllv
Sf-AT]crT]tOVc; va. q>epovv n~ ouo 1Cotv6'tT]tE~ mo 1COVto.;
220. 1tpe1tEt va V1tUPXel1CU1tOWC;tpitoc; va olaXelpi1;etat 'tT]otaJlUXT]1Ca.t tT]v f:1tiAVcrT]
tOV KV1tpla1COU;
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.:. Ilaoaxaub pOle ae KVk1.0 TOV aplO}lO xou m; avttnpooomeiei lCepl(J(JOTGpO alCO TO
1ewe; TO 7 aw.uoya ue TO lCO(JO(JVjJ.qJ{J)Veie;~ JzaqJ{J)veie; JiG ne; nopaxatca itpotaaeu;
To 1 anuaivei on t5ev (JV}ltpwveiC; k-aOolov KW TO 70rl (JV}ltpwveiC; a1colvTa.
Asv (JUJ.1<provID
Ka(6).ou
1 2
OUTS (JUJ.1<proVID,
OUT& Olll<provID
4 5 6
I:UJ.1<ProvcO
An6).UTU
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221. 01. TOUPKOKU1tP1.Ot Ko.VOUV cro~ape~ 1tpocr1to.eeU::~ "(1.0.vc e1tl.'tSUXes1 StpT]VIl;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
222. 'Exouv U1to.p~S1.KaeT}()1)xacrnKe~ 1Cl.vi]cret~ a1to n~ OVO 1tAeupe~ "(to. 'tTJVS1tlAUcrT)
tou Kuzpuncou
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
223. 01. Ota1tpa,,(!la'tC:u'te~ t11<;EM11vOKU1tptaKi]<; 1tAsupo.<; stvct KOVto. crqv
avt11taA111tAsupa
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
224. Ot TOUPKOKU1tptOt ea 1tpemn vu ()1)J..lJlOP<PIDeOVV!lE roue KaVOVe~ Ka1. n~ a~ic~
t11~ EM11VOKU1tptaKi]<; KOtVIDvia<; aJlecrID~ uerc mv evoxrn 'tIDV ovo xorvorrrnnv
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
225. H o.<pt~T}'tIDV TOUPKOKU1tpicov ea u1to~aeJ..licrst tOY EM11VOKU1tptaKo 1tOAtncrJlO
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
226. 01. a~is~ Kat oi 1tc1tOteT]crSl.~ 'tIDV TOUPKOKU1tpiIDV ocov a<popo. 'tTJOOUAS1.o.SWat
~amKo. 1tapOJlOtE~ us 0.1)'[£<; tIDV 1teptcrcrOtspCOv EAA11VOKU1tpicov
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
227. Oi a~iE<; Kat ot 1te1tOteT]cre1.~tIDV TOUPKOKU1tpicov ooov a<popo. 118tKo. Kat
ep11crKcunKo. 8eJlata (j1)J..l~aoiSouv us n~ a~is<;Kat n<; a1to'l'e1.~ tCOV
EM11VOKU1tpicov
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
228. Oi a~ls<; Kat Ot a1to'l'et<; tCOVTOUPKOKU1tpiIDV ooov a<popo. 'tTJVoucoyeveta Kat
t11V KOtVIDvtKo1toi11crT) 'tIDV 1tatOtrov stvoi ~amKo. 1tapo!lote<; us n~ a~lE<; Kat n<;
a1t6'1'Et~ tCOVEMT}VOKU1tpiIDV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
229. Ot a~is<; Kat oi a1to\jle1.~ tIDV TOUPKOKU1tpiIDV ooov a<popo. n<; KOtVIDVtKe<;
O'XBO'el.~()1)Jl~aoiSouv J..lStt~ a~ie~ Kat n<; an6\j1st<; 'tIDV EM11VOKU1tpiIDV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
230. Ot TOUPKOKU1tptOt eO. 1tpenEt va U1t0xpeIDeOVV va OeXtOVV n<;
EMT]VOKU1tptaK£~ npaK'ttKe<;;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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231. Ot TOUp1(OKUnptot ea nctpvow an6 'tTl xwpansptcr0'6tspa an' occ eu
ouvetcospouv
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
232. Tunatoto. 'troy Toupxoxuzpkov eUnpe1tSt vu exouy 1(1. au'to. 'to ot1(uiroJ-lu vu
1t11'YaiYouvce oTJJ.l6crtucrxoA£iu crnv Kunpo, 61tro~ 'tunatot6. rrov EUTJyo1(1)npiroy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
.:. Ilapaxasd: ptiJ.e ae ,,";"-;'0 TOVaplOpo TWV ae avuxpooomeiei xepiaaotepo a7'Coto
1 sox; ro 7 aw:Uoya ue to 7'COUOmnuporvek; ~ OlaqJOJvei,ue tu; 7'Capa1«J.rOJnpotaaeu;
To 1 onuaivei orl oev GvpqJOJvei, KaOo).ov teat ro 7on GVP'POJvefc;a;rO.A.VTa.
Atv (J1)JUj)rovID
Ka90AOl>
1 2 3
OUT& (Jl>I.UjlrovID,
061'& 3la<provID
4 5 6
1:l>J1<pC:OVID
A1tOA\J'ra
7
233. H o.CPt~TJrrov Toupxoxuzpfmv eu uu~"cret 'tTJcpopoA.oyia St~ ~cipo~ rorv
EUTJyo1(1)npiroy
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
234. Oi TOUp1(OKUnptot ea no.pouv n~ OOUA.ete~rov EUTJVOKU1tpirov
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
235. Ot TOUp1(OKUnptot ea1tpe1tSt vc exouY 1tp6cr~aO'TJ 1(1. curet ornv
ta'tpo<paPJ-laKeunKi] rtspieaA."'TJ 1tOUoeXOY'tat Kat oi EUTJVoKUrtptOt
12345 6 7
236. Ot EUTJY01CUnptot eu exouv J-lt1(p6'tsPTJnp6cr~ucrTJ O'n~ xorvorvnce; u1t11Pscrtss
S~Utrius 'tTJs cicpt~TJe;rorv TOUP1C01(1)1tpiroY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
237. H 1tot6'tTl'ta 'tIDV1COtVroYt1CWYu1t11psO'tWY)'tu rou; EUTJV01CUnptOue; eu
1tupuJ.lsiyst TJiotu1tupo. 'tTJYcicpt~TJtrov TOUP1C01(1)1tpiroY
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
238. Ot ci1topot TOUPK01CU1tptOtea 1tpe1tst va 01.Kat01>V't(l1smo6J-la'ta 1C(l11Ca'tOtria,
61tros Ot1Catouv'tat 1CUt01. o.1topm EUTJV01CU1tptOt
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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.:. To (JXt81O Awav 1LE:plA.a/..t/3avElm; nopoxato: xpoiaaeu; yza T1'/81'/jllOvpyia evtaioo
OjlO(J1[OV61aJCODxpctoix; Ilapcxaa» tJ'V}l1CA1jPW(fE (JTU; tcapatairo: "lpa}l}lee;
TOV aplO}lO 1LOV(JE: avrl1Lpo(JOJ1LE:DSl nepuraotepo a1Lo to 1 tOJ~ to 7 aVlUoya ue
to 1L0(J0 (JVWpOJvei~ ~ Oev (JVjlqJOJvci~ ue tu; ttapaxoxco npotaaeu;
3
0'61'& (JUJ1fProvcf>,
0''01'£ olacprovcf>
4 5
Aev (JUJ1CProvcf>
Ka9oA.ou
1 2 6
239. Avowuu nov O'UVOPCOVKat eAeUeepll otalciVllcrTl avepo.mCOVKat ayaerov __
240. Emorpoof rou EVO<;rpirou 'tTl<;a~im; tCOV1010K't11crtroVore KareX0!lEVa croo;
EMllVOKU1tPI0U<; 1tpoO'cpuye<;!lera. 'tTlVevCO<i1l __
241. Ieonuo otKaicoj..ta yta a.crK1l<i1l~t'to a1to n<; OUOxowomts; os eE!lara
OtKOVO!l1.Ka.,TtOAtnKa., olKaO'nKa. .
242. ~tao1.aKT} aTtoO'rpanconKo1toill<i1l a1to EMllV1.Ka. Kat TOUpJ(1.Kaorpcrsuucrc
1tOUea ~e1tepa.O'e1.'to sro; 2018
243. EmO'rpocpi} opiousvou aptej..tou TOUPKCOVeTtOiKCOVornv Toupxic !lera. 'tTlv
evcoO'll
244. YTtO n<; 1tupumlvco 1tpOUTtOeEO'e1.<;elPllvtKT}<;cru!l~irocrll<; ea KaAoucre<; evav
TOUPKOKU1tpto oro crmn oou;
245. Y1tO n<; 1tapa1ta.vro 1tpOU1tOesO'e1.<;etPllvtKi}<; crull~iroO'll<; ea 1tT}'Yatve<; oro O'mn
EVO<;TOUPKOKU1tptOU; .
•:. Ilepa a7ro tu; JU7.rpOpeq !CVf3ePV~(Jelq xat opyavtauoix; 7rOV ef1.7rAEKovral (JT1'/V
emA.V~ rov KV1LplaKOD, jlerpaE:l Kal 1'/ YVWWl rov 1LOA.ir1'/yza rov~ illov~ A.aoDq.
flapa!CaA.cV tJ'V}l1Cl1jpw(JE OTIC; 1CapaKaTW "lpa)l}lec; TOV aplO}lO 1LOV(JE
avrl1LpO(JOJ1CE:DEI7T:E:Pl(J(JOTSPOa1LO ro 1 tOJ~ TO 7 avaA.oya jlE: ro 7T:0(J0m(JTSDE:l~ ~
Oev m(JTSDE:IC;Tl~ 1LapaKaTOJ 1LpOra(JSl~ (!TO 1CAaiUlO TIle; E1Ci).V(flle; TOV
KV1CplaKOV.
~ro 1tAa.t.O'tO'"1~&1to.t)O'11~TOt) Kl)1tPl(lKOtl,
cre 1totO ~ae!lO mO'reuet<; on:
Aev 1'0 1tl<r1'&'Oro
Ka96i..ou
1 2 3 4 5
To 1U(J1'&'Oro
a1toA.u1'a
6 7
154. Ot EMllVOKU1tptOl eivat O'UIl1tOvenKoi
155. 011tpa.~et<; 'trov EMllVOKUTtpirov eiVUl ~a.O't!le<;
156. Ot EUllVOKU1tptOt eivUl oiKatot
157. Ot EUllVOKU1tptOl eivat a~tomcrrot
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01. unOwg1.C GO'\)Y1.U1:0'\)S TO'\)pKOKUnplO'\)<::
Asv TO ntO'TsiJro To 1tlO'T&Uro
~'CO 1tAUt<:nO1:11~£no..'\)C111~1:0t> Kt>nplUKOU, Ka9ol..ot> a1tOI..t>Ta
as 1totO ~a9~0 ma'teUst~ on: I 2 3 4 5 6 7
158. Ot T01JPK0K'61tptot u~iso1JV rnv 1J1toanlPt~T] (J01J --159. u~il;;st va stom 1tspi]cpavo~ yta 'C01J~T 01JPKOK'61tPt01J~
160. Ot T01JPKOK'61tptOteivm OtKatOt --161. Ot T01JPKOK'61tptot stvci uv9pro1tot us ouuzovoi«
01. unowg1.<: GO'\)y1.U 1:0V EllnvtKO AUO:
AEV TO 1l'1O'TEUro To 1tlO'TSUro
~'Co 1tAUtcrto 1:11~£no..'\)C111~1:0t> K'\)np1.UKOU, Ka96l..ou all'OI..t>Ta
as noto ~a9~6 ma'teUst~ on: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
162. 0 EMT]vtKO~ Aao~ oeiXVSt av'Ca1tOKpt<1T]cru; u1tat'tijast~ nov
EMllV01(1J1tpirov
163. Ot 1tpu~et~ 'C01JEMllVtKOU AUOUstvci ~ucrt~s~
164. 0 EMT]vtKO~ Aao~ a~isst mv 1J1toanlPt~T] a01J --
165. 0 EMT]VtKO~AUO~stvct OiKato~ --
01. unoyn:lS GO'\)ytU 1:0V TOUPKlKO AUO:
AEV TO 1l'1O'TWro To 1tlO'TEUro
~'tO 1tAUtcrto 1:11~£7t'iA,\)C111~1:0t> Kt>nplUKOU, Ka96l..ou all'OI..UTa
as 1tOtO~a9~o ma'teUW; on: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
166. Ot1tpu~et~ 'C01JTOUp1CtK01JAUOUstvm OtKUl.OAOY1l~Eve~
167. 0 TOUP1CtKO~Aao~ stvut OiKal.O~
168. 0 TOUp1CtKO~Aao~ cvrcnoxptverur
an~ avuYKe~ rov EMT]V01(1J1tpirov
169. Ot TOUPKot stvci uv9pro1tot us cru~1tOV01.U
.:. BaJ.£ 0'£ h15h-lO TOV apl8po 1t:OVavtinpoaomsiei noaa bla(jJO)vdr; ~ auuoarvek;
ue tu; xapoxatco npottursu;
AEV O'UJl<provro
Ka9ol..ou
1 2
OUTS eu Jl<Provro,
OUTS ola<provro
3 4 5
I:t>Jl<Provc.O
A1tOI..t>Ta
6 7
169. H EllT)vOKl>nplUKl] xorvomru oev 1tpt1tet 1tOtt vu O'Uyxcop~cret roix
TOUPKOKU1tptOu<;ytU n<; 1tpuSet<; rou; oro 1tupeA.86v
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
170. Ot EllT)voKUnplO\ eu cpaivoV'tuv uOVVUJlOluv ou¥Xcopoucruv Tllv TOUPKOKU1tPtU~
KOWOTlltU yta tu aicrXl1 tOu 1tupSA86V'to<;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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171. H T01)pKOK1>nplUKt} Kat T]EllllVOK1>nplUKt} xowornru 1tpE1tet vc cruyxoopi}crouv T]
I·tia tTjv aUT] yta TO1tapeAeOV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
172. KUJ1iu U1tO 't'l~ 0'60 KOlVO't'Tj't'&~Dev ea E1tpe1te vc cruyxoopi}cret rnv ruT] Y1a o,n
cruvEPT] oro 1t(lpeAeOV
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
173. H T01)pKOKUnpltlKt} KUlT) EllT)voKUnpluKl] KOlVO'TT)TUxpeta~e'tat vu
(j\)Jl~t~ucr'touv J..le'ta~uroix;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
174. 01TO\)p~oK'Unplol ea €oetxvav nocro Suvcroi stvci av (j\)J..lPtpa~ov'tav JlE
roi»; EMllvoK6nptou~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
175. Av a1tOAoyoUvtav Kcn 01 Silo K01V01'l)1'8~ yta 'to 1tapeAeOV ea U1tT}PxeaJ1otf3aio
O<peAO~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
176. HOT]J..locrtacruyyvOOJ..lllyta 'to 1tapeAeOV Kat a1tO 't'l~ oilo K01VO't'Tj't'&~ea i}Tav OO<P€AtJ..lll
Kat yta TOU~EUllVOKU1tPtOU~ Kat Y1.a 'tOU~TOUPKOKU1tPtOU~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
177. 0, EllT)voK'Unplol Sa napaoioov'tav crTOU~Toupxoxuxptou; cv
(j\)J..l~tpa~ovrav J..lETOVcrX€otOVAwav 11.a J..lia evroJl€vll Koxpo
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
178. Av oi Ell1)voKl>np101 ~l1titcrouv cruyyvOOJ..lT]a1to TOU~TOUpKOKU1tP1.0U~Y1.a 'to
1tapeA90v, aa eivai ecv va 1tpootOouv T~ 1tPollyouJ..lEVe~yevt€~ TOU~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
179. ~E xpet(i~eTat vc 1)nap~et (j\)J..lPt~acrJ..lo~aVaJ..lEcracrT01)~EllT)voKl>nplO\)<; KUI
TO\)<;TO\)pKOKUnplO\)<;
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
180. KU1 01 oilo K01VO't'111'E~ea 1tpE1tet vu a1tOAoyTjeOUVyta re Aa91'j 1tOUE1tpa';av oro
1tapeAe6v
1
7
2 3 4 5 6
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.:. llArwuJ.(ovrac; (]TO reAOC;too eponnuatosovion, 1CapW(aACOonavtnae (]TZC;
ttapaxato) eponnoeu; ypa.rpovrac; (]TOVKeVDxmpo T11V a1Cavnr(j1/ (jOV.
ta, £UXaPIOTOUp£"".Au VIa TI] QUjJJJ£TOXIJ Qa) OTI]V tpcuva Pll.t'
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Appendix II
Table 1. Pairwise comparisons, means, df and significance levels of
trust in all targets
Table 2. Correlations amongst constructs for each target of trust
Table 3. Correlations between the prerequisites and attitudes to
reconciliation and to a reconciliation plan
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Table 1. Pairwise comparisons, means, df and significance levels of trust in all
targets
Trust targets df p
Trust in
the Turkish government the Turkish Cypriot leaders -6.78 280 .00
The American government -5.12 280 .00
The Turkish people -6.08 280 .00
The British government -11.77 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people -11.65 280 .00
The United Nations -20.92 280 .00
The European Union -28.25 280 .00
The Greek government -28.76 280 .00
The Greek people '-29.53 280 .00
The Cypriot government -30.20 280 .00
The Greek Cypriot people -31.59 280 .00
Trust in the Turkish Cypriot leaders the Turkish government 6.78 280 .00
The American government -0.64 280 n.s.
The Turkish people -0.75 280 n.s .
The British government -7.34 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people -7.97 280 .00
The United Nations -16.45 280 .00
The European Union -23.96 280 .00
The Greek government -24.97 280 .00
The Greek people -26.48· 280 .00
The Cypriot government -27.58 280 .00
The Greek Cypriot people -28.55 280 .00
the American government The Turkish government 5.12 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot leaders 0.64 280 1.00
The Turkish people -0.10 280 1.00
The British government -9.89 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people -6.06 280 .00
The United Nations -16.89 280 .00
The European Union -24.21 280 .00
The Greek government -26.07 280 .00
The Greek people -27.08 280 .00
The Cypriot government -28.31 280 .00
The Greek Cypriot people -28.59 280 .00
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Trust targets df p
Trust in
The Turkish people the Turkish government 6.08 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot leaders 0.75 280 .00
The American government 0.10 280 1.00
The British government -6.25 280 1.00
The Turkish Cypriot people -7.57 280 .00
The United Nations -14.37 280 .00
The European Union -20.06 280 .00
The Greek government -23.56 280 .00
The Greek people -24.87 280 .00
The Cypriot government -24.77 280 .00
The Greek Cypriot people -25.70 280 .00
The British government the Turkish government 11.77 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot leaders 7.34 280 .00
The American government 9.89 280 .00
The Turkish people 6.25 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people -1.16 280 .00
The United Nations -11.0 I 280 1.00
The European Union -19.58 280 .00
The Greek government -21.88 280 .00
The Greek people -23.27 280 .00
The Cypriot government -24.32 280 .00
The Greek Cypriot people -24.33 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot people The Turkish government 11.65 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot leaders 7.97 280 .00
The American government 6.06 280 .00
The Turkish people 7.57 280 .00
The British government 1.16 280 1.00
The United Nations -7.24 280 .00
The European Union -13.10 280 .00
The Greek government -17.11 280 .00
The Greek people -18.74 280 .00
The Cypriot government -19.57 280 .00
The Greek Cypriot people -20.59 280 .00
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Trust targets df p
Trust in
the United Nations The Turkish government 20.92 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot leaders 16.45 280 .00
The American government 16.89 280 .00
The Turkish people 14.37 280 .00
The British government 11.01 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people 7.24 280 .00
The European Union -9.51 280 .00
The Greek government -16.05 280 .00
The Greek people -16.98 280 .00
The Cypriot government -18.49 280 .00
The Greek Cypriot people -19.50 280 .00
The European Union The Turkish government 28.25 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot leaders 23.96 280 .00
The American government 24.21 280 .00
The Turkish people 20.06 280 .00
The British government 19.58 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people 13.10 280 .00
The United Nations 9.51 280 .00
The Greek government -11.37 280 .00
The Greek people -13.11 280 .00
The Cypriot government -14.72 280 .00
The Greek Cypriot people -15.60 280 .00
the Greek government The Turkish government 28.76 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot leaders 24.97 280 .00
The American government 26.07 280 .00
The Turkish people 23.56 280 .00
The British government 21.88 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people 17.11 280 .00
The United Nations 16.05 280 .00
The European Union 11.37 280 .00
The Greek people -3.11 280 .14
The Cypriot government -3.17 280 .11
The Greek Cypriot people -4.07 280 .00
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Trust targets df p
Trust in
the Greek people The Turkish government 29.53 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot leaders 26.48 280 .00
The American government 27.08 280 .00
The Turkish people 24.87 280 .00
The British government 23.27 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people 18.74 280 .00
The United Nations 16.98 280 .00
The European Union 13.11 280 .00
The Greek government 3.11 280 .14
The Cypriot government -0.62 280 1.00
The Greek Cypriot people -1.31 280 1.00
The Cypriot government The Turkish government 30.20 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot leaders 27.58 280 .00
The American government 28.31 280 .00
The Turkish people 24.77 280 .00
The British government 24.32 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people 19.57 280 .00
The United Nations 18.49 280 .00
The European Union 14.72 280 .00
The Greek government 3.17 280 .11
The Greek people 0.62 280 1.00
The Greek Cypriot people -0.43 280 1.00
The Greek Cypriot people The Turkish government 31.59 280 .00
the Turkish Cypriot leaders 28.55 280 .00
The American government 28.59 280 .00
The Turkish people 25.70 280 .00
The British government 24.33 280 .00
The Turkish Cypriot people 20.59 280 .00
The United Nations 19.50 280 .00
The European Union 15.60 280 .00
The Greek government 4.07 280 .00
The Greek people 1.31 280 1.00
The Cypriot government 0.43 280 1.00
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Table 2. Correlations amongst constructs for each target of trust
Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the Turkish Cypriot leaders
[Trustworthiness 1.000
[Irustfulness .569 1.000
!Worthy of .599 .523 1.000
support
Legitimacy .624 .497 .507 1.000
Fairness .638 .473 .487 .548 1.000
Effectiveness .552 .339 .300 .466 .610 1.000
Efficiency .501 .347 .419 .475 .536 .706 1.000
Responsiveness 1.000 .569 .599 .624 .638 .552 .501 1.000
Compassion .569 1.000 .523 .497 .473 .339 .347 .393 1.000
~ntegrity .599 .523 1.000 .507 .487 .300 .419 .387 .606 1.000
!Worthy of pride .624 .497 .507 1.000 .548 .466 .475 .442 .514 .509 1.000
!frust [Irust- Worthy Legitimacy Fairnes Effectiveness Efficiency Responsivenessf'ompassior Integrity Worthy
tworthinessifulnes of pf
support I pride
Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the Turkish government
[Irust [Irust- Worthy !Legitimacy Fairnes Effectivenes Efficiency Responsiveness ~ompassion Integrity Worthy
!worthiness ~lnes5 of pf
support I pride
[Irustworthiness 1.000
[Irustfulness .648 1.000
Worthy of .667 .778 1.000
support
Legitimacy .627 .633 .649 1.000
Fairness .687 .668 .695 .627 1.000
Etfecti veness .363 .465 .516 .589 .570 1.000
Efficiency .464 .539 .485 .562 .557 .786 1.000
Responsiveness .550 .567 .574 .639 .613 .537 .537 1.000
Compassion .675 .697 .602 .532 .693 .414 .550 .698 1.000
ntegrity .486 .522 .526 .450 .607 .434 .435 .511 .587 1.000
Worthy of pride .753 .684 .648 .550 .726 .386 .438 .574 .729 .579 1.000
Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the Cypriot government
Trust [Trust- Worthy Legitimacy Fairness !Effectiveness Efflciency Responsiveness Compassion Integrity Worthy
worthiness fulness of of
support pride
Trustworthiness 1.000
Trustfulness .776 1.000
Worthy of .823 .784 1.000
upport
!Legitimacy .832 .805 .799 1.000
Fairness .743 .675 .700 .686 1.000
jt.ffecti veness .725 .639 .606 .670 .688 1.000
!Efficiency .672 .630 .585 .658 .686 .787 1.000
Responsiveness .641 .573 .579 .636 .652 .645 .633 1.000
Compassion .681 .649 .638 .682 .686 .638 .635 .738 1.000
Integrity .689 .660 .674 .699 .712 .624 .630 .644 .791 1.000
Worthy of pride .739 .687 .685 .692 .710 .668 .631 .630 .688 .699 1.000
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Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the British government
[Irust- Worthy jLegitimac) jEtTectiveness IFaimes, jEfficienc) Responsiveness ~ompassion ntegrity Worthy Trust-
ifulness of of worthiness
support pride
~rustfulness 1.000
Worthy of .655 1.000
support
Legitimacy .628 .711 1.000
Effectiveness .593 .698 .668 1.000
!Fairness .486 .521 .547 .636 1.000
IEfficiency .678 .664 .669 .639 .661 1.000
!Responsiveness .477 .468 .522 .612 .755 .657 1.000
!'--ompassion .657 .647 .651 .583 .513 .669 .514 1.000
ntegrity .640 .647 .720 .648 .521 .657 .519 .704 1.000
Worthy of pride .653 .631 .620 .586 .571 .713 .586 .669 .663 1.000
[Irustworthiness .691 .617 .756 .631 .535 .683 .591 .666 .705 .683 1.000
Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the American government
[Irust- Worthy Legitimacy iEtTectivenes Fairnes Efficiency jResponsi venes Compassior Integrity Worthy tr rust-
ulness of of Iworthines
lsupport pride
[Irustfulness 1.000
Worthy of .713 1.000
support
!Legitimacy .777 .851 1.000
!EtTectiveness .649 .747 .707 1.000
Fairness .551 .488 .558 .595 1.000
!Efficiency .736 .681 .762 .638 .607 1.000
!Responsiveness .595 .611 .588 .682 .787 .654 1.000
!Compassion .752 .685 .752 .668 .608 .723 .636 1.000
Integrity .708 .724 .695 .677 .510 .725 .620 .758 1.000
Worthy of pride 701 .670 .724 .626 .596 .699 .645 .737 .677 1.000
'rrustworthiness .773 .746 .769 .687 .563 .644 .620 .705 .713 .699 1.000
Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the European Union
[Irust- Worthy Legitimacy iEtlectiveness Fairnes Efficiency Responsiveness !'-'ompassion Integrity Worthy ~rust-
fulnes of of lworthiness
support pride
~rustfulness 1.000
Worthy of .646 1.000
support
Legitimacy .746 .791 1.000
Effectiveness .645 .689 .741 1.000
Fairness .670 .619 .710 .657 1.000
Efticiency .665 .676 .665 .649 .674 1.000
Responsiveness .633 .667 .704 .705 .725 .726 1.000
!Compassion .678 .672 .693 .670 .622 .607 .673 1.000
Integrity .664 .648 .665 .657 .603 .639 .673 .690 1.000
Worthy of pride .562 .530 .520 .579 .528 .595 .613 .544 .617 1.000
rrrustworthiness .700 .594 .691 .643 .656 .580 .645 .662 .596 .544 1.000
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Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the UN
[Irust- Worthy Legitimacy Effectivenes Fairnes Efficiency Responsiveness Compassion Integrity Worthy [Irust-
ifulness of of ~orthines
support pride
Trustfulness 1.000
Worthy of .710 1.000
support
Legitimacy .716 .793 1.000
Effecti veness .676 .708 .747 1.000
Fairness .585 .582 .646 .695 1.000
Efficiency .761 .729 .724 .747 .662 1.000
Responsiveness .660 .697 .712 .711 .746 .701 1.000
!Compassion .730 .634 .613 .649 .639 .695 .669 1.000
ntegrity .742 .635 .652 .720 .617 .736 .703 .749 1.000
Worthy of pride .679 .679 .644 .673 .620 .674 .704 .659 .727 1.000
Trustworthiness .761 .700 .73 I .710 .659 .778 .718 .722 .726 .719 1.000
Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the Greek Cypriots
[Trust [Irust- Worthy fLegitimac) Fairness !Effectiveness !Efficiency Responsiveness Compassion Integrity Worthy
~orthiness fulnes of pf
support I pride
Trustworthiness 1.000 .684 .697 .750 .729 .637 .639 .626 .660 .602 .589
Trustfulness .684 1.000 .816 .713 .627 .586 .639 .626 .628 .634 .667
Worthy of .697 .816 1.000 .819 .678 .578 .598 .658 .643 .587 .713
~UPjJOrt
Legitimacy .750 .713 .819 1.000 .742 .677 .666 .632 .646 .597 .643
IFairness .729 .627 .678 .742 1.000 .775 .683 .665 .656 .622 .672
!Effectiveness .637 .586 .578 .677 .775 1.000 .859 .666 .605 .572 .627
Efficiency .639 .639 .598 .666 .683 .859 1.000 .742 .657 .630 .643
Responsi veness .626 .626 .658 .632 .665 .666 .742 1.000 .705 .635 .634
Compassion .660 .628 .643 .646 .656 .605 .657 .705 1.000 .743 .685
Integrity .602 .634 .587 .597 .622 .572 .630 .635 .743 1.000 .688
Worthy of pride .589 .667 .713 .643 .672 .627 .643 .634 .685 .688 1.000
Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the Turkish people
[Trust [Irust- Worthy Legitimacy Fairness Effectiveness Efficiency Responsiveness Compassion Integrity Worthy
~orthiness ifulnes of pf
support •pride
Trustworthiness 1.000
Trustfulness .659 1.000
Worthy of .762 .813 1.000
support
Legitimacy .724 .700 .766 1.000
Fairness .824 .687 .716 .729 1.000
Effectiveness .574 .561 .562 .729 .716 1.000
Efficiency .584 .543 .564 .730 .700 .915 1.000
Responsiveness .671 .704 .713 .702 .715 .670 .674 1.000
Compassion .770 .689 .739 .660 .794 .576 .628 .783 1.000
Integrity .599 .624 .659 .689 .594 .546 .608 .727 .745 1.000
Worthy of pride .663 .552 .666 .654 .603 .531 .491 .653 .676 .651 1.000
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Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the Turkish Cypriot people
[Trust [lrust- Worthy !Legitimacy Fairness Effectivenes Efficiency lResponsivenes Compassior Integrity Worthy
jworthines ~ulnes~ of Iof
support Ipride
fTrustworthiness 1:000
fTrustfulness .765 1.000
Worthy of .828 .834 1.000
support
ILegitimacy .768 .694 .755 1.000
It:airness .836 .711 .772 .769 1.000
Effectiveness .726 .698 .765 .770 .789 1.000
Efficiency .730 .705 .742 .707 .778 .850 1.000
!Responsiveness .729 .669 .725 .685 .764 .701 .717 1.000
~ompassion .746 .681 .779 .709 .751 .750 .731 .826 1.000
Integrity .717 .648 .688 .713 .674 .665 .679 .682 .766 1.000
Worthy of pride .801 .736 .791 .737 .726 .685 .706 .708 .782 .763 1.000
Table. Pearson correlations among the constructs of trust for the Greek people
Trust [Irust- Worthy !Legitimacy Fairnes Effectivenes Efficiency Responsivenes Compassion Integrity Worthy
worthines jfulnes5 of Iof
support I pride
[Trustworthiness 1.000
fTrustfulness .789 1.000
Worthy of .842 .891 1.000
!support
!Legitimacy .829 .799 .842 1.000
!Fairness .823 .727 .807 .813 1.000
!Effectiveness .707 .658 .736 .736 .789 1.000
Efficiency .686 .700 .733 .739 .721 .857 1.000
Responsiveness .753 .792 .787 .711 .729 .692 .744 1.000
Compassion .731 .736 .783 .701 .763 .720 .683 .866 1.000
Integrity .694 .675 .697 .692 .734 .666 .699 .741 .756 1.000
Worthy of pride .718 .740 .782 .742 .698 .686 .665 .718 .774 .735 1.000
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Appendix III
Content Analysis Study 2 (chapter 7)
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Content Analysis- Chapter 7
The Cyprus issue and attribution of responsibility
Concerning the Cyprus issue, all participants were aware of it and almost all of them
were able to attribute responsibility for it. The majority of the participants (see Table
1) argued that it was both conflicting sides' fault; allocating then a share of the blame
also to their in-group. The two sides, to blame, were the Greek Cypriots and the
Turkish Cypriots with Turkish people.
Greek Cypriots' responsibility laid in their internal conflicts at a military (Civil war)
and at a political level (disagreements amongst political parties and politicians), both
in the past and in the present, as well as in their unfair treatment of the Turkish
Cypriots in the past. Turkish Cypriots' and Turkish people's responsibility laid in
their taking advantage of this political instability in Cyprus in favour of their interests:
"Both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots ... because us as well we did some
things to the Turkish Cypriots ...so that Turkeyfinds the opportunity to invade" P18,
line 75-76, p.2.
"Eh, whose fault it is, eh, it cannot be thefault of just one side, I mean it's the Greek
Cypriots' fault as well because they could not agree with each other and there have
been things among them but Turks as well cannot take advantage what is
happening in other countries for their own country's interest" P7, line 79-83, p.2.
"Eh, it's somebody's fault, I don't know if it's the correct one or not, but we had the
Civil war and then the Turks came ...if we didn't have the war among us the Turks
wouldn't have the chance to come ... " P8, line 98-100, p.3.
The participant who attributed responsibility solely to the Turkish people (referring to
Turkish settlers) expressed an impossibility to connect the out-group's action with any
factors or preceding events:
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"I don't see the reason why the invasion should happen, therefore, in some way I
believe it's the fault of the Turkish side" P16, line 74-75, p.2.
The participant who attributed responsibility mainly to the Greek Cypriot people, on
the other hand referred again to the internal political conflicts of Greek Cypriots
which hinder their effectiveness:
"First of all, the way I see it, there are too many political parties, we do not think on
our own what to do ...but, we are not organised, we have lets say, different political
parties, which say many different things, we don't have any common plan as Greek
Cypriots .... we are dispersed lets say" P14, line 90-93, p.2.
Apart from the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, some participants also attributed
part or all of the responsibility to other countries and international institutions.
However, external agents, were the least held responsible (2 out of 20 participants
thought they were to blame) for the Cyprus issue. Turkey, Greece and Great Britain
are all countries that have been involved in Cyprus' history and were considered
responsible for what has happened to Cyprus by certain participants.
"Pi for me, both of them ...
I: both of them, what do you mean, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots or do
you mean Turkey and Greece and ...
P: all of them together (are responsible for the Cyprus issue)" PlO, line 88-91, p.2.
"I believe that it's because of the mistakes of both sides, but the problem has to do
with Great Britain, that brought Turkey in the middle of the problems, while there
was no need for that ...because as I know, around 1960, before Zurich's accord,
Turkish Cypriots were only the 18% of the population which means that their power
in the community was not very important, but with Great Britain's encouragement,
putting Turkey in, it means that their power has increased, which is not right" P19,
line 89-94, p.2.
Finally, politicians, independently of their ethnicity, were also held responsible, but
by very few participants, similarly to foreign institutions (2 out 0[20 participants).
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The preferred solution to the Cyprus conflict
The sample appeared divided on this issue. The most popular reported preferred
solution (9 out of 19 participants) was compromise between the Turkish Cypriots and
the Greek Cypriots.
"I believe that they have to get unified, to unify the island and to have both Greek
Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but I don't know who will govern, not a President, to
have only, to create a council, with some Turkish Cypriots and some Greek Cypriots
that decide together on the issues ... " P2, I. 123-6, p.3.
"the Greek Cypriots have to compromise with the Turkish Cypriots, to find some
common ...interests and then tofind a solution" P4, I. 94-96, p.3
"to have the nvo parts unified ...but it needs a lot of work from both sides ....if this
could be done it would be the best" P12, I. 63-64, p.2
However, almost an equal number of participants (7 out of 19 participants) reported
wanting the return to the situation before the '74 invasion, where the northern part of
Cyprus was part of Cyprus and not under Turkish occupation; this solution meant the
regaining of northern Cyprus (6 out 19 participants) and the expulsion of Turkish
people from Cyprus (lout of 19 participants). This solution was very radical in
comparison to the compromise solution.
The regaining of northern Cyprus was related to the issue of identification and
belonging of the land to the state of Cyprus, both emotionally and cognitively
(reminiscence of the situation before the 1974 invasion), as well as to the power loss
of the Greek Cypriots in the northern part of the island since 1974. Similarly, the
expulsion of Turkish people was also related to identity issues, based on the perceived
differences that would occur to the identity of the country if the two communities
coexisted:
"I want my country back, to be the whole of it, ours, as it was ... " Pll, 1.101-102, p.3.
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"I believe that there should be, if there was a solution, to be as they lived before '74,
not as the referendum was saying .....as it was before '74, where everybody lived
together" P16, 1.94-97,p.2.
"to have the island as before '74 tofeel it as a whole, that it is ours not to
need their permission to go to the other part, since it is our country both in the south
and the north" P6, 1.106,110.112-113, p.3
"there will be a solution if Turks (it is not specified if it is the Turkish Cypriots or the
Turkish settlers or the army, but we assume participant 17 refers to all of them
together) leave from Cyprus .....because if we live with them, it will be very different, it
won't be the Cyprus we know" P17, I. 109,111-112, p.3.
Finally, the number of people who wanted the maintenance of the status quo was very
small (2 participants out of 19), and they were based on the appeal of the present
condition in comparison to other alternatives.
"the way things have become, to be able to stay as we are .... " P 9, l. 110,p.3.
One participant did not know what solution to suggest, because of the difficulty of the
situation and the hatred amongst the two peoples:
"It's very difficult, because we don't know how ...basically, if they open the frontiers
completely and everything ...it 's very difficult, we don't know how this could be done
because they can't give us back the houses or our regions, because what will be done
with the rest of Turkish Cypriots who live there? For this reason I can't think of a
solution easy enough for both of us but again there will be this hatred that's
why this hatred hasn't yet been overcome " P19, 1.121-125,130-131,p.3
The agents of "the" solution to the Cyprus issue and the involvement of international
institutions
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The most popular agents (supported by 6 out of20 participants) of the solution to the
Cyprus issue were the Greek Cypriots together with the Turkish Cypriots; politicians
and people at a grass root level. Then, there was an equal support (each one supported
by 3 out of 20 participants) for the European Union, the United Nations along with
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and the belief that no one could realistically
find a solution to the conflict. It is also very interesting that (2 out of 20) participants
thought that young people could find a solution, in contrast to what adults have so far
produced. Finally, Greece and Turkey, two traditionally involved countries, were
supported the least and only along with the international institutions, the EU and the
UN (see Table for the detailed results).
However, participants did not only refer to the agents of a solution but also to who
should/should not be involved in the Cyprus issue, the reasons for their involvement,
and also described the role these international institutions should play in it
Fifteen participants were positive about the European Union's involvement while 4
participants were cautious about it. There was no participant negative to it.
Participants' cautiousness was based on the perceived lack of interest and knowledge
of Greek Cypriots' sufferings and their lack of responsiveness. On the other hand, the
main positive argument for its involvement (for 9 out of 20 participants) was the
common super-ordinate European identity, while the neutrality and the power of the
European Union were almost equally important (reported by 7 out of20 participants).
Concerning the role of the EU it was mainly reported as listening to the people.
Concerning the United Nations, 12 participants (out of 20) were positive about their
help, while 3 participants were negative to it, and 3 were cautious about it. The main
reasons reported for their non-involvement was their lack of interest in Cyprus and
lack of knowledge of the sufferings of the Greek Cypriots. The help of the UN in the
past and the power of the UN, although mentioned, were not very influential (reported
by 1 and 2 participants out of 20 respectively). On the other hand, the reasons for the
UN's non-involvement were their perceived favouritism to Turkey and their proven
ineffectiveness in finding a solution (each reported by 1 participant out of 20).
Participants' opinions on the role of the UN extended from the creation of a new plan
to just listening to the Greek Cypriot people and learning about their wishes.
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Concerning Great Britain, the majority of participants (14 out of 20) were negative
about its involvement in the Cyprus issue; only 2 participants (out of 20) were
positive to it and 4 participants were cautious about it. The most popular reasons for
its non-involvement (for 11 participants out of 20) were Great Britain's private
interests and its proven favouritism towards Turkey (for 5 participants). Its
ineffectiveness and its lack of interest in the Greek Cypriots were also mentioned (by
1 and 2 participants out of 20 respectively). The reasons, on the other hand for its
involvement, were its help in the past and Greek Cypriots' inability to find a solution
on their own. Concerning the preferred role of Great Britain, it was mainly described
as consulting and then as staying neutral.
Similarly to results for Great Britain, the majority of participants (14 participants out
of 20) were mostly negative towards US' involvement. Only 3 participants reported
that it should be involved and 2 were cautious about it. The main reasons for its non-
involvement were personal interests (for 11 participants) and its proven favouritism to
Turkey (for 6 participants). Their ineffectiveness, their power and control over the
world, the lack of super-ordinate identity with Cyprus were also mentioned (each by 1
participant out of 20). As for GB, the preferred role for USA was consulting (not
interfering), and then, staying neutral.
Concerning Greece, the majority of participants (11 participants out of 20) were
positive to its involvement, 6 participants were negative to it and 2 participants were
cautious about it. The main reason for its involvement was its help in the past (for 7
participants) which could predict help in the future and its common ethnic identity
with Cyprus. For its non involvement, the main reason was its lack of interest and
sufficient knowledge about Greek Cypriots' sufferings, while its desire to control
Cyprus was also reported. The main preferred role for Greece was to stay neutral.
Finally, concernmg Turkey, the majority of participants did not support its
involvement in the Cyprus issue (13 participants out of 20) because of its private
interests, which she tries to promote. The participants who reported that it should be
involved (7 participants out 20) did not refer to its exact role.
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An equal number of participants suggested either that the solution should be found
only by the two immediate peoples involved, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish
Cypriots, or that the European Union and the United Nations should also be involved
in this process. It was also noticeable that 3 participants did not believe that there was
anyone able to find a solution and one participant actually gave the description of
someone who would have the ability to find a solution, but that this person may not
exist, or has not been found.
"for me, ( it should be) people who look at all sides, people's interests, they don't only
look at the economic benefits and who will take more, ...someone who will try to make
us progress as one country .. "part 13, l.93-97, p.2
The community appeared divided on this issue as well as it did for the possible
solution, which could also depict a division of the politicians in Cyprus. This could be
another barrier for the agreement on a unanimous solution and it makes the work of
the negotiating party even more complicated.
The Annan plan and the 2004 referendum (Which factors influenced/determined
Greek Cypriots' response to the 2004 referendum?)
The majority of participants rejected the Annan plan (16 out of 20 participants) and
the reasons presented for this rejection covered a spectrum, from moral to economical
reasons. The most popular reason was of an economical/political nature; the failure of
the plan to satisfy Greek Cypriots interests (10 out of20 participants) in contrast to its
success to satisfy of Turkish Cypriots' interests (3 out of 20 participants). On the
other hand, the second most popular reason was of a social nature, Greek Cypriots'
unwillingness to be unified with the Turkish Cypriots (8 out of 20 participants). The
third and fourth following (in popularity) reasons were the plan's lack of fairness and
"rightness" for Greek Cypriots (4 participants supported each of these reasons). Greek
Cypriots' willingness to maintain the status quo, the unrealistic, as perceived, nature
of the plan and its lack of trust in the Greek Cypriots were the reasons which were
reported the least. On the other hand, the reasons in favour of the Annan plan were not
based on the characteristics of the plan itself, as were the reasons against the plan, but
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on the chance the plan represented for the Greek Cypriots. The two reported reasons
were almost equally reported by the participants (3 and 2 participants out of 20
participants respectively).
All of these reasons could be further grouped into more general categories, giving the
following bigger categories. One of these bigger categories would be Interest,
consisting of in-group interest and out-group interest. It appeared to be an important
reason for saying "yes" or "no" to the referendum, for accepting or rejecting the
proposed Annan plan. Participants appeared to believe that the solution proposed by
the referendum was not in Greek Cypriots' interest, advantage; it would not be good
for them in the long run.
"I think it was good (that the majority voted "no" to the referendum) and now there
will be fewer consequences than there would have been if we had said "yes ", I believe
it is for the best" P8, I. 109-110, p.3
"eh I believe that the plan was not at all in our interest, and they shouldn't have said "yes" PlO,
1.62, p.2
" .....Me, personally, I was against, not the solution, but because based on this plan,
because the Cyprus issue will be resolved with a compromise plan, but this one was a
bit wrong for us, the Greek Cypriots" P14, I. 60-62, p.2
Apart from the issue of interest, the willingness to maintain the status quo was
expressed by some participants who reported that Greek Cypriots did not want a
solution in general or they were not ready for a big change. Some people voted
against the compromise plan because the present situation appeared more convenient
or more beneficial for them than any new one. The change that this plan, or any plan,
could bring was perceived as unwanted. However, this unwillingness to find a
solution was interestingly expressed in a way that was either attributed to a small only
group, or even to the whole in-group, excluding oneself from them.
" ... they just don't want a solution right now ... " P5, I. 60, p.2
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"..eh ...they were just not ready for something ...for a big change" P12, I. 39-40,,
p.1
"...a small group, not bigjust did not want a solution" P4, /. 61, p.2.
Another category that emerged was that of inter-group relations. Greek Cypriots,
according to participants, said "no" to the Annan plan because they did not want to be
unified with the Turkish Cypriots, to live with them, on the same land. Unification in
this case could either refer to the practical co-existence of the two communities andlor
the development of a common identity between them. Turkish people and the Turkish
component of Turkish Cypriots' identity were particularly emphasised by some
participants as the undesirable components they would not want to adopt or live with.
"for the Turkish Cypriots I believe they wanted us to live together, to be united; to
ban the borders and to be united with the Greek Cypriots, while for the Greek
Cypriots it is the opposite" P2, I. 74-76, p.2.
"Theyjust did not want the unification, to become one, while the Turkish Cypriots
wanted the unification" Pll, 1.57-58,p.2
"...but I believe that the Cypriots said "no" because they did not want Turks in
this side (of the island)" P3, I. 71, p.2.
H••And I don't think that anyone would want to live with Turks for years till
something starts ... " P9, 1.83-84,p.2.
Another factor related to the rejection of the Annan plan was fairness; the fairness of
the plan's articles concerning the distribution of land and power in the new State. It
was not about the type of solution in this case, but about the specific elements of this
specific plan, which were perceived as unfair to the Greek Cypriots. The plan was
seen as a mean on the one hand to give justice to its "victims", and on the other hand
to provide "fairness" to both conflicting parties. It was also interesting to see that once
more, the Turkish element of the Turkish Cypriot people and pseudo-state's identity
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was emphasised, showing that this was what they consider "an unfair intruder" in the
part of Cyprus, which has been occupied.
"because many points of the plan were unfair, to recognise the Turkish state on the
occupied land .... " P9, I. 82-83, p.2.
" ... because the arguments for either "yes" or "no" (to the Annan plan) have many
unfair points in" P 9, I. 88, p.2.
On the other hand, there were two factors related to Greek Cypriots' acceptance of the
Annan plan: first, the willingness to find a solution, any solution, just in order to end
the present situation. It is shown that certain Greek Cypriots believe that their chances
to solve the Cyprus issue are scarce; they have not been given many opportunities to
find a solution. Therefore, in this case, where they have been given a solution, even if
it is not the ideal for them, they would have to take advantage of it, by accepting the
Annan plan. These participants believed that if things remain the way they are at
present, things could only become worse in the future:
"....I believe it was a chance to solve the Cyprus issue ..... it was our chance to find
a solution .... " P11, I. 60, 87, p.2.
HI believe that we let go some cases where we have the possibility to correct a bit
the problem, even just a little, and we let them go, and this I think will cause more
problems in the future, it is very hard to create something again" P13, l. 60-64,
p.2.
The second factor was the competitiveness with Turkish Cypriots for international
favourability; Greek Cypriots are presented as "competing" with Turkish Cypriots for
international approval, based probably on the ongoing theme in the international
negotiations of "who has been showing goodwill to find a viable solution" and on the
assumption that whoever shows goodwill will also have an advantage (i.e. of power,
of benefits) in the final solution. The effectiveness of this "race" for international
approval seems to be related to political power, which once more is associated with
the Turkish Cypriot politicians, and not the in-group ones:
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".....the Turkish Cypriots, the Turks lets say, the other side, achieved their goal
very well because they said that we were all complaining because we were not
given a chance, a solution, and now that they gave us a chance, they appeared to
be the good ones at the end, this is very wrong, they appeared to be on top
because Denktash has a powerful speech and he achieved many things ...that's
why we should have said "yes" and then to correct several things ... " part 1, I.
115-120, p.3.
It is worth noting that throughout the interviews, there has not been any positive
evaluation of the Annan plan per se; not any acceptance of the validity or the
credibility of the settlement elements. The unfairness of its claims was presented as
taken for granted, and people only argued that accepting it, would have offered them
an opportunity either to change all its "unfair" and "incorrect" elements from within,
later on, or to show "good will" to the international community, in order to gain its
favourability in the negotiations.
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Table 1.Lay theories on the Cyprus issue
General Categories Sub-categories Number of
participants
(Total N=20)
Who is to blame? Turks (Turkish Cypriots and Turks) 1
Greek Cypriots 1
Greek Cypriots and Turks (Turkish 11
Cypriots and Turks)
politicians' "fault 2
Turks and the other countries' fault 1
Great Britain and Grc-Turks' fault 1
Do not know 1
The preferred solution Maintaining the same situation 2
Regaining northern Cyprus 6
Compromise 9
Displacement of Turks from Cyprus 1
Do not know 1
The agent of a solution the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish 6
Cypriot politicians and people
Europe 3
UN, EU, Greek Cypriots and Turkish 3
Cypriots
Noone 3
a young government, young people 2
description given 1
USA 1
EU, UN, Cyprus, Turkey, Greece 1
Reasons for rejecting the Not fair for Greek Cypriots 4
Annan plan: The plan was
Not fair in legitimising the Turkish
Republic of North em Cyprus
Not serving Greek Cypriots' 10
interests
Serving Turkish Cypriots' interests 3
The plan was not "right" ??? 4
the plan is not attainable, realistic 1
the Annan plan showed lack of trust
to the Greek Cypriots
: Greek Cypriots did not want to live with Turkish 8
Cypriots
did not want a change 3
Reasons for accepting the Provision of a chance to move 3
Annan plan forward
Showing willingness to find a 2
solution
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The second research question was on participants' attitudes to the inclusion of Turkish
Cypriots in a future common state. Three main categories emerged: attitudes towards
inclusion within national institutions, attitudes to policies favouring northern Cyprus
and attitudes to inter-group. intimate relationships. Frequencies of these categories and
their sub-categories were as follows:
Attitudes towards Turkish Cypriots within national institutions
Participants' attitudes to Turkish Cypriots within national institutions were
categorised as positive, negative or ambivalent. Positive were considered attitudes
which were in favour and trusting of the Turkish Cypriot representatives/members of
common national institution, while, negative were considered the attitudes which
were untrustworthy and against Turkish Cypriot representatives; either directly or
after a consideration of the positive and negative factors involved. The attitudes which
were considered as ambivalent were either those that were indecisive/inconclusive,
based on the consideration of both positive and negative factors involved, following
the operational definition of ambivalence as "a set of differing response alternatives to
a number of equally appealing and mutually exclusive stimuli for enactment"
(Thompson, Zanna & Griffin, 1995, p.363), or which were dependent on conditions
such as time (time will tell if Turkish Cypriots could be trusted or not), use of
common language and the target's ethnicity; ambivalence is going to be further
defined for the national institution where the criteria for the inclusion of participants'
answers will be different to those aforementioned.
The majority of participants were positive towards Turkish Cypriots in the police,
. while there was an equal divide between those that were negative and those that were
ambivalent (see Table 2). The reasons participants reported for their favourability to
Turkish Cypriot policemen were the role of individuality (that it depends on each
person's beliefs), the expected resemblance of Turkish Cypriot policemen with Greek
Cypriot ones, and the fact that Turkish Cypriots would not let politics interfere with
their job. The reasons related to negative and ambivalent attitudes were lack of
knowledge of the Turkish Cypriot policemen, lack of trust in policemen in general
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and the historical issues related to the Cyprus issue, which were related to the motives
of Turkish people' attitudes i.e. because Turkish Cypriots hate the Greek Cypriots and
would want to take revenge on the, therefore they would not help them, as a Greek
Cypriot would do.
Concerning Turkish Cypriot judges, the majority of participants were ambivalent
towards them. Again the number of those that were positive towards them was almost
the same as those that were negative (see Table 2). The main reason for positive
attitudes was the perceived objectivity that Turkish Cypriots would show towards
Greek Cypriots, while the main reason for negative attitudes was the perceived
favouritism that Turkish Cypriots would show to members of their ethnic group.
Perceived resemblance of Turkish Cypriot judges with the Greek Cypriot judges was
also reported, to justify participants' trust in the Turkish Cypriot judges. A small
number of participants (3 participants) did not provide any justification for their
opinion.
Apart from the police and the judicial system, participants were also asked if they
would trust Turkish Cypriots within a common army; an army consisting of both
Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot soldiers, officers and bases. The majority of
participants were positive to it, while there was an equal divide between those who
were negative and those who were ambivalent (see Table 2). The main reasons for
having a positive attitude were that it was Turkish Cypriots' interest as well to fight
for Cyprus, since it was their land as well, and that it was for the benefit of Cyprus, as
one country, if Turkish Cypriots were in the same army like the Greek Cypriots. The
reasons related to a negative attitude were fear of a new invasion and Turkish
Cypriots' lack of interest in Cyprus.
Participants were also asked if they would trust the Turkish Cypriot politicians and if
they would vote for Turkish Cypriot candidates as Members of Parliament or for the
position of the President of the Republic. In all three cases, the majority of
participants had a positive attitude towards Turkish Cypriots. However, there was a
difference concerning participants' negative and ambivalent attitudes. While,
concerning general attitudes to Turkish Cypriot politicians, the sample was almost
equally divided amongst the three types of attitudes, concerning the intention of vote
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for either of the positions, ambivalent participants were almost non -existing.
Comparing now the intention of vote for the two positions, although positive attitudes
were much higher than negative ones for both positions, participants appeared more
willing to vote for a Turkish Cypriot Member of the Parliament than a Turkish
Cypriot President (see Table 2). The main reasons for participants' positive attitudes
for all three cases were the expected resemblance of Turkish Cypriot politicians with
the Greek Cypriot ones and the individual characteristics of the candidates. On the
other hand, the reasons for participants' negative attitudes were Turkish Cypriots'
lack of political right to be in the government, their lack of interest in Cyprus and
finally their ulterior motive to deceive the Greek Cypriots.
Finally, concerning the possibility of studying in a Turkish Cypriot university in north
Cyprus, the majority of participants were positive to it, while there was an almost
equal number of negative and ambivalent participants (see Table 2). The reasons for
participants' positive attitudes were the perception of common land between north
Cyprus and south Cyprus and the commonalities between Turkish and Greek Cypriot
people. Similarly, the reasons reported for participants' negative response were
related to the relocation involved in such a decision; the lack of social support in north
Cyprus, the difference of language, of place and the lack of knowledge of Turkish
Cypriots. Another reason reported which was not related to the relocation or to the
difficulties in studying in a foreign speaking part of the country, was the desire to
study away from Cyprus in general. It should be noted that 1/5 of the sample did not
elaborate on their reasons for accepting to study in north Cyprus.
Attitudes towards policies in favour of northern Cyprus
In reference to economical resources, participants were asked if they agreed with an
advantageous distribution of resources to north Cyprus for a certain period, till it
becomes economically stronger. It has to be noted that participants who answered that
they would support such a policy in the beginning, but they would not do so later on,
and those who answered that although they would not want to support it, they would
feel forced to support it, were characterised/categorised as ambivalent. The sample
was almost equally divided amongst the three types of attitudes, while the majority of
participants still remained positive to it (see Table 2). The main reasons for
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participants' positive attitudes to such a policy were the recognised ultimate benefit
for both communities, the commonality of the land and the good of Turkish Cypriots.
The reasons for participants' negative and ambivalent answers were the unfairness of
such a policy to Greek Cypriots, and the perceived detrimental effect it would have on
Cyprus.
Attitudes towards inter-personal relationships (private domain attitudes)
In reference to participants' attitudes towards Turkish Cypriot employers, the number
of participants who were positive was equal to the number of participants who were
ambivalent about them. The number of people who were negative was the smallest
out of the three categories (see Table 2). It has to be noted that participants who
reported that they were cautious about the Turkish Cypriot judges were
characterised/categorised as ambivalent. The main reasons presented to justify
participants' positive attitudes were the importance of individuality in the fairness
Turkish Cypriots would exhibit, the lack of racism in Turkish Cypriots' behaviour and
the lack of any general pre-existent negative opinion on Turkish Cypriots. Similarly,
the issue of fairness and racism were reported in relation to participants' negative and
ambivalent attitudes, along with the historical differences and Turkish Cypriots' hate
towards the Greek Cypriots. .
In reference to moving to north Cyprus after a solution has been found, the majority
of participants (65%) were negative to it. Similarly to the results for Turkish Cypriot
employers, the number of participants who were positive was almost equal to the
number of those who were ambivalent (see Table 2). It has to be noted that as
ambivalent were characterised/categorised also participants who reported that they
would move to northern Cyprus if it was like in southern Cyprus. The main reasons
for participants' negative attitudes were the lack of past or any perceived future in
north Cyprus and the characteristics of the northern part i.e. religion, economic and
social development, which seemed unappealing to them. There was a number of
participants (4 out of 20) who did not elaborate on their positive attitude towards
living with Muslim people.
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In reference to Turkish Cypriots moving to southern Cyprus and Greek Cypriots
renting them their property (apartment or house), the majority of participants (60%)
were positive to it, while ambivalent participants were more than the negative ones.
The reasons for participants' positive attitudes were Turkish Cypriots' resemblance
with the Greek Cypriots, their common sufferings and the lack of any problem with
the Turkish Cypriots. On the other hand, the reasons for participants' negative and
ambivalent answers were the Cyprus issue and the differences between the Greek
Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots. Similarly to living with the Turkish Cypriots, there
was a number of participants (4 out of 20), who did not elaborate on their positive
attitude to renting their apartmentlhouse to Turkish Cypriots.
Concerning friendship, the majority of participants (65%) were positive to it, while
only 5% were negative to it; many participants were ambivalent about it. The reasons
for participants' positive attitudes were the perceived lack of reason why they would
not be friends and the lack of any problem with Turkish Cypriots. The reasons for
participants' negative attitudes were the perceived different habits of Turkish Cypriots
in comparison to Greek Cypriots.
On the other hand, in comparison to creating an intimate relationship with a Turkish
Cypriot, the sample appeared much more divided amongst the three attitudes; a much
lower number of participants were positive to it, while it was still the majority of the
sample; a bigger number of participants were negative to it and the number of
ambivalent participants was almost the same (see table 2). The main reason for
participants' negative and ambivalent attitude was the social pressure they would
receive; the rejection of the Turkish Cypriot identity, the characteristics of Turkish
Cypriots, like Muslim religion, clothes and place of living, and historical reasons were
also mentioned to justify their negativity and ambivalence.
Finally, in reference to marrying a Turkish Cypriot, similarly to developing an
intimate relationship, the sample appeared divided amongst the three attitudes.
However, in this case, the majority of participants were negative to it, followed by
those who were positive, making ambivalent participants the smallest group of the
three (see Table 2). As for the intimate relationship, the main reasons justifying
participants' negative attitude was the social pressure they would receive from their
491
parents, family and society and Turkish Cypriots' perceived different characteristics,
which appeared unappealing.
Table 2. Attitudes to Turkish Cypriots within a unified state
Number of participants
(Total N=20)
Positive Negative Ambivalent
(%) (%) (%)
Attitudes to the presence of Turkish Cypriots in the
common national institutions (public domain
attitudes)
Common police 10(50.0) 5(25) 5(25)
Common judges 6(31.6) 5(26.3) 8(42.1)
Common army 11(55) 5(25) 4(20)
Turkish Cypriot politicians 7(38.9) 5(27.8) 6(33.3)
Intention to vote for a Turkish Cypriot 13(72.2) 4(22.2) 1(5.6)
Member of the Parliament
Intention to vote for a Turkish Cypriot 10(55.6) 7(38.9) 1(5.6)
President
Studying in northern Cyprus 9(45) 6(30) 5(25)
Attitudes to policies infavour of northern Cyprus in
a unified state
Equal or bigger economical help to northern Cyprus 8(44.4) 5(27.8) 5(27.8)
Attitudes to inter-personal relationships (private
domain attitudes)
Turkish Cypriot employers 9(45) 2(10) 9(45)
Moving to northern Cyprus 4(20) 13(65) 3(15)
Renting an apartment to Turkish Cypriots 12(60) 2(10) 6(30)
Developing friendship with Turkish Cypriots 13(65) 1(5) 6(30)
Developing an intimate relationship 8(40) 5(25) 7(35)
Inter-marriage 7(35) 9(45) 4(20)
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